INTRODUCTION

This is the final article in the African Security Review which reports on the results of the collaborative survey of public opinion on security-related aspects, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) during 1996. This survey followed on and built upon the results of a similar survey which was conducted in 1995.

The 1996 survey questions can be grouped into a number of subject areas which relate to security issues. This article presents the results of questions regarding three issues, namely public attitudes towards South African participation in peacekeeping missions, military personnel recruitment and retention policies (including cadets), and labour relations in the armed forces. Three earlier articles (Volume 6, numbers 3, 4 and 5 of the Review), reflected the results regarding women in the security forces, language usage in the SANDF, attitudes towards undocumented migration and crime/policing, and finally, public attitudes regarding the image and future of the South African military and towards the defence industry.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The HSRC Omnibus survey is done quarterly and its purpose is to give clients an opportunity to participate in a national survey at low cost. The questions relating to the security services which were included in this survey, were the result of two workshops between members of the HSRC and ISS held during August/September 1996. The core questions regarding security were originally the same as those which were used during 1995, but amended where appropriate.

Two separate questionnaires were administered during this survey to two probability samples of 2 200 respondents each. Every effort was made to ensure that the data were representative of the South African population.

The fieldwork for the Omnibus survey was conducted nationally from 7 to 28 October 1996. The data were collected by specially trained interviewers using structured questionnaires during some 2 200 personal, face-to-face interviews. Interviews were often done after hours to ensure that the respondent that had been drawn, was available. If the specific individual was not at home during the first visit, but was available during the fieldwork period, an appointment was made and the person concerned, revisited. If nobody in the household qualified, or was available during the fieldwork period, the household was substituted.¹

Interviews were furthermore conducted in the respondents' choice of language.²

Trained co-ordinators, appointed by MarkData, were allocated to different regions in order to co-ordinate the fieldwork (data collection).³ Each co-ordinator was responsible for a group of interviewers who were recruited under close supervision and subsequently briefed according to specific instructions given by MarkData.⁴ The sample design was initiated by Prof Laurence Schlemmer, Ms Tertia van der Walt and Dr Mathilda du Toit, and formalised by Mr B Vukasovic. The capturing, processing and verification of the data were done by the Computer Centre of the HSRC.⁵

The sample allocation for the survey was done proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures, with a few exceptions.⁶ The visiting points were drawn by means of multiple stage cluster, probability sample design. The household and respondents were selected with a random grid from qualifying household members and interviewed at their homes.

The universe for this sample design was all South African residents of 18 years and older. All nine provinces were included in the survey, with care taken to include both rural and urban areas. The socio-economic classification of the respondents was represented as follows: tribal, traditional, rural in former self-governing areas and the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states); squatter areas, urban (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); hostels, hotels, boarding schools etc., in urban areas (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for so-called Coloureds (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for Asians (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for Blacks (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); towns and cities (non-metropolitan); towns and cities including flats (metropolitan); and rural areas (excluding the former self-governing areas and TBVC states).

An additional sub-sample was introduced for live-in domestic and other workers, based on the incidence of households employing domestic workers, as found in previous Omnibus surveys. Domestic workers who formed part of the main sample (e.g. those living at home) were interviewed as such.

Disproportion was introduced to give a minimum number of 120 respondents per province. The minimum number of Asians in the overall sample was fixed at 120.⁷

The sample realisation for this Omnibus survey was one hundred per cent and no major obstacles were encountered during the fieldwork.

PEACEKEEPING

Introduction

A number of African countries, including South Africa, are currently attempting to improve their capacity to contribute troops to international or multinational efforts to alleviate crises and assist with democratisation on the continent. These various national efforts have been assisted by a range of external initiatives, with the eventual goal of fielding appropriately trained contingents for intervention to end or reduce the effects of armed conflict on African soil.

There is considerable pressure on South Africa to become a major contributor to the evolution of a subregional capability for peace operations. South African policy guidelines for participation in peace operations are reflected in a number of official documents and policy positions, such as the White Paper on Defence and a range of key position papers pertaining to foreign policy and developmental requirements. In addition, South Africa is a member state of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with aspirations towards a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

In June 1996, the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU "accepted the principle of standby arrangements and earmarked contingents on a voluntary basis." It was envisaged that such earmarked contingents could serve either under the aegis of the UN or the OAU, or under subregional arrangements. In this regard, the meeting recognised "the need for proper preparation and the standardisation of training." The meeting also "recognised the need for further clarity with regard to the guidelines which apply to possible OAU peacekeeping operations."⁸ By January 1997, OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim had stated that the OAU was seriously considering the creation of its own peacekeeping force which would comprise military units of all member states.⁹

In Article 21 of the SADC Treaty (which deals with areas of co-operation), member states also explicitly agree to co-operate in the area of `politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security'. The content of the political and security `leg' of SADC was established/formalised through a communiqué following the 28 June 1996 Summit Meeting in Gaborone. The communiqué listed an impressive number of objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which included the development of a regional peacekeeping capacity and the co-ordination of participation in peace operations.

As far as South African policy is concerned, regional confidence-building and co-operation have become prominent trends, and peacemaking and conflict prevention are receiving priority consideration. The following guidelines regarding involvement in peace operations are providedin the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa:

There should be parliamentary approval and public support¹⁰ for the peace support operation.



The operation should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council.



Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and undertaken with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU.



The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.



There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.



Involvement in peace support operations can involve the provision of both combat and support troops.

These guidelines are expanded upon in great detail in a Policy Paper on Peace Support Operations, the fifth draft of which is currently under review by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence, and other relevant state departments.

Survey Results

On the question whether South Africa should have a peacekeeping force to send outside the country, almost two-thirds of respondents answered in the affirmative (62 per cent) with only 26 per cent giving a blank `no' to the notion (12 per cent were undecided or `did not know'.) This mirrors rather closely some of the findings of the 1995 survey, where 60 per cent answered in the affirmative, 26 per cent in the negative, and 14 per cent were undecided or `did not know'.

A breakdown according to party-political affiliation of the respondents is presented in Graph 1. The results, broken down by racial groups, are depicted in Graph 2.

Graph 1: Should South Africa have a peacekeeping force to send outside its borders to help other countries maintain peace, according to paty-political affiliation



Graph 2 Should South Africa have a peacekeeping force to send outside its borders to help other countries maintain peace, according to racial groups



It is obvious that the majority of the respondents are in favour of South Africa providing a troop contingent as part of a UN peacekeeping force. Broken down by political party affiliation, supporters of the Democratic Party (DP) and the Freedom Front (FF) were the least favourably inclined towards the participation of a South African contingent in peacekeeping operations (44 per cent and 38 per cent respectively). When broken down into self-chosen racial groups, the respondents responded between two-thirds to 70 per cent in the affirmative for peacekeeping (blacks 66 per cent, coloureds 64 per cent and Asians a marked high 70 per cent), with whites the least favourably inclined less than half (43 per cent) of those interviewed answered `yes'.

When the respondents are broken down into language preference (Graph 3), in answering whether South Africa should have a peacekeeping force for use outside the country, the same basic pattern as above is repeated. All language groups were above 50 per cent in their responses in the affirmative. Xhosa-speaking respondents were the biggest percentage answering `yes' to the question, and Afrikaans-speaking respondents the lowest at just over 50 per cent. The rest of the language groups clustered around 65 per cent.

Graph 3: Should South Africa have a peacekeeping force to send outside its borders to help other countries maintain peace, according to language



When asked where such a force should go, or be deployed, the results are as depicted in Table 1 below.

Differences occurred between the racial groups, with whites the most strongly opposed to any peacekeeping (32 per cent) and Asian and black respondents with a low 9 per cent and 10 per cent respectively opposing the idea of a peacekeeping force.

Strong clustering around deployment of such a peace force was found around the category `anywhere in the world' (black respondents 42 per cent, coloured respondents 41 per cent, Asian respondents 50 per cent and white respondents markedly lower at only 19 per cent). As a second choice, `only in Southern Africa' stood out as the choice of 24 per cent black respondents, 17 per cent coloured respondents and 16 per cent of Asian respondents, with white respondents presenting a strong 30 per cent. Figures for `only other African countries' scored no more than 10 per cent in all groups and much lower (average 1 per cent) for deployment of such a force in `other areas excluding Southern Africa'.

A breakdown according to party political preference of the respondents' choices looks similar with a clustering around `anywhere in the world' (African National Congress (ANC) 46 per cent; Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 41 per cent; Democratic Party (DP) 27 per cent; National Party (NP) 32 per cent and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP )29 per cent). The respondents identifying with the opposition parties on the right and centre right, namely the IFP, NP and the DP scored the lowest in this category when compared to the ANC and PAC-aligned respondents. Similar clustering to the above was found on deployment parameters `only in Southern Africa' (ANC 24 per cent; PAC 27 per cent; DP 17 per cent; NP 26 per cent; IFP 24 per cent).

There is little doubt that, apart from those who are uncertain or not at all in favour of a peacekeeping force, the rest of the respondents in the sample view the deployment, and parameters of such a peacekeeping force as having a bearing on two real issues: deployment `anywhere in the world' (the option chosen by most, namely 38 per cent) or deployment `only in Southern Africa' (24 per cent). (see Table 1). The responses to other deployment options were markedly low. This implies that there would be little public support for the notion of South African participation in a force which is designed exclusively for deployment in African contingencies, if such crises were outside the Southern African subregion.

On the question whether Southern Africa should establish its own peacekeeping force provided that the costs are shared by all partaking governments almost two-thirds of respondents responded `yes', namely 65 per cent, with only 18 per cent non-affirmative and 17 per cent undecided.

The affirmative response to the notion of a Southern African peacekeeping capacity according to racial groupings was: black respondents (67 per cent), coloured respondents (71 per cent), Asian respondents (71 per cent) and white respondents (27 per cent). Just more than a quarter of white respondents (27 per cent) felt that a Southern African peacekeeping capacity should not be considered, while some 18 per cent of black respondents responded in the negative.

When a party-political breakdown is analysed, the majority of respondents supporting all parties, both large and small, were in favour of a regional capacity for participating in peace operations (the cost of participation shared by governments of Southern African countries) (see Graph 4).

Graph 4: If costs were shared by Governments of the region, should Southern Africa establish its own peacekeeping force, by political party?



In response to the question, "If you should qualify, would you personally volunteer for a peacekeeping force to undertake a mission outside the borders of South Africa?", the responses were nearly equally divided between `yes' (35 per cent) and `no' (34 per cent). Only 7 per cent of respondents said that they did not know or were undecided, with 24 per cent of the respondents stating that they would not qualify. Black respondents were the most positive, with 37 per cent indicating that they would volunteer while white respondents appear the least likely to volunteer (only 19 per cent answering in the affirmative). In terms of party identification, the familiar pattern of the ANC and PAC-aligned respondents being by far the most positive (40 per cent and 46 per cent respectively) with the IFP, DP and NP markedly lower at 29 per cent, 29 per cent and 22 per cent respectively, is again evident. It would follow from these findings that volunteers for peacekeeping duties are likely to be younger black persons, rather than white persons. This reflects a broader tendency with regard to attitudes towards voluntary military service discussed in the following section.

Respondents prepared to participate in a multinational peacekeeping endeavour on a part-time basis, were evenly spread. `Very willing' and `willing' accounted for 15 per cent and 24 per cent respectively (total: 39 per cent) while `very unwilling' and `unwilling' accounted for 17 per cent and 27 per cent (total 44 per cent). A mere 9 per cent were undecided, and 9 per cent were neither willing nor unwilling. Respondents seem to have quite firm opinions about the need for and desirability of peacekeeping, yet there is a marked lowering of enthusiasm towards volunteering for such missions on a part-time basis.

If analysed by party political affiliation, voluntary involvement as part of international peacekeeping forces on a part-time basis yields the following results on a Likert scale:

very willing/willing:
ANC supporters 47 per cent,
PAC supporters 49 per cent,
IFP supporters 40 per cent,
DP supporters 23 per cent,
NP supporters 20 per cent, and
FF supporters 18 per cent.



very unwilling/unwilling shows an opposite trend:
ANC supporters 39 per cent,
PAC supporters 37 per cent,
IFP supporters 45 per cent,
DP supporters 49 per cent,
NP supporters 58 per cent, and
FF supporters 54 per cent.

A question was put to respondents on whether they would be personally prepared to volunteer for a peacekeeping force undertaking a mission outside South Africa (part-time military service as the basic assumption).

With the responses of `did not know' or `could not decide' or `not qualified or trained' excluded, respondents reacted as depicted in Graph 5.

Graph 5: Willingness to do part-time military service as part of international peacekeeping force, by racial group



White respondents are the most likely not to want to volunteer for such a force according to their replies, followed by Asian respondents, with black respondents most positive.

When party-aligned or party-identifying respondents responded to the same question with the same exclusions stated above, the results were as depicted in Graph 6.

Graph 6: Willingness to do part-time military service as part of international peacekeeping force, by political party

Conclusion

A strong general support pattern is observed for external roles for the SANDF, including peacekeeping, across population, language and socio-economic groups. The SANDF, respondents appear to argue, should be strong and members should act as both diplomats and defenders, contributing to the national profile and status by means of regional security co-operation and assistance, and by participating in peacekeeping operations. Similar to some findings of the 1995 survey, nearly two-thirds of the respondents are in favour of South Africa sending forces outside the borders of the country to help other countries maintain the peace as part of UN operations.

However, only 3 per cent of those who felt that South Africa still needs a strong defence force (see African Security Review 6(5) on the Image and Future of the Military) motivated their affirmative response on the grounds of the need to provide forces for international peacekeeping. This could either indicate that the majority of respondents see peacekeeping as a desirable, but a secondary area of activity for the SANDF or, more probably, indicates a lack of knowledge regarding the linkage between the `normal' tasks of armed forces and their duties as peace keepers, since the foundation of any effective peacekeeping force is generally accepted as sound conventional military training.

The predominant response of white respondents, namely an unwillingness to volunteer for peacekeeping and participation in external deployment of the SANDF, can perhaps be ascribed to their experiences with the deployment of conscripts in military operations in the Namibian/Angolan theatre. It may also indicate a more parochial outlook towards Africa and the world, one which is reflected in the majority negative responses among supporters of the Freedom Front and Democratic Party towards South African involvement in international peacekeeping endeavours. While Freedom Front responses may indicate a hangover from the years of South African diplomatic isolation, the DP responses are probably motivated more by concern for the utilisation of current and future taxation revenue.

Adherents of all political parties, however, support the establishment of a Southern African capability for participating in peace operations. This reflects the view that the security of South Africans cannot be pursued in isolation from that of our neighbours, and supports the concept of common, or collaborative security in the context of the Southern African region.

Indirectly, the relatively negative responses pertaining to individual willingness to participate in peace operations support the scrapping of conscription in favour of voluntary service for the full range of roles and tasks expected of the SANDF.

Finally, it must be stressed that the term `peacekeeping' has been used in its broadest sense in the Omnibus Survey. From 1948 to 1989, peacekeeping referred to a specific type of operation conducted by multinational forces, mostly under the UN flag, to monitor and observe cease-fire agreements between formerly belligerent states. In recent years, the concept of peacekeeping has been extended and mutated to include a host of third-party interventions and actions ranging from preventive diplomacy to humanitarian assistance and the military enforcement of agreements or UN mandates. The South African public still need to be informed of the true range and implications of future missions which may be launched under the banner of `peacekeeping'.

MILITARY PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION POLICIES, INCLUDING CADETS

Introduction

Although most South Africans are in agreement about the need for a strong defence force which helps neighbouring countries, participates in peacekeeping operations and which includes a vibrant defence industry when it comes to deciding who will do the job, the tendency is to rely on the full-time members of the SANDF. Part-time service in the military does not attract the same support and is fast becoming one of the neglected backwaters of the Department of Defence (DoD).

With the integration of the former statutory and non-statutory forces now rapidly becoming something of the past, the DoD has moved from a system of white male conscription to an all-volunteer force, to be comprised, according to the White Paper on Defence of "... a relatively small Regular Force, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Part-Time Force. The regular component has different categories of employment, including a flexible term service system for uniform members. ... As a result of the shift from a conscript to a volunteer force, the DoD will have to design appropriate strategies to attract a high quality of recruits, secure the required rate of turnover, develop functional and technical skills, and ensure representativeness."¹¹

The present Flexible Service System for the full-time uniform component consists of:

short term service for a maximum of three terms of two years each with a maximum enrolment age of 27 years, which feeds the medium term service system;



medium term service up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel or warrant officer with a minimum of three years and a maximum of ten years service; which feeds the



long term service system.

The Part-Time Force will be staffed as follows:

volunteers from the Reserves who have completed their previous military commitments;


volunteers who leave the full-time uniform component; and


volunteers directly from civilian life who will be trained on a modular basis.

The Part-Time Force of the SANDF includes the Citizen Force and Commando systems of the former South African Defence Force (SADF), and comprises conventional army units, Volunteer Air Squadrons, Naval Reserve Units, Medical Battalion Groups and territorial Army units, all to be composed of volunteers.¹²

Previously, the SANDF provided administrative and logistic support for school cadet training at white schools. The content of such training comprised drill and leadership, and was supplemented by target shooting as a sport and band performances as a military cultural activity. According to the Defence Review, "[s]ince 1993 cadet activities at schools have been optional, voluntary, extra-mural and accessible to all population groups ... By early 1997, 484 schools were still participating in school cadet activities, involving 40 000 pupils made up of approximately 450 drill teams, 240 brass bands and 490 target shooting teams. The figures are declining, however, due to the absence of a clear national policy for school cadets ... The SANDF's currently revised objectives for cadets are to instil a spirit of adventure and enhance the development of leadership amongst the youth; present assertiveness and leadership training and a self-disciplinary activity with an alternative form of recreation; allow the youth to make contact internationally; and provide skills in `home and hearth' protection, first aid and fire prevention."¹³

Thus far little if any public debate has occurred on the future of the part-time forces and the cadets in particular and any discussion on a system of national service for socio-economic or development reasons has been considered to be politically incorrect.

Survey Results

The response to the question on the desirability of compulsory national (but non-military) service for upliftment and general reconstruction/ development purposes is surprisingly positive, given the anti-militarist language that has characterised the South African political discourse in recent years. Nearly half of the respondents, namely 46 per cent, were in favour of non-military compulsory national service, while just over a third of the respondents (36 per cent) were against the notion of compulsory non-military service. Almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of the respondents were undecided or classified themselves as belonging to the `don't know' category. Given the intrusive nature of such service, the willingness among South Africans to participate, is rather surprising, although the poor growth in job opportunities may have contributed to the positive response.

A breakdown of the data according to support for political party is contained in Graph 7.

Graph 7: Desirability of compulsory national service for upliftment, reconstruction and development by party-political affiliation



Thus, less than half of the NP and IFP-aligned respondents felt themselves in support of the notion of compulsory non-military service in contrast to the ANC, PAC and Freedom Front-aligned respondents, among whom the majority or respondents favoured such a system.

Respondents were asked whether they thought that their employers would be willing to release them for part-time duty for up to three months. By far the majority fell in the category `uncertain/don't know', i.e. ANC 48 per cent, PAC 46 per cent, DP 39 per cent, NP 42 per cent, and the IFP 38 per cent, which could point towards the fact that:

these issues, since the de facto scrapping of conscription, are rather seldom discussed in the workplace,



this matter does not have any bearing on the issues that occupy the mind of average white and blue collar workers when compared with bread and butter issues; or



discussion about these issues are seldom advanced, allowed or advocated by employers or work-providers, such as big companies and/or corporations and/or the public sector.

Clearly, additional research is needed on this aspect in order to arrive at reliable data.

In response to the question, "If you qualify, would you volunteer for military service or not?", the most prominent trends are in accordance with party political affiliations as shown in Graph 8. Although the question does not refer to part-time or full-time service, it would probably be mistaken to view the responses as an indication of a preparedness to consider a career in the military.

Graph 8: Respondents' willingness to olunteer for military service



In response to a range of questions on the conditions under which respondents would be willing to do voluntary part-time military service, the following results are noteworthy (see Table 2).

A slight majority of respondents (53 per cent) were willing to be deployed in their own areas. Less than half in fact 47 per cent of respondents were willing to be deployed as part-time military personnel in support of the SAPS. Nearly 40 per cent of the respondents were willing to be deployed in international peace operations, namely 39 per cent. Willingness to be deployed in part-time military roles in emergencies or disasters were 44 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. Only 31 per cent, or less than a third of the respondents in the survey, were willing to be deployed in a part-time military role at `any time'. Uncertainty about deployment rated throughout in all political parties below 10 per cent. The low willingness to do part-time service during war is to be expected since this is ultimately a dangerous experience!

A last question in the category of recruitment and related policies, dealt with the future of the cadet corps/leadership training in secondary schools. This system of para-military preparation for youth (mainly white) was implemented under the National Party Government to advocate the positive image of the defence force of the time, prepare young people (initially only boys/young men, but later piecemeal venturing into a less gender-oriented approach, by including girls/young women in the programme) for military service, broader civic duties or so-called youth preparedness.¹⁴

The concept of leadership training and para-military schooling is not new, and is used in many African states, such as Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso. Yet, it is criticised by many as overt or covert militarisation, or (in)direct political socialisation (read: indoctrination). The more recent trend is away from a para-military orientation to an approach based on adventure training and leadership development.

Based on party political affiliation, when asked whether secondary schools should have a cadet system, leadership development, adventure training and elements of para-military training, respondents reacted as follows:

Graph 9: Should secondary schools have a cadet system, by political affiliation



The data reveal that the majority of respondents are in favour of a cadet/leadership training programme in secondary schools. The `don't know'/'undecided' category showed a 9-10 per cent low clustering, with the lowest `yes' response by those respondents supporting the DP (44 per cent).

However, support for the system cuts across party lines or political affiliation with the ANC-aligned respondents, NP respondents and FF respondents (60 per cent, 70 per cent and 88 per cent respectively) being the most supportive.

It can be argued that these findings still reflect a legacy of militarisation of the youth, or, it could be that different ideals/visions/values underlie the support for cadets. It could also mean that South Africans are generally aware of the future value of leadership training for young people.

Conclusion

Contrary to popular wisdom or the marked public expression of non-militarist sentiments, there seems to be strong support for the notion of maintaining current military capacity, as well a cadet system. In this sense, these findings reinforce those in earlier sections regarding the maintenance of a strong National Defence Force and defence industry.

In response to other questions relating to the need to retain a strong defence force (African Security Review 6(5)), few South Africans (10 per cent) were of the opinion that the SANDF should be strong (i.e. expand its number of personnel) for the purpose of creating jobs. One could therefore argue that South Africans tend towards the view that job creation and development are not primary SANDF tasks, although, as the results here show, there is substantial support for the notion of compulsory non-military service. More importantly, the South African public appear significantly divided on these issues.

The responses regarding willingness to perform voluntary part-time military service reflect the degree of anxiety evident in South African society regarding local safety and security in the neighbourhood, as opposed to in the region.

LABOUR RELATIONS

Introduction

Until 1993, all public service employees were denied the right to join trade unions, to strike, or to bargain collectively with the state as employer. The main reason for restricting the labour rights of state employees is the essential service they render to society. For the security forces, these rights were curbed due to the critical role they play in society in the maintenance of order, stability and national security.

Despite these realities, all public servants with the exception of the essential services departments,¹⁵ were granted basic worker rights under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, No 102 of 1993 on 2 August 1993, after years of labour unrest among state employees. Shortly afterwards, the Department of Correctional Services, which had witnessed an increase in unionisation and labour unrest among prison wardens, requested to be included under the Act. The spill over from the prisons department to the South African Police (SAP) was inevitable, as the Police and Prisons Civil Right Union (POPCRU) represented both police and prisons personnel. Subsequently, the South Africa Police (now South African Police Service) amended the Police Act, No 7 of 1958 to include a section on South African Police Labour Regulations, 1993, which allowed policemen to join trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining, but prohibiting strike action.

In 1995, the entire South African labour relations dispensation underwent review. A new Labour Relations Bill was tabled in February 1995, bringing all employees under one law the private sector, public service, nurses, teachers, agricultural and domestic employees, but initially excluded members of the SANDF, agencies and services established in terms of the Intelligence Services Act, and the SAPS. This exclusion flows from the unique functions they perform and followed the International Labour Organisation (ILO) criteria contained in Convention 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise), Article 9(l) which stipulates that "the extent to which this right can be extended to the armed forces and police be subject to national legislation and regulations." It is thus left to individual states to determine whether they can extend labour rights to their police and armed forces.

However, shortly after the release of this Labour Bill, the SAPS, under pressure from the police unions, requested that they should be included under the new labour dispensation. As a result, the Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 which came into effect on 11 November 1996 includes everyone, with the exception of uniformed members in the SANDF, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service.

The current legislative position is such, that the rights of members of the SANDF to belong to trade unions or partake in trade union activities, or to demonstrate, are curtailed in the Defence Act of 1957, Section 126 A-B. One of the current debates is whether these rights can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed for members of the armed forces.

Survey Results

To the question, "Do you think that members of the SANDF and the police should be allowed to strike or demonstrate?", the respondents' views on both the SAPS and the SANDF having this right, were clearly negative. The majority (60 per cent) were against the SAPS having the right, 32 per cent for and 8 per cent undecided. Similarly, 62 per cent of respondents felt that members of the SANDF should not have the right to demonstrate, 28 per cent supported this right and 10 per cent were undecided. There is slight, but not significantly less support for members of the SANDF to strike or demonstrate (see Table 3).

An analysis of survey results by political party affiliation indicates that the mainly black political parties were more supportive of the right to strike and demonstrate. This could be attributed to the roles played by the trade union movement and demonstrations in the process of obtaining both labour and political rights for the broader populace.

When a cross-tabulation was drawn by income on this question, the lower the income, the less the support for the right to strike or demonstrate, for both the SAPS and SANDF. Women were also slightly less supportive of the right to demonstrate and strike.

Conclusion

On the issue whether members of the security forces should have the right to strike or demonstrate, it was found that respondents did not clearly distinguish between the SANDF and SAPS. Although the responses are slightly more restrained with respect to the SANDF, the public appears to view both security services in the same light. This despite the fact that the new Labour Relations Act lists only the police and parliamentary services as essential services.¹⁶

On the whole, the respondents to this Omnibus Survey reject the right of members of the security forces to demonstrate. This could be due to the essential service they render to society. An even greater concern could be that both the police and armed forces have access to and are trained to use weapons, and society may feel threatened by the possibility that these members may abuse this to obtain their objectives.

It is apparent from the results of this opinion poll that roughly a quarter of respondents supported the view that members of the SAPS and the SANDF should have the right to strike or demonstrate. Should limitations be placed on the rights of policemen and soldiers to strike and demonstrate, suitable alternatives need to be put in place.

CONCLUSION¹⁷

Contrary to popular wisdom or the marked public expression of non-militarist sentiments, there seems to be strong support for maintaining a school cadet system. There is also substantial support for the notion of compulsory non-military service. More importantly, the South African public appear very divided on these issues.

A strong general support pattern is observed for external roles for the SANDF, among them peacekeeping, across population, language and socio-economic groups. Similar to some findings of the 1995 survey, nearly two thirds of the respondents are in favour of South Africa sending forces outside the borders of the country to help other countries maintain the peace as part of UN operations. It needs little repetition that the foundation of any effective peacekeeping force is professional soldiers with sound conventional military training.

Adherents of all political parties also support the establishment of a Southern African capability for participating in peace operations. This reflects the view that the security of South Africans cannot be pursued in isolation from that of our neighbours, and supports the concept of common, or collaborative security in the context of the Southern African region.

The South African public, as represented by the respondents to this Omnibus Survey, is not in favour of granting members of the security forces the right to demonstrate. Should limitations be placed on the rights of policemen and soldiers to strike and demonstrate, suitable alternatives would, however, need to be put in place.

ENDNOTES

Substitution of the visiting point was only allowed for the following reasons: refusal by the selected respondent; empty premises, e.g. no building or occupied structure; nobody on the stand qualified for the survey; after three visits made at different dates and times, the respondent could still not be found at home; respondent could not communicate with the interviewer because of the use of a foreign language; or respondent was not physically/mentally able to be interviewed.



The questionnaire was printed in English and Afrikaans and translated during training into other languages used in the local area.



The co-ordinators were trained between 3 and 4 October 1996 by MarkData in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Gauteng and North West. Clients were invited to attend the training session and to give additional information pertaining to their questions.



Interviewers were recruited to conduct interviews as close as possible to their own residential area. Preference was given to interviewers with prior interviewing experience. Co-ordinators were responsible for the recruitment of the interviewers.

All interviewers had to comply with the following minimum requirements: a matric educational qualification or equivalent; and fully bilingual or multilingual in order to speak the relevant language in a particular fieldwork area.



The co-ordinator's responsibility was to ensure that all the questionnaires sent to MarkData had already been checked for correct completion, and that 20 per cent fieldwork control was done. From the office, a 20 per cent fieldwork control (back check) was done once again on each interviewer's questionnaires. The co-ordinators also supervised the fieldwork process to ensure that the correct procedure was maintained. Details of the fieldwork progress were communicated to MarkData on a regular basis.



Census enumerator areas and similar areas were used as the clusters. The number of respondents drawn per enumerator area was either 4 or 8. All clusters were drawn with probability (a serial sampling procedure was applied).



The factor weights to be applied to the captured data set were derived at the sampling stage. The aim of the factor weights was to correct the disproportions which were incorporated in the sample design. The only weighting targets were the stratification variables: `province' and `socio-economic' category. RIM weighting is generally used in two cases: when the purpose is to weight data according to various characteristics, but the relationship of the intersection of those characteristics is unknown; or when there are not enough respondents to fill all the possible cells (e.g. males who had passed Grade 10, 35-44 years old, employed part-time). As the RIM weighting runs, it attempts to distort each variable as little as possible, while still trying to attain all the desired proportions among the characteristics. The `Root Mean Square' figure was used to determine how much distortion had been introduced.

The following variables were submitted to the RIM weighting procedure at various stages: age; gender; education; employment status; occupation; marital status; language; and population group.

Close examination of outputs suggested that a satisfactory solution cannot be obtained despite the increased number of iterations (too high between the weights ratio) and only `age', `gender', `education' and `population group' variables were retained. RIM weighting targets for the former TBVC states were estimated according to population characteristics drawn from the available Census data. Weighted and unweighted frequencies on all biographical variables are available.



Summary of major recommendations of the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 5 June 1996.



Panafrican News Agency, 6 January 1997.



Own emphasis. While the White Paper correctly refers to the necessity of public support for a particular operation, this survey provides an indication of generic support for peace operations in general.



White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, p. 33.



Defence Review Second Report, Second Draft, 21 February 1997, pp. 85-87.



Ibid., p. 79



In earlier studies, such as the South African Co-operative Research Programme (1993-1994) under chairmanship of Dr F van Zyl Slabbert, with the research co-ordination responsibilities executed by Charles Malan and Johan Olivier of the HSRC, the marked presence of levels of violence and militarisation among South African youth was quantitatively and qualitatively researched and observed. Consult for more information the respective contributions by N J Rhoodie, C D Schutte, C P de Kock, J C R Liebenberg, F Lortan & D M M Ehlers (pp. 399ff), in the published report. See F van Zyl Slabbert, C Malan, et. al., Youth in the New South Africa Towards Policy Formulation: Main Report of the South African Co-operative Research Programme, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1994. These research findings by the co-operative youth programme tie in with similar findings in earlier studies. See for example J Cock & L Nathan (eds.), War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, 1989.



The services departments referred to are the South African Police Service, South African Defence Force and Correctional Services.



A special `essential services committee' has recently reported on which other categories of employment can be classified as essential services, based on the nature of the service and whether a disruption of such services may endanger the lives, personal health and safety of the entire population, or part there of.



The recent Omnibus Survey differed in many respects in the types of questions asked in the Survey conducted last year. Only in a few cases were questions exactly the same. It is therefore not possible to compare the current and past tendencies as they are reflected in the two surveys, and hence argue that the same findings were repeated. Yet, in the very broadest terms, it seems that one can tentatively argue that the respondents in the latest Omnibus Survey tend to be as strongly favourable towards a strong defence posture as is evident from the previous survey results.