INTRODUCTION

The nature and scope of contemporary humanitarian emergencies generated by conflict in Africa continue to exceed the international community's will and capacity to respond. Decision-makers have failed to recognise that the type of interventions which are required, will no longer occur within the context of a system of sovereign states controlled by legitimate and internationally accepted leaders. In many cases, crises occur where beleaguered state governments have lost control over substantial parts of their territories, and no longer have a monopoly of forces and the means of mass violence. The control of armed force often devolves into the hands of a variety of sub-national groupings, and the civilian population becomes the principal target of violence. In such circumstances, the control, division, relocation and even extermination of civilians becomes a primary war aim of opposing forces.2 International interventions, however, have been disabled by reliance on the military doctrines and humanitarian relief conventions of a past era, and peace processes have become a cosmetic activity which is largely irrelevant to the stabilisation needs of crises.3

What is urgently needed, is a clear concept for legitimate, multinational military intervention to end gross abuses of human rights by both governments and non-government actors which cannot be controlled by governments. In particular, the international community needs to develop an appropriate mechanism to respond to genocide and the human suffering caused by violent conflict. Such advocacy obviously flies in the face of the much-vaunted principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. However, it will be argued that both the principle of non-interference and the related concept of sovereignty can no longer be considered in absolute terms, nor can the signatories to the charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity continue to use them as an excuse for inaction when faced by gross crimes against humanity.

The aim of this article is to challenge conventional wisdom on the sanctity of national sovereignty and the dogma of impartiality. It points to a potential swing, away from national or multinational intervention in third-party conflicts, and towards global paralysis. It also examines the basis and validity of the principle of 'non-interference', before commenting on the relationship between international law and the imperative for intervention. In conclusion, a plea is made for revisiting the popularly dismissed notion of moving away from blind adherence to impartiality and accepting that both democratisation and development require a minimum degree of stability in order to succeed.

FROM INTERVENTION TO INACTION

Hoffman4 sees acts of intervention as "acts which try to affect not the external activities, but the domestic affairs of a state." Bull5 has defined intervention as "dictatorial or coercive interference by an outside party in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state or ... an independent political community." In almost every historic age, the existence of revolutionary conditions within states has invoked intervention by strong foreign powers. In this respect, however, the record of the twentieth century has been remarkable. In approximately 200 revolutionary struggles which occurred during the first half of the century, some form of foreign intervention took place in almost half, and half of these again involved intervention by more than one outside power.6 This trend continued during the Cold War era. In the 1960s, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were the dominant interventionists in a number of armed struggles for national political power in the developing world, particularly in Asia. The 1970s saw the same three major military powers also intervening extensively in Africa – at times on different sides in the same internal conflicts, as in Angola, the former Rhodesia, and Eritrea.7

Intervention in the affairs of the South African state from 1948 to 1994 was seen as an essential element of the liberation struggle. Indeed, the retention of exclusive political power by white minorities in Zimbabwe and South Africa was almost universally regarded as a matter of international concern. When the beleaguered white-dominated governments of both these countries denounced the sanctions imposed upon them as an invasion of their sovereignty, international norms were invoked to reject the idea that racism was an internal matter.

Historically, the principle of non-intervention has not been upheld very well. Global and regional powers have intervened in the domestic affairs of weaker states in pursuit or defence of their national interests. Such interests have often been justified in terms of more universal values. Thus, states have proved willing and able to intervene for a number of reasons which today may seem ludicrous: to rid the world of the Muslim anti-Christ, to contain the threat of communism, and to make the world safe for democracy. Intervention was motivated by ideology rather than humanity: ideology which aimed at sustaining or expanding the power of regimes, rather than protecting the rights of humankind.

More recently, there has been growing concern among humanitarian agencies that developments in international humanitarian interventions and new-generation peacekeeping operations are proceeding in directions which subjugate crucial humanitarian principles and human rights values to other political and military objectives.8 Since 1988, the UN Security Council has had to react to international demands to intervene in a number of 'complex emergencies'. A complex emergency may be defined as "a large scale emergency caused wholly or partly by an armed conflict, which tends to combine an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large-scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, resulting in large numbers of displaced persons."9

A central difficulty in reacting to the new demands for humanitarian intervention has been the almost blind assumption that the supremacy of the principle of 'non-interference', as a cornerstone of international law, still holds. The closely associated classical 'peacekeeping principle' of consent has served as lode stone and guideline for action (or inaction). The Security Council has therefore proved willing to authorise multinational intervention in humanitarian crises caused by conflict only where the consent of the major parties to such conflicts has been obtained.

In contemporary humanitarian crises, however, it has been increasingly difficult to depend on consent as a prerequisite for intervention. In many cases, it is impossible to obtain consent because authority has collapsed, or consent has become meaningless because of a proliferation of groups claiming authority. In such circumstances, agreements are either non-existent or worthless, and international law and conventions are openly flouted. Indeed, the new 'peacekeeping' environment has fundamentally challenged the concept and quality of 'consent' as a prerequisite for meaningful intervention. Yet, even when limited military intervention for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid is being considered, the consent of governments and warring parties is still considered a prerequisite for such intervention.

For example, after a slow response to the suffering and fighting which had engulfed Somalia since early 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 733 in January 1992, which asked for the consent of the warring parties to humanitarian intervention. In December 1992, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 46/182, which aimed to improve the UN's co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. However, the opposition of the 'Group of 77' (developing/ non-aligned countries) against any encroachments on 'national sovereignty' watered down this initiative, and they continue to argue against international efforts to develop humanitarian-based rights to intervention.10 Despite the lessons of Somalia, the issues of non-interference, sovereignty and consent have continued to constrain the nature and scope of international and regional responses to contemporary crises in Africa.

At least 150 000 Burundians have died in ethnic violence since October 1993. In neighbouring Rwanda, a four-year UN peacekeeping operation failed to halt an ethnic genocide that resulted in between 500 000 and one million deaths. During the holocaust which lasted from April to July 1994, Hutu extremists "systematically hacked down, shot and blew up tens of thousands of Tutsis and Hutu moderates."11 Despite obvious indications that Burundi is headed for a fate similar to that of Rwanda, the world has been slow to respond to the deepening crisis in the tiny central African state. By May 1996, the UN Secretary-General had expressed the opinion that the type of emergency deployment which would be necessary to halt the killing in Burundi was beyond the capacity of the UN, and that a multinational intervention force was thus needed. But his idea of an operation in Burundi failed to win the support of key Security Council members, such as Britain and France.12

The crisis in Burundi was soon neglected as the plight of Rwandan refugees trapped in conflict in eastern Zaire gained widespread media coverage at the end of 1996. The Zairian emergency re-emphasised the need for the development of an efficient system for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate human suffering. But non-interference remained a holy cow, with the Zairian Government setting conditions for the deployment of an intervention force designed to deliver humanitarian assistance to refugees from neighbouring Rwanda. It insisted on approving the nations which were to participate in a Canadian-led multinational force, and reserved the right to refuse certain countries entry to Zairian soil.13 Moreover, US participation in the intervention force was contingent upon the securing of commitments by Zaire and Rwanda not to interfere with the mission, as well as the acquiescence and co-operation of the rebel forces involved.14 Although the perceived need for the Canadian-led mission had dissipated by the end of 1996, with the voluntary return of thousands of refugees to Rwanda following a lull in hostilities, Zaire was soon to erupt into full-scale civil war. Beyond a renewed spurt of diplomatic activity at the level of both the OAU and the UN, there was no sign of international intervention to halt the conflict. But there were reports of a mercenary force supporting the government troops (with soldiers recruited from Belgium, France, Serbia and Croatia), while Kinshasa claimed that Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire was being supported by troops from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and mercenaries from Eritria, Ethiopia and Somalia.15 Certain actors, it seems, will always be ready to ignore the principle of non-interference.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE

According to the Bonn Declaration, the concept of human security implies the "absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture." In the African context, the most salient of such threats emanate from violent ethno-political internal conflict, small arms proliferation, the displacement of people, hunger, poverty, environmental degradation, crime and corruption. The prevalence of such threats on the continent is often caused or magnified by poor governance, including a tendency towards military intervention in the political process, and the disintegration of national armies. However, the state and military strength remain the primary focus of security thinking, despite significant academic recognition of the need for new security thinking in the post Cold War world. Booth,16 for example, has argued for a conceptual redefinition of security which recognises that people should be the primary referent of security thinking, and that this allows for the identification of threats to human security that emerge at subnational, national and transnational levels.

Multinational intervention in the affairs of states in order to alleviate human suffering in Africa requires, at the level of the UN Security Council, the OAU, and of individual heads of state and government, some acceptance of the validity of the concept of human security, if not formal acknowledgement of its primacy over state or regime security in the post-Cold War era. That such acceptance has not been forthcoming (beyond some lip service) may perhaps be ascribed to the preoccupation and intentions of the founding fathers of the UN and the OAU, and the subsequent wording of the charters of these two bodies.

The preamble to the UN Charter includes a determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." One of the four purposes of the Organisation, as stated in Article 1 of the Charter, is "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

Despite the implicit recognition of the validity of the concept of human security found in these elements, the remainder of the UN Charter deals predominantly with the security of states, rather than people. For example, as stated in Article 2, the first principle of the UN is that "[t]he Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members", which are signatory states. The seventh and final principle articulated in this Article states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..."

The preamble to the OAU Charter, signed in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963, also indicates some awareness of the validity of the concept of human security. The signatory Heads of African States and Government stated, among others, that they were:

convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny;



conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;



inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger entity transcending ethnic and national differences;



convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions of peace and security must be established and maintained; and



desirous that all African states should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured.

Yet, the purposes of the OAU, as stipulated in Article 2 of the Charter, have a strong state-centric bias, including:

to promote the unity and solidarity of African states; and


to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.

This is reinforced by the first three principles of the Organisation, as articulated in Article 3 of the OAU Charter, where Member states, in pursuance of the purposes stated in Article 2, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

the sovereign equality of all member states;



non-interference in the internal affairs of states; and



respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.

In Article 6 of the Charter, "[a]ll Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article 3 of the present charter." No mention is made in Article 3 of human rights in any form, but states are granted 'inalienable rights' to independent existence. Thus, the principles upon which the OAU has been founded, and continues to function, are based on the notion of sovereignty rather than human security.

The theory of sovereignty implies that a state cannot be ruled from outside, but that the main decisions about its actions must come from within it. Sovereignty means the power to make decisions of last resort, which cannot be overridden or reversed by any other decision-maker or agency.16 In a world of states characterised by permeable boundaries, mass communications, interdependent economies, and a fragile ecology, the concept of sovereignty has indeed become a relative one, even for the major powers.

Yet, the legal doctrine of sovereignty stresses relative independence from the outside world in its extreme form: a state is considered sovereign if it obeys no laws or commands from outside itself, except those it accepts voluntarily by its own internal decision process. But to control their own affairs, governments must first be able to control their own behaviour.18 This implies that, in order to enjoy sovereignty, governments must also enjoy legitimacy.

Legitimacy is, in the broadest sense, a collective judgement that attributes the qualities of 'goodness' or 'morality' or 'righteousness' to behaviour.19 According to Lawson, "[l]egitimacy is the condition of being considered to be correctly placed in a particular role and to be carrying out the functions of that role correctly. Political legitimacy means having widespread approval for the way one exercises political power."20 In a sense, legitimacy presupposes legality, or the existence of a legal system and of a power of issuing orders according to its rules.21 When the total legal order has lost its efficacy, a new legitimacy must be sought, as the principle of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of effectiveness.22

Surely those states which are totally dependent for their survival on external aid and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans (predicated on the structural adjustment of their economies) have lost considerable power to make decisions of last resort, and with it the right to invoke the principle of sovereignty when confronted by international indignation over human rights violations. And those governments which have lost control over their armed forces, or which allow their armed forces to massacre civilians, have surely lost the last vestiges of legitimacy, in the eyes of their subjects, as well as those of the international community. National armed forces have historically been a major symbol of national sovereignty and pride, but when a few hundred foreign mercenaries can turn the tide of internal wars (as in Angola and Sierra Leone), there can surely be neither sovereignty nor pride.

It is difficult to comprehend how acts of genocide and other gross human rights abuses can be considered "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Moreover, the remainder of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter states that "... this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." The latter (Article 39) holds that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." Such measures, according to Article 42, may include " ... such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

According to the International Peace Academy, peace is "[a] condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence." Direct violence is, in turn, defined as "a condition that exists when human beings deliberately kill or physically injure other human beings", while indirect violence is "a condition which exists when the physical and psychological conditions of some groups, classes or states is inferior to that of others."23 The latter condition means that there is little peace on this earth, for there is inequality in all states and social systems. However, the Security Council must surely be obliged, in terms of the Charter, to declare a threat to the peace when human beings deliberately kill or physically injure other human beings on a massive scale, and to authorise effective intervention in order to terminate such actions.

And when a national legal order has lost its efficacy, to the extent that it no longer protects the citizenry from the grossest of human rights abuses, a higher body of law should be invoked – international law – at least until a new legitimacy has been established at the national level. The problem, however, is that the efficacy of international law itself is widely doubted, and the will to act is often sadly lacking.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In most societies, certain kinds of killing (even mass killing) are accepted without the legitimacy of such actions being questioned. For example, the slaughter of livestock or the elimination of millions of insects with pesticides are not generally considered acts of violence, or in any way illegitimate, because the lives of both are devalued. But it is frightening to note that there have been numerous instances throughout history where human beings have also been devalued or bestialised, and where violence against them has been regarded in much the same way as violence against non-human beings (slaves, women, heathens, and members of certain ethnic, religious and racial groups). Dehumanisation facilitates the participation of human beings in violence with minimal qualms about morality or legitimacy, and the devaluation of human beings against whom violence is perpetrated obviates the need for justifications of violence.24 While such dehumanisation may be accomplished through the process of indoctrination and socialisation within particular states, the remainder of the international community should not be immunised by the process. Moreover, the victims of such treatment should have recourse to international law.

However, the current body of international law is predominantly "a system of agreements between independent and sovereign collectivities, usually states that defines how relations between and among them will be conducted."25 But a system of international law thus conceptualised, has proved more effective in restraining the behaviour of states towards other states than it has in restraining the behaviour of states towards their own citizens. For example, even when faced with defeat, Nazi Germany refrained from using poison gas against the Allies, although it had shown no compunction about using it against its own Jewish citizens.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists the sources of international law as:

international conventions in force between parties;


international customary rules;


general principles of international law; and


such subsidiary sources as prior judicial decisions.

The violation of human rights is legitimately an international concern, affirmed by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Accords. When a norm is given such overwhelming international approval, a government cannot legitimately charge a violation of sovereignty where it has abused or allowed the abuse of human rights, in clear violation of international law.

While the limited efficacy of international law must be accepted, so to must its merits. As Papp26 has observed: "International law is a sometimes successful, sometimes futile, instrument that international actors use to reduce the level of violence, conflict and disagreement in the complicated world system." The principle of humanity, as codified in international law and practice, demands that people be treated humanely in all circumstances, and that everything possible be done to alleviate human suffering and to assure respect for the individual. The dictates of humanity should be the essential starting point for the development of an international capacity for humanitarian intervention, for "the UN is under moral and legal duty to defend, uphold and apply the principle of humanity wherever and whenever possible."27

International law, as an effective restraint on the behaviour of governments, requires not merely the existence of legal principles, but also the willingness of governments to comply with them. Compliance, or non-compliance, is a function of several factors, including:

the subject matter that law seeks to regulate;


changes in the motives and needs of government; and


the ability of states to violate the law without serious threat of sanctions.28

While the basis of international law may lie in multinational consensus, each of the above factors are subjected to the political judgement of national governments. While it may be expected that such judgements may, in many instances, err on the side of non-compliance on issues of international law relating to arms control and disarmament, the 'new international economic order', and the law of the sea, it is difficult to accept or justify judgements which amount to non-compliance with international humanitarian law in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, states remain extremely reluctant to invoke the full force of international law to address issues which are not perceived as directly related to their national interests and related foreign policy guidelines, and this is reflected in their doctrines on military intervention.

Various national doctrines on military intervention which are too restrictive may amount to "a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis."29 According to Levine,30 "[h]uman rights must be an objective of foreign policy. Self-professed realists in international politics display a cynicism in analysing foreign policy which makes them overlook the realism of moral purpose as an objective of diplomacy." This does not imply that governments should pursue an absolutist human rights foreign policy, but rather that they should not be indifferent to acts such as the extermination of Jews by Hitler, the liquidation of Cambodian people by Pol Pot, the terror imposed by Idi Amin on the people of Uganda, or the wholesale slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. An activist human rights policy is needed to eliminate or limit evils such as these. But this must also be linked to the will and capacity to implement such policy.

National policy guidelines for participation in multinational interventions continue to stress the need for a 'comprehensive and lasting solution' as a precondition for involvement. But there are strong arguments for a far more modest assessment of the attainable capabilities of intervention.

"[T]he notion of a standing UN force is contentious. The arguments for such a force, however, have their basis in the horrific inter-tribal slaughters in Rwanda and Burundi. If the UN had at its disposal even a small, rapidly-deployable constabulary force of lightly-armed troops, it might have been able to prevent this new chapter in man's cruelty to man. Indeed, the speed with which such a force could be deployed may be more important than its tactical proficiency, which may need to be only marginally better than rag-tag local forces to have a profound effect."31

Although the transformation of a state which is engulfed in civil war, for example, is more than can be expected, an intervention force may be able to achieve goals which, though relatively modest in relation to the conflict situation as a whole, can nonetheless ameliorate conditions significantly for a large number of people. As Clapham32 has noted, "[t]he essential requirement for any would-be interventionist is to take a hard-headed approach to the situation, and disregard outcomes that result from mere wishful thinking."

CONCLUSION

There appears to be no legal constraint on multinational military intervention to provide humanitarian assistance or to halt the gross abuse of human rights, with or without the consent of governments and subnational actors which are either directly or indirectly the cause of such human suffering. There is no need to amend the UN Charter, or any other aspect of international law in order to legitimise such interventions. What is needed, however, is political will on the part of the Security Council to interpret international law more appropriately, and the commitment of member states of the UN and/or regional organisations to provide the means for upholding or enforcing the law thus interpreted. There can be no doubt that these means exist. Just about every state in the international system maintains armed forces for the purported primary purpose of defending against an armed invasion of the territory of the state. Yet, the majority of states are not at war, nor are they likely to be in the near future. In the interim, their collective military assets are under-utilised, with thousands of soldiers being trained and retrained for a war which they will probably never fight. Such forces could be gainfully employed in the service of a higher cause than safeguarding the 'sovereignty' of a particular state – in operations designed to safeguard humanity from the abuses of the inhumane.

The will to do this must also be backed by a clear concept of operations for such interventions, one which recognises that the 'search for diplomatic solutions' may be endless when dealing with undiplomatic and inhumane armed thugs, and that the threat or use of a measure of force is inevitable when dealing with looters, rapists and murderers. In short, a concept for enforcement is needed – not 'peace enforcement', for this has eluded both definition and conceptualisation since it was first coined by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 – but law enforcement, something which is known throughout the world and which has been practised effectively for centuries. Effective intervention in future humanitarian crises caused by violence and affecting innocent human beings requires that an urgent effort be made to develop a system of international law enforcement. While this has admittedly proved problematic in the extreme with regard to that body of international law which regulates aspects such as economic relations among states, there is no morally justifiable reason why this should continue to be the case with blatant crimes against humanity.

Like white collar crime, political skulduggery is notoriously difficult to detect and even more difficult to prosecute. This is the realm of 'diplomatic solutions', of countless and meaningless Arusha decisions. On the other hand, there is nothing subtle about common, violent crime which is blatantly committed by armed groups in full view of the international media. There should be nothing subtle about the prosecution of the perpetrators of such crimes. This is the realm of multinational military intervention.

In the absence of a meaningful concept for multinational military intervention, Africa will continue to be a continent steeped in crises which are marked by unco-ordinated, unauthorised, unilateral interventions – not only by individual governments, but also by mercenary organisations, multinational corporations, and an agglomeration of NGOs and aid agencies. If such actors can so easily circumvent the principle of non-interference, why do legitimate international bodies such as the UN and the OAU continue to revere the principle to the point of paralysis? It is time to face the fact that orthodox international peacekeeping is an outmoded and inappropriate response to contemporary African crises. It needs to be augmented by a concept for international law enforcement, which includes aspects such as the 'coercive disarmament' of those who have no conceivable right to bear or use arms. Violent internal conflicts in Africa may have complex root causes, but they find expression in military terms: killing and maiming. Surely military means can be used to doctor these symptoms, while the search for a more lasting cure continues?

ENDNOTES

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project which is sponsored by the Norwegian Government and supported by the Norwegian Institute for Interantionall Affairs (NUPI).



J Mackinlay, International Responses to Complex Emergencies: Why a New Approach is Needed, International Peacekeeping News, 2(5), 1996, p. 36.



Ibid, p. 37.



S Hoffman, The Problem of Intervention, in H Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 10.



Bull, Ibid., p. 1.



K J Holsti, International Politics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1983, pp. 242-243.



J E Dougherty and R L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, Harper and Row, New York, 1981, p. 327.



C Cushing, Humanitarian Assistance and the Role of NGOs, Centre for Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1995.



Quoted in Cushing, Ibid., p. 8.



Ibid.



All Africa Press Service, 24 April 1996.



Agence France-Presse International News, 7 May 1996.



Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 November 1996, p. 3.



New York Times, 14 November 1996.



The Star, 28 and 30 January 1997.



K Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations, Southern African Perspectives, 30, 1994, p. 3.



K Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1980, p. 21.



Ibid, p. 166.



S Ball-Rokeach, The Legitimation of Violence, in J F Short and M E Wolfgang (eds.), Collective Violence, Aldine Atherton, Chicago, 1972, p. 101.



K Lawson, The Human Polity: An Introduction to Political Science, Hughton Mifflin, Boston, 1989, p. 41.



A P d'Entrèves, The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Poitical Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 141.



Ibid., p. 147.



International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook, Pergamon, New York, 1984, p. 7.



Ball-Rokeach, Ibid., p. 106.



D S Papp, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 392.



Ibid., pp. 403-404.



J O C Jonah, Developing a United Nations Capacity for Humanitarian Support Operations, in L Gordenker and T G Weiss (eds.), Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters, MacMillan/International Peace Academy, London, 1991, p. 82.



W Jones and S Rosen, The Logic of International Relations, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1982, p. 455



Former US Secretary of State, George Schultz, commenting on the criteria for the use of force enunciated in 1984 by Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Quoted in C Stevenson, The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force, Armed Forces and Society, 22(4), 1996, p. 515.



H M Levine, Political Issues Debated, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1982, p. 270.



Peacekeeping Perils and Prospects: "The Big Ten" Lessons Learned from Recent Operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, report on observations from two BENS-sponsored symposia on peacekeeping (29 September, 1995, New York; 26 October 1995, Boston), January 1996.



C Clapham, Problems of Peace Enforcement: Some Lessons from Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, in J Cilliers and G Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, vol 2, Institute for Security Studies and South African Institute for International Affairs, Halfway House,1995, p. 151.