INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

Southern Africa is undergoing a wide-ranging demilitarisation process. Much of this is intentional and has been motivated by the advent of democratic governments within the region, the dire levels of underdevelopment in some of the countries (most notably Mozambique and Angola), and pressure from international aid organisations and monetary institutions to reform both the political institutions and economies of the region. Yet, a substantial part of this demilitarisation is unintentional and can best be described as "demilitarization by default."¹ The ravaged nature of many economies (itself a product of ongoing internecine conflicts and South African domination of the region during the 1980s) and the exorbitant costs of replacing obsolescent and no longer easily available equipment, are major contributory factors in this regard.

The development of the region, therefore, is clearly a priority as is the need to reduce excessive military expenditure and ensure the reallocation of these monies to more urgent development needs. Implicit within this statement, however, are a number of interrelated assumptions which require `teasing out' if the conceptual framework of this article is to possess any relevance. These are analysed below.

The first concept concerns the definition of development in itself a debate that has plagued development theorists for decades. This article does not intend to explore the different contours of the development debate complicated and detailed as the latter is. Rather, it opts for a broad, generic definition of development a definition that provides the framework within which conversion can be broadly contextualised. Two interrelated factors underpin the definition of `development' itself as used within this article. Firstly, it is asked, what the definition means and, secondly, what the normative assumptions are that underpin the use of the term.

For the purposes of this article it is assumed, firstly, that the term development is a wide-ranging concept referring to a marked and sustainable improvement in the economic outputs of a country, its employment levels, its political and social stability, its psychological well-being, and its level of cultural and spiritual enrichment and harmony. Such stability and development, furthermore, are intimately intertwined with the levels of similar stability and development in the region within which a particular country is inserted. Secondly, it is assumed that development as defined above is not only necessary, but also desirable. In this sense, the encouragement of development is not only a pragmatic necessity (avoidance of conflict and its contribution to regional and global security, for instance) but is ethically and normatively necessary that is, it accords with certain fundamental and universal moral values which justify the pursuit of the development of all humans in their own right.

The second concept which requires clarification is that of `security'. Security admits to a much broader definition than that traditionally ascribed to it by traditional military analysts and strategic studies scholars. It is best described as follows:

"Unlike traditional military security, human security is much less about procuring arms and deploying troops than it is about strengthening the social and environmental fabric of societies and improving their governance. To avoid the instability and breakdown now witnessed in countless areas around the globe, a human security policy must take into account a complex web of social, economic, environmental and other factors."²

The same author stresses the new definition of security equally eloquently when he states:

"National Security is a meaningless concept if it does not encompass the preservation of liveable conditions on earth. A reasonable definition of security needs to encompass breathable air and potable water, safe from radioactive and toxic hazards, an intact climatic system, and protection against the loss of topsoil that assures us our daily bread. The well-being of nations and their individual citizens depends as well on economic vitality, social justice, and ecological stability as it does safety from foreign attack. Pursuing military security at the cost of these other factors is akin to dismantling a house to salvage materials to erect a fence around it."³

The third concept, the concept of `defence', therefore constitutes a component, but a subordinate component, of this broader definition of security. As with development, the term defence, as defined in this article, has both a definitional and normative dimension. Traditionally defence has been defined, in the twentieth century at least, as being that instrument of state, in this case the armed forces, who possess a monopoly over the instruments of violence, and who can and may use these instruments, when so ordered into service by the government of the day, to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. In this article, defence is defined in a broader sense and refers to the use of military force as a legitimate policy instrument of state by an elected and sovereign government in pursuit of its national interests regardless of whether the armed forces are used in an internal or external role.

The instruments of defence may be used in pursuit of a wide range of tasks in support of the human security needs of the country. This can include the provision of military aid to the civil power against external military threats, internal armed threats to the constitutional order and democratic dispensation, and support to the national police if the capabilities of the latter are inadequate for the tasks for which it is constitutionally mandated. They may also include military aid to the civil community through the provision of assistance in the event of natural disasters, emergency assistance, maintenance of essential services during periods of crisis, assistance with reconstruction and development tasks and assisting demobilised soldiers with re-entry into civilian life.

Normatively, the requirement for appropriate defence is seen as a legitimate and moral right for a nation, provided the exercise of such defence is consistent with the principles of international law, the management of such defence is subordinate to elected civil authority, and the expenditure on such defence does not militate against the development requirements of both the country concerned and the region within which it is inserted. Ultimately, the link between defence and development and the definition of what constitutes `excessive military expenditure' is context-bound and depends on the peculiarities of the country concerned.

The fourth concept, the concept that lies at the heart of this article, is that of `conversion'. Conversion is defined here as having two facets. The first facet is the actual process of converting military resources to non-military and primarily civilian uses. This is defined as a process whereby the diverse human and material resources of defence are purposefully converted towards civilian and non-military use with the specific intention of ensuring that such a process of conversion is supportive of both development and peace and stability itself. This definition presupposes three interrelated factors. Firstly, it should indeed be possible to convert the defence resources in question. Some defence resources are not convertible or, alternatively, are only convertible at an exceedingly high price the experience of the defence facilities abandoned by the former Soviet Union in the wake of their withdrawal from Eastern Europe, for instance.⁴

Secondly, the process of conversion is never undertaken for its own sake it is invariably supportive of a broader political, economic and social project of either a national or regional character. The nature of this project invariably bestows the conversion process in question with its own unique variables and peculiarities. Thirdly, if a conversion process is to be successful and is to be supportive of a broader political project, then a strategy capable of attaining these goals must be present from the outset.

The second facet of conversion is that the process of conversion is inseparable from and subordinate to the concept of disarmament:

"Conversion is a consequence of disarmament; more precisely, it forms part of the implementation of defence and foreign policy decision aimed at reducing the levels of military force. This reduction might be considered as appropriate by policy-makers as a result of the changes in the international situation, allowing the achievement of acceptable levels of security with lower levels of military force-in-being, or political-economic pressures determining the reallocation of resources between sectors of the national economy, or by a mix of these factors."⁵

The scope of this article examines some of the key factors which must be present to ensure that the conversion is successful, it refers to the strengths and weaknesses of current initiatives to convert and reallocate South African defence resources and excess military expenditure, and it proffers some broad strategic outlines on how this process can better be managed and conceptualised in future.

LINKING DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE REALLOCATION OF DEFENCE RESOURCES BENEFIT DEVELOPMENT?

There is no necessary link between reductions in military expenditure and development such links are contingent and depend both on the disposition of the political authorities to utilise monies in such a manner, and the existence of a strategy designed to ensure that this occurs. Most studies indicate that the relationship between a reduction in military expenditure and development is context-bound and is determined by the exigencies of the country and the historical period of the country concerned.⁶ A reduction in military expenditure will clearly not facilitate development when the following broad conditions are absent:

A stable and resilient political culture with robust and legitimate political and civil institutions exists in the country concerned. Without this precondition, the ability for development to take place in an ordered and stable environment will be greatly reduced.



Stable civil-military relations with a high level of trust between the civil authorities and the military élite exist. The preparedness of the armed forces to accept cuts to their budget, and their willingness to support development initiatives will be bedevilled unless a mutual recognition of the importance of development within the broader security equation exists among both parties.



A relatively high level of interaction exists between the state, political society and civil society over the formulation and implementation of defence policy. Without these internal confidence and security-building measures, the ability of the state to ensure effective `buy-in' and legitimacy for its endeavours will be severely limited.



The prospects for regional stability, peace and development are reasonably good. Where such short term prospects are ill-defined, the existence of enduring confidence and security-building mechanisms to ensure the effective management of conflict within a region can constitute the framework within which the eventual development of the region can take place.



A relatively high level of political and institutional will exists within both the state and political society to ensure that development, and not simply the economic empowerment of certain social classes, is implemented.



An important condition is the magnitude of the cuts themselves, as well as the question whether they will be able to make a substantial qualitative and quantitative contribution to development. This is largely dependent on the percentage of both the gross domestic product (GDP) and state expenditure which defence spending constituted.



A further condition is whether fiscal deficits fall as a result of the cuts in defence expenditure or whether they are offset by increases in other areas of public spending.



The extent to which a coherent and integrated human security policy exists which proves capable of integrating the diverse elements of security (political, economic, social, military and technological) is another condition. Key to the success of such a policy and strategy is the following:

* defining in practical terms and in a manner intelligible to good governance, the scope, policy implications and strategy required to operationalise this `new thinking' in security;

* defining the key role-players and stakeholders in both the formulation and implementation of such a policy and strategy;

* identifying the elements of such a policy and strategy; and

* identifying a nodal point responsible for the co-ordination for such a strategy within the state ensemble



A viable conversion strategy should exist as a key element of this human security policy referred to above, and the extent to which it can take into account those technologies, facilities and human resources which can be realistically converted, is also of importance. The success of such a strategy critically depends on three factors:

* the existence of a coherent strategy to guide this process of conversion;

* the availability of government monies to fund and/or facilitate the conversion process; and

* the reallocation of resources that can be proven to benefit resource mobility, particularly in as much as it affects output and employment.



A further factor is whether a level of policy and strategic coherence exists regarding redeployment of defence expenditures at a national level (donors and aid agencies), and a regional level.



Public expenditure in other development sectors does not increase health, education, social works and public works for example.



Public sector reform is not taking place for a variety of political and practical reasons. Fear of the disruptive influences of demobilised military personnel on the political and social fabric of society constitutes a major concern in this arena.



The costs of importing military hardware for legitimate defence needs continues to prove exorbitant.



A nationally accepted definition should exist among key stakeholders in political society, the state and civil society of what constitutes `excessive military expenditure'. The following definition is proffered in this regard:

"In this respect the relevant concept should be military expenditure stricto sensu, i.e. those strictly related to security services. It excludes such activities as health care and infrastructure building and repair, which are sometimes imputed to the defence ministry budget, but includes military-related expenditure outside this budget ... the question of excessive expenditure for military equipment and technology should take into account legitimate military needs (i.e. defending a nation's territory and sovereignty from external aggression). To determine the effects of these military expenses stricto sensu on development it must be recognised, on the one hand, that security is a necessary condition for development but, on the other hand, that there is a trade-off between military expenditure and development funding."⁷

Most of these conditions are currently either fully present (a stable political culture, resilient civil-military relations, an increase in public expenditure on social services, wide-ranging public sector reform and a high level of political will) or largely present within South Africa (a degree of regional stability, a degree of policy coherence within the state, and a large degree of self-sufficiency with regard to local armaments production).

The existence of the armed forces, furthermore, is a largely uncontested fact. The Constitution provides for the maintenance and deployment of armed forces, if so required, in a variety of functions, including preservation of territorial integrity, in fulfilment of international defence obligations, in peace support operations, regional security initiatives, in support of the police services, in response to disasters and national emergencies, and in support of the government's reconstruction and development initiatives. That the armed forces are deployed in these roles is a practical reality and occurs on a daily basis. This fact has been endorsed and legitimised by Parliament, Cabinet and major role-players in civil society via the South African Defence Review arguably the most consultative review ever conducted in any democracy.

Two conditions are lacking with regard to the South African conversion process, however. Firstly, notwithstanding the existence of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) within South Africa at present (a policy which constitutes the basis of a human security policy/strategy), the co-ordination of the RDP strategy is unclear and, as such, bedevils the location and institution of subordinate strategies relating to the management of security and the conversion of defence resources. Secondly, a focused conversion strategy is absent which will prove capable of reorienting defence resources towards development needs, and which is a subordinate strategy of the human security strategy referred to above. It is important, therefore, to outline the elements of a proposed conversion strategy and the manner in which this strategy can be implemented within the present South African environment in support of both the RDP and peace and stability.

THE FIVE SECTORS OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE CONVERSION: HUMAN RESOURCES, LAND AND ENVIRONMENT, BASE CLOSURE, EXCESS INVENTORY DISPOSAL AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY CONVERSION

Six areas of conversion have been identified in international disarmament and demilitarisation processes. These include the reallocation of financial resources, reorientation of research and development (R&D) functions, the restructuring of industry, demobilisation, base closure and redevelopment, and the scrapping of surplus weapons.8 Six major areas of conversion have been identified in the current South African demilitarisation process which correlate to the processes identified above (with the exception of the reallocation of financial resources which has not occurred in a systematic and planned manner). These include industry conversion, demobilisation, excess arms disposal, base closure, land redistribution (this being of particular political significance in the South African transition) and R&D reorientation. All of these processes relate directly to attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to reorient military resources for primarily non-military uses.

In all these arenas, the progress with the conversion of these capabilities towards civilian-centred development goals has been uneven and asymmetrical itself a product of the different institutional responsibilities for such conversion within the state, the relative inexperience of the new government and, as stated above, the absence of a unifying, integrated and implementable strategy capable of operationalising the new thinking in security which underpins much of South African policy. These processes, their strengths and weaknesses, and suggested strategies for the future, are analysed in further detail below.

Human Resource Conversion: beyond cash grants and basic skills training

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), like all other armed forces in the Southern African region, is undergoing and is anticipating a substantial reduction in its force levels. Initially, it was anticipated that some 138 000 personnel would be integrated into the SANDF in 1994. This consisted of some 90 000 former South African Defence Force (SADF) members, 32 000 former Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) members, 6 000 former Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) members, and 10 000 members from the former homeland armies

At present, however, the force levels of the SANDF stand at approximately 100 000. The reasons for the shortfall from the initial figure of 138 000 have been various. Firstly, only 15 000 of the guerrilla fighters were finally attested for service within the new SANDF. Most opted for employment elsewhere either in the private or the public sector while some 6 000 former guerrilla fighters were demobilised due to ill-health, age or aptitude. Secondly, the number of former SADF members declined as a result of either having opted for voluntary severance (6 000 in all), or termination of service as a result of contract expiration. In addition to these force reductions, Department of Defence policy further anticipates that the force levels of the SANDF will have to be reduced from the present levels of 100 000 to 70 000 to ensure that the envisaged force design will be aligned with both future national defence requirements and budgetary realities.

What is significant about the current and planned downsizing process within the SANDF is the lack of a long term reintegration strategy for the personnel being demobilised as a result of this process. Personnel being demobilised from the former guerrilla forces are released into civil society with paltry amounts of money ranging from R12 000 to R42 000, depending on their years of service. Former SADF personnel fare substantially better and are entitled, upon severance and depending on their years of service, to receive both a gratuity and their pensions backdated to their attestation in the armed forces.

In both cases, however, little scope exists for either upgrading and/or converting the not insubstantial skills which these members (and particularly those in the officer corps and the non-commissioned cadre) have accumulated during their long years of service. To a certain extent, an attempt to rectify this situation has been made with the creation of the Service Corps whose stated mission is to:

"Assist with the reintegration of ex-service members into civil society by upgrading the standard of education, vocational and life skills to enable members to find employment or start their own enterprise in the private sector, provide career guidance on a continuous basis and assist with the social reintegration of members where possible."⁹

However, the Service Corps has been stymied by a number of interrelated factors. The first is the fact that it only concentrates on rationalised and demobilised personnel from the lower end of the military hierarchy and, as such, its focus on skills provision lies predominantly in the private and junior non-commissioned officer range. Secondly, the perception exists, and this is partially confirmed by the membership of the Service Corps, that the Corps has become a `dumping ground' for former guerrilla fighters. The legitimacy of the Corps to a broader range of demobilised personnel and, indeed, its capacity to provide conversion and accreditation skills to both the officer and non-commissioned officer corps, therefore, is limited.

While the services of the Service Corps need to be retained, and its focus should continue to be on the reintegration of more junior members of the armed forces into civil society, a more ambitious programme needs to be instituted within the SANDF that will extend beyond the cash payments of the demobilisation process and the basic skills training provided by the Service Corps. In particular, the armed forces need to focus on conversion strategies such as alternative certification programmes whereby the substantial organisational, managerial and technical skills of the armed forces can be converted for use within the civilian sector. Alternative certification is best described as follows:

"Simply put, alternative certifica-tion refers to programs designed to facilitate the entry of college graduates with appropriate subject matter expertise into classroom teaching or administrative positions in the schools ... Alternative certification programs allow arts and sciences graduates to participate in intensified programs which do not require the typical accumulation of credit hours, to demonstrate compe-tency requirements, and/or to gain the necessary expertise through field- based experiences while holding a teaching position."¹⁰

While the focus of alternative certification in countries such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, has exclusively been on converting the skills and the capabilities of former officers and senior non-commissioned officers into classroom-based competencies, the concept is used in a wider sense in this article. Here, it refers to the possible conversion of the skills and capabilities of all former soldiers into a wide range of competencies including managerial and administrative capabilities within both the private and the public sector, possible conversion into teaching and instructor-based competencies, as well as conversion of technically-related skills into similar areas.

Alternative certification programmes (ACP) in the US, for instance, take place within the broader context of defence downsizing. This downsizing has had profound effects on force levels in all the arms of service of the US Armed Forces. To prepare military personnel for a second career upon severance, a variety of Military Career Transition Programmes (MTCP) have been instituted. Although many former military officers and non-commissioned officers find employment in the private sector directly upon severance from the organisation, a large number want to go to university or college while many desire retraining in a new skill.¹¹

Skills which could be developed and converted within an ACP programme could include leadership and management skills, effective written and oral communication skills, team-building, strategic capabilities, and an ability to work with large groups of people. Most senior and middle ranking officers from all integrating forces possess graduate qualifications from civilian tertiary institutions, as well as having completed a variety of staff courses at the different Arms of Service Staff Colleges (the latter providing extensive background in managerial, strategic, financial and administrative techniques). Junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers, for their part, have completed a range of military courses in areas of functional specialisation, leadership and basic management skills.

The advantages of alternative career certification programmes as the dominant human resource conversion strategy within South Africa, therefore, are various:

They would provide military personnel who are about to be demobilised with an opportunity to convert their skills to gainful use within the civilian sector. This contributes substantially to a reduction in the levels of uncertainty and insecurity among personnel about to be demobilised.



Given the fact that ACP are not full-time courses, military personnel can complete their certification while still in uniform. Given their part-time nature, demobilised personnel will not be faced with the problem of sustaining themselves and their families for three to four years of full-time study once demobilised. The SANDF can contribute, at little cost, towards their education by allowing them time off to study and prepare themselves for their impending demobilisation



ACP provide for the utilisation of the extensive skills which military personnel have acquired within the armed forces for the benefit of both the public and private sector. Most particularly, it ensures that former soldiers are guaranteed relatively stable employment in the future (unlike the insecurities rife within the informal sector).



It would provide a visible demonstration by both government and the armed forces that the welfare of former soldiers is considered. Furthermore, it ensures that the ongoing resources invested in defence will ultimately have a development `spin-off'. Conversion and accreditation of military experience and qualifications represent a practical use of acquired skills that would not, in the normal course of events, have a social utility.



South Africa already possesses growing expertise in this arena, most notably the various accreditation initiatives that have been forwarded to the National Qualifications Board for consideration, as well as the different courses being offered at certain graduate business schools in the country.

The institution of an Alternative Certification Programme, or an amalgam of any other human resource conversion strategies for demobilised officers and non-commissioned officers, would require the following planning stages to be successful:

popularisation of the concept of alternative certification among major stakeholders;



securing agreement among major stakeholders on the veracity of such a programme in future and ascertaining whether such a programme would meet their employment needs;



identifying those areas of the economy which could most meaningfully benefit from the introduction of an alternative certification programme (certain management ranks in the civil service at a provincial and local government level, for instance).



investigating which institution/ institutions could be used for the introduction of a pilot programme;



identifying those individuals who are either eligible for or interested in alternative certification; and



initiating a national programme with appropriate endorsement over a five to ten year period the anticipated time within which the demobilisation of most personnel will be realistically achieved. Thereafter the programme could become a standard component of the military career transition programmes of the SANDF whereby medium contract personnel are prepared for their second careers.

The consequences of not developing a systematic and clear human resource conversion strategy are self-evident. The ability of former soldiers to use their not inconsiderable skills towards other ends has been amply documented. The real and alleged involvement of former soldiers in ongoing crime, even during the early stages of demobilisation, should provide South African defence planners with food for thought.

Base Closure and Community Economic Adjustment: linking defence downsizing to the Reconstruction and Development Programme

An area of conversion that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency, and one that contains considerable potential for South Africa's national development strategy, is that of base closure and community economic realignment. The need for the development of a Base Closure and Community Economic Realignment Strategy (BCCERS) emerges as the result of three interrelated factors:

The results of the anticipated Transformation Project under way within the Department of Defence is likely to result in wide-ranging base closures in the forthcoming years. Such closures will be spread across the length and breadth of South Africa and will affect communities in both the urban, peri-urban and rural areas.



The prospects for the conversion of these facilities both towards gainful use by the community and towards the overall development of the country are considerable. Such a conversion process would immensely benefit the RDP as outlined in all major government policy documents.



Both aspects of a BCCERS the conversion of military facilities for civilian use and the reorientation and redevelopment of civilian economies affected by such closures should be dealt with as interrelated components of such a strategy.

Although a number of bases and facilities have been closed since the De Klerk government initiated its demilitarisation process in 1990, much of this has been done on a case-by-case basis and has not been framed within the context of a coherent national conversion strategy. In a recent Cabinet Memorandum, compiled in October 1997 between the Department of Defence and the Department of Public Works, it was agreed, however, that an interdepartmental task team is required to oversee these anticipated base closures and ensure that they are integrated into the country's RDP.

In order to ensure that this process contributes to the country's broader development initiatives, a number of key elements that are presently lacking, should underpin this process:

The BCCERS should be consistent with existing government policy most notably the RDP and the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Programme (GEAR the latter subject to possible modifications in both its form and content). The goals of such a BCCERS should be consistent with the development goals as enunciated in the RDP and related policies and strategies. These goals are concretely measurable in such initiatives as the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI).



Such a policy and strategy should build upon the work already done within the Department of Defence on such issues most significantly the Land and Environment chapter in the report on the Defence Review process which details the principles and policies underpinning defence policy on land use, maintenance and disposal.



The BCCERS should be consistent with defence needs as expressed in existing defence policy documents as approved by both Cabinet and Parliament most notably the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.



The environmental consequences of such a strategy should be considered in detail and should be integrated into the resulting policy and strategy.



The major stakeholders at national level, involved in both the formulation and implementation of such a BCCERS, include Parliament, Cabinet, the Department of Defence and the Department of Public Works (the latter being responsible for ownership of all state facilities and land in South Africa). However, a range of state departments will be involved depending on the peculiarities of the base closure in question (a greater involvement by the Department of Land Affairs in rural base closures versus the greater involvement of metropolitan local government in urban base closures, for instance).



It is important to identify a nodal point responsible for the co-ordination of such a national strategy. In the South African scenario, it is recommended that this nodal point reside in the Department of Public Works.



The major stakeholders at a local level involved in the tendering of advice on the policy implications of local closures and the joint management of the implementation of such a strategy should include provincial government, local government, local communities affected by the effects of such a closure (as represented by local businesses, trade unions, churches and civic organisations) and civil society groupings active in the area concerned (non-government organisations (NGOs) and aid programmes, for example).



As far as possible, due to very real fiscal constraints, monies generated for a BCCERS should be procured from local government, local business and donor assistance programmes. This will require a creative approach to the generation of resources in this regard. Limited assistance can be requested from national government, although in all likelihood this responsibility will be delegated to the respective line departments. The Department of Defence cannot be held responsible for the conversion and maintenance of such facilities in either the short, or the medium to long term.



A comprehensive audit of all land and facilities currently in use by the SANDF needs to be undertaken jointly by all stakeholders and interest groups involved in the process of formulating and implementing a BCCERS. Such an audit has to be done in a transparent manner aimed at the building of confidence between the different role-players in this arena.

The formulation and implementation of a BCCERS can begin within a relatively short period of time. The results of the wide-ranging transformation process designed to give organisational and practical effect to the vision of the Defence Review and the reality of the budget constraints facing the Department of Defence will be known by the beginning of 1998. The development of a BCCERS should also build on the growing defence partnership pioneered by the Defence Review which involves a wide range of actors across the political and civil spectrum and should be aimed at ensuring the formulation of a defence policy that is as legitimate and transparent as possible.

Land Return and Redistribution: balancing development and defence needs

The South African Department of Defence (DoD) is the largest land user of all government departments within the South African state. It currently utilises approximately 0,4 per cent of the country's land surface for its defence-related needs (as compared to the UK's 1,2 per cent, the US' 1,1 per cent and France's 0,4 per cent). Since 1986, the DoD has returned approximately 234 000 hectares of land to the Department of Public Works (DPW) and is anticipating the further return of more defence properties to the state. At present, it controls some 482 519 hectares of state land.

Given South Africa's history of land dispossession, it is not surprising that a range of land restitution claims have been brought against the DoD by communities dispossessed of their land during the past three decades. This, in essence, marks the qualitative difference between military land redistribution in developed countries and those countries which have only recently emerged from a colonial-type past. At present, nine major land restitution claims have been levelled against the SANDF, ranging from bases such as the Army Battle School in the Northern Cape (approximately 130 000 hectares and the SA Army's major training area), the Simon's Town Naval Base (the home of the bulk of the South African Naval fleet), to Ysterplaat Air Force Base in Cape Town (one of the major bases of the SA Air Force). All these claims are presently being processed by the National and Regional Land Claims Commissioners.¹²

In an historic move, the White Paper on Defence included a chapter on Land and the Environment on the insistence of the dispossessed communities and those NGOs involved in land and environment issues. To give practical effect to these broad policy pronouncements, the Defence Review process established a Land and Environment Committee consisting of the chairperson of the Parliamentary Land Committee, members of the DoD, representatives from the dispossessed communities and various land and environment NGOs. The committee further detailed the principles and procedures which would underpin the resolving of restitution claims. Key principles agreed to by the Committee, Parliament and Cabinet included the following:

that the DoD remained committed to the Land Reform Programme of the Government (the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994);



that preference would be given to the restoration of land;



that the DoD would remain committed to the restitution of land claims through negotiations and that it would only use the Land Claims Court as a last resort;



that any need for alternative land for the DoD would be determined consensually among all different role-players and stakeholders;



that no settlement would depend on the automatic substitution of land for land, but on the core functions and activities of the DoD; and



that creative alternatives would be explored in cases where land could not be restored.

With regard to the environmental consequences of land and base closure, the DoD was fortunate to already possess a relatively advanced environmental policy. The Defence Review Committee on Land and Environment furthermore committed the DoD to the ongoing cleanup of existing training areas, the investigation of non-military utilisation of military facilities, the development of the existing environmental forums between the DoD and relevant stakeholders, and the co-option of specialist expertise from both civil society and abroad to assist the DoD in the execution of its environmental responsibilities.

The South African Arms Industry and Conversion: myth or reality?

Both DENEL (the state-owned defence industry) and the South African private sector arms industry have experienced limited success in their conversion endeavours, although their diversification strategies have been notably more successful. Faced by a declining domestic market and an increasingly competitive international market, both sectors were forced, since the early 1990s, to investigate alternative products and alternative markets. Diversification ventures with both domestic and foreign capital were pursued in a variety of different arenas ranging from the manufacture of polyester pipes, mining equipment, gear boxes and night vision equipment, to items for the motor industry.¹³ Presently, it is estimated that DENEL's civilian range of products constitutes some sixteen per cent of its turnover.¹⁴

Conversion has been notably less successful, however, with only one of the DENEL subsidiaries, HOUWTEQ, having deliberately pursued a strategy of conversion since DENEL's inception in 1992. This conversion process, which entailed the development of low-earth orbit satellites, was eventually terminated in 1994 as a result of international pressure (most notably from the US) and the restrictions imposed on South African defence production via its accession to the MTCR. It is unlikely that the South African defence industry will be able to proceed much further in conversion efforts without a substantial cash boost from central government (an exceedingly remote possibility in the present economic climate) and the institution of a clear conversion strategy (although the latter may be too late for conversion efforts within the defence industry, given the lost opportunities of the past five years). In essence, the South African defence industry will remain a small industry providing specialised products for niche markets on the domestic and international front.

Inventory Clean-Ups: contributing to the demilitarisation of the Southern African region

The process of faltering demilitarisation introduced by the De Klerk government in 1989 and pursued with greater vigour under the new ANC government after 1994 has been concretely demonstrated in the reduction of force levels from those of the white conscription period, and the reduction in the inventory holdings of the armed forces. Most of these reductions have been precipitated as a result of the decline in the defence budget and the concomitant disposal of main weapons systems the latter resulting in related disposals of such subsystems as spare parts, maintenance equipment, facilities and munitions required for the maintenance of these main weapon systems.

Major weapons systems that have been disposed of in the past few years have included 258 Saracen troop carriers, 1 200 Eland (Panhard) armoured cars, 25 000 9mm submachine guns, 120 Harvard aircraft, forty Puma helicopters, ten Super Frelon helicopters, six minesweepers, two air and sea rescue launches, one navigator boat, 105 000 anti-personnel mines and 199 Buffel mine-protected vehicles. Systems in the process of being disposed, include, among others, 200 000 R1 (7,62mm) assault rifles, 2 701 Buffel mine-protected vehicles, 37 Impala MKII aircraft, twelve Cessna aircraft, 22 Mirage F1 AZ aircraft, one naval tugboat and four tactical communication systems. In addition to these items a range of general commodities, including obsolete clothing items, camping equipment, commercial vehicles and office equipment, is being sold off to the public via auctions.

Perhaps the most significant element of inventory disposal has been the wide-ranging destruction of anti-personnel mines. In 1996 the Minister of Defence instructed that all studies regarding the development of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) should be terminated, that studies relating to mine clearance could continue, and that 5 000 APL could be retained for R&D purposes, and a further 13 000 for training and demining purposes. Since May 1997, the DoD has destroyed some 242 423 APLs and has also destroyed 1 000 phosphorous mines on 30 October 1997.

Although inventory disposal is not conversion in the strictest sense of the word, South Africa's contribution to the disposal of APLs has provided a concrete political and moral demonstration of the country's ongoing commitment to both regional and international demilitarisation. However, inventory disposal and its role within the broader conversion equation need to be critically assessed from the perspective of a number of interrelated factors:

Excess inventory disposal does not necessarily entail a downsizing in the inventory stocks of the armed forces. The positive effects of excess inventory disposal are often offset by procurement of new systems and items to replace ageing, obsolete or expensive systems and equipment.



The disposal of excess items can contribute to demilitarisation and conversion if such items are either redeployed for civilian use vehicles, aircraft and communications systems, for instance. However, if such items are not destroyed and are simply sold and/or donated to other countries, and particularly those countries enduring and/or anticipating conflict, then the net effect of such disposal can be lost.

CONCLUSION

This article has highlighted the ongoing and diverse strategies towards conversion within the South African environment. The prospects for conversion in the base closure, land redistribution and arms disposal arenas appear to be encouraging. In all three examples, this is the result of extensive networking between key stakeholders and interest groups in political society, civil society and the state, as well as the existence of well-integrated policy guidelines for all three arenas. With regard to human resource conversion, it is evident that, notwithstanding the ongoing demobilisation and rationalisation process, considerably more attention needs to be paid to the development of long term reintegration strategies with a particular premium being afforded to alternative accreditation and skills development.

Arenas where conversion has been less successful, include the defence industry, the R&D component and the reallocation of defence resources. The lack of success in the defence industry and in terms of R&D is undoubtedly attributable to the lack of finances, coherent policy, and the simple fact that the process of downsizing, diversification and commercialisation of such industries occurred prior to 1994 during a period where considerable fluidity and uncertainty existed in the South African political, institutional and policy environment.

This article has attempted to illustrate that, because these various initiatives are uneven, asymmetrical and, in some cases, incomplete, a higher level of co-ordination within a broader policy, strategic and organisational matrix is urgently required. In essence, all the strategic approaches outlined above require a practical `operationalisation' which will ensure the following:

the definition of a new proposed national conversion strategy, in practical terms and in a manner intelligible to good governance, as well as the scope, policy implications and strategy required to make this strategy work;



the identification of the key role-players and stakeholders in both the formulation and implementation of such a policy and strategy;



the identification of the elements of such a policy and strategy, as attempted above; and



the identification of a nodal point responsible for the co-ordination of such a strategy.

With regard to such a nodal point, the focus will have to be on ensuring the co-ordination and integration of this strategy with the broader development vision of national government policy. It is suggested that an interdepartmental Conversion Committee is formed by the relevant government departments and that this committee is co-chaired by a representative from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and another department (the latter either being on a fixed or a rotating basis). Furthermore, a Directorate of Defence Resource Conversion should be established within the Defence Ministry to provide administrative and logistical support to such an initiative.

Ultimately, the formulation of such a strategy should be consistent with the ongoing attempts to formulate and implement a common, integrated and cohesive human security policy, a national security policy and a conversion strategy for the development of all sectors of South African society and, eventually, the region itself. Given the limited capacity of the South African state and the immensity of the development challenges which it faces, it is imperative that a national nodal point is established, thus linking all ongoing defence and security activities to the broader development initiatives as identified by the RDP and related government policies. This will ensure more effective co-ordination of these initiatives and prevent the uncontrolled fragmentation, and ultimately dissipation of many eminently sensible strategies.

ENDNOTES

This article is an edited version of a paper with the same title read at an international conference on conversion of defence resources, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn, Germany, 11-13 November 1997. The opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defence.

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M Renner, Transforming Security, in L R Brown, State of the World, Norton, London, 1997.



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A Abriani, Conversion and Environmental Conflict, in Conversion: Opportunities for Development and Environment, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, p. 2.



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