INTRODUCTION

It is not insignificant that the English words `rival' and `river' are derived from the same Latin word, rivalis one who uses the same stream. Enmities arising from access to and the use of water are ancient and run deep. Understanding threats in the 21st century requires a broader and more sophisticated approach. The end of the Cold War has contributed to the rise of so-called new security issues. The notion of human security suggests that security can be viewed as emerging from conditions of daily life food, shelter, health, public safety, employment and water rather than downward from a state's foreign relations and military strength.¹

Worldwide, water resources are under threat.² The complexity of the environment-security debate is well illustrated in the issue of water. Water is likely to be a source of strategic rivalry depending on its degree of scarcity, the extent to which its supply is shared by more than one state or region, the relative power relationship of the sharing states and the accessibility to alternative fresh water resources.³ This natural resource has often been described as a casus belli particularly in the Middle East.⁴ Water is one of the key elements in the path to national prosperity as it relates to irrigation and food production, a form of cheap energy and one of the important structural controls in flood and drought control schemes. Furthermore, as rivers flow from one area to another, one state or region's access can be affected by another's actions.

The water situation in Southern Africa is no exception in this regard.⁵ Water issues pose three challenges to security policy-makers in the region. These relate to water shortage and availability; water supply and quality; and rapid population growth, cross border migration and urbanisation. threats.⁶ The maintenance of water quality also remains an issue. This article will not succumb to clichés on the matter. It will rather focus on the facts, which are:

Southern Africa's water inventory is characterised by several contradictions. South Africa is home to one-third of the region's population. While South Africa accounts for eighty per cent of Southern Africa's water use, only ten per cent of the total water resource is available in South Africa.⁷



The overall picture that defines the region's water profile is that of scarcity. At least three of the region's states (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) are acutely short of water.⁸



Resource geopolitics in Southern Africa have long been neglected. However, water is now recognised as a fundamental political weapon in the region. Despite the `peace dividend' in the region, water will increasingly shape the international relations and security arrangements of Southern Africa.



The relative wealth in Southern Africa is concentrated in the water poor south of the region.



Poverty is worst in the water poor north of the region.

WATER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A river knows no boundaries. What happens at its source will reverberate through its course until it reaches the ocean. Almost none of the world's major rivers are contained within the borders of a single state. Three aspects of water shape its role in potential international conflicts. Water is the most likely renewable resource to generate conflict. No society can survive without adequate water supplies. Water is required for the operation of an economy (even an agrarian one). It is usually associated with a particular territory over which states may fight for control. Water often crosses international boundaries, so access to water is increasingly a potential source of conflicting international relations. Water resources also tend to be unevenly distributed. These aspects contribute to profitable trade in water, while they simultaneously contribute to the politicisation and securisation of water. A state like Lesotho is poor in natural resources, but income derived from water trade earns the country valuable foreign exchange. It is also not insignificant that Lesotho heads the Water Sector in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁹ There is furthermore no agreement on water's true value. Water is a migrant commodity with a variable value. A common theme runs through conflicts over water. They are produced in fixed locations, but traded to distant places. Since rivers often pass through more than one state, they are constant sources of potential tension. States upstream may not only pollute the water, but, as a political measure, may threaten to dam the river as a means of coercive diplomacy. In the case of Botswana, for example, 94 per cent of fresh water originates outside its borders, contributing to the vulnerability of the state.¹⁰ Like in the Middle East, water problems are especially important in Southern Africa, where water resources are unevenly distributed and where supplies often cross international borders.

This article deals with the emerging water problems and their security implications for Southern Africa. It also defines and delimits the hydropolitical security complex as a single complex, as well as consisting of a set of complexes. An inventory of all states and actors will be presented. Lastly, regional co-operation in this regard is investigated.

RECENT WATER ISSUES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The need for water security is a human security issue. Recent events in Southern Africa highlight the potential for conflict in this regard. Conflicts over natural resources and environmental degradation have dogged Southern Africa for decades and are likely to intensify since there are few agreed mechanisms for their equitable resolution. The selection of recent water-related issues listed below, indicates the potential for inter as well as intrastate conflicts over water involving states and non-state actors at local, national and regional levels.

A hydroelectrical project's dam in the Cunene in northern Namibia could displace 2 000 Himba.¹¹



Namibia intends to drain water from the Okavango causing a diplomatic row between Namibia and Botswana.¹²



Three consecutive years of drought have forced the Tanzanian government to investigate alternative water resources.¹³



The first tranche of finance for the Maguga Dam Project in Swaziland, stemming from the Komati River Basin Development Project, a bilateral water development initiative between South Africa and Swaziland has been raised. The project aims to boost water resources for Swaziland and South Africa.¹⁴



Botswana and Namibia await the outcome of the decision of the International Court of Justice over the ownership of the nondescript Sedudu Island in the Chobe River in a period of massive military build-up in Botswana.¹⁵



The subcontinent of Africa is vulnerable to endemic droughts as a result of the El Nino/Southern Oscillation pheno-menon that causes dry conditions in the region. The effects of El Nino on water resources in the region remains uncertain and governments are responding with drought contingency plans with World Bank assistance in some cases.¹⁶ Tanzania is already experiencing food shortages after poor rains in the region.¹⁷



Malawi's biggest river, the Shire, which supplies the state's hydroelectrical power, is shrinking and may dry up as a result of falling water levels in Africa's third largest lake.¹⁸



A political confrontation looms over South Africa's plans to solve its water demands by obtaining supplies from the Zambezi River.¹⁹

Table 1 provides a selective overview of major water resources in Southern African river basins. Potential conflict areas are also identified.

TABLE 1

WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN RIVER BASINS: A SELECTION OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT ISSUES²⁰

SOUTHERN AFRICA: A HYDROPOLITICAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Members of SADC form a security complex. According to Buzan²¹ a regional security complex is "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another." Buzan also elaborates on subcomplexes that determine security issues in a particular region. The hydropolitical security complex is defined as including all those states that are geographically partly `owners' and `users' of the rivers in the region and consequently regard the rivers as major national security issues. The concept of a hydropolitical security complex contributes to an analysis of how water scarcity is affecting the security situation in Southern Africa and what underlying potential conflicts can be identified.²² The joint dependency on rivers in the region indicates that the national security of all states is linked. Therefore, the security perception must be based on the region as a level of analysis. This notion challenges the traditional definition of national security. In this way, Southern Africa is a hydropolitical security complex. Various subcomplexes are identified. These include, among others, the Zambezi, the Okavango and the Orange River hydropolitical security complex.

OVERVIEW OF SOUTHERN AFRICA'S WATER SITUATION

Water issues in the region are one of the most important, but also one of the most neglected security concerns in the region. Current predictions of the region's water profile in the next millennium present a picture of absolute scarcity. To give an indication of the importance of water and the problems related to it, Falkenmark's study is particularly helpful.²³ In order to quantify the present water demand and relate it to the pressure placed on it by, among others, population pressures, she rated water scarcity on a scale of one to five, using a number of persons per million cubic metres per day. According to this model (Table 2), a country can survive with one million cubic metres per 2 000 people. Falkenmark refers to this as the `water barrier'. However, in terms of this scale, projections for Southern Africa are not too optimistic. By the year 2000, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe will experience scarcity to absolute scarcity. Projections for 2025 is far bleaker: absolute water scarcity will be experienced by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Lesotho. Mozambique will experience water stress.²⁴ Table 2 reveals the full extent of the water crisis by indicating the projected decrease in water availability by the next millennium.

TABLE 2

LEVELS OF WATER SCARCITY FROM INCREASING PRESSURES ON AVAILABILITY OF WATER RESOURCES²⁵

WATER DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CO-OPERATION

If the individual countries in the region are to realise the benefits of water diplomacy with respect to shared river basins, it will contribute to regional development as is envisaged in the SADC Protocol. It is also imperative that measures are taken and mechanisms put in place to strengthen existing links in the water sector. This section focuses on institutional arrangements in this regard.

International water law is organised around four main doctrines. These doctrines attempt to delineate the rights of riparian (river basin) states to utilise water from an international river course. Having evolved at different times, reflecting developments in international water law and responding to claims by riparian states, these doctrines reflect different historical and judicial approaches to riparian problems.

The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty

Also known as the Harmon Doctrine, this doctrine regards a water course as being subject to the exclusive sovereignty of a riparian state through which it flows as it relates to that portion that flows through its territory. However, this doctrine is often regarded as anarchic and not reflective of realities of international law.

The doctrine of absolute territorial integrity

According to this doctrine, states should not interfere with the natural flow of water passing through their territory in such a manner that will impact on the behaviour of the flow downstream.

The doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty

This doctrine asserts that international rivers cannot be the subject of the exclusive appropriation by one state alone. This doctrine restricts the abovementioned principles to the extent that it ensures that all riparian states can reasonably utilise the waters of a shared course. The application of this doctrine is contentious. It arises from the fact that the formulation of the principle of equitable apportionment is vague. In addition, conflicts arise from issues such as determining the hierarchy of users of the water of a shared river.

The doctrine of community of interest

In an attempt to advance and improve on the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, this doctrine suggests that all basin states have a common interest in developing the basin. A more integrated approach, this doctrine attempts to contribute to the development and management of a shared international basin, suggesting equitable division and sharing of benefits.

According to Naff,²⁶ these doctrines notwithstanding, the multiplicity of doctrines on the utilisation of shared international rivers asserts that "international law as an instrument of regulations on the transboundary freshwater issues is at present inconclusive and weak." The absence of formal political agreements contributes to this problem.

However, a widely accepted set of guidelines for international water rights is to be found in the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, adopted at the 52nd Conference of the International Law Association in Helsinki in 1966. Despite criticism levelled against these rules, they concentrate mainly on the water rights and obligations of states. An important principle of the Helsinki Rules is that each basin is entitled, within its own territory, to a "reasonable and equitable share" in the beneficial uses of water of an international drainage basin.²⁷ Despite these provisions, there are no comprehensive guidelines in international law on the non-navigational use of international rivers beyond the principles of "equitable utilisation" and sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas (states must not permit the use of their territory to cause injury to other states) as enshrined in the Helsinki Rules. Since 1974, the United Nation's International Law Commission has been unable to establish any binding framework. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are still the only means of establishing rights. These agreements are often insufficient to facilitate conflict resolution.²⁸ They have progressed, however, from the application of the initial concept of an international river, to that of an international drainage basin, and currently to that of an international watercourse system.

Extensive co-operation exists between Southern African states regarding specific river basins. These include, among others, river basin commissions relating to the Orange, the Limpopo and the Okavango, a series of Joint Permanent Technical committees, the Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP), and ZACPLAN. However, full regional co-operation and co-ordination remain lacking.²⁹

A significant development in this regard was the signing of SADC's Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems on 28 August 1995. The object of the Protocol is to develop close co-operation for the judicious and co-ordinated utilisation of the shared watercourse systems in SADC, bearing in mind the Helsinki Rules and the work of the International Law Commission of the UN on the non-navigational uses of international watercourses and to ensure food security in the region.³⁰ The Protocol was formulated under the Environment and Land Management Sector co-ordinating unit of SADC (SADC-ELMS).

The SADC Protocol includes rights and responsibilities. One of these responsibilities is that states within a particular river basin must co-operate with other states on issues regarding the river. In addition, it calls for states to establish institutions on three levels. At the level of government via Joint Permanent Technical committees, signatories should agree on the sustainable sharing and development of common resources. At the level of the river basin, a commission should be established. On the third level, there should be co-operation through river authorities, boards and utilities. The Protocol also provides for the establishment of a regional monitoring unit based at the Water Sector of SADC.³¹

Mozambique and Zambia did not sign the Protocol, and it has not been implemented by all its signatories. Future implementation of the Protocol is likely to impact positively on the water future of the region. However, a number of obstacles remain.

THREATS TO WATER SECURITY

Schemes such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, provide temporary relief from water stress and, at best, buy time to transfer water from one drainage basin to another. Similarly, they limit the development possibilities in the donor basins and states. It could also contribute to environmental degradation that affects the ecology of the river basins receiving water. Efforts to ensure survival could take the form of `water imperialism', i.e. transferring water from river basins in states not even neighbouring the water-stressed state. An illustration in this regard is South Africa's plans to tap water from the Zambezi.³² An issue related to this is the social impact of efforts to ensure water security. The LHWP displaced 1 500 people and affected the livelihood of 20 000. In 1996, the level of sixteen earthquakes per month, associated with the building of new dams, reached a level of VII on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale.³³

One of the most important obstacles in achieving water security is the institutional weakness of SADC as an organisation. This is illustrated by the International Court of Justice case between Namibia and Botswana. SADC as an institution could not resolve the conflict, despite the provisions contained in the SADC Water Protocol for the settlement of disputes. Article 7 of the Protocol states:

"1. Any dispute arising between two or more member States from the interpretation or application of this Protocol which cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication under Article 16 (1) of the Treaty of SADC.

2. (a) If a dispute pertaining to this Protocol arises between SADC and a member state, a request shall be made by the Council for an advisory opinion in accordance with Article 16 (4) of the Treaty of SADC;

(b) The opinion given by the tribunal shall be accepted by the parties as final and binding."³⁴

In addition, states may feel that their sovereignty is threatened by stronger regional integration in this regard. A further threat is a general lack of awareness in the region about the true value of water in monetary terms. Northern water rich states may use this to their advantage. Interstate linkages are threatened by different water rights and legislation in states. Large scale linkages could contribute to other environmental security issues. Water transfer from one state to another could seriously impact on downstream states. Another threat involves the total lack of long term planning in current arrangements, such as the SADC Protocol. This is hampered by the lack of reliable data.³⁵

There has been a proliferation of proposals to address water scarcity issues in Southern Africa (see Table 3). Towards the end of this millennium, developments relating to water management are characterised by the return of the state in regaining control over water resources, as opposed to individual ownership, in order to effectively manage it in the public interest. An illustration in this regard relates to the fact that water is managed by the Ministry of Defence in Israel.³⁶ Similarly, South Africa is currently undergoing a water revolution under the leadership of Kader Asmal, the South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry.³⁷

TABLE 3

A SELECTION OF PROPOSED MAJOR WATER TRANSFERS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA³⁸

The impact of such projects is that donor states stand to lose water to the recipient states. In addition, major water transfers require substantial `water diplomacy' via international negotiation and agreement. So far, it has been limited to bilateral agreements, such as the LHWP.

CONCLUSION

Although this contribution has illustrated the imbalance between water availability and usage, as well as the potential conflict areas associated with it among states in Southern Africa, it cannot be considered the principal casus belli in Southern Africa. It could be a contributing factor in regional instability, as some states are more water rich than others. However, South Africa and its SADC partners, as a security complex, are faced with one of the greatest challenges in the region. The long term solution might be the revival of the SADC Water Sector, the creation of commissions and regulating authorities. The problem might be addressed on a smaller scale, i.e. on a basin or watercourse level. The absence of water issues on the agenda of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) could be addressed. South Africa's leadership in the region places a double responsibility on the country, often accused of acting as a de facto upstream state in its water diplomacy. As the chair of SADC and with the leadership role that South Africa plays in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, the country could reverse this perception. An investment in the water security of the region is an investment in the development prospects of the region.

ENDNOTES

This contribution draws partly on the author's research for the New South African Security Policy Fellowship (1995) awarded by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London; see also J K van Wyk, SA Moet Voortou Neem om Water in Streek te Bewaar, Die Burger, 10 September 1996.

L Ohlsson, The Role of Water and the Origins of Conflict, in L Ohlsson (ed.), Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint, Zed, London, 1995, p. 22; see also, among others, M Tennberg, Risky Business: Defining the Concept of Environmental Security, Cooperation and Conflict, 30(3), 1995, pp. 239-258; C Thomas, The Environment in International Relations, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1992; L Pettiford, Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World, Third World Quarterly, 17(2), 1996, pp. 289-306; E K Stern, Bringing the Environment In: The Case for Comprehensive Security, Cooperation and Conflict, 30(3), 1995, pp. 211-237; A H Westing, The Environmental Component of Comprehensive Security, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 20(2), 1989, pp. 129-134.



See, among others, M S Sherrill, Wells Running Dry, Time, November 1997, pp.17-21.



P H Gleick, Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, International Security, 18(1), 1993, pp. 84-117.



See, among others, J Bulloch & A Darwish, Water Wars: Competing Conflicts in the Middle East, Victor Gollancz, London, 1993; S Deconick, Water en het Israëlisch-Palestijnse Vredesproces, Internationale Spectator, January 1997, pp. 17-22; J R Starr & D C Stoll (eds.), The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, Westview, London, 1988.



For a discussion on the Southern African context, see, H Hudson, Resource Based Conflict: Water (In)security and Its Strategic Implications, in H Solomon (ed.), Sink or Swim? Water, Resource Security and State Co-operation, ISS Monograph Series, 6, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1996, pp. 3-16; L Swatuk, Environmental Issues and Prospects for Southern African Regional Co-operation, in H Solomon & J Cilliers (eds.), People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa, ISS Monograph Series, 4, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1996, pp. 38-48; A Mutembwa, Water and the Potential for Resource Conflicts in Southern Africa, unpublished paper, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1996.



Weekly Mail & Guardian, 14 March 1997, 15 August 1997, 3 and 24 October 1997; The Star, 13 October 1997; see also, A Klotz, International Relations and Migration in Southern Africa, African Security Review, 6(3), 1997, pp. 38-45.



The Natal Witness, 4 April 1996.



The Natal Witness, 1 December 1995.



A A Lighthelm (comp.), The Southern African Development Community (SADC): A Socioeconomic Profile, Research Report, 244, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1997, p. 8.



J S Goldstein, International Relations, Harper Collins, New York, 1996, pp. 442-450; P R Viotti & M V Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997, pp. 264-268.



Weekly Mail & Guardian, 7 March 1997; The Star, 18 August 1997.



Business Report, 3 February 1997 and 6 August 1997.



New Nation, 21 February 1997.



Business Report, 30 October 1997.



Southern Africa Report, 10 January 1997.



Weekly Mail & Guardian, 8 August 1997; The Star, 7 October 1997, Business Day, 25 September 1997; Beeld, 18 September 1997.



The Star, 4 September 1997. On the issue of food security, see among others, R Bush, The Politics of Food and Starvation, Review of African Political Economy, 68, 1996, pp. 169-195; W H Bender, How Much Food Will We Need in the 21st Century?, Environment, 39(2), 1997, pp. 7-11, 27-28.



The Star, 26 September 1997.



Business Day, 30 October 1995.



A I Conley, A Synoptic View of Water Resources in Southern Africa, in Solomon, op. cit., pp. 25-52; W V Pitman & J Hudson, Regional Water Resources: Prospects for Trade and Cooperation, in L Kritzinger-van Niekerk (ed.), Towards Strengthening Multisectoral Linkages in SADC, Development Paper, 33, Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1997, pp. 138-148; Mutembwa, ibid.



B Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991.



M Schultz, Turkey, Syria and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex, in Ohlsson, op. cit., pp. 91-122.



M Falkinmark quoted in H Coetzee, Southern Africa Water Issues, in M Venter (ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, Maskew Miller Longman, Cape Town, 1994, pp. 147-148.



Coetzee, ibid.; The Star, 7 February and 19 September 1995.



Falkinmark, op. cit.



T Naff, Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East, in P Rogers & P Lydon (eds.), Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prospects, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 272.



P Heyns, The Namibian Perspective on Regional Collaboration in the Joint Development of International Water Resources, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 11(4), 1995, p. 483.



International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Review 1991-1993, Brassey's for the IISS, London, 1992, p. 220.



Pitman & Hudson, op. cit., p. 144.



Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Explanatory Memorandum Concerning the Ratification of the Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, Pretoria, 1995, pp. 1-4; Sunday Times, 27 August 1995.



SADC, Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, Gaberone, November 1995.



G D de Villiers et. al., South Africa's Water Resources and the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme: A Partial Solution to the Country's Water Problems, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 12(1), 1996, pp. 65-77; Coetzee, op. cit., pp. 147-148; The Star, 7 February and 19 September 1997.



Sowetan, 26 October 1995; Sunday Times, 28 January 1996; Weekly Mail & Guardian, 5 July 1996.



SADC Protocol, op. cit.



Pitman & Hudson, op. cit., p. 144.



Ohlsson, op. cit.



National Water Bill, fourth draft, 5 September 1997; Sunday Times, 28 September 1997.



SARDC, The State of the Environment in Southern Africa, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Harare, 1994, p. 2000.