The Implication of International Co-operation in the South African Area of Maritime Interest


Vice Admiral Robert C Simpson-Anderson, SD, SM, MMM
Chief of the South African Navy

A paper presented at a conference on South Africa and International Naval Co-operation on 9 August 1994 at the Nassau Centre, Cape Town, jointly hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 19, 1994



INTRODUCTION

Maxi van Aardt (1993), of the Department of Political Studies at Rand Afrikaans University, in a paper entitled In Search of a More Adequate Concept of Security for Southern Africa, argues that "the conventional approach to security lacks an ethic of care and responsibility with regard to both the marginalised groups in society and to the earth and its resources".

She states that "the ideal is to find a way in which such a perspective of care and responsibility might become a wider social imperative, more conducive to solving mutual problems among states". Furthermore, "the real security issues facing the sub-continent will only be solved or managed if security is treated in interdependent terms" and that "a more integrated approach might be achieved by rethinking the conventional conceptualisation of security against the background of increasing interdependence, connectedness and need among southern African states"
.

This is an excellent point of departure from which to address the topic in the regional sense, but South Africa also has maritime interests beyond the region and co-operates reasonably extensively with countries beyond the region.

SCOPE


The subject will be discussed under the following headings:
  • The maritime interests of the RSA.
  • Determinants for the scope of co-operation.

    *
    The SA Navy's history of co-operation.
    *
    Existing co-operation.
    *
    Future co-operation.
    *
    Co-operation with the littoral states of the region.

  • Conclusion.

    THE MARITIME INTERESTS OF THE RSA

    Geostrategic Position

    From the geostrategic point of view the RSA forms part of the coastal region of the South Atlantic and South Indian Oceans. Its geostrategic importance arises from its location, its strategic minerals, industrial base and extensive communications. It is at the gateway between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Given the vulnerability, in times of crisis, of Suez and Panama, the Cape's place among Admiral Fisher's five keys that lock up the world is still obvious and it is still recognised as a major choke point. (Groenewald, March 1994).

    Strategically the Cape Sea Route is one of the world's most important routes. Approximately 30% (154 million tonnes) of Middle East oil bound for Europe and the Americas is currently being conveyed around the Cape. This is only about 20% of that carried during the peak period in the 70s when Suez was closed. The number of tankers rounding the Cape every month varies from 60 to 80. Several new factors enter the argument:
    • A stable bi-polar situation has been replaced by an unstable multi-polar one with increased potential for local or regional conflicts due to factors such as ethnic nationalism, religious intolerance, or territorial claims.

    • The gradual shift in power from the West to the Far East which is slowly becoming discernible.

    • The apparent marginalisation of Africa as the major powers turn toward other priorities in the absence of global East-West competition.
    Whether perspectives based on these and other factors tend to stress or ?reduce the strategic importance of the Cape Sea Route, it remains an issue, and this in itself is significant.

    Maritime Economic and Commercial Interests


    The maritime economic interests of the RSA can be discussed under the following headings:
    • Trade
    • Exploitation of Marine Resources
    • Protection of the Marine Ecology and Conservation of the Marine Environment.

    Maritime Trade

    The RSA has a well developed port and maritime infrastructure, with good facilities for ship repair and the potential to get involved in shipbuilding.

    Ninety to 95% of South African imports and exports in terms of tonnage, or 80% in value, flow through its ports. Given a Gross National Product (GNP) of RM 296 667 and that imports were RM 59 000 and exports RM 75 000 in 1991, the strategic importance of maritime trade and the interdependence of the economy as a whole with that of the maritime community
    can be appreciated. In the same year the value of South Africa's exports was 22,45% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). South African ports handled over 114 million tons of freight during 1992, excluding petroleum. (Soltynski, July 1994)

    About 8% of South Africa's exports are destined for Africa, while imports from Africa
    are relatively small. Trade figures for Africa are difficult tot obtain, but TRANSNET indicates that about 1,5% of South Africa's total imports (entering through its ports) are destined for African states and about 2,4% of its total exports come from African states. Ninety per cent of South Africa's imports and exports travel more than 10 000km to their destinations - probably one of the longest distances travelled by any country's exports in the world (Groenewald, March 1994). The same factor applies to the members of the SACU (Southern African Customs Union) and the SADC (Southern African Development Community), with the exception that the SADC also trades through the ports of Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Nacala. The rail and road infrastructure supporting these ports is, however, not very efficient.

    Internal political developments in South Africa and its re-admittance to the community of nations, opens up exciting prospects for trade in the Indian Ocean Rim
    . Indeed, the concept of an Economic Co-operation Zone in the Indian Ocean was discussed officially as recently as November 1993. An Indian Ocean Trade Bloc, along the lines of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Asian Pacific Economic Forum, would create a market of over 1 400 million people, one of the largest in the world. Nations around the rim of this expanse of ocean can use the seas to reach each other more easily for barrier-free trade (Groenewald, March 1994). The impact of such a trade bloc on world trade flow may well lead to more traffic rounding the Cape.

    A similar prospect for trade exists with the establishment of a South Atlantic Rim
    which would encompass Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on the western side of the rim, with the littoral states on the western seaboard of Africa as the eastern side. These countries have a combined potential market of over 450 million people.

    Exploitation of Marine Resources


    The fishing
    industry is an important component of the maritime economy, contributing about 2% of the GDP and providing approximately 18 000 job opportunities. Prospects for growth are not favourable since some of the fish resources have been over-exploited. Protection and management of this resource, which South Africa shares with its neighbouring states, is obviously of great importance.

    Marine mining
    consists mainly of limited petroleum gas mining (MOSSGAS) off the South Coast and diamond mining off the West Coast. The discovery of oil and gas in economic volumes would be of great strategic significance, but unless further significant discoveries are made, expansion beyond existing installations is unlikely (Groenewald, March 1994).

    Protection of the Marine Ecology and Conservation of the Marine Environment


    The coastal environment is under increasing pressure from development, tourism and recreation and there is a growing awareness of the need for conservation
    , especially those areas that are still unspoiled.

    Industrial waste,
    discharged into the sea on beaches or via
    channels and rivers, is the greatest source of pollution of the marine environment. It can be assumed that a similar problem exists among South Afica's littoral neighbours to the north.

    With 300 000 to 500 000 tons of oil being transported along the RSA coast daily there is a constant danger of oil spills resulting from accidents, which is highly likely given the ageing tanker fleet and the notorious sea conditions. The recent ore carrier disaster with the subsequent pollution along Cape Town beaches and Dassen Island is a case in point. Likewise, a major oil spill off a neighbouring African coastline may present a serious pollution problem to South Africa's coastal ecology or vice versa
    , taking the prevailing sea currents into account.

    DETERMINANTS FOR THE SCOPE OF CO-OPERATION

    Quo Vadis the New SA ?


    The Navy cannot and does not aspire to co-operate internationally on its own initiative. The extent of naval co-operation is a direct function of the Government's aspirations and imperatives. Co-operation is therefore strictly prescribed by the country's national strategy and its foreign policy which determine its perceived status as an international and as a regional player.

    It is a fact, however, that South Africa is regarded as a medium power and that it most certainly has a role to play in world and regional affairs. To this end naval diplomacy is without a doubt one of the more appropriate and effective instruments and the Navy is already playing an important role in this regard.

    The SA Navy's History Co-operation


    Prior to the rescinding of the Simon's Town Agreement in 1975, when all contact ceased, the South African Navy was afforded the opportunity to participate in regular multi-national exercises as an equal member. It also had access to international training. Most of the senior officers now serving attended either French or British specialisation or staff courses, or both.

    The years of isolation imposed by most of the international community brought major changes and this type of access was denied the Navy which in turn adversely affected its inter-operability with other Navies. It managed, however, to maintain most of its capabilities and even renew some during these years. Having become greatly self-sufficient and innovative over the years, it has actually become an exporter of training, having trained officers and sailors of some seven navies during the past 10 years.

    Existing Areas of Co-operation


    There are a large number of existing areas of co-operation. Perhaps the most obvious is that regarding hydrography.
    The RSA is a signatory to the current international Hydrographic Convention adopted in 1967, and a member of the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) since its inception. The Navy Hydrographic Office is directly involved in the following IHO workgroups (Groenewald, March 1994):
    • World Electronic Navigation Data Centre (WEND).

    • Committee on the Exchange of Digital Data (CEDD).

    • Committee on Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (COE).

    • Commission on the Promulgation of Radio Navigational Warnings (CPRNW).

    • Working Group on Standards for the Release of Tidal Data to Commercial Organisations.

    • International Association of Geodesy (IAG) and IHO Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS) Working Group (HALGOS).

    • IHO Chart Standardisation Committee (CSC).

    • IHO International Charting Group Area H. The RSA is jointly responsible for the compilation of the International Chart Series, which covers the area from Zaire to Kenya with the Indian and Southern Ocean islands included. The SA Navy Hydrographic Office is a major role player in area H and is responsible for the production of the first International Chart in this area.
    A second area of co-operation is that relating to the Southern Ocean. The Department of the Environment maintains an Antarctic research station (the SANAE Base) and weather stations on Gough and Marion Islands, as well as 2 automatic weather stations on the South Sandwich Islands of Zavadovski and Southern Thule. This affords the Navy and the civilian authorities involved a unique opportunity to co-operate with their counterparts whose countries also have Antarctic interests, notably the French, the British, the Argentineans and Chileans. It has on occasion also been assisted by the Germans and the Russians.

    A third area is that of naval control of shipping exercises for the South Atlantic
    . The aim of naval control of shipping exercises is to provide participating countries with practice in the naval and civil control of shipping, an activity which is of utmost necessity in any war zone. South Africa annually participates in such an exercise with a number of South American countries.

    Then there is the standing tri-annual exercise with the Argentinian Navy
    . The SA Navy participated in exercise ATLASUR with the Argentinean Navy off the coast of Argentina for the first time in 1993. This is set to become a standing exercise which will be conducted every 3 years with the venue alternating.

    Future Co-operation

    Regional Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic Ocean


    This idea did not gain momentum until 1986 when Brazil mooted the establishment of a Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic (SPCSA)*. A resolution was adopted at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly declaring this Zone to promote co-operation for social and economic development, protection of the environment and conservation of resources. Member states of the Zone have since been expressing the hope of welcoming a non-racial democratic South Africa into the community of South Atlantic States. It is hoped that the SA Government will become an active member of this enterprise in the not too distant future. If so, the SA Navy would undoubtedly be in a position to make a valuable contribution towards the ideals of the Resolution. (Editors note
    : South Africa has subsequently joined the SPCSA)

    Regional Naval Co-operation in the Indian Ocean


    Other than the prospects for trade in the Indian Ocean Rim, there are other areas of possible co-operation, such as the exchange of shipping information, the protection of the environment, research, and provision of facilities for repair, rest and recreation. There is also the possibility of regular combined exercises and co-operation with such navies with respect to search and rescue in the area.

    Co-operation with the Littoral States of the Region


    As indicated before, future co-operation in the region is the main focus of this paper. "Region" is taken to mean the littoral states and the Indian Ocean island states south of the Equator, with the possible inclusion of Nigeria and Kenya.

    The Interdependence of the Members of the Region


    Although accurate figures are hard to obtain, it is clear that now that South Africa is normalising its internal politics, the interdependence among neighbouring countries, and particularly their dependence on the "economic engine of Africa", will increase. Trends in commercial traffic flow since 2 February 1990, when the then State President, F.W. de Klerk, took the first dramatic step towards the new South Africa clearly illustrate this. (Appendix).

    This dependence will most certainly be reflected in the arena of mutual security. The potential for internal conflict in this region is high. Interdependence tends to make the problems of one state the problems of its neighbours. The most recent Military Balance
    (1993/94) by the International Institute for Strategic Studies confirms the problems in Sub-Saharan Africa:

    For the last 12 months, Sub-Saharan Africa has been the region (in the world) most plagued by conflict and instability. There is a growing feeling amongst Africans that their problems are considered to be less serious than elsewhere in the world. While the UN has devoted some attention to the problems of Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia, "peacekeeping" efforts have not resulted in definitive conflict resolution. The OAU has revived discussions about creating its own peacekeeping forces and work directly with the UN to solve regional conflict, but this (with the exception of the case of Rwanda) has not yet borne fruit.
    (Beukes, June 1994)

    Resources could be a further source of conflict. Two of them are fishing and water. Foreign fishing fleets are plundering marine resources and presenting a severe challenge to famine-stricken and agriculturally depleted African states. Access to ports will remain crucial in the quest to increase exports, a goal that is emphasised by donor-driven structural adjustment programmes (Breytenbach, 1994). Because of the lack of maintenance and the instability experienced by a large number of coastal states, the ports of South Africa will remain of vital importance to many of the land-locked states to the north of the RSA.

    Any peacekeeping efforts or military co-operation in Sub-Saharan African and island states would require not only land forces, but the use of maritime forces as well. In this regard the high accessibility of a large number of Sub-Saharan countries through naval diplomacy or naval projection of power should be borne in mind.

    Naval Co-operation


    Naval co-operation in this region presents a challenge to the SA Navy in that most littoral states only have limited coast guard navies. The thrust of the RSA's efforts toward co-operation should thus be to help establish naval capability where it does not exist and to assist in the improvement thereof where it does. The greatest demand will therefore be in the field of training
    and this has a direct implication on the Navy's capacity to train, especially given the need of the country's own population in this regard.

    The acquisition of suitable ships
    presents a similar problem. Given the acute foreign exchange problems of most countries in the region, nothing more than the rudimentary is possible in the medium term. These fledgling navies would essentially remain coastal services and would therefore require modest but sturdy workhorses for coastal and fisheries patrols. At present the SA Navy is the only contiguous sea navy, with global reach on a limited scale, in the region. The RSA does, however, have a similar requirement for coastal patrol vessels at the bottom end of the scale. The opportunity for a local build programme which could achieve significant economies of scale by providing ships for Africa, therefore presents itself.

    The next step would be the maintenance of these navies and the provision of facilities
    to make them self-sufficient. The ultimate goal would be a high degree of inter-operability with the option of a linked command, control and communication system which would enable the navies of the region to communicate directly to present an immediate and combined response to contingencies that may arise, especially with regard to the safety of life at sea.

    To this end the need for interoperability
    would be paramount. Forces made up of units from different countries have tremendous problems operating with each other in terms of language, manoeuvering instructions, the control of helicopters, air direction, logistic support and particularly security measures involving aspects such as communications security and emission control.

    General Maritime Co-operation


    Obvious areas of general maritime co-operation in the region which present themselves and where the SA Navy could and should play a significant role are those areas of activity aimed at water space management and the enforcement of state authority.
    Examples are:
    • Assistance with the protection of marine resources, notably fishing.
    • The protection of the marine environment and ecology.
    • Pollution control, including oil spills and the dumping of toxic wastes at sea.
    • Disaster relief, which has specific implications for the Navy's sealift capability.
    • The combating of piracy, drug smuggling and illegal immigration.
    • Safety of life at sea.
    • Hydrography.
    • The support of scientific research.
    Modern coast guard and naval vessels require sophisticated support facilities as well as technical expertise and training. Sheer cost could prohibit the duplication of facilities of this nature. Sharing these costs and the existing facilities would represent a more efficient use of scarce resources.

    CONCLUSION


    Co-operation amongst countries promotes ties of friendship, peace and prosperity. In this regard a challenge still exists in southern Africa and since South Africa is the country with the best developed navy and naval/maritime infrastructure in the area, its Navy could play a meaningful role in the creation of structures for the purpose. It could and should also assist its neighbours as and when necessary, an investment in effort which would undoubtedly have a binding political effect on the countries in the region and yield enormous dividends in terms of mutual security in years to come.

    The Implications of Maritime Co-operation

    A Co-ordinated National Strategy


    The major implication is that the effort to co-operate cannot and should not be initiated by the Navy on its own. It should be a combined effort by all departments and authorities involved as part of a co-ordinated and integrated national strategy.
    • This strategy should in the first instance strike a balance between South Africa's own needs on the one hand, and its policies and responsibilities regionally and internationally on the other. Should the RSA assume some form of leadership role in the region, the utmost care should be taken to defuse any lingering threat perceptions there may be. The strategy should therefore guide agreements and subscriptions to international bodies, organisations and commitments.

    • The strategy should also involve the role players in potential trade rims. The guiding aim would be to co-operate toward improved welfare and prosperity, stability, peace and security, the protection of the marine environment and its resources and the safety of life at sea.

    Implications for the SA Navy


    Such a co-ordinated national and outward looking strategy would have the following implications for the SA Navy:
    • A Balanced and Capable Navy. The Navy should be capable of fulfilling its primary role at any time. Diluting this capability in favour of international co-operation and the ability to render aid and assistance would be folly. This demands a Navy of credible deterrence and capable of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country when required.

    • Reach and Seakeeping. The SA Navy has to be capable of operating in 3 oceans: the South Atlantic, the Indian and the Southern Oceans. It has to operate under some of the most extreme weather conditions in the world over long ranges. It is essential, therefore, that it should have the reach and seakeeping ability to do so.

    • Flexibility and Size. The Navy has to fulfil a wide variety of roles and tasks in time of war and in time of peace. In respect of the latter the following demands have to be met; locally to meet the country's own requirements, or regionally or even further afield, as the Government may deem necessary:

      *
      Assistance with the protection of marine resources, notable fishing.
      *
      The protection of the marine environment and ecology.
      *
      Pollution control, including oil spills and the dumping of toxic wastes at sea.
      *
      Disaster relief.
      *
      The combating of piracy, drug smuggling and illegal immigration.
      *
      Safety of life at sea.
      *
      Hydrography.
      *
      The support of scientific research.
      *
      The support of the Government's diplomatic initiatives.

    • Any number of these might need to be conducted simultaneously. The Navy should therefore be adequate in size and have the built-in flexibility with the required range of capabilities in its portfolio.

    • Inter-operability:

      *
      Not only does the Navy have to co-operate with the other state departments, with the other Arms of the South African National Defence Force, but also with foreign navies. These include the navies of the region as well as those further afield. The Navy therefore has to strive to achieve and maintain a sufficient degree of inter-operability with all its partners, whether locally, regionally or on distant peacekeeping missions.

      *
      In the regional context, there should be regular face-to-face contact amongst the region's navy chiefs to pave the way towards combined operations, which in turn should lead to the creation and maintenance of regional work groups on aspects of common interest, such as hydrography. The navies should have open communication lines amongst each other and conduct regular exercises on those aspects that are of common interest.

    • Membership of the Professional International Maritime Community. In pursuing the Government's objectives, the SA Navy could and should enable the country to retain its membership of the professional international maritime community. The RSA should therefore pursue links with countries whose navies could assist in furthering its professional abilities, maintain and renew its technological base and contribute to its operational readiness.

    • Infrastructure. Likewise, the SA Navy must have sufficient infrastructure, notably in terms of command and control, communications and intelligence. It should also have sufficient training capacity in order to export training where required as well as the necessary depth in its logistics support infrastructure.

    Africa as an Equal Partner in the World


    The nations of the region should work toward a common vision for the future of "Africa for Africa". South Africa is the developed world's gateway to Sub-equatorial Africa, and the sea, that barrier-free highway, the key to unlock it. Recognition of this fact and of the leading role that South Africa and its maritime community could and should play, would go a long way towards Africa's development and ultimate equality as a world partner.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY


    Beukes, T, Research Material provided by the Institute for Maritime Technology, Simon's Town, June 1994.

    Breytenbach, W, Types of Conflicts in southern Africa and Mechanisms for their Resolution, published in Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa
    , 1994.

    Esterhuysen, P (ed.), Fair, D and Leistner, E, South Africa in Sub-equatorial Africa - Economic Interaction, Supplement to Africa Insight
    , volume 24, no 1, by the Africa Institute of South Africa, April 1994.

    Esterhuysen, P (ed.), Africa at a Glance
    , published by the Africa Institue of South Africa, January 1992.

    Groenewald, E P, South Africa's Maritime Interests and Policy, SA Navy
    , March 1994.

    Saasa, Oliver S, The Effectiveness and Dependability of South Africa's Ports and Trade Routes, University of Lusaka, as published in Critical Choices,
    op cit.

    Simpson-Anderson, R C, US Navy International Symposium on Sea Power
    , Newport, November 1993.

    Soltynski, M, Research Material provided by the Institute for Futures Research, University of Stellenbosch, Bellville, July 1994.

    Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa's Future Relations with the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic
    , June 1994.

    Van Aardt, M, In Search of a More Adequate Concept of Security for Southern Africa, South African Journal of International
    Affairs, volume 1 number 1, 1993.

    Van Niekerk, H, Figures obtained through the kind assistance of the Department of Transport Economics, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, July, 1994.


    APPENDIX

    SOUTH AFRICA’S TRADE WITH AFRICA (1990 AND 1992) R MILLION

    Country/Region

    Exports

    Imports

     

    1990

    1992

    1990

    1992

    TOTAL AFRICA

           
    Excluding SACU

    3 855,0

    5 976,0

    727,0

    1 306,4

    Including SACU

    13 292,0

    17 348,0
    3 012,0
    4 120,0
             
    Southern African Customs Union
    9 437,0
    11 372,0
    2 285,0
    2 814,0
             
    Botswana
    3 343,0
    4 392,0
    139,0
    164,0
    Lesotho
    1 540,0
    1 700,0
    102,0
    100,0
    Namibia
    2 840,0
    3 200,0
    690,0
    900,0
    Swaziland
    1 714,0
    2 080,0
    1 354,0
    1 650,0
             
    Rest of SADC
    2 576,4
    4 434,8
    575,0
    1 004,5
             
    Angola
    50,6
    365,2
       
    Malawi
    424,2
    698,0
    82,0
    134,0
    Mozambique
    466,8
    678,3
    30,5
    51,0
    Tanzania
    21,7
    27,7
    2,6
    10,3
    Zambia
    512,9
    1 112,2
    7,5
    44,6
    Zimbabwe
    1 100,2
    1 553,4
    452,4
    762,6
             
    Rest of Sub-Equatorial Africa
    1 083,4
    1 223,8
    75,4
    62,2
             
    Burundi
    5,8
    12,0
    0,0
     
    Comoros
    21,9
    31,7
    0,3
     
    Congo
    6,4
    24,7
    15,5
    4,4
    Gabon
    7,6
    14,0
    8,3
    3,8
    Kenya
    10,2
    151,0
    11,8
    23,7
    Madagascar
    51,5
    53,5
    1,3
    6,6
    Mauritius
    311,6
    391,6
    14,5
    12,3
    Reunion
    131,6
    181,3
    0,4
     
    Rwanda
    0,4
    8,2
    0,9
     
    Seychelles
    45,4
    61,9
    0,4
    0,9
    Uganda
    2,3
    2,9
    0,1
    0,1
    Zaire
    488,7
    291,0
    21,9
    11,4
             
    Rest of Africa
    195,2
    317,9
    77,3
    238,7

    (Esterhuyse, January 1992)

    Possible member states: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Camaroon, Cape Verdi, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinee, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uruguay and Zaire.