In 1999, the South African cabinet approved a major multibillion dollar defence acquisition programme. The backdrop to the acquisition programme was a wide-ranging national consultative process that resulted in the formulation of two historic documents within the defence arena — the White Paper on Defence and, more importantly, the Defence Review. Both documents, and the processes from which they emerged, were historic in the sense that the South African government had never before consulted so widely on defence issues as it did between 1995 and 1998.

Yet, for all its historic significance, many of the key assumptions underpinning new South African defence policy were flawed. They were premised on a defence function that was, in many respects, at odds with the types of defence roles and tasks which the government increasingly had to consider and, in a more universal sense, with the types or roles and tasks which armed forces were increasingly assuming (and, indeed, had historically always assumed). The key principle underpinning most of the new South African defence policy was its focus on the primary function (the responsibility of the defence force to provide for the preservation of country sovereignty and its territorial integrity).

This article argues that, notwithstanding the importance of the primary function for the funding and the design of defence forces, in general, and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in particular, this cannot be done to the exclusion of other more immediate and likely tasks that defence forces are being forced to consider. Failure to configure armed forces for as wide a range of roles and tasks as is financially and practically feasible could have serious political, force design and financial ramifications. It is for this reason that the ongoing debate around the role and functions of South African government departments, in general, and the South African defence function, in particular, needs to be prosecuted with the same level of openness and honesty that has characterised the South African defence debate to date.

The year 1994 was characterised by the election of a new government, the initial restructuring of the executive levels of the state and the formulation of the new government’s policy positions. Defence was no exception to this process and both the new minister and his ministry embarked on the formulation of a white paper in June 1995 and the initiation of a strategic defence review process that were to have a major impact upon the management of defence in the new South African democracy. South Africa, prior to 1994, had seen very few comprehensive defence white papers in its history (the last significant one was in 1977 outlining the ‘Total Strategy’ doctrine) and all of them had been formulated in a closed environment. The 1995 white paper process was to be substantially different in two regards — its content and its inclusivity.

The content of the White Paper on Defence was different from that of a ‘traditional’ defence white paper in two major respects. Firstly, rather than adopting as its departure point an appraisal of the strategic environment within which South- African defence found itself situated, it adopted, as a first principle almost, the importance of ensuring robust and stable civil-military relations in a democracy. As such, it was a strongly normative document that sought to detail those principles and values upon which defence in a democracy should be established. These included the principles for sound civil-military relations, the management of defence in a democracy, the importance of transforming the representivity of the armed forces, the cultural transformation of the armed forces, and the armed forces and international law.

Secondly, the White Paper on Defence gave scant guidance for the size and shape of the future armed forces and called on the institution of a defence review process to accomplish this objective. With regard to force planning guidelines, the White Paper predicated force design on the primacy of the primary function:

"The size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its primary function. However, provision will have to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace support operations."¹

The emphasis on the primary function of the armed forces (preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty) was to constitute the major force design principle in the subsequent Defence Review and the Department of Defence’s transformation process.²

The White Paper on Defence was based on a considerably more inclusive process than previous white papers and was characterised by a high level of interaction and consultation between the Ministry of Defence and Parliament’s new and powerful Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). The JSCD actively participated in each and every step of the formulation of the White Paper and the final product, tabled in Parliament in May 1996, was endorsed by all political parties represented in Parliament (thereby bestowing on the final product a high level of political legitimacy). The Defence Review process, initiated in July 1995, proved to be even more inclusive than had been the case with the White Paper on Defence.

In July 1995, the Minister of Defence established a Defence Review Work Group in response to the suggestions contained in the draft White Paper on Defence. Initially, the Work Group consisted only of members of the Department of Defence drawn from the SANDF, the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence. The aim of the Work Group was to provide plans for the institution of a comprehensive Defence Review that would examine the implications of the White Paper for the shape, size, posture, doctrine and equipment of the SANDF. In essence, the Defence Review took, as its point of departure, existing government policy and the White Paper on Defence as representing the aims of defence, and attempted to outline strategies and resources which would be committed to defence in order for it to accomplish this aim. It sought to provide a planning framework within which the defence function could be conceptualised in the medium to long term. As such, it took precedence over other management cycles operating within the Department of Defence. The process, it was emphasised, should be conducted in a transparent and accountable manner and should include a wide range of actors from the state, political society and civil society at both a national and regional level.

In February 1997, the Ministry of Defence expanded the Work Group to include, in addition to Department of Defence actors, parliamentarians from the JSCD, representatives from the academic community, certain defence-related non-governmental organisations (NGOs), a representative from the country’s defence industry and a representative from the country’s national Part-Time Force Council. In an attempt to garner as wide a degree of legitimacy for the Defence Review as possible, the Work Group embarked on a wide-ranging consultation process with political society, civil society and the state. The specialised work groups which were established to investigate specific issues reflected this diversity drawing on a wide range of interest groups and NGOs from civil society. A series of Defence Review workshops were held in each of South Africa’s nine provinces that local business, local NGOs, local government, politicians and members of the public attended. Three large national consultative conferences were also held in Cape Town between 1996 and 1997.

The consultative approach to the Defence Review received much critical acclaim from individuals who participated in the process — ranging from pacifist groupings to former servicemen’s leagues — as well as from Parliament, the media and international commentators. The breadth and depth of consultation exceeded any similar policy process in South African defence planning history and remained possibly the most consultative process on defence policy ever attempted by a modern democracy.

The content of the Defence Review was essentially divided into two components. The first report would outline the posture, functions and force design options for the defence force of the future. The second report would outline the human resource requirements, part-time force requirements, acquisition processes, land and environmental issues, and legal considerations that affected the management of South African defence.

The key premises regarding the SANDF’s desired operational and human resource capabilities as outlined in the Defence Review were the following:

The defence posture of the country should be primarily defensive (strategically defensive and operationally offensive) and this should be reflected in strategy, doctrine and tactics. This marked a significant shift, in theory at least, away from the previous regime’s doctrine of ‘offensive defence’. Budgetary constraints, however, had effectively forced South Africa’s defence posture into a defensive mode — in reality, the creation of a defensive posture by default.



The primary purpose of the national defence function would be to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and budgetary allocations should reflect this prioritisation.



A core force capability should be maintained whereby the SANDF would have the ability to deal with a range of contingencies in the short to medium term and the ability to expand to appropriate levels in the medium to long term, should the threat scenario change significantly (the latter presupposing accurate intelligence).



The SANDF would be responsible for executing a range of additional secondary functions if so ordered into service and provided the requisite finances were made available. These functions were identified as being regional security co-operation, international peace support operations, co-operation with the South African Police Service (SAPS) in the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and a variety of non-military tasks (maritime protection, air space and traffic control, disaster relief, maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, VIP air transport, Antarctic transport support, hydrographic services, medical services and government communication security services).



The SANDF had to be a balanced force — in terms of capabilities rather than balance between budgets and force levels of the arms of service — in order to allow it to meet and cater for a wide range of contingencies.



A variety of transformational human resource programmes needed to be instituted within the SANDF to ensure that the armed forces were capable of responding to the challenges of the new millennium. These included equal opportunity and affirmative action programmes, civic education programmes, demobilisation strategies and programmes designed to enhance the role of the part-time forces in the defence human resource equation.

The focus on the primary function was reflected in the final force design, approved by both Parliament and the cabinet. Initially, four force design options were proposed. The basic differences between these options are outlined below:

Option one: This was the recommended option of both the Department of Defence and the JSCD and was finally approved by the cabinet. It argued for the maintenance of a minimum growth core force which could meet a wide range of contingencies (bar invasions by major powers). It also argued for the maintenance of force levels (part-time and full-time) in the region of 101 000 personnel and for the provision of a variety of conventional weaponry to accomplish these objectives. It acknowledged that certain gaps would remain, however, such as the lowering of air defence capabilities, restricted maritime capabilities, limited landward capabilities, and more. This option reflected a bias towards traditional defence contingencies, but acknowledged that certain secondary functions, for instance, involvement of the SA Army in the interior would continue to remain a defence role in the foreseeable future.



Option two:?This reflected the ‘ideal’ vision of the Department of Defence and, as such, was dubbed the ‘Department of Defence Long-Term Vision Force Design’. This option was predicated, virtually in its entirety, on a traditional account of defence roles and contingencies, and reflected the influence of Western cultural concepts on the defence planners in the Department of Defence. It catered for conventional contingencies (excluding invasions by major powers), but scaled down on the involvement of the SANDF in support of the SAPS in the interior. It argued for force levels in the region of 135 000 personnel (part-time and full-time) and for the procurement of conventional equipment slightly larger and more expensive than that recommended in option one.



Option three: This was strongly resisted by defence planners during the Defence Review process. It was introduced into the debate by members of a civil society strategic think-tank who had been co-opted onto the Defence Review Work Group by the Minister of Defence. It was retained as an option because it was felt that it realistically reflected the likely roles and tasks that the SANDF was currently executing and was likely to execute in future. This option advocated a shift from conventional to non-conventional operational concepts in its force design logic and argued strongly for a consideration of secondary functions in the force design and budgetary process. As such, it reduced the SA Army’s conventional capabilities, replacing them with increased counterinsurgency and landward peace operation capabilities, limited the Navy’s conventional capabilities through the removal of corvettes and submarines, and placed a greater emphasis on the Air Force’s transport capabilities.



Option four: Initially, there was some reluctance to consider this option that was premised on theories of non-offensive defence which had been introduced into the defence debate during the post-1994 period. It was premised on the same level of defence as option one, but did this within the framework of a defensive posture. Accordingly, it enhanced the role of territorial protection (landward rear defence), air defence capabilities (fighter and radar capabilities, for instance), helicopter support to landward forces was increased and naval capabilities were also heightened (with a greater emphasis on inshore patrol capabilities). Its adherence to traditional defensive operational concepts limited its broader utility and, as a result, to participate in other secondary functions.

Option one was finally approved by the cabinet, although the ‘ideal’ vision enshrined in option two was acknowledged. A second report detailing the force structure required by the Department of Defence, the acquisition process and land and environmental considerations, was also tabled and approved by both Parliament and the cabinet in May 1998. The Defence Review was finally tabled in Parliament as a composite document on 22 May 1998.

Option one with its emphasis on the primary function was to have a major influence on the procurement package approved by the South African government in 1998 (although other considerations, such as industrial participation, influenced the final decision in a tangential manner). Based on the approval of the Defence Review by both the cabinet and Parliament in May 1998, the cabinet announced its intention to proceed with major weapons purchases as outlined in the force design option approved by the Defence Review.

The proposed acquisition package covered purchases of mainly conventional weaponry totalling some R30 billion (US $5 billion). These included the purchase of Meko class corvettes (Germany) to revitalise the blue water capabilities of the SA Navy, the purchase of submarines (Germany) to replace ageing Daphne class submarines (France), the purchase of Grippen fighters (UK/Sweden) to replace Cheetah C fighters (the latter a South African upgrade of the Mirage F1 fighters), the purchase of Augusta light utility helicopters (Italy) to replace Alouette helicopters (France) in service in the SA Air Force, the purchase of Westmoreland maritime helicopters (UK) for Corvette platforms, and the purchase of Hawk 100 trainers (UK) to replace the ageing Aeromachi Impala trainers (Italy).

The package, although approved by both Parliament and cabinet, was criticised for its seeming extravagance in a country afflicted by vast disparities in wealth. It was also criticised by certain former and serving military officers who maintained that some of the items (fighter aircraft and submarines) were ill-suited to the types or roles and tasks which the country could be expected to play on the African continent and were inappropriate for the type of external threat that South Africa, should it face one, would need to repel in future (low-level irregular and militia-type incursions).

Yet, notwithstanding the consultative nature of the Defence Review process and the wide acclaim it received from government, Parliament and civil society alike, the major tension which existed within the Defence Review was the extent to which a developing country such as South Africa could afford to predicate both its force design and its budget on the primacy of the primary function.

Perhaps the key organising principle of both the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review was its commitment to design armed forces for their primary function — the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This remains the key raison d’être for the existence, maintenance and funding of the armed forces in South African defence policy and planning.

The rationale behind this emphasis on the primary function was basically threefold. Firstly, it was stated that the ultimate and primary responsibility of the state is that of the security of its citizens against external attack — best expressed in its role in ensuring the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Secondly, it was argued (as it had been during the negotiation process between 1990 and 1994) that the armed forces should confine themselves to their primary function and desist from involving themselves in various secondary functions on an ongoing basis, precisely because this would lead to their politicisation and the incremental usurpation of the authority of elected civilian government by the armed forces.

Thirdly, the focus of South African defence planners on the primary function was a product of a number of interrelated cultural and ideological factors — primarily the influence of Western defence concepts on South African defence thinking. The influence of this thinking (aptly referred to below as ‘doctrinal mannerism’) was and still is extensive and is a product of the strong ascriptive affinities that exist between many armed forces in the developing world and the intellectual discourses of the former (mainly Western) colonisers.

While these arguments possessed a certain validity, it has become increasingly clear that the centrality afforded to the primary function by both South African defence planners and planners of many of the more advanced developing countries will need to be revisited in future. A critique of these assumptions in the South African context is mounted below.

One of the most frequently cited and compelling arguments advocating the restriction of armed forces to their primary function is that of their role in ensuring the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations (one of the key arguments during the South African negotiation process). It argues against the extensive utilisation of the armed forces in those tasks relating to either military aid to the civil power (tasks relating to the maintenance of internal stability via the combating of insurrection, preventing secession and supporting the police services), or military aid to the civil community (reconstruction and development tasks) and proffers a number of reasons in this regard.

Firstly, and most importantly, it politicises the armed forces, either overtly or insidiously, by facilitating their entry into the realm of both government and civil administration. Secondly, as a result of this process, it leads to the politicisation of the corporate identity of armed forces and results in the development of a mentality that seeks to confront and challenge government, rather than remain subordinate to its dictates. Thirdly, it undermines the legitimacy of the armed forces. Fourthly, its leads to the militarisation of society and, fifthly, it negatively affects the combat-readiness of the armed forces.

There are powerful and disturbing examples of how the involvement of armed forces in non-primary roles have resulted in the development of a praetorian identity and the subsequent translation of this identity into various forms of military influence over and/or intervention in the political process (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Greece, Spain and others). Although the influence of the military did not always translate itself into the classical coup d’état, it often resulted in a high level of military influence within and over the decision-making process within civilian government. The deployment of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in a variety of internal roles during the 1980s undoubtedly contributed to both its politicisation and the extension of its influence within the executive nodes of the state ensemble (most vividly demonstrated by its role and influence within the State Security Council and the National Security Management System).

However, there are also compelling examples of countries that have extensively used their armed forces in these secondary functions and have not witnessed an assault on the principle of civil supremacy. China uses its armed forces in a wide range of reconstruction and development tasks and yet, the armed forces remain totally subordinate to the authority and direction of the Chinese Communist Party. Israel has used its own armed forces in both internal development tasks and stability roles (the latter with questionable impartiality) and yet, the principle of civil supremacy remains inviolable in that country.

Senegal utilises its armed forces almost exclusively in secondary functions (internal development tasks and peace support operations) and, despite this deployment, its forces are non-partisan in nature and subordinate to the elected government. Closer to home, the deployment of the SANDF in a police supportive role during the post-1994 period (in numbers larger than those deployed at the height of the State of Emergency between 1984 and 1986) has witnessed neither its further politicisation nor its attempts to undermine the authority of democratic government. How is one to make sense out of the seeming contradiction between the politicisation of the armed forces once deployed in this role, and the fact that both the civil authority and the armed forces can coexist quite easily with the deployment of the armed forces in this role?

The answer, in essence, lies in the fact that their is no necessary link between the deployment of the armed forces in secondary roles and their eventual politicisation. To maintain this would be to engage in an exercise of formal logic to the detriment of reality. However, there is a strong contingent link between the deployment of armed forces in these roles and their subsequent relationship with the civilian authorities. These relationships are determined not by abstract principles, but by the amalgam of factors that inhere within a society at a given moment. Critical factors in this regard include the legitimacy and authority of elected government, the resilience of civil society and its influence over the formal decision-making process in government, levels of economic development in the country, the composition of the armed forces, and the corporate identity of the armed forces themselves.

The prospects of the armed forces challenging the civilian authorities within the present context of civil-military relations is highly remote. Parliament’s undisputed authority, the powers of civilian government and the limited size of the SANDF render the prospects of undue interference in the political process improbable. Furthermore, notwithstanding the pronouncements of the White Paper, there are cogent reasons for insisting that the armed forces continue to remain involved in secondary functions in the short to medium term (and possibly increase their involvement in this sphere in future). Some of the reasons are outlined below.

While it is prudent to monitor the involvement of the armed forces in these roles carefully (and the White Paper on Defence provides a series of proposed mechanisms towards this end), political leaders and defence planners should be mindful of the consequences of a premature withdrawal of the armed forces, for instance, from an internal stability role. The very nature of civil-military relations which the emphasis on the primary function seeks to protect, could be irredeemably undermined if widespread crime and internal challenges to the constitutional order should spiral out of control.

An emphasis on the dominance of the primary function should be a context-determined variable and not an absolute principle. The emphasis on the primary function by ANC negotiators during 1990-1994 reflected a fundamental concern at the time — the fear of the armed forces using their considerable influence to intervene in the political process. This was a valid concern within that particular historical context. Uneven civil-military relations, a politicised military, and insecurity and uncertainty with regard to the future were real factors at the time. The rapidly changing nature of civil-military relations during the last three years — nowhere more evident than in the ongoing shift of power from the executive to the legislature — has heralded a new set of priorities and realities with regard to South African civil-military relations. With sufficient oversight and control, armed forces can and should be used more extensively in tasks that provide support to the civil power. This argument is contentious and is analysed in greater detail below.

Almost all modern armed forces in the developed world, particularly during the post-World War II period, have maintained that the primary role of a defence force is to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation. This remains its central raison d’être, its right to existence. Yet, is this an accurate reflection of what armed forces have been used for in the past, and the roles in which they are likely to be deployed in the future?

It is contended that this is neither an accurate reflection of what modern armies, with a few exceptions, have occupied themselves with in the 20th century, nor of the roles which the South African armed forces have been expected to execute since their establishment in 1912. This is considered below in more historical detail:

Modern armed forces (for the purposes of this article, it is assumed that the SANDF falls into this category) have rarely been used in the primary role. The following observation amplifies this point:

"Firstly ... the ‘traditional’ view of what armed forces are for is actually a rather modern one: a product primarily of this century. The British Army, for example, was always on active service between 1815 and 1914 but usually in remote areas of the world deployed in penny-packets in a quasi-gendarmerie role. Secondly, even in the age of alleged Total War, modern armies have spent little time actually engaged in heavy metal fisticuffs. Indeed, since 1945 the tasks for which western armies have actually been employed have been taken almost entirely from the list given above."³

The ‘list’ referred to includes the role of the armed forces as the guarantor of the civil power against internal enemies, peace operations, patrolling of frontiers to protect vital interests (fisheries, prevention of smuggling), regional security exercises and disaster relief.



The South African armed forces have never been used, historically, to repel external armed aggression against the country by a hostile power. They have been used, positively and negatively, in a variety of secondary roles ranging from support to the police services to support to Allied commitments beyond the country’s borders.⁴

Notwithstanding the crucial responsibility of the state to guarantee the security of its citizens, much of the justification for the retention of armed forces to fulfil their primary role concentrates on a narrow definition of the role played by ‘threats’ in modern, interstate relations (such threats are always seen as that of a conventional, external aggressor). What is rather required is a paradigm shift that allows for the creation of new concepts and theories capable of explaining the role and functions of armed forces in an increasingly complex, postmodern world.

What emerges from an appraisal of the above is essentially two-fold:

It has been precisely in the ‘non-traditional’ military arenas, the secondary functions, that African armed forces have historically been deployed and that the present SANDF finds itself deployed. Eight major secondary function ‘task clusters’ can be isolated in this regard:

Support to the police in the maintenance of law and order: This typically includes SANDF support to the SAPS in routine crime prevention (roadblocks, cordons and house-to-house searches, for example).



Countering internal threats to the constitutional order: This includes the maintenance of armed capabilities (conventional, semi-conventional and militia) required to prevent secession or armed revolt by internal political groupings against the duly elected democratic government (these tasks could arguably be grouped under the primary function, however).



Border protection: The responsibility for border protection in many countries remains the preserve of either the police or a specially constituted border guard designed solely for this purpose. The SA Army presently retains responsibility for this function and will assume full responsibility for this function in future, subject to the necessary legal and constitutional amendments.



Participation in peace support operations: Although South African participation in this arena has been limited thus far, increased involvement is likely — both in terms of South Africa’s possible membership of the Security Council and its emerging leadership role on the African continent.



Maritime protection: The SA Navy plays an ongoing role in fisheries protection and has recently been requested to extend this assistance to neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Namibia.



Support to socio-economic development programmes: Reconstruction and development support already exists in the form of the SANDF’s support to the Service Corps, and its involvement in a variety of socio-economic projects in the health and literacy fields. Frequent requests are made to the Department of Defence to render assistance in road construction, water provision or educational assistance.



Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance: The SANDF remains involved in this arena on an ad hoc basis depending on the frequency of requests made for assistance and determined by both its existing capabilities and the availability of forces in this regard.



Support of foreign policy: Although any external military deployment by the SANDF is supportive of foreign policy initiatives, certain activities — ‘flying the flag’ or utilising armed capabilities in support of specific diplomatic initiatives (the use of the Outeniqua in support of the Zairian peace talks) — may require the specific allocation of armed force for this purpose.

Two observations can be made in light of the above if the actual use of the South African armed forces, both historically and currently, is contrasted with the manner in which current South African defence doctrine justifies the retention and design of armed forces. The first is the extent to which the notion of a classic, modernist defence force, configured to protect the country against an external conventional threat, continues to enjoy a disproportionate influence in the minds of the defence planners and strategists. This appears to be the twin product of the dominance of certain concepts and categories among South African defence strategists, and the historical influence of Western (largely 20th century) concepts in defence thinking (an influence that was also noted in the civil-military relations debate). Secondly, the preceding examples illustrate the extent to which the South African armed forces have been involved, both historically and currently, in the execution of a variety of secondary functions on a continuous and regular basis. What are the implications of this for the theoreticisation of a more appropriate South African defence architecture?

In order to re-examine the utility of the term ‘threat’ in an African environment, it would be a moot point to examine the nature of conflict in the late 20th century, in general, and the forms it assumes in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular. Conflict in this scenario translates itself mostly, and with very few exceptions, into intrastate conflict either between opposing political or civil groups, or between the central government and secessionist or guerrilla movements (classic conventional conflicts have been few, bar the North African Campaign during World War II and the semi-conventional battles between South Africans and Angolans during the 1980s). The origin of these conflicts, almost without exception, has been a variety of environmental, demographic, economic, political and development factors which, notwithstanding the role of military force in peace support operations, demand socio-economic and not military strategies and responses.

When conflict translates itself into interstate conflict, two phenomena are immediately apparent:

The incidence of interstate conflict occurs primarily at the level of implicit and explicit support by neighbouring countries for dissident movements operating from their territory. Interstate conflict defined as conventional war between two sovereign states has rarely occurred. Even the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo bears testimony to this observation. Uganda and Rwanda support the rebels and rarely come into contact with DRC troops. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia support the Kabila government and rarely come into contact with Ugandan and Rwandan troops.



When such conflict does occur, it rarely assumes the form of conventional, high technology interstate rivalry. The recent involvement of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola in the fighting that led to the liberation of Zaïre, for instance, was confined to material support for the indigenous Zairian guerrilla and militia forces, occasionally supplemented by low-level light infantry and special forces from the neighbouring country when required (a similar level of support that is currently provided to Kabila). Angola’s invasion of Congo-Brazzaville during 1997 was mainly conducted with light, highly mobile infantry and artillery forces. A similar argument can be made regarding the force capabilities utilised by Tanzania in its invasion of Uganda.

The determination of roles, missions and tasks, and the planning and design of force structures for the armed forces in these contingencies, are thus a different conceptual and practical exercise from planning for classic threats in the European sense of the word. If forces were to be designed for the likely types of external threats mentioned above, it is questionable whether high technology and advanced conventional forces would be appropriate. Given the low force-to-space ratio that characterises much of the African continent and the dispersed nature of fighting, it would seem preferable to rely on larger, light infantry contingents supported by special forces and appropriate air and maritime capabilities.

The answer to the strategic and intellectual challenges outlined above does not lie in a reformulation of answers, but in a reconstruction of the questions that underpin much of the logic and methodology of defence thinking. Rather than positing an external (invariably conventionally armed) aggressor as being the justification (and answer) for the question, ‘What are armed forces used against?’, it would be more appropriate to rephrase the question to read: ‘What are armed forces for?’ The answer is less complex than it seems and a suggestion is made in this regard.

It would be more appropriate, it is argued here, to define armed forces as those policy instruments (whether landward, maritime or airborne) that are placed at the disposal of the state to manage those crises of sufficient magnitude which other state departments, either collectively or individually, are not equipped to manage. They do this because of their unique features — their ability to project force, their superior organisational abilities, and their ability, if required, to manage the instruments of state violence judiciously. The nature of those tasks which the state may expect the armed forces to execute, will be determined by the short to medium term environment within which a country is placed, specifically on the basis of continually changing political, development and budgetary realities.

Notwithstanding the belief of most defence planners in the aphorism of ‘design and budget for the primary function and we execute the secondary functions with the collateral utility derived from our primary force design’, a real tension does appear to be developing between this perspective and the emerging realities of the secondary function arena. This tension is reflected at two levels. Firstly, it is partially reflected in the growing political and public pressure for the increased deployment of armed forces in their secondary roles — particularly, when it concerns political and financial motivations for maintaining defence expenditure at its present levels.

Secondly, the South African armed forces cannot, and with growing pressure to participate in the secondary function arena will be less likely to, execute secondary functions on the basis of collateral utility. The SANDF has neither the budget, the equipment (in terms of inventory size and capabilities), nor the personnel to do so. A much more realistic assessment of the role which the secondary function plays in determining force design, equipment purchase and training requirements needs to be made. This process is already under way in many modern armed forces — the influence of the participation by Canada and Denmark in peace support operations on their respective force designs, and the role of the UK’s foreign policy requirements in determining the size and capabilities of British armed forces, for instance. Some suggestions with regard to a more precise balancing of primary and secondary functions in South African force planning are outlined below.

It seems likely that the South African armed forces of the future will be increasingly configured around non-traditional roles and secondary functions, and that these roles will encompass, in addition to the primary function, regional security, peace operations, a variety of internal stability tasks, protection of the civil power against unconstitutional action, border protection and maritime protection. The following policy challenges will have to be anticipated in the forthcoming decade if this force design is to be consistent with political, fiscal and practical realities.

Although forces will be maintained for the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty, these will probably tend towards cheaper, lighter and less technology intensive forces with a strong emphasis on reservist and part-time components. Certainly, a more detailed appreciation needs to be made of the extent to which underexplored doctrines such as civilian-based defence and guerrilla tactics (the unconventional brigades proposed by the Army Sub-Workgroup during the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council process, for instance) could be configured with existing area defence capabilities to provide cheaper and more widespread defensive ‘cover’ than is presently the case (a cover that would be more consistent with the country’s primarily defensive posture than is presently the case).

A greater recognition needs to be afforded to the secondary functions within the context of defence policy and planning. Two important factors need to be considered in this regard:

This does not entail an abrogation of the responsibility of the state to provide for the preservation of territorial integrity and the protection of sovereignty. It simply entails executing this in as cost-effective a manner as possible and in such a way that the state does not lose the ability to execute the other tasks which the armed forces will be called on to perform in the short, medium and long term.



The prioritisation of those secondary functions for which it will be necessary to budget and design needs to occur. For financial and practical reasons, it is clearly impossible to budget and design for all those secondary functions listed in the task clusters referred to above. However, it is clear that certain task clusters will have a direct impact on defence budgeting and force design configuration. These will include such activities as peace support operations, border security, support to the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order, and maritime protection.

Certain task clusters should not be designed for, however, and should either be avoided or only executed if the armed forces have the short-term capacity to do so. These include support for reconstruction and development efforts, specific foreign policy initiatives, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Allowing a developing country, and a country oriented towards the judicious use of its scarce resources, to design its armed forces solely for its primary function, appears to be a luxury that few developing countries can afford.

In conclusion, a more appropriate force design option for the current SANDF is one which maintains a deterrence capability predicated on a mixture of conventional and non-conventional capabilities with a greater reliance on the guerrilla traditions that all South Africans have used with great efficacy throughout the country’s history. To accomplish the secondary functions it would see an increased emphasis on landward territorial forces, air transport capabilities, combat helicopter capabilities and certain blue water capabilities. For financial reasons, it would envisage a diminished role for air fighter, submarine and armour capabilities.

The Defence Review was undoubtedly a watershed process in the history of South African civil-military relations. It opened the terrain of the hitherto closed defence debate to a wide range of actors from political society, civil society and the state. It bestowed a high level of legitimacy on the Department of Defence and provided the first reliable computation of defence needs and requirements for many decades. It has the potential to be replicated by other countries in the region — a phenomenon that will greatly enhance the process of demilitarisation, disarmament and confidence-building within Southern Africa — although much will depend on their preparedness to countenance the levels of transparency and open debate which characterised the Defence Review. Yet, as argued in this article, a crucial tension exists at the heart of South African defence planning, concerning the extent to which defence planners are realistically designing armed forces for the existing and likely challenges that they may face in future.

A rigorous and critical reappraisal of the roles, tasks, doctrinal and strategic assumptions, and equipment acquisitions of the armed forces of developing countries is required if they are to remain affordable, appropriate to the defence needs of the country concerned and adequate in terms of their technical capabilities. Already, South Africa has embarked on a major re-equipment process which, by its very nature, will circumscribe the types of tasks that the defence force will be able to execute in future. In a very real sense, South African defence planners will have to disenthral themselves of many of the assumptions upon which they operate (a process that is already occurring implicitly within the Department of Defence). The following observation is pertinent in this regard:

"As long as imported theories and cultural movements remain divorced from the opposition of forces which are the only means of lending specific importance and historical density to the signs produced in Latin American cultures, they act as little more than orthopaedic aides within the contexts of those cultures. Characteristically, this kind of production exhausts itself in mere formal repetitions or ‘doctrinal mannerism’."⁵

It is precisely this ‘doctrinal mannerism’ which developing countries can ill-afford to emulate.

SANDF force design alternatives

Arm of service and element	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4
	Recommended
"Total Cost, SANDF (Rm)"	5 010	6 014	4 084	5 912
Personnel
Full-Time Force	22 000	36 000	26 200	27 200
Part-Time Force	69 400	98 000	77 900	82 000
SA Army
Mobile division	1	1	1	1
Mechanised Brigade (RDF)	1	1	1	1
Parachute Brigade (RDF)	1	1	1	1
Special Forces Brigade	1	1	1	1
Territorial Forces:
Group Headquarters	27	18	32	18
Light Infantry Battalions	14	10	8	10
Area Protection Units	183	205	205	205
Total Cost (Rm)	2 517	3 289	2 869	2 998
SA Air Force
Fighters
Light Fighters	18	16	16	18
Medium fighters	32	32		44
Reconnaissance
Light Reconnaissance Aircraft	16	16	16	16
Medium Sigint Aircraft		3		4
Longe Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	6	4		4
Medium Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft		8	8	8
Short Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	10
Remotely Piloted Sqns	"1,00"	"1,50"	"0,75"	"1,26"
Helicopters
Combat Support Helicopters	12	12		16
Maritime Helicopters	5	6		8
Transport Helicopters	96	96	48	64
Transport Aircraft
Transport Aircraft	44	64	64	64
VIP	9	9	9	9
Voluntary Squadrons	9	9	9	9
In-Flight Refuelling/Electronic Warfare
A/C	5	3		4
Airspace Control
Radar Squadrons	"3,50"	"2,50"	"1,00"	"5,67"
Point Defence Squadrons		2		4
Mobile Ground Sigint Team	3	6		1
Total Cost (Rm)	1 725	1 941	868	2 070
SA Navy
Submarines	4	4		4
Corvettes	4	4		4
Strike Craft	6	6	8	6
Combat Support Ships	1	1		1
Minesweeper/Hunter	8	8	3	8
Inshore Patrol Vessels	2	2		8
Harbour Patrol Boats	39	39	16	39
Total Cost (Rm)	715	731	309	790
SA Military Health Services
CB Defensive Programmes	1	1		4
Medical Battalion Groups (FTC)	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
Medical Battalion Groups ( PTC)	1,50	1,50	1,00	1,00
Total Cost ( RM )	53	53	38	54