INTRODUCTION

The 1990s have witnessed many dramatic megapolitical developments, from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, to the abolition of apartheid in the South Africa, to name but a few examples. In their place, the growing emergence of intra-state conflicts, with a concomitant requirement on the viability, credibility and practicality of using force to settle disputes and to maintain peace and security have been witnessed. This has been especially prevalent on the African continent.

This increasingly turbulent situation has been triggered by, inter alia, the disappearance of superpower influence over alliances and developing nations. Although a decline in the number of conflicts seems to be in evidence over the past two years, the years since 1989 saw more military operations in Asia, Europe and Africa than during any other time since the Second World War. The world remains politically and militarily unstable. These developments have produced a dramatically changed global security environment an environment which is likely to become even more uncertain as we enter the 21st Century.

It is also obvious that the nature of warfare is changing. Increasingly, new theories and suggested strategies for warfare are being put to the fore as a panacea for the new age requirements of mankind in conflict situations. The logic of Clausewitzian theory on the rationale behind war is increasingly questioned. The advocates of this `revolution in military affairs' (RMA) support new theories of warfare ranging from so-called `fourth-generation war' (which states that the revolution in military affairs impacts primarily on the tactical level of warfighting), to the Tofflers' third-wave war concept, which declares that war is an extension of how wealth is created, and hence an extension of world mega-economic trends.¹

At the operational level, the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm tend to entangle the debate further. In its essence, Desert Storm seems to have heralded a greater reliance on technology and sophisticated battle management techniques as the way forward for warfighting in the future. The question needs to be asked though, what the impact of the RMA will be on the developing world, and especially on Africa. Is this also going to be the paradigm within which future conflicts in Africa will be resolved?

This article aims to contribute to an improved understanding of this very complex subject by:

investigating in some detail the new warfare paradigm which underpins the RMA;



examining the nature of conflict in Africa and the possible relationships which may exist with the RMA; and



pointing to some strategic implications and strategy options for forces which may become involved in future conflicts on the continent.

NEW AGE WARFARE

The Changing Security Environment

The one issue which seems to dominate present-day popular literature on security thinking, is that security and security management can no longer be regarded only in terms of its military connotations. Various other threats are emerging which, although these may eventually impinge upon the security dimension of the power base of a country, are on the surface very far removed from military and security matters. These concern issues like crime, poverty, resource scarcity and disease, to name but a few.² This new perception impacts directly on threat postures and patterns, as perceived by potential opponents in conflict situations, and, in effect, has expanded the range of contingencies for which military strategists have to prepare. The primary result has been that the nature of threat development now shows an increasingly non-linear pattern.³ Virtually any socio-economic ill may spill over into conflict, especially in areas where social and democratic development have been less than optimal.

This has impacted significantly on the kinds of threat environments which face potential adversaries. To illustrate this, the following broad comparison is presented between characteristics of the previous and future foreseen threat environments.

Characteristics of the Previous Threat Environment (typically pre-nineties, and especially pre-eighties):

modes of conflict were primarily interstate in nature one state against another;



conflict manifestations and the underlying strategic philosophy on conflict were predominantly of a conventional and/or nuclear nature especially between the two major Cold War rivals;



orders of battle (ORBATs) of opponents were mainly static in nature this became less the norm as we moved into the modern era, but even recent conflicts still made use of trenches and fixed positions from which to wage war (e.g. the Gulf War and the Angolan War);



force design patterns of warfighting parties assumed linear proportions, with equipment procurement and ORBATs developing in line with perceived changes in threat variables, of which opponent capabilities were the most important;



reasonably fixed and clear-cut rules of engagement (ROE) existed;



opposing doctrines and tactics were well-known to the various parties in a conflict; and



strategic early warning of a pending attack was generally possible, due to the time it took to move large bodies of men and equipment into position for attack refer to the Iran-Iraq wars as examples.

Characteristics of the Emerging Threat:

conflicts are assuming an increasingly intrastate nature, although spill-over potential remains high in most cases;



conflicts are becoming increasingly non-conventional in nature, as they are fought more often in developing countries with limited conventional forces however, it needs to be stated that the danger of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation, and other technology proliferation, is real;



ORBATs are becoming dynamic and random and hence difficult to predict, mainly due to the fact that forces are no longer organised along predominantly conventional lines;



non-linear force structure increments are becoming increasingly apparent this is mainly the result of the greater availability of ultra-sophisticated weaponry on the world's arms market, such as missile systems, chemical weapons, computerised planning systems, and systems which embrace the greater use of micro-technology;



doctrines are becoming increasingly vague and fused, being tailor-made to suit specific operational requirements;



strategic early warning is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, mainly among less technologically developed opponents, due to the unconventional nature of systems and doctrines involved in combat, and due to the unique and non-traditional triggers which often initiate conflict;⁴ and



more pressure is being exerted on especially the defence forces of developed countries to become more aggressively involved in peace support operations.

The above may be summarised by stating that traditional doctrines and force structures and this remains the case in most modern defence forces have been directed towards the use of overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory. As should be already apparent from the above, and as will be argued further in this article, this is hardly a formula for coping with the wide range of new threats which are presently emerging, and which are likely to emerge in the next century.⁵

This seriously hampers the development of defence forces' force design and force structure in most countries.⁶ How does one plan for such a volatile environment? How does one go about acquiring equipment for threats which are vague and unmanifested? How does one achieve the optimal balance in one's force design between catering for expected minor contingencies, but simultaneously remaining prepared for major conflicts, however rare these may be? And what about the trade-off for peace support operations? Does one prepare for visible threats, or to counter potential capabilities? Intent can change more rapidly than military capability, so the clever solution would seem to be to design one's force levels according to perceived opponent capabilities, and not according to threats.⁷ There is obviously a careful balance in approach required, driven mainly by considerations of cost and effectiveness.

The changes in the security environment can only have an impact on the nature of future conflicts, and on the resulting nature of forces which will take part in such conflicts. The question is, though, what a nation will require from its military in the next century. Viewpoints differ, especially in an era of greater openness which surrounds the defence debate in most countries. In most cases, there would seem to be some agreement that the following should be the major drivers which need to underpin the formulation of defence forces' vision and mission:

to protect the nation's interests in whatever form these may be threatened;



to provide adequate protection against any surprises of a military nature;



to participate in peace support operations;



to enhance the country's international image and influence;



to support domestic goals and interests;



to allow for strategic and operational choices in the pursuit of national goals/interests and foreign policy; and



to integrate the requisite scientific and technological capabilities into warfighting capabilities at the levels which may be required.⁸

Especially the latter point leads one to the RMA how military organisations and strategists are positioning themselves (technologically) to manage the range of responsibilities in this volatile environment, especially among the defence forces of developed countries.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

The concept of an RMA is primarily underpinned by the theory of information warfare, but not exclusively so. Also included in the concept is the increasing destructiveness and accuracy of weapons, the vast distances over which forces can be projected, the speed of information processing and computing power, and the growing capacities to gather intelligence.⁹ This new approach to warfare bases its success on shock rather than on attrition. It forces an enemy "to follow the course that one desires by foreclosing options which may be deemed undesirable."¹⁰

The RMA has led to the emergence of a vision as expressed by the United States Department of Defense which calls for the capability to dominate an opponent across the full range of military operations also termed Full Spectrum Dominance. Within this context, the number of operational concepts abound, which all rely almost exclusively on the force multiplier capabilities which the RMA, specifically information warfare, can provide. These operational concepts are dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, full-dimensional pro-tection, focused logistics, information superiority and technological innovation.¹¹

The aforementioned leads one to believe that the employment of (sophisticated) defence forces in the next century will become increasingly focused on the following:

the greater fusion of information obtained from a wide variety of sensors into one coherent battle picture, on which commanders will be able to base informed decisions, considering virtually all variables;



the collection of intelligence information from sources which will cover all ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum in-time and on-time;



attacks on an enemy's information nerve centres, to such an extent that the need for the use of physical violence may be negated in many cases, as the opponent's ability to activate and command forces may be completely neutralised;



the reliance on remotely piloted sensors and attack platforms;



the neutralisation of enemy strong points by means of precision attack over long distances, and by using stand-off techniques;



the use of virtual technology to simulate battlefield conditions before, during and after engagements to such an extent that the battlefield becomes completely `transparent';



the greater use of non-lethal technologies to ensure that collateral damage is minimised; and



the sophisticated analysis of enemy target systems by the employment of multi-disciplinary task teams comprising of analysts with expertise in intelligence, information systems and targeting, and by relying on ultrasophisticated surveillance systems to undertake battle damage assessment (BDA).¹²

In the final analysis, therefore, the RMA will result in the development of a significantly different style of warfare where there is no distinction between front and rear areas, where distance does not guarantee protection, where if a target can be found, it can be destroyed, where the most precious military commodity will be information (and intelligence),¹³ and where the most lethal military weapon will be speed and surprise.¹⁴

Within this kind of warfare, the elements which will drive force design and force structure developments should logically be:

requirements for the rapid projection of power;



the acquisition of platforms and sensors which will enhance total situational awareness of the battlefield;



the acquisition of precision guided munitions (PGM), preferably in stand-off mode; and



the development of ultrasophisticated C4I systems.¹⁵

But, there is another dimension of warfare which is becoming increasingly visible, a kind of warfare which operates almost exclusively on non-linear patterns the so-called `grey area conflict'.

Grey Area Conflict

Wars, especially those of an intrastate nature, are increasingly assuming grey area characteristics. These wars find their origins in areas, such as conflicts over scarce resources, ethnic and religious conflict, transnational crime (with its linkage to terrorism and insurgency), migration and illegal immigration, border disputes, famine and state collapse.¹⁶ These conflicts primarily manifest themselves under the banner of low intensity conflict (LIC).

Despite the emergence of sophisticated information warfare and other technologies, one has to question the employment of these (RMA) concepts within the grey area environment. Certain elements highlighted by the discussion on the RMA may certainly be employed very successfully to counter grey area problems. On the other hand, certain grey area threats may require new operational concepts, employing technology, intelligence and units specially trained to operate in a new and very hostile environment.¹⁷ There also seems to be greater scope for the merging of civilian and military capabilities in countering these threats.

When analysing the nature of conflict in Africa, and especially the form it is likely to take on in the next century, it becomes increasingly apparent that grey area conflict, or LIC, is likely to dominate the conflict spectrum. Exactly how the RMA is likely to impact on this dimension of warfare is a matter of conjecture. The many different variables which typify conflict in Africa need to be taken into consideration in any analysis of this nature.

Africa and the Revolution in Military Affairs

Theories abound on the likely nature of future conflicts in Africa, and the areas in which these conflicts may occur. Discussions on this topic centre on, inter alia, whether conflict will be predominantly interstate or intrastate in nature, whether one may soon talk of endemic state collapse in many cases, and what the effects will be of famine and the large scale migration of populations. Whatever preference one has for these various viewpoints, or combinations of foreseen scenarios, there can be little doubt that, when reduced to its essence, one is in fact addressing two levels of conflict on which defence planning in the next century should be based minor, or what may be referred to as short warning conflict, and major conflict.¹⁸ However one chooses to define the distinction between these two levels, it should be obvious that each will have a markedly different impact on defence planning, and the resulting force design and force structure considerations likely to be involved in such conflicts.

It is probably safe to say that when one considers minor conflict, one is primarily envisaging conflict of an intrastate nature, although many of Africa's interstate conflicts have been minor in the past, depending of course on one's definition of the concept. This has mostly been due to the lack of forces and sophisticated equipment. The effect on populations, however, has been devastating. Although present intelligence forecasts on the likelihood of conflict in Africa over the next two decades would still seem to put the emphasis on the greater emergence of intrastate conflict, one has to consider the potential for spill-over which exists on the continent. Even in Africa, there is an increasing interdependency between states due to an improved communications infrastructure, travel opportunities and economic ties. This leads one to question whether conflict can remain localised, especially on a continent where artificial borders cut across ethnic, religious and ideological unities.¹⁹

The next question which is often discussed, is where such conflicts are likely to occur. One only has to consider where conflicts and differences of opinion presently take place to be able to make some kind of linear projection into the future to arrive at likely scenarios. It is then not difficult to come to the conclusion that, with certain exceptions in West Africa and Southern Africa, the focal point for conflict on the continent well into the next century, will remain the Central African basin.²⁰

Conflict on the continent will remain a fact, despite greater regional integration, the vision of an African renaissance,²¹ and other optimistic forecasts by economists and politicians. The nature of Africa's problems are just too endemic and systemic to disappear overnight. Considering present United Nations and Organisation of African Unity initiatives with respect to the resolution of such conflicts, it is also safe to state that the likelihood of continued involvement by non-continental actors in peace support initiatives is high.²² Hence, there will be a continued drive by defence forces through planning, associated force design and structure initiatives to prepare for contingencies in this regard.

How does the RMA impact on these potential future conflicts, and on the involvement of forces in these conflicts? It is foreseen that it will impact primarily on considerations of technological levels of forces to be involved in the conflict, force projection, the extent to which information warfare may be used, and on intelligence provision.

The technological levels of conflicts in Africa have traditionally shown characteristics of Tofflers' `first' and `second wave' wars i.e. being primarily of agrarian and industrial era design.²³ Very few manifestations of information warfare have been visible on the continent in the past, but according to the Tofflers' description, some of the weapon systems which are presently available in Africa may be seen as exhibiting certain `third wave' characteristics.²⁴ In fact, the nature of defence forces' force design and structure compositions are likely to reflect an increasingly confusing and difficult to predict mixture of old and new equipment.²⁵

The availability of some modern surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), fighter aircraft and other air defence systems in a number of countries, such as Angola, Libya, Egypt and even Botswana, would seem to indicate that the dividing line between older and modern technologies is becoming increasingly vague. It has to be kept in mind that weapon systems, such as the SA-8 and SA-18 SAMs, and the MiG-29 fighter aircraft, to name only a few examples, which are by present standards classified as modern weapon systems, are likely to be regarded internationally as old in ten years' time. By implication, this should also make them easily affordable on the second-hand market. Despite the fact that these systems will be regarded as old by then, they will remain as lethal as ever, requiring sophisticated counter-measures to ensure the survival of friendly forces where they are deployed.

Developed countries will continue to target the developing world as an arms market, despite the latter's relative inability to pay.²⁶ These changes in the world's arms market thrusts "could have profound implications for a variety of national security issues, including defence policy and military doctrine, arms control, regional security, and the future of the national defence industrial base."²⁷ It is especially as a result of the greater fusion of modern and older equipment, that doctrines and tactics in defence forces and in informal non-statutory grey area groupings of armed forces are becoming more difficult to predict.²⁸ These groupings will increasingly tailor-make their tactics to suit specific operational and technological requirements see also the section under Characteristics of the Emerging Threat, for more details as to what these specific tactics and operational requirements are likely to be.

The result of the above on defence planners considering involvement in, for example, peace support scenarios on the continent, is that doctrinal and force structure considerations are increasingly difficult to deal with. Typical contingencies which such planners must consider in their plans over the next decade or two, would be the following:

the extent to which modern-day information gathering sensors and platforms are really usable in Africa. The terrain does not lend itself to the use of aerial photography to the same extent as does, for example, the Middle East. The use of stand-off platforms may be more difficult in the mountainous and bushy areas of Central Africa than virtually anywhere else in the world. The extensive cloud cover in this area during the summer months places further restrictions on the use of imagery sensors. Still, there may be opportunities for the use of low altitude, remotely piloted vehicles with high resolution foliage penetration sensors in certain areas. Such platforms, however, can seldom provide information on the location and intention of small roving bands of irregular forces. It may just be that the traditional informant on the ground may still remain the best source of intelligence information under such conditions;



the extent to which information warfare may be applied in the full context of the term is highly dubious. For information warfare to be employed optimally, one has to operate against an opponent which makes extensive use of systems which depend on electromagnetic sensors and datalinks, computerised systems and sophisticated battle management and C4I ways of operation. The irony therefore is that the less sophisticated an opponent, the less use one's (sophisticated) information warfare assets may be. Despite this apparent contradiction, it must be stated that the majority of defence forces in Africa make use of some relatively sophisticated ways of communications and data storage systems. There would therefore seem to be some rationale behind employing limited information warfare capabilities to attack information nerve centres, even if it should remain limited to broad spectrum communications jamming;



the decentralised nature of most defence forces' infrastructure on the continent, especially among less sophisticated countries, and the lesser reliance on centralised battle management nerve centres, also raises a question mark behind the extent to which the use of precision guided munitions employed over long distances, may really be effective. In Africa, long distance is really long distance!;



the greater use of non-lethal technologies may be something which may deliver positive results. However, our imaginary defence planner will have to consider the costs of factoring this into the force design and force structure equation, especially taking into account that even the defence forces of the developed world are still battling to come to terms with the nature and extent of the use of these technologies on future battlefields; and



the requirement to rapidly (re)deploy forces over distances of thousands of kilometres virtually overnight, and to switch between one type of mission and associated tasks to another, may require a `generalist' kind of background which may militate against the more specialised types of training and application required in the information warfare realm.

In the final analysis, although there seems to be scope for the employment of some RMA technologies on the future African battlefield, the potential for employment of these technologies, especially as espoused by information warfare literature, would seem to remain limited. One would have to question the resulting implications for strategising within this foreseen environment.

STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS

One needs to approach the matter of strategising for conflict on the African continent in an holistic manner. Such an approach operates both vertically and horizontally. In its vertical dimension, strategy encompasses all aspects of peace and security, ranging from political vision to tactical military performance.²⁹ This is the classic Clausewitzian approach, linking war and politics in its fullest context.³⁰ The horizontal approach to strategy includes the application of power on land, sea, in the air, and in space, together with strategic nuclear and special operations forces, where relevant.³¹

Seen in the African context, therefore, it should be evident that the application of military power poses significant challenges to military strategists. There should be clearly defined linkages, at least in the vertical approach to strategy, between political goals to be achieved and military capabilities to execute these goals. In the past, such linkages have been less than optimal in many cases. As history has proven over the last decade, it does not matter how heroic one's political ambitions and goals with respect to involvement in conflicts on the continent, if friendly forces are not able to perform at better than modest levels in engagements, then strategic failure is virtually certain.³²

The nature of the forces designed for involvement is also an important factor to be considered. Associated with this is, of course, the matter of doctrine. As the US can testify, despite the use of conventional forces and doctrines in grey area type conflicts, there have been relative few successes, as experiences in Panama and Somalia have shown.³³ Having the proper blend of force structure, doctrine and tactics is therefore crucial in deciding engagement policies. Such a strategic framework should consider the objectives to be achieved in conflicts over the next few decades on the continent (the ends), the strategic concepts according to which forces should be employed (the ways), and the associated capabilities required to execute these concepts (the means). It will also need to consider the potential conflict spectrum according to which such involvements could occur. These could typically range from a benevolent partner-type of outreach approach, to assistance in national disasters, peace support operations, grey area/low intensity conflict, and even semi-conventional war. The prognosis for the outbreak of a full-blown conventional war on the African continent over the next two decades would seem to be remote. As indicated earlier, the most likely scenario would seem to be a blend of the peace support/grey area conflict/LIC-type engagement.

Considering the above, what should therefore be the major drivers that defence planners and strategists should consider when embarking on strategic planning with the resulting force design and force structure implications, especially among those countries who consider themselves likely to become involved in such a scenario in the early parts of the next century? There are obviously a plethora of variables which may be considered, but based on the aforementioned discussions, and especially referring to the potential impact which the RMA and associated technologies and doctrines may have on conflict, the following are probably some considerations:

involvement in military engagements on the continent are likely to assume increasing `come as you are' characteristics. There will be relatively little time allowed for a surge in equipment purchases, training for forces and modifying doctrines and tactics. The implication therefore is that forces will need to be ready all the time, first time;



as a result of the above, force structures of defence forces profiled for engagement should exhibit great flexibility in the manner in which they are tailored. The luxury of designing and embedding forces and equipment for specialist roles and tasks only, is likely to become more and more rare. Forces involved in one contingency today, will have to have the ability to redeploy their energies, their forces and their mission virtually overnight;



the dividing line between the prevention and containment of conflict is likely to be become increasingly blurred. Forces may be required to employ diplomacy and non-lethal technologies and systems one day in prevention, and the next may be required to employ hard-kill options in LIC situations as mercurial irregular actors attempt to derail sensitive negotiation processes;



Clausewitz's theory on the friction of war is likely to be especially prevalent in conflict situations on the continent. As stated by Colin S Gray, the director of Security Studies at the University of Hull: "So many and potentially synergistic are the sources of friction in war and preparation for war, that it is little short of amazing that great military enterprises can be organized and carried out at all."³⁴ On the African continent with its infrastructural and other problems, the issue is so much more complex. Escalation potential for conflicts is enormous in many cases, with great spill-over potential. One has only to consider the history of conflict in the Central African basin over the past decade to be aware of this. It has been evidenced that initial small, unpredicted changes of state can have massive non-linear consequences later.³⁵ Once again flexibility is a prime requirement for operating under such conditions;



forces will need to be self-contained in their force support. The infrastructural conditions on the continent will force this upon them;



the long distances over which involvement is likely to occur, emphasise transport systems which can operate non-stop and at high speed to allow for rapid force projection;



the importance of information and intelligence gathering in the highly volatile and uncertain environment as depicted in the preceding paragraphs almost goes without saying. The complexities, however, of obtaining intelligence information on the movements and plans of non-regular forces in the typical African terrain makes this a daunting task. The extent to which this can be executed successfully or not, is probably the primary determinator of the extent to which friction may be a factor in future conflicts. An important role is foreseen for the employment of special forces units in such scenarios;



despite the overtly limited potential for the use of RMA-type technologies in African conflicts, modern technologies should be embedded as force multipliers into the force designs of forces to be involved, as far as is possible. Here, one would see the use of especially RMA technologies on the terrains of information gathering, C4I, the possible use of non-lethal weapons, battle management planning and execution, etc. Less utilisation is foreseen of these technologies in hard-kill options;



most conflicts in Africa are likely to involve multinational forces for peace support operations. This underscores the importance of interoperability, flexibility in doctrinal adaptation and the requirement for good command and control interfaces;



force design considerations should focus primarily on the acquisition of systems which may be considered multifunctional. Here one would see systems such as helicopters (transport and combat support), mobile short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft, light and mobile reconnaissance vehicles with troop carrying capabilities and enhanced self-protection capabilities, and systems which are equally at home being deployed over land, from the air, or by ship; and



in the typical grey area environments postulated in this article, the need for self-protection of own forces is of paramount importance. There is great potential for the use of certain information warfare technologies, such as full spectrum jamming systems operating against infrared and even kinetic energy weapon systems, better body protection capabilities for troops on the ground, and better anti-landmine capabilities. There is also probably a requirement to invest in defensive biological and chemical capabilities.

The military strategist of the future will therefore continuously need to consider the ultimate political motives to be achieved, how he may structure his forces in a way to support this, how he may ensure the survivability of these forces and how the outcome of tactical engagements can be assured in his favour, without inflicting unnecessary damage on any opponent.

CONCLUSION

The continuation of warfare on the continent seems to be a fait accompli, no matter how sad a prognosis this may be. It is also likely to remain a fact that many defence forces, not initially involved in such conflicts, may eventually become involved even if only under the guise of restoring peace to troubled conflict spots.

A requirement will therefore continue to exist for defence forces to prepare themselves for these kinds of engagements engagements which are likely to operate in the predominantly grey area part of the conflict spectrum. Within such warfighting scenarios flexibility will be the name of the game flexibility in force design and force structure composition, flexibility in strategising, and flexibility in doctrinal planning and execution.

In this environment, there is a place for the new technologies which underpin the RMA. Their potential uses are not likely to be as many, or as varied as in foreseen scenarios in the Middle East, the Far East or Europe. Principally as a result of this, the challenge to strategists is so much greater, especially when operating within a budgetary constrained environment. Still, it would seem as if the types of technologies which may be successfully employed in warfighting situations on the continent, could be in the realms of information and intelligence gathering, battle management and planning, force projection and self-protection.

The last word on the RMA and conflict in Africa has not been spoken. This article should be viewed as an exploratory study of this field. As the landscape of future megapolitical and military developments in Africa unfolds, one should receive increasingly clear signals on exactly the kinds and dimensions of warfare likely to emerge in the next century. One certainty, though, is that it will be a volatile and unforgiving environment, and that armed forces planning to become involved in any manner of conflict management or prevention, will be tested to exhibit warfighting characteristics not previously required of them.

ENDNOTES

Colonel Ian van Vuuren held the position of Deputy Director Strategic Management Systems at the Defence Secretariat, Department of Defence until the end of 1997. His previous appointment was Director of Air Force Intelligence until the end of 1996. He spent nineteen years as a career officer and left the Department to pursue other interests. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defence.

R Bunker, Generations, Waves and Epochs Modes of Warfare and the RPMA, Airpower Journal, Spring 1996, p. 21.



I van Vuuren, Transforming the Defence Intelligence Community for New Challenges in Southern Africa, SA Defence College, May 1996, p. 4.



I van Vuuren, Developments in the (Sub)Continent and the Influence on the SA Air Force A Prognosis till 2006, Pretoria, 1996, p. 37.



A M Gray, Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990s, Army Intelligence Journal, Winter 1989-1990, p. 4.



W Mendel, New Forces for Engagement Policy, Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, p. 25.



Although the terms `force design' and `force structure' are often used interchangeably in literature, the distinction between the two terms is as follows (as employed by the SANDF) the force design consists of all those force structure elements (FSEs) that participate directly in the conduct of military operations. These include their organic logistic support and administrative support elements. The FSEs are the constituent parts of a defence force described at unit level, e.g. one ship, or one squadron of aircraft, or one infantry battalion. The force structure is the sum total of all the FSEs. It also includes those FSEs which are part of the force support and which are not included in the force design, like bases, colleges and commands.



D N Rogers, Managing the RAAF beyond 2000, Defence Challenges in New Era Security, June 1996, <www.adfa.oz.au/DOD/apc96/rogers.htm>



R Fogleman, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, Department of the Air Force, Washington, 1997, p. 3.



I McLachlan, Defence Challenges in New Era Security, June 1996, <www.adfa.oz.au/DOD/ minister/m960611b.htm>



T G Mahnken, War in the Information Age, Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, p. 40.



Fogleman, op. cit., p. 3.



Mahnken, op. cit., p. 41.



In the military environment, a clear distinction is drawn between information and intelligence. In its simplest form, intelligence is viewed as processed information and generally refers to the disposition of an enemy or opponent. Information, in turn, is comprised of many data elements. Military operations are always planned on intelligence, and never on information. The term information also refers to other decision-making inputs which do not necessarily relate to enemy dispositions, like information on the whereabouts of own aircraft, command and control information, etc.



McLachlan, op. cit.



Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. In the latest literature, this term has come to replace the traditional C3I, which omitted the reference to computers.



Mendel, op. cit., p. 25.



Ibid., p. 28.



Rogers, op. cit.



Van Vuuren, op. cit., p. 5.



Ibid., p. 25.



R Kasrils, Reinforcing the African Renaissance, The Defence Review Debate, National Assembly, 20 August 1997, p. 1.



Mendel, op. cit., p. 26.



Bunker, op. cit., p. 22.



A Toffler, War and Anti War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1993.



Van Vuuren, op. cit., p. 24.



Ibid., p. 20.



Defence Industry Working Group, National Defence Policy for the Aerospace Industry, Pretoria, April 1994, p. 6.



Van Vuuren, op. cit.



C S Gray, On Strategic Performance, Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, p. 32.



Ibid., p. 31.



Ibid., p. 32.



Ibid.



Mendel, op. cit., p. 27.



Gray, op. cit., p. 34.



Ibid.