INTRODUCTION

The past decade has revealed the inadequacy of current international capacities for the prevention and management of local and regional intrastate conflicts and the limitations of traditional peacekeeping activities. Conflicts on the territory of the Soviet successor states have destabilised much of the peripheral area of the former Soviet Union, and have given rise to 'unrecognised republics'. Although most of these conflicts have been frozen rather than open, they still represent potent challenges to regional security. The Chechen conflict shows that the Russian Federation itself has also become an unstable arena.

The task of 'keeping the peace' in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is crucial to Russia, which fears the spill-over effects of peripheral conflicts on the integrity of the Russian Federation itself. The international community at large is also challenged by the potential escalation of conflicts which have so far been contained within CIS borders. However, international responses to these conflicts have been limited, and the principal regional power, Russia, has had to play a dominant role in stabilising the region which was formerly the USSR. Russian efforts at peacekeeping are commonly perceived as peace enforcement, as they have had their own characters and goals, which diverge in many respects from international norms.¹

The Russian Federation and South Africa are both 'multinational' states which have recently emerged from more or less peaceful political revolutions. Both countries belong to a significant subregional grouping: the CIS in the case of Russia, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the case of South Africa.² South Africa has also emerged from an era of isolation as the major power in an unstable region.

Despite the conversion from apartheid to democratic majority rule in 1994, the country also remains confronted with significant challenges to its internal security during the process of democratic transition. However, it is unlikely that South Africa will be allowed the luxury of consolidating the transition process before it is required to keep or restore the peace in its subregional zone of influence. Indeed, the past few years have witnessed concerted efforts by Western powers to ensure that South Africa has the capacity to fulfil this role in a manner which is acceptable to the international community.

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Russian attempts to keep the peace, and to identify the lessons from this experience which are relevant to South Africa. This will be done by highlighting the regional geopolitical dynamics which impact upon Russia in the post-Cold War era, and their influence on its peace operations policy. This is followed by a brief review of Russian experience in peace operations - at home, in a regional context, and under the UN flag. Finally, lessons are identified which may be pertinent to South African policy makers, and perhaps others in the Southern African region.

REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the bipolar model of international relations ceased to exist, and created a qualitatively new military-political and military-strategic environment. This development has had a significant destabilising effect on individual regions of the world and on the territory of the former Soviet Union.³

The process of dividing the political, economic and military interests of the sovereign states resulted in the loss of formerly smooth regional economic ties and a gradual decline in the level of all types of production in all the republics of the former Union. The question of re-establishing repressed nationalities in the independent states has had a negative impact on the development of the internal political situation in the CIS, and has created a situation where mutual distrust and competing political and territorial claims have fanned the flames of nationalistic conflict.

A lack of internal unity among peoples of different nationalities who have formed their own communities within the boundaries of their national borders has provoked a number of crisis situations in places such as Georgia, Moldova, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia itself. The rise of nationalism, as manifested in the wide dissemination of chauvinistic ideas, has also led to an exacerbation of cross-national clashes both within individual states (the problem of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and of North Ossetia and Ingushetia in Russia) as well as between states (Armenia and Azerbaijan).⁴

As a consequence of conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, a so-called 'migration crisis' could take place. By 1993, approximately 860 000 people from the countries of the 'near abroad' (countries formerly within the Soviet Union) had already arrived on Russian territory. Because of the seriousness of these conflicts, and the consequences for Russia, their management will continue to require new concepts and flexible mechanisms for their realisation. Russia thus finds itself at the epicentre of peacemaking activity in the territory of the former USSR. Its own basic efforts are understandably being directed at managing crisis situations and armed conflicts in areas immediately contiguous to its borders, since stability in those territories is vital to the Russian state and to its citizens, 25 million of whom live in the 'near abroad'.⁵

At the Russian Federation's present stage of development (its creation as a state and the implementation of democratic reforms), a range of additional factors have emerged which threaten the security of the individual, society and the nation. Among the more dangerous threats is the broad and protracted economic crisis which brought with it a crisis in political power and a significant increase in the nation's crime rate. Threats to information security are on the rise, as is a danger that society will become degraded and that Russia will move from a supplier of consumer products to become simply a source of raw materials for economically advanced countries.

But the most salient threat, as far as the armed forces are concerned, remains that posed to the multinational Russian Federation by nationalistic strife. The consequences of this friction could lead to the disintegration of Russia and the loss of federal statehood. The primary internal sources of military threat against which military force could be employed, may be summarised as follows:

unlawful, armed, violent activity on the part of nationalist, separatist and other organisations aimed at destabilising the internal situation in the Russian Federation and the violation of its territorial integrity;



attempts aimed at the violent overthrow of constitutional order and at disrupting the operations of the organs of state power;



attacks on nuclear energy facilities and chemical and production facilities;



the presence of illegal armed gangs;



organised crime and contraband activity on a scale that threatens the security of citizens and society;



attacks on arsenals and facilities which manufacture armaments, military and special equipment;



attacks on organisations, institutions and structures which have state armaments for purposes of seizing these weapons; and



the illegal spread on Russian territory of weapons, ammunition and explosives for use in attacks and acts of terrorism, and also the unlawful sale of drugs.

For Russians it is quite clear that the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and also the level of its internal security depend primarily on the rapid resolution of major economic, political and social problems. In addition to political solutions, however, it is accepted that forceful methods will be required in order to maintain stability, and that some individual instances will require decisive action by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and by the Internal Troops.⁶

Beyond the borders of the Federation, Russian security priorities extend to states within the CIS and to those states which did not join the Commonwealth, all on the territory of the former USSR. It is felt that antagonisms inside the states of the Commonwealth and, to some extent, between them, should be dealt with through the creation of a Collective Peacekeeping Force for stabilisation and for peacekeeping in the CIS member states.⁷

RUSSIAN POLICY ON PEACE OPERATIONS

Russian policy on peace operations has evolved largely within the framework of the CIS. Serious attention has been devoted to the problem of regional security at nearly every meeting between the CIS heads of state. At a meeting in Kiev on 20 March 1992, for example, an accord was adopted On Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Article 6 of the Accord expressly states that: "[t]he states party to this agreement may, in accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter, other international agreements and by mutual consent, agree to the participation of military and civilian peacekeeping personnel in peacekeeping efforts undertaken by CSCE⁸ organs and structures and in UN peacekeeping operations being carried out in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council." This agreement provides the legal basis for CIS countries' participation in peacekeeping operations, together with more particular accords between Russia and the host country in each specific situation.

To halt the bloodshed in the so-called 'hot spots' in the territory of a number of sovereign states of the former USSR and beyond its borders, and also in accordance with CIS agreements and with the consent of the leadership of several of these states, a number of active peacekeeping units and sub-units have been formed within the armed forces of the Russian Federation.⁹

In certain hot spots in the region, Russia has been and remains the only power capable of separating antagonists and bringing them to a negotiating table. Real world experience has confirmed that no international organisation or group of states will take the place of Russian peacemaking efforts in the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, it has been noted in UN circles that Russian peacemaking in the territory of the former Soviet Union has its own distinctive features and does not conform to 'standard' UN practice. Of specific concern has been the fact that the conflicting sides themselves participate in the peacemaking forces. For example, in the Dniester area of the Republic of Moldova and in Georgia's Southern Ossetia, in addition to Russian military contingents, units of the conflicting sides themselves participated in the operations. However, it is these parties who, along with Russia, are the most interested in stability in the given region.

There are obviously both benefits and drawbacks in this approach. On the one hand, co-operation with antagonists provides an in-depth knowledge of the situation and the area of operations, and assists in stringent control over observance of the cease-fire. On the other hand, it can promote excessive suspiciousness of the opposing military contingents towards one another, and accusations that the Russian contingent favours one side over the other. Nevertheless, this policy worked to stabilise the situation in the Dniester area, in Southern Ossetia, and in Abkhazia.

Russia views participation in international peacekeeping activity as an element of its foreign policy and of its national security policy. Peacekeeping has been elevated to the level of national policy, and is duly reflected in official military doctrine which states that: "Russia will assist in the efforts of the world community and the various organs of collective security for the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, peacekeeping and peace restoration, and, for this purpose, considers it essential to maintain armed and other forces for conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with the UN Security Council or in keeping with international circumstances."¹⁰

At the government level, there has been a decision to create an Interagency Board, jointly chaired by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Minister of Defence, for co-ordinating Russia's participation in peacekeeping. Other groups involved in the formulation of peacekeeping policy include sixteen ministries, agencies and committees, as well as representatives of social and other non-government organisations.

It is felt that the political and military-strategic control of operations must remain in the hands of the UN, the Organisation for Safety and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or the CIS, depending on whose decision led to the peacekeeping operation. However, CIS peacekeeping mechanisms in the territory of the former Soviet Union are still in an early stage of development. In the interim, Russia has faced a heavy financial burden in the financing of its peacekeeping forces and operations in the territory of the former USSR. In 1992 alone, the Ministry of Defence spent more than 2,5 billion rubles (approximately two billion rand at current conversion rates) for these purposes. Despite the fact that a CIS Protocol was signed which called for covering peacekeeping expenditures though contributions from the CIS states, the reality is that Russia has received no reimbursement. Moreover, the international community, which is inclined towards recognising Russia as a sort of guarantor that any clashes will not grow into regional wars, has not been willing to cover, out of UN resources, Russia's peacekeeping expenses in the near abroad.¹¹

The basic path to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission within the CIS framework would start with a determination of the missions and the specific conditions of the situation in the conflict area. The primary decision to carry out an operation using a multinational force would be made by a council of the heads of the CIS states, based on a request of one or several CIS member states and with the consent of the conflicting sides. The UN Security Council and the OSCE would be informed about the decision to conduct such an operation.¹²

Despite allegations to the contrary,¹³ Russian policy views a peacekeeping operation which involves a military contingent as a continuation of political and diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in a region where an armed conflict could arise or has already arisen. And while it is believed that "Russian peacemaking doctrine does not consider consent to be a mission prerequisite",¹⁴ official policy holds that "the consent of the two sides engaged in the conflict is a fundamental condition for conducting such an operation."¹⁵

In the absence of objective conditions for peacekeeping within the UN, OSCE, or CIS framework, Russia remains wary of the fact that armed conflicts tend to escalate very quickly and cause heavy losses among the civilian population. However, there has been no definition of precise and reasonably compatible criteria for determining which military actions should be taken to enforce the peace. Despite the fact that enforcement powers are clearly reflected in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the problem of peace enforcement raises many complex political and legal issues which have remained unresolved - especially the identification of those crimes against humanity which should automatically lead to action by the Security Council.¹⁶

It is within this grey area of international law and policy that Russia has recently had to take the lead in efforts to maintain peace and security in the 'near abroad', while also coping with significant internal challenges to the maintaining of law and order.

RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Internal 'Peacekeeping'

Russian law defines the purpose of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) as follows: "[t]o defend the interests of the individual, society, the state, and the constitutional rights of citizens to be free from criminal acts and other illegal infringements." Their responsibilities thus include assisting Internal Affairs organs in maintaining public order and public safety, and in providing the necessary lawful procedures during a state of emergency.

The Internal Troops are a component of the MVD system and are not a part of the Russian armed forces. As such, they are state organs intended to provide domestic security in peacetime and which do not possess the organisational structure for conducting ground combat actions against a foreign enemy (they have no heavy weapons or military hardware, and they are not capable of carrying out large scale combat actions). Russian law also does not allow independent actions on the part of federal forces. The Internal Troops are legally charged with assisting the various agencies of the MVD, and are assigned only a support role.

An Internal Troop grouping is created in a region with the consent of the conflicting parties - and often at their insistence. For example, the extension of the state of emergency in North Ossetia and Ingush in 1993 was done on the initiative of the republic organs, rather than the federal organs of power. Because the Internal Troops do not always possess sufficient military resources to operate from a position of strength, consent and co-operation from the conflicting parties are considered mandatory conditions for deployment. Through co-ordination and joint decision-making, local authorities create conditions for troop action, and the troops act in the interest of restoring peace.

Conditions in North Ossetia and Ingush necessitated the creation of a combined peacekeeping force of some 11 000, consisting of troops from the North Caucasus military district. It succeeded in separating the combatants and, in concert with the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, guaranteed the establishment of state of emergency procedures.¹⁷ A stand-off between militarised groups was resolved, and the situation in the conflict zone became manageable and predictable.¹⁸

The armed forces may be brought into operations for protecting internal security only when this is unavoidable and when there are insufficient Internal Troops to do the job. Since 1988, the Internal Troops have acquired significant experience in actions in various crisis situations in Central Asia, in the Trans-Caucasus region, and in the Northern Caucasus. They have learned to cope effectively with tasks such as:

reconnaissance to identify illegal groupings, fighters and bands;


forceful actions to disarm fighters, and to suppress mass unrest;


escorting columns of refugees and providing humanitarian aid; and


the separation of combatants.

There is a notable similarity between these functions and those of 'new generation' peacekeeping. Moreover, Russia is a multinational state in which national formations possess elements of statehood: there are republics which are part of a federation, autonomous districts, and oblasts. All the peoples of Russia are represented in the Internal Troops. The role of the Internal Troops is therefore similar to peacekeeping as defined by the United Nations, i.e., conducting operations with a multinational force and using only minimum necessary force. The troops act impartially, but this does not mean a blind neutrality or passivity. It is rather an active intent not to permit actions which infringe on the rights of either of the conflicting sides.

On the other hand, Internal Troop actions also include special operations, such as:

detaining dangerous armed criminals;



suppressing mass disturbances in populated areas and in penal institutions;



freeing hostages;



taking back captured buildings, structures, facilities, transport equipment and land;



disarming illegal armed groups and seizing their weapons, ammunition, combat hardware, explosives, and other military property; and



searching for and detaining violators who penetrate the guarded territory of an important state facility.

These types of activities are more akin to peace enforcement than to peacekeeping. However, force is not the definitive characteristic. Combat-type actions are conducted only when there is no other alternative, and then they are very specifically circumscribed.

The Internal Troops thus have a significant repository of skills and experience which may contribute to the international quest for effective means of maintaining peace and stability. However, western nations tend to rely less on real-life experience than on comprehensive and sophisticated normative constructs, which bear little semblance to realities. While Russian regulations and directives may be unpopular in these quarters, they do exhibit a concreteness borne of practical experience.¹⁹

Regional Peacekeeping

Based on the Accord On Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other intergovernment accords, Russian military contingents have been used since July 1992 in peacekeeping operations in Southern Ossetia and the Dniester region. Peacekeepers have also been deployed on the banks of the Humist River in Abkhazia and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Under crisis conditions in Tadjikistan and at the request of the Republic, the 201st Motorised Rifle Division began a peacekeeping operation in September 1992.²⁰

The political power struggle which erupted in Tadjikistan during 1992 has presented perhaps the greatest challenge to the CIS and Russian peacekeepers. In May 1992, the Tadjik opposition seized power from the Tadjik Supreme Soviet, precipitating civil war. The opposition was defeated in December 1992 and the current Tadjik government assumed control. The ongoing armed insurgency of the opposition forces, in particular from across the Tadjik-Afghan border, continued to destabilise the country.

Without a firm ceasefire in place, the CIS deployed a joint peacekeeping force in terms of the March 1992 Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS for the first time. Collective operations began in Tadjikistan in December 1992, in accordance with a 30 November 1992 decision of a meeting of CIS defence ministers. Their mission was to guard and defend the most important state and economic objectives, patrol dangerous areas, escort convoys carrying humanitarian cargo, and serve as the guarantor of peace and security in the region.²¹ The collective force consisted of contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. With the Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division as its mainstay, the force is reported to have peaked at a strength of about 25 000. National contingents have been fully financed by their home governments, but command of the force has been financed from a joint budget according to the following scale: Kyrgyzstan - ten per cent; Tadjikistan - ten per cent; Kazakhstan - fifteen per cent; Uzbekistan - fifteen per cent; and Russia - fifty per cent.

The civil war continued at low to medium intensity, with neither side able to gain a decisive victory. The opposition established bases in neighbouring Afghanistan, and Tadjik refugees received combat training on Afghan territory. Over 100 Russian peacekeepers have been killed in the continued clashes between government and opposition forces, with the Islamic fundamentalists proving particularly intransigent.²²

Between April and October 1994, a UN Special Envoy chaired three rounds of Inter-Tadjik talks on national reconciliation, which resulted in the signing of an agreement on a temporary ceasefire and the establishment of a Joint Commission for oversight of its implementation. On 16 December 1994, by Resolution 968, the Security Council established the UN Mission of Observers in Tadjikistan (UNMOT) with an authorised strength of 45 and a mandate to:

assist the Joint Commission, composed of representatives of the Tadjik government and of the Tadjik opposition;



monitor the implementation of the Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tadjik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks;



investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to report on them to the United Nations and to the Joint Commission; and to



maintain close contact with the parties to the conflict, as well as close liaison with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the CIS.

In May 1996, the UN Secretary-General appointed a resident Special Representative and Head of Mission of UNMOT. On 23 December 1996, a breakthrough was achieved when Russian and UN mediation efforts led to the signing in Moscow of a peace agreement by Tadjik President Imomali Rakhmonov and United Tadjik Opposition (UTO) leader Said Abdullo Nuri. The General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tadjikistan and the Moscow Protocol, signed on 27 June 1997, launched a period of transition in which:

refugees are to return;



UTO fighters are to be demobilised or reintegrated into the governmental structures;



the armed forces, police and security apparatus are to be reformed; and



the democratic processes in the country are to be improved, leading to elections and the formation of a new government.²³

In November 1997, the Secretary-General reported that substantive progress towards addressing security concerns had been made, leading him to recommend that the Security Council expand UNMOT's mandate.²⁴ The Council, by Resolution 1138 of 14 November 1997, expanded the mandate of UNMOT and extended it until 15 May 1998. The Security Council also increased the size of the mission to 120 military observers.²⁵ Russia has maintained about 9 000 troops from the 201st Infantry Division in Tadjikistan, and they are due to stay there until a final settlement is reached.²⁶

As a result of the Russian experiences in Tadjikistan, as well as in Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, issues surrounding the use (or increased use) of Russian armed forces in conflicts in CIS territory have become permanent topics of debate at the highest levels within Russia and the CIS. However, the widely accepted idea of creating a truly multinational CIS peacekeeping force, is still far from reality. The fact is that the primary burden of responsibility for the functioning of such forces and for carrying out peacekeeping efforts has fallen almost completely on the shoulders of the Russian armed forces. This problem has been compounded by a lack of any laws on the management of Russian forces in the territories of other states, and by frequent accusations that Russia supposedly continues to behave like a domineering superpower.

While the Russian army's peacekeeping involvement has admittedly not always been highly professional, there have been exceptions - such as the experience of the Russian battalion in Yugoslavia and the generally positive results of military intervention in the Dniester area and in South Ossetia.²⁷ Russia also continues to enhance its peacekeeping capacity and professionalism. It trains military peacekeeping contingents according to a programme especially developed for this purpose by the armed forces. The programme was designed with the knowledge that service in the units will be voluntary and that there will be a constant turn-over of personnel due to separation into the reserves or completion of fixed periods of service. Increased attention is paid to the preparation of personnel for independent actions under circumstances unusual for soldiers, i.e., circumstances in which the weapon does not play a primary role. For example, the ability to make contact and to achieve assigned goals without using force is of primary importance.²⁸

The training is thus increasingly in keeping with that presented by 'traditional' UN peacekeeping countries, and is likely to be further refined as Russia expands its contributions to UN and other multinational efforts to keep the peace beyond the CIS region.

UN Peacekeeping

Although by no means a 'traditional' peacekeeping country, direct Russian participation in UN peacekeeping operations does have a 25-year history. In October 1973, the first group of Russian military personnel was sent to the Near East as UN military observers. However, it was only in 1991 that Russian participation in these operations increased: in April, after the war in the Persian Gulf, a group of Russian UN military observers was sent to the Iraq-Kuwait border area, and in September another was sent to the Western Sahara. By the beginning of 1992, Russian military observers had also deployed to UN missions in the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. By 1994, 105 personnel comprising six groups of Russian UN military observers were participating in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN: sixteen in the Middle East (three in Syria, eight in Egypt, four in Israel and one in Lebanon), fifteen along the Iraq-Kuwait border, thirty in the Western Sahara, three in Cambodia, 23 in the former Yugoslavia and nineteen in Mozambique.

The selection of volunteers for UN observer positions is done by the Main Directorate for the Training and Disposition of Personnel. Training for these duties is done at annual, two-month courses (up to 100 persons per year) in connection with the senior officer courses of the Vystrel military college,²⁹ where officers gain experience in maintaining combat documents and in working with topographical maps of the NATO countries which have been accepted as basic to the UN system.

In April 1992, for the first time in the history of Russia's peacekeeping activities, a 900 man Russian infantry battalion was dispatched to Yugoslavia. This action was based on UN Security Council Resolution 743 and was in accordance with the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation No 2462 of 6 March 1992. The battalion included a command group, five rifle companies of 117 men each, and a headquarters company of 266 men. In addition, twelve officers worked in the headquarters of the East sector, and five worked in the headquarters of the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia. Two personnel were killed and fifteen wounded in the line of duty. According to official comments from the office of the UN Secretary-General and of the commander of the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, the Russian battalion handled its missions successfully.

Combat support, logistics support and rear support for national contingents participating in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia were all handled centrally by the administrative components located in force headquarters in Zaghreb, Croatia, and by the UN Secretariat. Direct logistics support for the Russian contingent was also provided through the Ministry of Defence in accordance with instructions received from the Russian government.

Building on this positive experience, Russia continued to expand its contributions to UN peacekeeping and, by March 1997, it ranked second among the 69 nations which were contributing troops to the seventeen ongoing UN peace operations worldwide. Poland, with 1 116 troops was the largest contributor, followed closely by the Russian Federation, with 1 065 troops and military observers deployed as follows:³⁰

Angola (UNAVEM) - 158 troops and eleven observers;


Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) - one troop and 37 police;


Croatia (UNTAES) - 848 troops, six observers and three police;


Croatia (UNMOP) - one observer;


former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) - two observers and one police;


Georgia (UNOMIG) - three observers;


Guatemala (MINUGUA) - three observers;


Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM) - eleven observers;


Middle East (UNTSO) - four observers; and


Western Sahara (MINURSO) - 25 observers.

In addition to this substantial support for UN operations, Russia remains engaged in multinational efforts to restore peace in the former Yugoslavia. On 5 January 1996, a Russian Brigade (RUSBDE) was founded to participate in the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The RUSBDE consists of a command battalion, two airborne battalions, and logistics units. It is part of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), but is independent in fulfilling its tasks and is not part of NATO.³¹ About forty per cent of the 1 500 RUSBDE personnel are combat veterans.³² NATO's supreme commander, General George Jolwan, described the Russian troops in Bosnia as "well-trained, well-equipped, well-led and highly motivated."³³

LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE?

In comparison to the territorial area of the former USSR, Southern Africa's regional situation is commonly perceived as quite rosy - at least, by African standards. However, this is more a popular myth than a reality. Last year bore witness to a number of events and processes which prove that the Southern African region is by no means a zone of peace and stability.

The internal threats to South Africa's security may also not be as salient as those of Russia, but the country continues to grapple with extremely high levels of crime, which include murder, drug trafficking, armed robbery, vehicle hi-jacking, fraud and theft. In addition, the proliferation of illegal weapons, a massive influx of illegal immigrants,³⁴ ongoing attacks on farms in border areas and elsewhere, and violent political strife in areas such as KwaZulu-Natal pose a serious threat to internal security.

South Africa's foreign policy is obviously influenced by the need for internal reconstruction and nationbuilding, but this cannot be viewed in isolation from the greater Southern African region. At the subregional level, SADC member states, like the CIS, have yet to operationalise an effective mechanism for dealing with the issues of security co-operation and conflict resolution.³⁵

Despite some obvious similarities in the regional geopolitical situation of the two countries, it is readily apparent that Russian policy and practice in the conduct of peace operations reflect a far greater concern with regional and international security than has thus far been exhibited by South Africa. Unlike South Africa, Russia has been able to clearly define its strategic interests, and through its activities in conflict resolution, has managed to create a strong role for itself as a regional power capable of responding to turmoil within its sphere of interest in a predictable manner. In its peacekeeping operations in the near abroad, Russia has ultimately responded to situations in a responsible manner, limiting its engagement to maintain neutrality, and making an effort to gain international recognition for its actions.

There has been considerable debate on whether or not Russia's peacekeepers operate within the guidelines prescribed by the UN. The West has hitherto made a strong distinction between peacekeepers (troops deployed to maintain a ceasefire or to provide humanitarian assistance without using military force) and peacemakers or peace enforcers (who use force, often in order to disarm warring factions). Russia has not made this distinction, arguing that these rules should be relaxed so that Russia can react to the challenges it is facing in the near abroad.³⁶ Although not formally articulated as such, the characteristics of Russian peacekeeping policy include:

a readiness to use peacekeeping (or peacemaking) forces in zones where there are still active fighting;



the involvement of military contingents from parties to the conflict in peacekeeping operations;



a willingness to sustain Russian pre-eminence in peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former Soviet Union, while attempting to solicit the involvement of other CIS member states;



a determination to use high levels of military force where these are necessary to establish control over the local military situation;



reliance on specially trained professional soldiers who volunteer for peacekeeping missions;



emphasis on close co-ordination between peacekeepers and local administration; and



a desire to maintain at least an appearance of neutral third-party intervention.³⁷

Despite this 'robust' approach, regional operations by Russian peacekeepers have not directly threatened the sovereignty of any of the host countries within the CIS. The Russian Federation is well aware of what the reaction of its neighbours, and perhaps more significantly, that of the international community would be should it act in a threatening manner towards any internationally recognised nation.

At the policy level, the pertinent lesson for South Africa is that there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between regional dominance and submission, in the face of adversity and significant challenges to regional stability. At present, the country is erring on the side of submissiveness at the policy level. This is a precarious route to follow, given the continued volatility of regional power politics and the considerable powers of South Africa's chief executive. Next year will see a second term of office for the African National Congress and a new President elected to power, one who, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, may be far more inclined to utilise the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peacekeeping roles for which they are ill-prepared as a result of previous cautious policy guidelines. Government changes virtually overnight at election time, but policy lags years behind.

This does not imply that South Africa should emulate Russian peacekeeping policy in its entirety. It is simply an argument in favour of the development of a policy which is responsible and predictable, and which does justice to the pursuit of South Africa's real national and regional interests. It also implies that South Africa should be wary of its unrealistic reluctance to use peacekeeping forces in areas where there are still active fighting, for this is exactly the type of contingency which precipitates demands for peacekeeping in Africa. It should also be prepared, in an unambiguous manner, to use military force where this is necessary to establish order in situations of anarchy and intolerable human suffering.

In the realm of 'internal peacekeeping', the primary lesson for South Africa is not the need to establish an internal troop division (although there has been some support for the idea of creating an organisation distinct from the defence force and police service for maintaining internal stability). Rather, it is that experience and skills gained during internal operational deployment of the SANDF can contribute to the body of theory and practice in the realm of training for peace operations. While the West is loath to recognise this fact, for fear that it will 'pollute' established UN practices, there is no need for South Africa to be overly 'conventional' in its approach to training and force preparation for peace operations. Indeed, some uniqueness and ingenuity will be required to counter the failures of UN peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa.

This also holds true for the Russian approach to regional peace operations, which recognises the harsh fact that the international community will simply not send peacekeepers to certain neighbourhoods, and accepts the fact that the major regional power will have to carry the burden of this neglect. If a permanent member of the UN Security Council is able to face up to this reality, then surely it is fallacious for South Africa to continue to labour under the illusion that the UN will fix things when the region faces its next emergency. As Russia has experienced, the most one can hope for in a dangerous neighbourhood is a UN observer mission to monitor the performance of regional coalitions of the willing.

South Africa should therefore continue with active engagement in attempts to build a collective Southern African peacekeeping capacity which provides for equitable burden-sharing among the SADC countries, and which prepares for real-life scenarios. Such scenarios may indeed see a regional force intervening to stabilise the situation in one or more countries in the neighbourhood, with South Africa fielding the bulk of the troops while footing the bill for others.

As far as UN peacekeeping is concerned, there are also some important lessons for South Africa. While heavily committed to peace operations at home and in the near abroad, Russia has also taken its rightful place in international efforts to keep the peace further afield. It has deployed military observers to assist UN operations in the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. Moreover, it made a significant troop contribution to UN peacekeeping in Bosnia Herzegovina, and it has made an even larger commitment to the coalition follow-on mission in this area. The experience gained in these missions can be ploughed back into the training of future generations of Russian peacekeepers, and can contribute towards some coherence and international acceptability of Russian approaches to peacekeeping at home and in the near abroad.

South Africa would do well likewise to focus its efforts at enhancing capacity for all three levels of peace and order maintenance: at home, in the Southern African region, and further afield. While the issue of 'internal peacekeeping' seems relegated to the Ministry of Safety and Security and the transformation of the South African Police Service (SAPS), there has been some debate and effort to enhance regional peacekeeping capacity - although far too little has been achieved in this realm. However, South Africa continues to avoid any significant moves towards engaging in peacekeeping at the international level. This is incomprehensible, considering that this is almost a sine qua non for any kind of respectability in the ongoing debate on the future of peacekeeping and the reform of the UN system. While countries such as Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe consistently feature among the UN's top twenty troop contributors, South Africa has yet to subscribe even to the UN Standby Arrangements, or to deploy a single UN military observer abroad.

Russia undoubtedly has lessons to teach South Africa at all three levels, but it has been largely excluded from the drive to build indigenous peacekeeping capacity in Africa. Part of the reason, no doubt, is the stigma which clings to Russian peacekeeping 'doctrine' among the UN peacekeepers' club. Russia also admittedly lacks the money to splash on capacity enhancement programmes in Africa. However, there is no reason why Russian peacekeepers should not be invited to share their experiences in the increasing number of seminars and courses on the subject which are being presented in South and Southern Africa.

The Vystrel military college also provides opportunities for the training of foreign UN military observers, and would welcome students from South Africa. Such low profile contacts may lead to a more thorough and objective understanding of the Russian approach to peacekeeping, and to the identification of greater opportunities for co-operation in the realm of international peacekeeping.

CONCLUSION

International peacekeeping is in a state of crisis in terms of finances, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality troop contributions. It has also become readily apparent that Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace and the related definitions are no longer relevant to the realities of intrastate conflict. There can no longer be a conceptual distinction between 'peacekeeping' and 'peace enforcement' when the UN Security Council has recently authorised a number of non-UN peacekeeping missions with a Chapter VII mandate.

To argue, as is popular, that the Russian approach to keeping the peace cannot be considered as 'peacekeeping' is clearly in contradiction of contemporary realities. No two modern-day peacekeeping operations bear much semblance to each other, with the exception, of course, of the ongoing missions from an earlier era. That the UN has a clear preference for the latter type of peacekeeping is evidenced by the fact that thirteen of the seventeen UN operations currently deployed are either decades old or observer missions, or both. On the other hand, the 'real peacekeeping' is being done by regional organisations and alliances.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has come under increasing pressure to become an active and significant participant in international endeavours to keep the peace. South African policy-makers obviously have to contend with the issues confronted by other UN member states, pertaining to policy debates on peacekeeping and peace enforcement at the macro-level. There are also great expectations that the country will not only contribute to the peacekeeping efforts of the UN, but will also become a key player in the resolution of the type of conflicts which have wracked the African continent since the end of the Cold War, where there is little peace to keep.

However, within the context of visions which aim at Africans accomplishing what the international community has been unable to do through the UN system, South Africa remains reluctant to play a leading role in keeping the peace in Africa. South Africa's past destabilising influence in the subregion, no doubt, is part of the reason for this cautious approach. There is still some suspicion and uncertainty among the other SADC countries over South Africa's future foreign policy. South Africa, too, is concerned about being perceived as a regional hegemon. But the harsh reality is that responsibility for international peace and security is being delegated to coalitions of the willing led by single nations, and South Africa is a prime candidate for such leadership.

Despite this reality, concrete policy guidelines have yet to emerge on the contribution of the SANDF towards the maintenance of peace and security. Moreover, the SANDF still lacks the type of experience which can only be gained by unit-level deployment on an actual multinational peace operation. Such experience is unlikely to be gained in the near future, unless it is willing to convert useful skills and experience in other areas of operations into international peacekeeping practice. The other alternative would be a regional crisis which clearly impinges upon South Africa's national interests and necessitates SANDF deployment without adequate readiness.

South Africa and the community of Southern African states have little option but to face up to the real challenges of keeping or restoring the peace in a dangerous subcontinent. This is perhaps one of the clearest lessons to be learned from the Russian experience.

ENDNOTES

This article is published in support of Training for Peace in Southern Africa, a project funded by the Royal Norwegian Government and conducted in collaboration with the african Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs (NUPI).

Royal Institute for International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, revised June 1997, <www.riia.org/rcis2.html>



The CIS is an organisation of twelve former Soviet republics which was established in 1991 to preserve and maintain under united command a common military-strategic space. Member states are: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Georgia; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Russia; Tadjikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; and Uzbekistan. Until recently, SADC also had twelve member states: Angola; Botswana; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. In October 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Seychelles were admitted as new member states by the SADC Heads of State and Government, but both countries have yet to accede to the SADC Treaty and to pay their membership fees.



E A Vorob'yev, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, On Russia's Conceptual Approach to Peacekeeping, text of an oral presentation at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference, December 1993, Fort Leavenworth. Translated by R R Love, Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US, March 1994, pp. 1-2, <leav-www.army.mil/fmso/trans/ rus/peace.htm>



A F Arinakhin, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Experience in the Use of Russian Peacekeeping Forces for Peacekeeping Operations in the CIS, text of an oral presentation at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference, December 1993, at Fort Leavenworth. Translated by R R Love, Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US, March 1994, pp 5-6, <leav-www.army.mil/ fmso/trans/rus/peace.htm



Vorob'yev, op. cit., pp. 1-2.



A S Kulikov, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander-in-Chief of Russian Internal Troops, Russian Internal Troops and Security Challenges in the 1990s, text of an oral presentation, originally in Low-Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Frank Cass, London, 3(2), Autumn 1994. Translated by R R Love, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. US, June 1994, <leav-www.army.mil/fmso/trans/rus/kulikov.htm>



Arinakhin, op. cit., pp. 5-6.



The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created in the early 1970s as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. Until 1990, it functioned as a series of meetings and conferences setting norms and commitments and periodically reviewing their implementation. At the 1994 Budapest Summit, the CSCE was reconstituted as an organisation, rather than a conference, and became the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe).



Arinakhin, op. cit., p. 6.



Vorob'yev, op. cit., pp. 2-5.



Ibid.



Krysenko, op. cit., p. 14.



See, for example, L Kennally, Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine, Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1995, p. 7.



Ibid.



Vorob'yev, op. cit., p. 4.



Ibid.



Krysenko, op. cit., pp. 13-14



Arinakhin, op. cit., pp. 6-7.



Kulikov, op. cit.



Krysenko, op. cit. pp. 13-14.



Ibid.



Arinakhin, op. cit. pp. 6-7.



United Nations, Tadjikistan - UNMOT, unofficial document, 15 January 1998, pp. 1-2, <www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot. htm>



On 4 February 1997, the UTO released the last group of 44 government prisoners that it had captured during the civil war.



United Nations, op. cit.



Anon, Seleznyov: Russian Troops Help Tadjik Peace, Russia Today, 27 January 1998, <www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news/98012713.html>



Arinakhin, op.cit. pp. 6-7.



Ibid., pp. 9-10



Vystrel is a military college located some 40 km north of Moscow. Originally established as a Guards battalion in 1826, it is now a multiprogramme educational institution specialising in advanced practical officers training. Vystrel has provided training for all Russian UN military observers since 1974, and in 1996, it established a UN Military Observers Training Centre. Since then, 38 foreign students (including officers from the US, the UK and the Nordic countries) have completed the Centre's English language UNMO course.



United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 March 1997, <www.un.org/ Depts/dpko/troop/a_troop.htm>



Although Russia was initially reluctant to join NATO in Bosnia because it did not want to take orders from its Cold War foe, lengthy negotiations resulted in a formula for participation that requires NATO to pass its orders to Russian troops through a Russian general.



Untitled, <www.tfeagle.army.mil/russian/ RussianBdeStructure.htm>



V Isachenkov, NATO Commander Praises Russia for Joining Bosnia Mission, San Diego Daily Transcript, 25 January 1996, <sddtsun. sddt.com/files/librarywire/96wireheadlines/01_96/DN_01_25/>



Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants range between two and eight million, which constitutes a significant threat to the socio-economic power base of South Africa.



For a detailed exposition of progress and problems in this regard, see J Cilliers, The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa, African Security Review, 4(5), 1995, pp. 30-47.



M Shashenkov, Russian Peacekeeping in the 'Near Abroad', Survival, 36 (2), Autumn 1994, p. 46.



Vorob'yev, as quoted in ibid.