The SANDF Transformation Process1

by Fanie Uys
Captain, South African Navy

Published in African Security Review Vol 6, No 1, 1997 

SCOPE


The specific focus of this article is the management structure for the transformation programme of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the structural transformation of the Department of Defence.

The first section presents the change imperatives implicit in the transformation programmes. This is followed by a brief discussion of the transformation management structure, its origins and the recent changes made to it, after which more detail is provided on the transformation of the administrative, command and control, and supporting structures of the Department of Defence.

THE CHANGE IMPERATIVE AND ITS INHERENT SEQUENTIAL LOGIC


The change imperative for the Department of Defence emanates from five significant changes in the South African environment.

A requirement for a new mission, roLes, tasks and capabilities


There has been a complete change in the strategic environment within which the SANDF operates due to the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the conflict in Angola and Namibia, and internal changes in South Africa. The purposes and design of its seven different predecessors (MK, APLA, SADF and the homeland forces) have largely been invalidated by these events. The security needs of the new South Africa require a new mission, roles and tasks, and a commensurate new capability portfolio (force design) for the SANDF. The needs of clients have changed and therefore the nature of the Defence Force's product must change.

A requirement for vastly improved cost-effectiveness


Since 1989, the defence budget has decreased in real terms by more than 49 per cent. All indications are that the downward trend has not yet bottomed out. Together with this, the integration of the previously seven different armed forces into the new SANDF led to an almost 35 per cent increase in personnel numbers. The resulting pressure on the budget has led to an increasing 'hollowing out' of the force. It is manifested in :
  • an understaffing of combat and support units, leading to under performance of these units and an imbalance in fixed and variable cost relationships;

  • a reduction in exercises and doctrinal and technology development - i.e. eroding of the SANDF's potential combat advantage against potential adversaries; and

  • under-investment in capital, inevitably leading to eventual inability to conduct operations as well as increasing maintenance costs.
A requirement to embrace principles of defence in a democracy

The White Paper on Defence has as its main theme 'defence in a democracy'. It discusses a number of principles of defence in a democracy, including, inter alia the principles relating to civil control over the military – 'civil' referring to the elected representatives of the people as opposed to appointed officials. The way in which defence is managed in the future, will have to adapt to these principles. Specifically relevant in this regard is the shift in government power relationships that has taken place. Substantial power shifts have taken place from the executive to the legislative branches of Government. The client can no longer be seen as the 'higher authority', but as being external to the organisation and separate from top management.

A requirement for alignment with new social norms


Social norms in South Africa have undergone significant changes. Emphasis is now placed on factors such as equal opportunities, representivity, transparency, etc. The Department of Defence is an open system within South African society, and it will inevitably be influenced by these changing norms. An inability to align with these norms will be extremely detrimental to the Department of Defence. This alignment will require a significant transformation in the culture of the Department of Defence.

A requirement for alignment with the new public administration approach


The White Paper on Transformation in the Public Service and the Draft White Paper on State Expenditure, as well as other changes in public administration, spell out new practices in public administration. This includes output costing and accrual based accounting, and emphasis on service, decentralisation and enabling the work force. This represents a significant break from recent practices – also for the Department of Defence. The Department will have to change the way in which it does things.

Conclusions on the change imperatives


These change imperatives constitute a vast environmental change, requiring adaptation on a large scale. The nature of the required changes are threefold:
  • The Department of Defence needs to adapt to new client needs with a new mission, roles, tasks, and a commensurate force design.

  • The Department of Defence needs to improve its efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

  • The Department of Defence needs to adapt its organisational culture and management practices.

THE TRANSFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The initial transformation effort


Transformation in the Department of Defence started in January 1994, before the SADF became the SANDF. It is true that discussions and changes in thinking started before this date, but January 1994 saw the first concrete actions taken by the predecessors of the SANDF to launch a change programme through the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC). Resulting from the JMCC planning process, many transformation activities originated, including the Integration process. It started the process of introducing or beefing up civil control, inter alia resulting in the establishment of a defence secretariat– a process not yet completed. It was also the start of the Department's process of re-examining the mission, roles and tasks of the SANDF and the process to adapt the capability portfolio of the SANDF. This led to the White Paper and after that to the Defence Review process.

One of the issues that had to be faced in the redesign during 1994, was the question of sustainability under a reduced budget. Judged against the emerging defence policy, analysis showed that the Department would have to change its command and control, and support structures fundamentally to ensure an optimal and sustainable tooth-to-tail ratio. Consequently, a project was launched in 1995 to design a reduced support structure and a small project team was appointed under leadership of a chief director. At that time it was thought that the term 'transformation' aptly described this activity. The project team, however, realised in its initial analysis, that the term was incorrect.

Consultants were brought on board in April 1996 for assistance. Their advice confirmed the initial analysis (as did that of most of the other organisations tendering for the job).

The Programme (as it was called at that stage) was structured in seven work streams:
  • Work stream I focused on the new mission, roles, tasks and force design. In effect, it encompassed the White Paper and Defence Review.

  • Work stream 2 focused on the re-engineering of processes and structures to effect the savings required to make the force sustainable.

  • Work stream 3 focused on the leadership, command and management practices that had to be institutionalised to ensure the beneficial effect of change. These practices should also include institutionalising those social norms and practices referred to earlier.

  • Work stream 4 focused on change management.

  • Work stream 5 focused on communication.

  • Work stream 6 provided the information systems backup required during transformation.

  • Work stream 7 focused on the alignment of all related transformation activities outside the control of the transformation team.

  • Work stream 8 dealt with general project management matters.
Structures created for the Programme included a transformation management team and a larger transformation work group composed of representatives of all arms of service and staff divisions.

The restructured transformation effort


As studies progressed, it became apparent that the initial transformation management structure had to be changed. Specific problems identified, were as follows:
  • The Minister and Defence Secretary needed to be more directly involved in the programme management and its general direction.

  • More integration of effort, especially of other transformation-related activities thus far not addressed in the integrated formalised Programme, was required.

  • The nature of the transformation effort will change as the first phase (i.e. the initial design) is completed.
Consequently, the Council of Defence decided to effect some changes to the management structure of the transformation programme. The following changes are presently being introduced:
  • A Steering Committee comprising the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the National Defence Force and Defence Secretary would steer the transformation programme in future.

  • A transformation management team with leadership shared between the Chief Director Transformation Management (a SANDF officer) and the Chief Director Policy (a secretariat official) would support the steering committee directly.

  • Other transformation-related activities thus far not included in the formalised Programme, will also be included.

  • The rigid work stream division will be phased out and replaced with a more integrated approach of projects per deliverable.

RESTRUCTURING ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES

The restructuring logic and effort


Designing the new administrative, command and control, and support structures of the Department of Defence should essentially follow and not precede or pre-empt the determination of other policy aspects. These include defining new functions, tasks, contingencies, doctrine, force design, and human resources related issues which are the subjects of the White Paper and Defence Review.

The Defence Review has not yet been completed. Restructuring could not wait, however, until the Review was completed. This would delay the desired result unnecessarily and also increase cost. There are a number of actions that can be taken with low risk of failure due to wrong estimates on how the emerging policy will turn out. Work is therefore continuing while care is taken not to pre-empt policy decisions.

The broad approach to restructuring


The restructuring of the administrative, command and control, and support structures of the Department of Defence will be based on the following:
  • the requirements implied by the force design and operations for which it is intended, and broad defence policy;

  • the appropriate sound administrative, command and management principles and practices: these are threefold in nature/origin, namely principles and practices required for alignment with social norms such as representivity, equal opportunities, alignment with democracy, etc.; practices prescribed by other government policy documents/white papers; and sound military and general management practice;

  • a study (currently under way) into process optimisation: it follows the principles of optimising process and consequently structures; working' top down'; and doing 'as is' assessments with a 'clean sheet' redesign where required; and

  • further considerations that may be identified.

The macro process model


The process optimisation study has identified the following macro processes:
  • providing strategic direction process;
  • providing forces process;
  • employing forces process;
  • providing resources process; and
  • the cross-cutting performance management process.

The performance Management process


In order to ensure continued and verifiable alignment with requirements and performance improvement, the performance management process has been targeted as a crucial process for revamping. It not only needs to ensure internal performance improvement, but should also provide the mechanisms to ensure effective control by Parliament and the Cabinet.

Strategic direction/overall departmental Management structure


In line with constitutional and other legal stipulations, the overall management of the Department of Defence is vested in three structures, namely the Minister for Defence assisted by a ministry, the Chief of the National Defence Force assisted by a Defence Headquarters Staff, and the Secretary for Defence assisted by the Defence Secretariat.

The broad principle of dual military and civilian leadership in the Department is accepted as permanent. The exact relationship between the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the National Defence Force will be decided later. As a first step, the subordinate staff structures reporting to these two officials will be rationalised, using the following principles:
  • Duplication of staff will be eliminated or restricted to the absolute minimum. The Defence Secretary and the CSANDF will share staff structures.

  • Staff structures will first be rationalised and then the reporting channels to the Defence Secretary and the CSANDF will be established.

  • Staff structures will be designed for maximum co-operation (including co-location).

  • In order to ensure that costs are minimised, staff of both the Defence Secretary and the CSANDF will consist of both civilian and military personnel, applied in the most cost-effective manner. Rotating military officers under the authority of the Defence Secretary and allowing for rotation of other public servants from the Secretariat and even from other departments to Defence Headquarters, should ensure both continued revitalisation and enhanced transparency, and consequently, civil control. Maintaining a healthy balance in numbers to prevent military domination (by uniformed personnel) will be institutionalised.

  • Effective control through centralised strategic direction will be ensured, while efficiency will be enhanced through maximum decentralisation to executive agencies. Executive agencies will be structured in combat and support services. The practice of referring to executive agencies as 'arms of service' will be discontinued.

The 'Employ Forces' Process


The force employment process refers to employment at operational and tactical level. This is the way in which military command is exercised and structured with respect to operations ordered by Government and approved by Parliament.

The process of restructuring the force employment process still needs considerable study. The broad options in this regard are as follows:
  • continuing with separate command authority vested in the present Chiefs of Arms of Service;

  • structuring for unified operational command, analogous to the structures existing in the United States or Great Britain, for example. Such unified command may be vested in the CSANDF or another officer appointed specially for this purposes; and

  • further options that may become apparent during the course of the study.
The principles pursued in this study/restructuring are as follows:
  • It should be based on the operational/defence tasks and contingencies identified in the Defence Review.

  • It should enhance and ensure civil oversight without hampering military effectiveness.

  • The structure should enhance effectiveness/likelihood of success during operations. This also includes taking cognisance of the requirement for joint (interservice and interdepartmental) and combined (international/in conjunction with allied forces) operations such as may be encountered during peace support operations.

  • It should facilitate economy and performance management, not only in the employment process itself, but also further back in the process chain of the Department of Defence.

The 'provide forces' process


The process of providing forces entails moulding equipment, people and other resources into combat-ready forces. It involves development of tactical doctrine and procedures, training and maintenance.

It is doubted whether a model different from the traditional one followed internationally – vesting this process in an army, air force and navy – will be found. It is therefore foreseen that three combat services will exist for the purposes of providing forces. The study may determine it to be cost-effective to in fact create further combat services for this purpose, although the international trend is away from fragmenting services. Cost-effectiveness and operational readiness are considered to be the main driving forces in this process.

The study will also determine how these combat services will be structured internally. The necessity for the present structure of commands, among others, will be investigated. It is already apparent that the number of commands may be reduced, but it has not yet been determined by how much. The study may also result in the change of the nature of the structure of commands.
The 'provide resources' process It is foreseen that this process will be vested in the following structures:
  • Joint support services: It is apparent that considerable cost benefits may be derived from the creation of joint support services rather than duplicating common support functions in all three combat services. An example of such a support service is a joint medical service such as in existence presently in the SANDF, or, for example, also in the German Armed Forces. The exact number and nature of these support services have to be determined by the study.

  • Vesting support functions within combat services and giving such services a joint supporting role will be used in cases where this proves to be more cost-effective.

  • Outsourcing support and resource provision to other elements within the Department of Defence, other Government departments and agencies, and the private sector, will be used in cases where a clear case for retention of such functions cannot be made. This will ensure focus on core business and consequently enhanced effectiveness, efficiency and economy.

TARGET DATES


The final target date for completion of the transformation of the administrative, command and control, and support structures of the Department of Defence is May 1999.

The interim target for establishment of the staff structures and executive agencies (i.e. combat and supporting services) referred to above is April 1997. This will provide two years for the implementation and right-sizing/rationalisation of such structures.

ENDNOTES

  1. Edited version of a paper read at the SANDF and Transformation Conference, organised by the Institute for Security Studies, in conjunction with the South African National Defence Force, Pretoria, 15 October 1996.