INTRODUCTION

The year 1997 seems ordained to become another watershed in redefining the future profile of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The South African decision to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, announced on 27 November 1996, is set to herald not only a new era for Sino-South African relations, but may also be the beginning of an end to the PRC's 48-years' tryst with destiny where the return of its 'renegade province' of Taiwan has been the single most critical crisis of its independent sovereign existence. There are, of course, a number of other major events on the year's agenda, like the return of Hong Kong and the 15th Party Congress. With the transfer of power in 1994, the South African Government of National Unity (GNU) has joined the international mainstream and it serves South Africa well to befriend new power centres like the PRC which has already obtained a respectable emerging permanent place of its own. In addition, the way in which South Africa defines its foreign relations will have a major bearing on its emerging international stature. In extending its transition to democracy to the conduct of its international relations, South Africa has decided to adopt the mainstream international consensus which clearly favours diplomatic ties with Beijing.

In more practical terms, both the PRC and South Africa have emerged as major players in their respective continents and today need to co-operate in most of the major world organisations. This, in turn, has also increased their mutual interdependence which is so clearly reflected in their expanding bilateral trade and other interactions.

Unlike the case of the two Koreas and (erstwhile) two Germanies, the PRC presents a unique situation where Beijing insists that any country willing to have diplomatic relations with Beijing will have to first break off their diplomatic ties with Taipei which it regards as its renegade province.1 Accordingly, despite their declared intentions, the crucial question still remains how soon South Africa can fulfil PRC's precondition and also how far Taiwan can be pushed towards giving up its hard-earned claim to South Africa's allegiance of some 75 years. As the pronounced deadline of 31 December 1997 approaches, the tide seems clearly against Taiwan, which is showing greater willingness to compromise, though still trying to take maximum advantage from its leverage against South Africa. It is in the context of this hectic triangular lobbying and activity towards evolving the 'new framework' for their interstate equations that this article tries to crystal-gaze into the future of Sino-South African relations and to examine and highlight the PRC's perceptions, problems and prospects in getting South Africa to move to fulfil Beijing's preconditions.

THE WHY AND HOW OF RAPPROCHEMENT

Speculation on the imminent split in relations between Taiwan and South Africa ran particularly high ever since the PRC's high-profile Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, and Vice-Minister, Yang Fuchang, paid a transit visit to Johannesburg early in 1992. This was soon followed by a historic visit to Beijing by ANC leader Nelson Mandela, as well as exchanges of quasi-diplomatic missions between Pretoria and Beijing.2 The flow of official and non-official visitors has particularly increased since the visit by a delegation from the South African Communist Party (SACP) delegation in February 1996 and Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo's visit to Beijing the following month. This was soon reciprocated from the PRC side by a return visit by Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, Wu Yi, who led a high-profile business delegation to the ninth session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was held in Johannesburg from 27 April to 11 May 1996.3 Similarly, shortly after the announcement on 27 November, the first ANC delegation visited Beijing in December 1996, led by the ANC's Deputy General Secretary, Ms Cheryl Carolus.

However, goodwill visits were not alone in bringing about this historic about turn in South Africa's policy towards Beijing. Though some kind of revision was widely expected, following the transfer of power to the GNU, it was Beijing that was particularly active in making the best of this perceived opportunity. While Taipei had also been prompt to develop rapport with the new dispensation, the PRC had adopted a much more vigorous two-pronged policy of consolidating existing ties and exploring new areas for co-operation, and simultaneously increasing pressures on the GNU to upgrade their diplomatic ties with Beijing. These pressure tactics, in fact, had lately almost reached the level of coercion. Apart from using Hong Kong's merger and the South African Communist Party (SACP) to its advantage, Beijing was pushing its case at every global forum and bilateral encounter, exhorting the ANC leadership to put an end to the legacies of the erstwhile white minority (apartheid) government, especially its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. On the other hand, the PRC had also clearly made an open offer to invest $50 million in case South Africa decided to switch its recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

This campaign was obviously very well supported by Beijing's overall projection of various advantages that accrue to South Africa from switching its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, thus highlighting its strengths against Taiwan's weaknesses. Compared to Taiwan, for example, the PRC not only has a population that is five times larger, and diplomatic ties with 159 sovereign states compared to the 30 small sized developing redundant states that recognise Taipei, it is also a permanent member of the United Nations' Security Council and most other world organisations, has an economy growing at about 10 per cent per year and (in terms of purchasing power parity) is set to become world's largest economy by the year 2005. Furthermore, by the 1990s, the PRC has clearly shed its ideological fervour of Mao's years and it is pragmatism, not communism, that today defines its foreign relations. As a result, therefore, in the changed context of the post-Cold War era, perhaps nothing plays a more critical role in raising the mutual stakes for both than the expanding bilateral trade which has experienced a virtual boom during the 1990s. The return of Hong Kong is perhaps the only other (completely unusual) factor that can be compared in terms of having played an equally important role in tilting the balance in favour of Beijing.

THE BOOMING BILATERAL TRADE

To go by the statistics provided by the PRC, the Sino-South African bilateral trade was $225 million for 1992, $658 million for 1993, $900 million for 1994 and $1,32 billion for 1995. Bilateral trade had already reached $1,2 billion during the first ten months of 1996. On the other hand, according to the Director of the South African Centre for Chinese Studies (SACCS), Leslie Labuschagne, the expanding Sino-South African trade had quadrupled between 1992 and 1994.4 In comparison, Taiwan's bilateral trade with South Africa stood at $1,87 billion and is expected to fall sharply, following Taipei's suspension of various projects in South Africa. In the case of Beijing, after the merger of Hong Kong this year, its bilateral trade with South Africa is expected to be some seven times higher than that of 1992, and this will be more than one-and-a-half times larger than South Africa's bilateral trade with its long-time ally Taiwan. Beijing, accordingly, has already become South Africa's largest trading partner from Asia.

Despite its long-drawn indulgence with some 44 African states, South Africa is today not only the PRC's largest trading partner in Africa, but also the destination for about 80 per cent of Chinese exports to the whole African continent. Moreover, the bilateral trade between the PRC and South Africa has a vast potential to grow with the increased purchasing power among mainland Chinese and South Africans. Despite the PRC's sworn opposition to the previous white government and its support of the black liberation movements, Beijing's overt and covert trade with Pretoria (however marginal it might have been) had always been a cementing factor between the two countries.5 Even today, the PRC's share in Africa's $200 billion total annual external trade has been only a little over two per cent. Due to the special attention given to South Africa, its share with the country has been generally twice that. With the merger of Hong Kong, the PRC's share in South Africa's trade with Asia will increase to more than 16 per cent, which is higher when compared to Taiwan's 13 per cent and is bound to grow much faster.6

Due to historical realities, most of South Africa's trade has traditionally been confined to a few selected countries in Europe, followed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in Asia and, of course, with some African countries. China, which has only recently entered as a full-fledged partner, can supply South Africa with much of the mid-level technologies that have been the forté of Taiwan. With the unification of Hong Kong, China's foreign trade has the potential of increasing beyond $400 billion per annum and its foreign exchange reserves will exceed $175 billion. Going by the example of South Korea, which switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1992 and became the PRC's fourth largest trading partner over the following four years, the potential of Sino-South African trade seems very promising. Finally, with South Africa's fairly advanced defence equipment now being freely available in the world market, China's increasing purchasing power, together with its military modernisation should soon make the two sides interested in exploring the prospects for defence co-operation which can provide a crucial bond to their emerging new equation.

THE HONG KONG FACTOR

Nothing has been more decisive in settling the choice in Beijing's favour than the timing for the return of Hong Kong. Beijing was determined to use this leverage to the hilt and had made it more than clear that, with effect from 1 July 1997, all states that did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC would have to close down their diplomatic missions and other activities in Hong Kong. A similar threat to close the South African Consulate in Hong Kong and to deprive South African Airways of its rights to fly to Hong Kong, proved the proverbial last straw in the ongoing debate whether and when South Africa should switch its recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Added to these, were South Africa's own compulsions to be an important new actor on the international scene. Therefore, more than the high-moral arguments regarding the 'universality principles' or 'world opinion' in resolving the issue of diplomatic recognition, it was essentially the return of Hong Kong that tilted the balance in favour of Beijing. For instance, although Taiwan's total investments over the years makes it South Africa's largest foreign investor from Asia, it has lately lost its position to other countries like Japan and Malaysia, with Hong Kong now constituting the third largest Asian investor in South Africa with its investments growth rate of 24 per cent for 1995 making this tiny island particularly attractive.7

All this was enough to make the question of granting diplomatic recognition to the PRC one of the most important and pressing foreign policy issues for the GNU.8 This was also the first foreign policy issue that became widely debated among the South African opinion/decision-making élite and, apart from external lobbying, the long-drawn inaction and lack of clarity on the part of the South African Government ensured that the issue was blown out of all proportion.9 Finally, towards the end of 1996, it was apparent that both sides were really only working out the timing and methodology for making the necessary announcement which eventually came from Pretoria on 27 November 1996. Yet, few within the South African Government knew about the imminent announcement before they heard it on radio, saw it on television or read about it in newspapers the next morning. The immediate stimulant was apparently provided by President Li Teng-hui himself, who was determined to make his trip to Pretoria at the earliest possible opportunity. President Mandela wanted to head off the inevitable obligation to extend ties further with Taiwan that would have befallen him following this meeting with President Li Teng-hui which had its obvious implications considering Beijing's sensitivities on this question.10 Mandela, therefore, having hesitated for years, announced his decision in a sudden move: "We have now granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. We will cancel our diplomatic relations with Taiwan with effect from December 1997."11 However, at the same time he also affirmed that President Li Teng-hui had been keen to visit South Africa that month (November 1996) and that "I have got an open door. I will see him."12

The PRC, though it has been quick to welcome Mandela's announcement, sees no reason yet to lessen its pressure on South African policy makers. This again seems closely related to the return of Hong Kong, followed by the merger of Macao in 1999, issues that have encouraged the PRC leadership to believe that the unification with Taiwan is also only a matter of time and that South Africa must not fight shy in breaking off its ties with Taipei. According to the Chinese, the announcement by President Mandela was not as categorical as Beijing had expected, for this was accompanied by explanations that were meant to placate Taipei:

by offering a long period of 13 months to make necessary adjustments with various new elements which included voices that asked Pretoria to seek 'dual recognition'; and



a personal assurance to Taipei from Mandela himself saying that, despite South Africa having downgraded its ties with Taiwan, he would try to keep them at as high a level as possible, short of granting formal diplomatic recognition.

Despite these explanations, the leadership in Taipei has not been a silent spectator to this decision and it is this sharp reaction from Taipei that has particularly sent alarm bells ringing in Beijing, pushing it further towards adopting a hard-line.

TAIWAN'S TRAVAILS

Taiwan was equally prompt in describing Mandela's announcement as an 'unfriendly' act that had seriously damaged Taiwan's dignity and interests. Foreign Minister John Chang warned South Africa not to "underestimate the importance of the Republic of China (ROC)" as he announced the postponement of his forthcoming trip to Pretoria.13 Later, being unable to convince President Mandela to revoke his decision, John Chang announced in Johannesburg on 5 December 1996 that Taiwan could recall its ambassador to Pretoria for an indefinite period of time.14 Taiwan also announced the suspension of its 17 major aid and joint ventures with South Africa, worth an estimated $840 million, and it put the whole gamut of its existing and impending economic investments under review, including major projects such as a $3,5 billion petrochemical complex and a new airport. Decisions on these issues will largely depend on the way the two sides move further with their negotiations towards evolving the 'new framework' of unofficial ties between Taiwan and South Africa.15

All efforts by Taipei to get the 'unfriendly' decision revoked have thus far failed, and it is not sure how many concessions are likely to be allowed by Beijing which is standing firm on its demands. More than affecting the Taiwan-South African ties, the decision by President Mandela has administered a major setback to President Li Teng-hui's 'pragmatic diplomacy' which aims at expanding Taiwan's 'international space', despite the fact that the island still holds reunification with mainland China as its official goal. Clearly, for Taiwan this switch represents a major setback in its fight to keep its separate identity visible and, worse still, it threatens to initiate a chain reaction that might put an end to Taiwan's 48 years of independent existence. Even the decision by South Korea to switch recognition cannot be compared to that of South Africa, since it has remained by far the largest and most important of the 30 nations that still accord full diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. This partly explains how potentially decisive the South African decision is for the future of cross-strait relations.

Taking the cue from South Africa's decision, Beijing, in fact, has already accelerated its efforts towards winning over the remaining friends of Taiwan. In its efforts to undermine Taiwan's diplomatic turf, the PRC has not only increased its interactions with pro-Taiwan countries in Africa and Latin America, but is even trying to bully smaller states like Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, to close down their consulates in Hong Kong, unless they drop their formal recognition of the Government in Taiwan. The PRC has a reputation for such actions. In 1992, the PRC closed down the French consulate in Guangzhou in protest against Paris signing a major arms deal with Taiwan. The deal included 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters to be fitted with Matra and Mica missiles. A second example is its ongoing diplomatic showdown with the United States following the June 1995 'private visit' by President Li Teng-hui to his alma mater in New York. Both were good lessons for these very influential powers. In January 1997, the PRC chose to veto UN Resolution 2758 to dispatch UN military observers to Guatemala to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, apparently because the Taiwanese Foreign Minister, John Chang, was said to have been present at the signing ceremony of this accord. China interpreted this as an attempt to violate the sanctity of its sovereign existence. This was the third occasion where the PRC used its veto during the last 25 years at the UN, which clearly shows how serious it is when it comes to dealing with Taiwan. Niger which, on the other hand, has switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1996, has since become the largest recipient of the PRC's aid in West Africa.16 According to the PRC's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the pro-Taiwan states of Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have already agreed to exchange trade offices with Beijing.17

But Taiwan has also stepped up its secret trips to countries that have no diplomatic ties with it, such as the Vatican, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands.18 Apart from the 30 countries that have diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Taipei today has substantial unofficial trade and economic ties with nearly 40 other countries, including 16 countries with which it has established ministerial and vice-ministerial level communication channels. According to one report, Taiwan's Economic Ministry has clearly targeted 26 countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations.19 These actions speak volumes on Taiwan's refusal to give in to Pretoria's entreaties and will increase South Africa's difficulties to rush through its diplomatic switch-over from Taipei to Beijing. Within the South African political élite, opinions remain divided. For example, taking the view in Taiwan's favour, the major South African opposition parties, including the National Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front and the Conservative Party, have expressed concerns about the economic impact of breaking off ties with Taiwan. Taiwan still remains South Africa's largest source of foreign capital, with total investments of about $1,56 billion. Taiwan-funded firms in South Africa provide more than 45 000 jobs, which means that should it choose to do so, Taipei can still make it difficult for South Africa to implement its decision in time.20

BACK TO THE FUTURE

However confident the leadership in Beijing may be, it cannot afford to be complacent on this issue. In a way, this uncertainty seems to be the reason why the PRC has lately accelerated its efforts towards further expanding its interaction with Africa, in general, and Pretoria, in particular. History might again oblige mainland China to make special concessions towards South Africa, even if they are only symbolic in nature. In fact, to put the current triangular crisis in its historical perspective, China's one-sided courtship with South Africa could be traced back to ancient times,21 even though these ties were later completely obscured by the colonial powers from Europe. The same was also, more or less, true of the PRC's forays into Africa after 1949. Being the traditional headquarters of the world communist revolution, it was Moscow that had the clear advantage of being the patron of anti-colonial movements, while China supplied moderate military aid to obscure movements. Beijing, in fact, gradually stopped supporting groups who were fighting against the black ruling regimes and, by the late 1970s, was openly supporting black ruling leaders, such as Morocco's King Hassan II, Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko and Francisco Nuguema of Equatorial Guinea.22 Since the 1970s, China's trade, aid and diplomatic offensive was clearly directed at winning "friends at court and influence people in power", and nearly 50 per cent of its foreign aid was geared towards 21 'friendly' African nations while a stream of black dignitaries poured into (then) Peking to be received by Mao Zedong and flatteringly entertained by Zhou En-lai.23

The same trend has continued to date, with over a quarter of the heads of state which visited the PRC in 1996 being from Africa. Interesting enough the new Communist regime in Beijing did not pay much attention to South Africa until its first encounter with African leaders during the Bandung Conference of April 1955. It was through Abdul Nasser of Egypt, therefore, that the Communist leadership of the PRC opened its new innings in Africa. Right from the beginning the PRC treated South Africa as a special case in its general anti-colonial policies in Africa. The two sides exchanged visitors from 1958 and their mutual trade developed as such that it came under severe criticism from China's other allies in Africa and was formally closed early in the 1960s. The staunchly anti-Communist South Africa did not consider recognising the new Communist regime in the 1950s and decided to stay firmly with the Kuomintang regime.24 Pretoria viewed China's interference in Central Africa, especially its development activities, for example the gigantic Tanzam and Mali-Guinea railway projects, as threats to its economic and security interests in the North. There were many other international factors that also worked behind the propaganda. The minority regime of South Africa believed at one stage that the PRC was bent on spreading communism through violence and that the provision of military supplies free of charge to the black national liberation movements was seen as part of a larger design to eradicate Western civilisation from Southern Africa.25 The attitude of South Africa's white minority in 1950s was, therefore, partly influenced by the indulgence of the PRC in the newly independent African states, of whom as many as 15 nations had granted recognition to the PRC by 1971. The number of such states was trebled during the next ten years. Today, the PRC has formal diplomatic ties with 44 of the 53 African countries.26 The popular perception of the PRC in Africa has been an important consideration why the South African Government decided to switch its diplomatic recognition to Beijing. But, just like South Africa's internal transition, the real switch from Taipei to Beijing shows all signs of being equally slow and arduous.

EVOLVING A NEW FRAMEWORK

At the time of writing, Beijing has shown no signs of seeking a compromise solution. The PRC stands firm on its policy whereby Pretoria, if it wishes to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing, will have to first sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The PRC, however, will have no objection to South Africa keeping its unofficial people-to-people contacts with Taiwan. Some pro-Taiwan groups in South Africa voiced their opposition and asked Nelson Mandela to make a personal intervention and try and seek 'dual recognition' with both Taipei and Beijing, but the PRC continued to stand firm on its policy saying that it "does not, and will not, accept dual recognition."27 Doubts were also created by Mandela's often contradictory statements, although these were perhaps more illusionary than fact.28

It is in this context that Taiwan now seeks to redefine these 'unofficial' relations to its advantage. Accordingly Taipei has been the first to talk about evolving a 'new framework'. In this regard, Taiwan's Foreign Minister, John Chang, had his first meeting with his South African counterpart, Alfred Nzo, in Johannesburg on 20 January 1997. The two sides agreed to continue their negotiations towards evolving their future relations which, according to John Chang, would be based "on the principles of reality, continuity, morality, legality and formality."29 But working out these details might at best only delay the process a little further. Faced with increasing protestations from Taipei, Mandela had already made it public that he "[does] not intend to reopen discussion on this issue" and that considering today's changed realities, his continuation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan is "inconsistent with South Africa's role in international affairs."30 Accordingly, Taiwan's manoeuvring space seems to be limited and President Mandela has shown that he remains determined to normalise ties with Beijing.31

However, Taiwan continues to pitch its demands high. For example, according to Taiwan's Ambassador to South Africa, Loh I-chang, who is the central figure in these negotiations, Taipei's vision of the 'new framework' includes the following:

that South Africa treats its representation like an embassy and its diplomatic mission bears its formal national designation (Republic of China);



that Pretoria grants Taiwan's diplomatic officials, stationed in South Africa, full diplomatic privileges, including direct access to the head of state and the foreign minister; and



that Pretoria signs a bilateral investment guarantee agreement undertaking to safeguard the interests and rights of Taiwanese businessmen.32

To what extent these demands will be fulfilled only time will tell, but despite Taiwan's huge foreign exchange surplus for offering investments, time clearly favours Beijing. Or that is what the policy statements from all three sides seem to suggest. But a solution, in the end, has to be found.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular projections during the last four decades, the PRC's approach towards South Africa was traditionally determined by two factors. Firstly, Beijing always perceived that engaging Pretoria was part of its strategy to isolate Taiwan so as to enforce the early unification with mainland China. Secondly, due to South Africa's size and stature, Beijing always paid special attention to Pretoria. Despite being mired in contradictions brought in by Mao's hard-line cultural revolution and the split with the former Soviet Union, the PRC had always kept its ties with Pretoria more or less unaffected by its general anti-colonial tirade in Africa, which thrived on popular slogans. For Beijing, therefore, more than heralding a new era for Sino-South African relations, South Africa's decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing seems to complete a full circle in the PRC's attempts to isolate Taiwan. After Israel and South Korea, South Africa was perhaps the only strong pillar that could defy the PRC's pressures. Therefore, the South African decision has finally sealed the fate of international cross-strait relations in favour of Communist China, though the finer details of this may not be clear for some time to come.

ENDNOTES

C Yanni, Stance on South African Relations Reiterated, China Daily (Beijing), 6 December 1996, p. 2.



China to Develop Close Ties with South Africa, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 1 December 1992.



Chinese-South African Trade Still Growing, China Daily (Beijing), 2 May 1996, p. 5; also The Star (Johannesburg), 30 April 1996.



South Africa Sponsors Beijing Investment Symposium, Xinhua (English), cited in FBIS-CHI-94-220, 7 November 1994. The combined total for PRC and Hong Kong for 1995 was $2,77 billion which was far higher than Taiwan's bilateral trade for that year which stood at $1,87 billion.



A Hutchison, China's African Revolution, Hutchison, London, 1975, pp. 196-198.



S Hong, Sino-African Ties to Improve, China Daily (Beijing), 26 December 1996, p. 5; also M Havenga, The Dilemma of Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective, in South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, South African Institute of International Relations (SAIIA) and Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD), Johannesburg, 1995, pp. 32-46.



T Ming-ming, Why Did South Africa Choose Beijing, Hong Kong Wen Wei Po (Chinese), translated and cited in FBIS-CHI-96-250, 5 December 1996.



G Mills, The Case for Exclusive Recognition, in South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, op. cit., p. 82.



Ibid.



South Africa Snaps Ties with Taiwan, Recognises China, Khaleej Times (United Arab Emirates), 28 November 1996; also H Stockwin, Jiang Triumphant as SA to Stop Recognising Taiwan, The Times of India (New Delhi), 29 November 1996.



Though a certain opinion had been building up in favour of Beijing for quite some time, it was President Mandela who put an end to these speculations by announcing barely three months before (August 1996) that he would not be guilty of suspending relations with Taiwan and that such an action would come only from "a man with no morals." See South Africa Snaps Ties with Taiwan, op. cit.



Ibid.



Taipei To Review South Africa Aid, Investment Programs, Hong Kong AFP, cited in FBIS-CHI-96-231, 28 November 1996; Li Teng-hui Vows to Resist Beijing's 'Irrational Pressures', Hong Kong AFP, cited in FBIS-CHI-96-231, 29 November 1996.



Taiwan Recalls its Envoy from South Africa, The Asian Age (New Delhi, London), 6 December 1996, p. 7 ; Taipei Recalls Envoy to South Africa, Johannesburg, Channel Africa Radio (English), cited in FBIS-CHI-96-242, 14 December 1996.



J S Chang and S Wu, Taipei To Suspend Co-operative Projects Worth $840 Million, Taiwan Central News Agency (English), cited in FBIS-CHI-96-237, 9 December 1996; also A Huang, Taiwan Rethinks on Investment in South Africa, The Asian Age (New Delhi, London), 29 November 1996, p. 7.



F Wang, Taipei Urges Business To Edge Into Africa, Taiwan Central News Agency (English), cited in FBIS-CHI-97-010, 14 January 1997.



L Holland, Spokesman Criticises Pro-Taiwan States, Overseas Visits, Hong Kong AFP, cited in FBIS-CHI-97-011, 16 January 1997.



P Pun, Lien Chan Plans 'Secret Visit' to Dublin After Vatican, Hong Kong Standard, 16 January 1997, p. 7.



Ministry To Promote High-Level Economic Exchanges, Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao (Taipei, Chinese), translated and printed in FBIS-CHI-97-010, 10 January 1997, P. 4.



Chang and Wu, op. cit.



T Filesi, China and Africa in the Middle Ages, Frank Cass, London, 1972, p. 4. From the second century onwards, Chinese voyagers used to travel from the Arabian Sea to the Horn of Africa. Commerce and prestige was their purpose. The Chinese were not conquerors in principle, for the rulers of this Celestial Empire considered themselves invested with a universal authority which needed to be revealed, not imposed.



R Breeze, China Losing Ground in Africa, The Times of India (New Delhi), 6 October 1979.



D Blooworth, China's Role in Africa, Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 31 August 1974.



B D Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China, University of California, Berkeley, 1971, p. 16.



A Ogunsanwa, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971 Cambridge University Press, New York, 1974, p. 209.



L Dizhong, China Respects African People's Choices: Jiang Pledges Aid to friends, China Daily (Beijing), 20 May 1996, p. 1.



China Will not Accept Dual Recognition, The Nation (Islamabad, Pakistan), 5 July 1996; the same stand was repeated by Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, during his meeting in Beijing with the first ANC delegation led by Deputy General Secretary, Ms Cheryl Carolus. See Qiao Qichen Greets ANC Delegation, China Daily (Beijing), 14 December 1996, p. 1.



Mills, op. cit., pp. 82-83.



L J Yen and L Chu, Chang Holds Constructive Talks in South Africa, Taiwan Central News Agency, printed in FBIS-CHI-97-014, 20 January 1997.



South Africa Will Not Reopen Taiwan Talks, China Daily (Beijing), 5 December 1996, p. 1.



President Mandela reiterated his willingness to normalise ties with Beijing during the recent visit by PRC's Assistant Foreign Minister, Ji Peiding, to Pretoria. See L Yegang and Z Yi, Nelson Mandela Vows to Normalise Ties, Xinhua (Chinese), translated and printed in FBIS-CHI-97-020, 28 January 1997.



B Yeh, Taipei Protests Pretoria's Plan To Recognise Beijing, Taiwan Central News Agency (English), cited in FBIS-CHI-96-231, 27 November 1996.