INTRODUCTION

A second collaborative project on public opinion on security related aspects between the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has been undertaken last year. The previous survey was conducted in May 1995 and the results distributed in August 1995. The fieldwork for the second survey was conducted in October 1996. The 1995 survey covered the following aspects: attitudes towards South African participation in peacekeeping operations, unionisation within the emergency services, threat perceptions among South Africans, the role of women in the police and military in various circumstances, part-time military service, demobilisation and the future of the commando's (territorial forces).

At the time, the 1995 survey was the first national public survey to investigate and report on South African attitudes towards security issues since the 1994 elections and received extensive media coverage. The second survey has followed on and built upon the results of the 1995 survey, although quite a number of questions were refined and changed where circumstances deemed such changes to be appropriate.

The 1996 survey questions can be grouped into a broadly similar number of subject areas. This article presents only the results of public attitudes regarding two issues, namely women in the military and police and language policy in the SANDF. Subsequent articles will present the findings on the image and future of the military, the image of the defence industry, peacekeeping and military recruitment issues, labour relations in the military, migration and policing/crime issues.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The HSRC Omnibus survey is done quarterly and its purpose is to give clients an opportunity to participate in a national survey at a low cost. The questions relating to the security services which were included in this survey were the result of two workshops between members of the HSRC and ISS which were held during August/September 1996. The core questions regarding security were originally the same as those which were used during 1995, but amended where appropriate.

Two separate questionnaires were administered during this survey to two probability samples of 2 200 respondents each. Every effort was made to ensure that the data was representative of the South African population.

The fieldwork for the survey was conducted nationally from 7 to 28 October 1996. The data was collected by specially trained interviewers using structured questionnaires during some 2 200 personal, face-to-face interviews. Interviews were often done after hours to ensure that the respondent that had been drawn, was present. If the specific individual was not at home during the first visit, but was available during the fieldwork period, an appointment was made and the person concerned, revisited. If nobody in the household qualified, or was available during the fieldwork period, the household was substituted.1

Interviews were furthermore conducted in the respondents' choice of language.2

Trained co-ordinators, appointed by MarkData, were allocated to different regions in order to co-ordinate the fieldwork (data collection).3 Each co-ordinator was responsible for a group of interviewers which were recruited under close supervision and subsequently briefed according to specific instructions given by MarkData.4 The sample design was initiated by Prof Laurence Schlemmer, Ms Tertia van der Walt and Dr Mathilda du Toit and formalised by Mr B Vukasovic. The capturing, processing and verification of the data was done by the Computer Centre of the HSRC.5

The sample allocation for the survey was done proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures with a few exceptions.6 The visiting points were drawn by means of multiple stage cluster, probability sample design. The household and respondents were selected with a random grid from qualifying household members.

The universe for this sample design was all South African residents of 18 years and older. All nine provinces were included in the survey, with care taken to include both rural and urban areas. The socio-economic classification of the respondents was represented as follows: tribal, traditional, rural in former self-governing areas and TBVC states; squatter areas, urban (metropolitan and non metropolitan); hostels, hotels, boarding schools etc., in urban areas (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for so-called Coloureds (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for Asians (metropolitan and non metropolitan); former townships for Blacks (metropolitan and non metropolitan); towns and cities (non metropolitan); towns and cities including flats (metropolitan); and rural areas (excluding the former self-governing areas and TBVC states).

An additional sub-sample was introduced for live-in domestic and other workers, based on the incidence of households employing domestic workers as found in previous Omnibus surveys. Domestic workers who formed part of the main sample (e.g. those living at home) were interviewed as such.

Disproportion was introduced to give a minimum number of 120 respondents per province. The minimum number of Asians in the overall sample was fixed at 120.7 The sample realisation for this Omnibus survey was one hundred per cent and no major obstacles were encountered during the fieldwork.

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Background

There is a great variation among states (as opposed to guerrilla movements) in the extent to which women serve in the armed forces.8 Some countries exclude all women, others allow limited involvement, and others have opened up all or the majority of military positions to women. Historically, those nations that have permitted women to participate in combat (the former Soviet Union, Germany and Israel) have done so only because of grave threats to their national survival. After the crisis passed, each country adopted policies which excluded the employment of women in combat. In more recent times, countries that have tested integrating women in ground combat units have found such tests rather unsuccessful.9 In contrast, women often form part of guerrilla movements during insurgency wars, as in the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe – but generally such policies are dropped once these movements come power. With recent pronouncements on the issue of gender equality in the military, the South African Department of Defence (DoD) has embarked boldly upon a road few national armed forces have thus far travelled, and upon which few appear willing to travel.

It was only in 1970 that women were permitted to join the South African permanent force. The primary motivation for recruiting women was the shortage of qualified white males and the need to release white men for operational duties. From this period until just prior to the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), women served in a variety of support roles. It was only in 1994, in line with the constitutional provisions which forbid discrimination on the grounds of race or gender, that military policy guidelines were issued to allow women to be trained and employed on the same basis as men in the SANDF. Since then, the military career paths of women have been the same as those of men. Women are subject to the same selection and training procedures and no posts are exclusively reserved for men. In addition to the traditional support musterings, all combat musterings are now accessible to women.

Presently, with the emphasis on equality and representivity, a concerted effort is being made to increase the number of women in senior positions and at all decision-making levels in all the arms of service.10 The White Paper on Defence commits the DoD to "... overcoming the legacy of racial and gender discrimination ... The DoD acknowledges the right of women to serve in all ranks and positions, including combat roles ... To this end the Minister will establish a joint working group on affirmative action and equal opportunity within the DoD ... The Minister will present to Parliament detailed plans on the equal opportunity and affirmative action programme in the DoD. The Minister will report annually to Parliament on the progress made in implementing the programme."11 Current thinking in the Defence Review process indicates that more training opportunities should be made available for female recruits, so that the number of women at senior rank levels can be increased.12 In fact, by 1997, the DoD has made impressive strides – within the Department as a whole some 18 per cent of personnel are women (out of a total of 98 806, while 8 609 of the 76 616 persons within the SANDF are women.13 Yet, the process has been problematic. Although "... women can now serve in all uniformed posts throughout the SANDF ... [p]roblems associated with retaining the services of women to bring them in line for senior appointments include aspects such as day-care for young children and family disruption when both parents are serving members and have to attend long courses or be deployed away from home."14

Despite the formal provisions that stipulate that women have an open career path in the military, there still appears to be popular resistance to women serving in combat positions within the military. This reservation often rests on the perceived unsuitability of women for combat roles. Such perceptions are revealed by questions such as: War involves the risk of death and are women not more vulnerable to attack? What will happen to women soldiers if they are captured by the enemy? Women have to deal with certain physical realities and does this not hinder performance in combats? Although very little research has been done on the topic, many claim that women are biologically less suited to combat. Others profess that women may undermine combat (read 'male') bonding and cohesion, which could affect combat effectiveness.

Perhaps the single most comprehensive study yet completed on the issue of women in the military was that of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces which was submitted to the President of the United States on 15 November 1992, following the involvement of some 40 000 American military women in the Gulf War.15 The analysis and recommendations presented by the Commission illustrate the complexity and sensitivity of issues surrounding the involvement of women in combat. The recommendations of the Commission deal at length with a large variety of issues: quotas and goals; voluntary versus involuntary duty; fitness/wellness standards; occupational physical requirements; basic training standards; pre-commissioning standards; gender-related occupational standards; parental and family policy; pregnancy and deployment policies; combat roles for women; ground combat; combat aircraft; combatant vessels; special operations; risk rule; transition process; and conscription.

By comparison, the recent shifts in South African policy have been remarkable in their simplicity and boldness, perhaps riding roughshod over a number of complex issues which may have benefited from more in-depth research. In America, for example, it has been argued that: "[t]he case against women in ground combat is compelling and conclusive. The physiological differences between men and women are most stark when compared to ground combat tasks. This is underscored by the evidence that there are few women, especially enlisted women, interested in serving in ground combat specialities. The overriding importance of small unit cohesion to ground military success, and the unknown but probably negative effect that the presence of women would have in those units were of critical concern to most Commissioners. Several polls [in the US] revealed in most convincing terms that the public and military, especially the military people most familiar with its rigours, were fundamentally opposed to women in ground combat. The weight of international experience with women in ground combat units provides no conclusive evidence supporting the assignment of women in ground combat units."16

South Africa is, of course, not the US, although, as the following sections illustrate, public opinion on these issues appear to be remarkably similar. So, one would expect, would be the opinions of professional soldiers.

Survey Results

To the question "whether women should be allowed to volunteer for combat duty", a slightly greater proportion of respondents (48 per cent) were against women in combat positions, compared to 46 per cent who expressed themselves in favour (6 per cent undecided).

If these responses are broken down by political party support, some interesting findings emerge. The political parties with a predominately white support base are significantly more supportive of women volunteering for combat positions. For example, 62 per cent of the Freedom Front (FF), 56 per cent of the Democratic Party (DP) 47 per cent of National Party (NP) and 46% of ANC supporters agreed that women should be allowed to volunteer for combat duty. Only 40% per cent of PAC and 42% of IFP supporters agreed that women should be allowed to serve in a combat role. (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Should women be allowed to volunteer for combat duty by political party support



These findings are unexpected, particularly if one considers the important role women performed in the former armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the strong role that many ANC women leaders are currently playing at a national level, as well as in the advancement of women's rights. For the remainder, it appears as if the majority of respondents accept that women should be given the choice as to whether they wish to volunteer for combatant roles.

Similar responses were identified in the analyses of this question by race. Whites were by far the most supportive of women in combat roles (60 per cent), followed by Asians (47 per cent), blacks (45 per cent) and coloureds (37 per cent) (see Table 1).

To the question, "Should women be allowed to volunteer for combat duty (fighting a war) or not?", the response (by gender) was as depicted in Figure 2.

A slightly higher percentage of females than males responded in the affirmative when asked about the voluntary deployment of women in combat (48 per cent versus 46 per cent). Slightly fewer females answered in the negative to this question in the survey with 47 per cent giving voluntary combat deployment for women a blank "No" as against 50 per cent of their male counterparts. Those that were uncertain or responded with a "Do not Know", were markedly low at around 5 per cent, with little difference between the genders (males 5 per cent and females 6 per cent).

Figure 2: Should women be allowed to volunteer for combat duty by gender



There appears therefore to be little difference in attitude on this issue by gender. Women are slightly more supportive at 48 per cent than men at 46 per cent. As is to be expected, the higher the level of education, the greater the support for women to be allowed to volunteer for combat duty, and the more sure the respondents were on the issue of whether or not women should be allowed to volunteer for combat functions.

A problem in the interpretation of the research results regarding this question, is that the exact definition of combat is open-ended. The US Presidential Commission public opinion surveys found, for example, that public opinion was complex and divided. Women combat pilots are, for example, more publicly 'acceptable' than women infantry soldiers. The US Commission subsequently recommended that, "[m]ilitary readiness should be the driving concern regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances under which women might be assigned to combat positions. [But] ... women should be excluded from direct land combat units and positions. ... In addressing the issue, the Commission found the effectiveness of ground units to be the most significant criterion."17

Besides the question relating to women in combat positions in the military, a number of questions were posed with respect to the role of women in the South African Police Service (SAPS). The question was asked "whether women should be allowed to do police patrols in dangerous areas." Almost two thirds of the respondents (65 per cent) were of the opinion that women should not be allowed to do police patrols in dangerous areas, while 30 per cent were of the opposite opinion. Less than 5 per cent of respondents were undecided on this issue. There appeared to be general consensus (72 per cent of all respondents) that, should women be deployed in dangerous areas, they should be accompanied by a male. (If it were not that half of the respondents were women, these findings could have been seen as sexist!) See Tables 3 to 5 below.

As with the other questions, the responses to women patrolling in dangerous areas were analysed by political party support. Except for the supporters of the DP, all other party supporters were strongly in favour of women not being allowed to police areas perceived as dangerous. The strongest opposition came from IFP supporters, of whom 76 per cent were opposed, followed by the PAC with 72 per cent, the Conservative Party with 67 per cent, and the ANC with 66 per cent.

The responses by race to this question correlate with the above findings, Blacks were most opposed at 68 per cent (27 per cent for), followed by coloureds at 64 per cent (31 per cent for), Asians at 61 per cent (38 per cent for) and whites at 54 per cent (43 per cent for). Opinions on this issue, therefore, are least divisive within the black community and most divided within the white community. Although whites may still be relatively sheltered from the violence and crime faced by the majority of blacks in their daily lives in the former exclusively black townships, it is evident that black respondents are much more reserved on this issue than any other racial community.

Interpretation

While the DoD has accepted the full integration of women and men at all levels, this is a complex and challenging human resource issue and one which will remain in the public eye for many years to come. Much less ambitious, but well-researched and careful programmes remain controversial elsewhere, for example in the US.

The responses to the questions on whether women should be allowed to volunteer for combat duty seem to indicate that, while past stereotypes may remain for some time, there is a feeling that women have the right to choose whether they wish to serve in the front-line. The most significant finding is that this support is lowest among supporters of the ANC and within the black community as a whole. The question that follows from this finding is: if women who have joined the military have the right to volunteer for a combat appointment, should the assignment of men to combat positions also be based on individual choice? The US Presidential Commission was succinct in its view on this issue: "Men can be involuntarily assigned to any position in the Service, and women can be involuntarily assigned to any position open to them based on the needs of the Services. The Armed Forces have never had a 'voluntary assignment policy.' Such a concept would hinder combat readiness and effectiveness ..."18 It could be argued that any different policy in South Africa would also be unconstitutional.

Regarding the deployment of women in the police in dangerous areas, there appears to be general consensus that women should not be used in dangerous areas. If they are to do patrols in these locations, they should be accompanied by a male. The findings of the opinions of women in combat positions in the military and women facing dangerous conditions in the police, almost create the impression that respondents view police patrols potentially more threatening than women being deployed in a combat role. It is to be expected that responses to this question would be very different if there was a high external threat perception to the country, and women were expected to be deployed to the front-line. It would possibly be accurate to argue that police duty in South Africa is presently the most dangerous occupation available to an individual.

The current legislature and gender-oriented caucuses should take note of the high proportion of respondents opposed to equal participation of women in the armed services. The opposition is found in respondents' rejection of women taking part in police patrols in dangerous areas, as well as in respondents' rejection of women doing active military duty in the front-lines. Nevertheless, more than three-quarters of the respondents are in favour of recruiting more women into the armed services.

In conclusion, it is apparent that South African public opinion does not support the carte blanche deployment of women in dangerous situations, such as police patrols and in combat musterings within the SANDF. Government policy in this regard should therefore remain sensitive to the broader public attitudes, as well as to international trends.

One particular area deserving further research would be that relating to the opinions of women soldiers to combat duty. Research conducted in the US, for example, indicated that only some 12 per cent of enlisted women and 10 per cent of female non-commissioned officers surveyed, said that they would consider serving in the combat arms (infantry, armour, artillery and combat engineers).19

LANGUAGE IN THE SANDF

Background

Clear communication is a prerequisite for military operations which require the accurate and specific transfer of commands and information as rapidly as possible in a situation which may be life-threatening. Military formations throughout the world, therefore, have developed an extensive vocabulary of specific terms and 'shorthand' to cover a wide contingency of events and categories of information. Training and the conduct of operations, furthermore, are closely interlinked. Since training should simulate and resemble the conduct of operations, it must occur through the same language as operations. Therefore, peacetime command and control, training manuals, etc. should be standardised in the interests of optimal operational results. With up to 60 per cent of the career life of an SANDF officer spent on formal training, training is highly formalised and backed up with manuals, both technical and tactical. This requires terminology to be developed for every part and action, on items such as: the sub-component parts of the fuel injection system of a main battle tank; the screw breech block mechanism of a 155 mm G6 self-propelled medium gun/howitzer; and the detailed composition of a vanguard force in the advance.

Following the Afrikanerisation of the former Union Defence Force during the fifties, it took a concerted effort over decades to establish and develop terms in Afrikaans which covered and dealt with all the requirements for the conduct of military operations. Concomitant with technological development, new terms such as 'side-ways looking, aperture radar' appeared as part of the ever-expanding international military vocabulary. The former Union Defence Force nominally adopted a dual language system of Afrikaans and English in 1912. During the fifties, a dictionary of military terms came into being to provide standardised terms for each and every item and military action in both official languages, as well as a Krygstaalraad (Military Language Board) in 1949 to determine and standardise Afrikaans military terminology.20 The Union Defence Force (and subsequently the SADF) eventually adopted a highly formal system of alternating English and Afrikaans months for the conduct of all training and correspondence as from 1 November 1949. But the result was that officers often delayed or dated correspondence to the month that suited their language skills – and that most single service operations and training in the Army came to be conducted almost exclusively in Afrikaans and those in the Air Force and Navy in English.21

However, such issues pale in significance to the challenges now confronting the DoD in doing justice to the official languages of South Africa. Section 6 of the South African Constitution22 states that, "[t]he official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu."

Recognising the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people, the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages.

National and provincial governments may use particular official languages for the purposes of government, taking into account usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances, and the balance of the needs and preferences of the population as a whole or in the province concerned: but the national government and each provincial government must use at least two official languages.



Municipalities must take into consideration the language usage and preferences of their residents. The national government and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures, must regulate and monitor their use of official languages. Without detracting from the provisions of subsection (2), all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably.

Equitable treatment does not, of course, necessarily and direclty translate into equality.

Having not been exposed to similar requirements in the past, many of the indigenous languages now recognised in the Constitution do not have the technical or tactical vocabulary which would cover a large portion of modern military correspondence, training and operations. As a result, the DoD would have to embark upon an extensive preparatory programme to develop terms, words and phrases to cater for these requirements should it wish to use Sepedi, Sesotho, or Setswana as an aeronautical or maritime training and operational language, for example. Moreover, the number of individuals who would use such a language would be very few.

The requirements of the South African Constitution therefore present military operational commanders and trainers with a quandary. In response, the Minister of Defence appointed a Language Consultative Forum during November 1996, for the purpose of determining, through a consultative process, an appropriate language policy which could be submitted for internal discussion within the DoD, and subsequently to Parliament (possibly as early as July 1997). The Forum involves members of the DoD and a large variety of interested parties, including members of the Pan-South African Language Bureau. A series of meetings have followed and the Forum is in the process of finalising a document on Language Policy for the Department of Defence.

At present, it appears as if the Forum is working towards one or more 'thread languages' within the DoD – with English as one of the clear candidates. Although Afrikaans is the lingua franca within much of the Army (the largest component of the SANDF), there appears to be some resistance from ANC supporters to perpetuate a situation where the second 'thread' language is that of the former oppressor. Whatever the eventual choice, the various 'thread' languages would presumably become more dominant at senior training and staffing levels – as well as for operations – while at lower levels the initial idea is that soldiers would expect to be assisted during training in a language that they understand. While the latter would initially inevitably mean English or Afrikaans, the constitutional imperative to offer (even general) training in any of the eleven official languages 'on demand' is in itself problematic – not least since soldiers will, at a later stage, have to learn the military terms in the operational language.

Given the requirements of the Constitution, the DoD will have to recognise that all official languages have the status as languages of record for the purposes of departmental filing and archiving. This is not an insignificant challenge, since the amount of documentation produced and circulated within the DoD at any given stage is massive – and this is compounded by the issue of the security classification of many documents. Furthermore, although individual-to-individual correspondence may theoretically occur in any of the eleven languages, a common language would be required for multi-addressee correspondence, in order to obviate the requirement for translation of even rudimentary and routine correspondence. Unfortunately, such complexities are not generally apparent to the wider public.

Survey Results

South African opinion appeared to be almost evenly divided in response to the question: "The military requires a single language for effective command. Do you agree or disagree?" The majority of respondents (47 per cent) disagreed with the statement, while 41 per cent agreed with the idea of a single language for effective command. Uncertain responses amounted to 12 per cent. When presented in terms of the home language of the respondent, it is apparent that only the majority of English speaking South Africans clearly support the use of a single language for the military. The majority of all other language groupings are opposed to the use of a single language, although the degree of opposition compared to those favouring a single language ranges from 1 per cent (Tswana speakers) to 23 per cent (South Sotho speakers).

Figure 3: The military requires a single language for effective command. Do you agree or disagree? (per home language grouping)



When the response was broken down by support for political party, the figures indicated that the supporters of the DP (63 per cent for and 32 per cent against), NP (50 per cent for and 40 per cent against) and PAC (49 per cent for and 40 per cent against) agree with the statement that the military requires a single language for effective command. Supporters of the ANC oppose (49 per cent against and 41 per cent for) such a single language choice for the military, although the difference of only 8 per cent indicates significant disagreement on the issue. Of all parties, only supporters of the IFP appear to have a clear majority view on the issue, with 55 per cent against the use of a single language and 20 per cent in favour of a single language (15 per cent undecided).

When the results were analysed in terms of formal educational qualifications, respondents with a higher than Grade 12 agreed with the statement (53 per cent versus 41 per cent), while the majority of all others with a lower educational qualification disagreed. This may indicate that those with a higher education have an awareness of the practical difficulties of higher military training in different languages and/or reflect a greater degree of tolerance, which is commonly associated with higher levels of education.

When analysed according to race (see Figure 4), the majority of respondents in two population groups were in favour of the use of a single language in the military, with 82 per cent of Asian respondents and 49 per cent of white respondents answering in the affirmative. Black and coloured opinions were remarkably similar, with 50 per cent of coloured respondents and 49 per cent of Black respondents opposed to the use of a single language of command.

Figure 4: The military requires a single language for effective command. Do you agree or disagree? (per racial grouping)



There were also significant differences in the way respondents from the various provinces viewed the question. Table 6 shows that the bulk of the respondents from the Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the North West Province favour a single language policy, while the bulk of respondents from the Western Cape, Free State, Mpumulanga, Northern Province and Gauteng disagree with having a single language.

Interpretation

Although the DoD has committed itself to the provision of language assistance training at an early stage in the careers of soldiers, the concept of a military professional organisation operating in eleven languages is patently unworkable. Nevertheless, there is significant public opposition to the notion of a single language of command.

The aspect of a single language for the military is an intensely emotional issue. As a result, respondents may have reacted according to their feelings, rather than the dictates of practicality and military effectiveness. The extent of such emotions became evident during 1996, when the chairperson of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence (PJSCD) proposed that English be the language of training and operations in the SANDF. The subsequent uproar (mainly by Afrikaans speakers) required the intervention of the President to calm emotions. A similar situation developed more recently when the Speaker of Parliament proposed that English be the language of record in Parliament. These incidents point to the obvious sensitivity with which the language issue will have to be handled by the DoD and a variety of other stakeholders.

If logic is to compete with emotion in the resolution of the language issue in the military, the public needs to be far better informed on the complexities of the situation and on the practical implications of the Constitution. The public should also be kept well informed of the forthcoming decisions in this regard, and the reasons why they are made.

CONCLUSION

In responses to other questions (still to be released), the respondents in the survey sample seemed to link the idea of a newfound democracy (and perhaps even stability) with a strong defence posture. However, the provisions of the Constitution may be at odds with public opinion (on the role of women in the military) and military effectiveness (in the case of language of command).

Respondents were also quite parochial or 'conservative' in their views about the deployment of women in combat (even for those people belonging to the parties that previously were engaged in the struggle for liberation, such as the ANC and the PAC). The SANDF has progressively embarked on an 'open policy' in this regard, which seems to be more progressive or permissive than respondents would have chosen, were they the decisionmakers. In terms of gender issues in the military, the SANDF seems to be in step with the Constitution, which is arguably comparatively very progressive according to international perspectives. Yet, when future policy decisions (policy planning, implementation and execution) are considered, the potential discrepancy between public views as held by the respondents in this Omnibus survey versus those of politicians and the legislature, should be taken into consideration.

On the other hand, public opinion seems to support the constitutional provisions pertaining to language rights, even in the military context. Here decision-makers may have to make a tough choice between abiding to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and the dictates of public sentiment, or being swayed by the practicalities of effective command and control. In the final analysis, both the gender and language issues are likely to be resolved in the same way as the most fundamental political differences which plagued pre-liberation South Africa – through compromise. Such compromise is likely to reflect the inherent tensions between 'political correctness', popular opinion, pragmatism and combat effectiveness. But, even a democracy has to rely for its ultimate defence on the military – an organisation which essentially cannot be structured along democratic lines.

ENDNOTES

Substitution of the visiting point was only allowed for the following reasons:

1 refusal by the selected respondent;

2 empty premises, e.g. no building or occupied structure;

3 nobody on the stand qualified for the survey;

4 after three visits were done at different dates and times, and the respondent could still not be found at home;

5 respondent could not communicate with the interviewer because of the use of a foreign language; or

6 respondent was not physically/mentally able to be interviewed.



The questionnaire was printed in English and Afrikaans and translated during training into those languages used in the local area.



The co-ordinators were trained between 3 and 4 October 1996 by MarkData in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu/Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Gauteng and North West Province. Clients were invited to attend the training session and to give additional information pertaining to their questions.



Interviewers were recruited to conduct interviews as close as possible to their own residential area. Preference was given to interviewers with prior interviewing experience. Co-ordinators were responsible for the recruitment of the interviewers. All interviewers had to comply with the following minimum requirements:

1 a matric educational qualification or equivalent; and

2 fully bilingual or multilingual in order to speak the relevant language in a particular fieldwork area.



The co-ordinator's responsibility was to ensure that all the questionnaires sent to MarkData had already been checked, for correct completion and that 20 per cent field control was done. From the office, a 20 per cent fieldwork control (back check) was done once again on each interviewer's questionnaires. The co-ordinators also supervised the fieldwork process to ensure that the correct procedure was maintained. Details of the fieldwork progress were communicated to MarkData on a regular basis.



Census enumerator areas and similar areas were used as the clusters. The number of respondents drawn per enumerator area was either 4 or 8. All clusters were drawn with probability (a serial sampling procedure was applied).



The factor weights to be applied to the captured data set were derived at the sampling stage. The aim of the factor weights was to correct the disproportions which were incorporated in the sample design. The only weighting targets were the stratification variables: 'province' and 'socio-economic' category. RIM weighting is generally used in two cases: when the purpose is to weight data according to various characteristics, but the relationship of the intersection of those characteristics is unknown; or when there are not enough respondents to fill all the possible cells (e.g. males who had passed Standard 8, 35-44 years old, employed part-time). As the RIM weighting runs, it attempts to distort each variable as little as possible while still trying to attain all the desired proportions among the characteristics. The 'Root Mean Square' figure was used to determine how much distortion had been introduced.

The following variables were submitted to the RIM weighting procedure at various stages: age; gender; education; employment status; occupation; marital status; language; and population group.

Close examination of outputs suggested that a satisfactory solution cannot be obtained despite the increased number of iterations (too high between the weights ratio) and only 'age', 'gender', 'education' and 'population group' variables were retained. RIM weighting targets for the former TBVC states were estimated according to population characteristics drawn from the available census data. Weighted and unweighted frequencies on all biographical variables are available.



While there is a strong debate on affirmative action/equity pertaining to the issue of women in society, the debate is fraught with complexities when the military, and more so deployment of women in combat situations, is concerned. Gender-caucuses, be they liberal or radical inclined, pacifist or pragmatic in nature, are deeply divided on the issue of women in the military, as well as deployment in combat. A further angle to the debate is brought into it by some militant Afro-feminists. See for example M Nzomo on women, democracy and liberation/equity – also in military structures – in a chapter entitled Women, Democracy and Development in Africa, in W O Oyugi et. a.l (eds.), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, James Currey, London, 1988, pp. 139-159.



Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President, 15 November 1992, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C,.1992, p. 26. Soviet women soldiers served mostly as snipers or guerillas behind the lines during 1940 to 1945. Israeli women guerillas served with distinction during the Haganah in 1948 and again during the 1967 Six Day War.



See, for example, the remarks by the Minister of Defence in CSANDF, Update of the Minster of Defence's Briefing on Transformation, CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletin, 10/97, 11 February 1997, p. 2: "The achievement of broad representivity will be achieved through affirmative action, equal opportunity and gender sensitive programmes."



Department of Defence, White Paper on National Defence, Defence in Democracy, DoD, Pretoria, 1996, pp. 36-37.



CSANDF, Defence Review: Human Resources, CSANDF Internal Communications Bulletin, 25/97, 24 March 1997, p. 2.



Defence Review Drafting Team, Structure of the Department Human Resources, Part-Time Forces, Second Interim Report, Defence Review, p. 62.



Ibid.



Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, op. cit.



Ibid., p. 27



Ibid., pp. 22 and 24



Ibid., p. 3



Ibid., p. 24



At its inception, the Krygstaalraad estimated that it would have to translate and define some 30 000 military terms – and could only do so at an average rate of some 300 per month! L Jooste, Die Politieke Koerswending van 1948 Besorg 'n Nuwe Identiteit aan die Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, 26(2), 1996, p. 124



See, for example, ibid., pp. 122-127



The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996 as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly.