INTRODUCTION

Africa evokes powerful images: of catastrophe, famine, strife and warfare. African statesmen and scholars continually emphasise the need to stop endless conflicts that divert the meagre resources of the State into arms acquisition. During the 1970s and 1980s the region witnessed increasing militarisation,2 spending a disproportionate percentage of its GNP on arms purchases. The issues of peace and security remained elusive. In the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era, there are hopes that this trend will not continue. Since the end of the 1980s, there have been some encouraging developments that raised the expectations for a slowing down of the militarisation process and an end to the most destructive conflicts in the region. However, new threats to security, in the form of the proliferation of small arms, have emerged.

Before analysing these developments, it is necessary to look at the trends in military expenditure and arms transfers in the region.

TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ARMS TRANSFER

During the 1960s and 1970s military expenditure increased rapidly in Africa. By the mid-1980s it reached peak levels. The high military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa during this period reflected the pre-occupation of governments with military-related threats, and the demands and vested interests of the military as an institution. In the last decade the region's military expenditure has declined. From some $10 billion and 3,6 per cent of GDP in 1985, it has decreased to $8 billion or 2,6 per cent of GDP in 1994.3 The 1994 level is about one-fifth down in comparison to figures for 1985.

Considering the growth of the armed forces in sub-Saharan countries, the US Arms Control and Disarmament agency found that they grew marginally at a rate of 0,3 per cent annually during the decade 1983-1993, and declined by 3,2 per cent annually between 1989-1993. While the relative size of forces is one of the indications of military balance, soldier-to-citizen ratio indicates the investment of human resources in the military power of a state. In Africa, the figure for soldiers per 1 000 people declined from 2,7 in 1983 to two in 1993. This is one of the lowest force ratios in the world, second only to South Asia with a figure of 1,7.

There has been a reduction in the transfer of major conventional weapons in Africa at the turn of the decade, both in terms of value and the number of weapons delivered. The data in Table 1 reflect the value of arms delivered between 1987 and 1994 to Africa and indicate a drastic drop in arms transfers. The total value has decreased from $13 730 million in 1987-1990, to $2 323 million in the period 1991-1994. The maximum impact was felt on Russian/Soviet arms transfers. These declined considerably from $10 000 million in 1987-1990 to $600 million in 1991-1994. The value of arms transfers by most other suppliers, including the United States, has also declined. The dominance of Russia/the Soviet Union on African arms imports appears to have vanished. Its share in the total arms deliveries to the region has diminished from 72 per cent to 25 per cent (see Table 2). The United Kingdom, France and China have emerged as prominent suppliers between 1991-1994, with a 12,9 per cent, 8,6 per cent and 8,6 per cent share in the total imports, respectively. However, the continuing sales by Russia, even though at a much lower level than in the past, and the substantial deliveries by other countries, are discouraging and suggest that arms will probably continue to be available from external suppliers seeking profits or pursuing some or other political or ideological agenda in Africa.

Source: RF Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994, CRS Report, 4 August 1995.

Source: RF Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994, CRS Report, 4 August 1995.

A survey of the value of arms transfer deliveries by individual countries in Africa during 1983-1993 also shows a downward trend (see Table 3). In conflict-ridden countries, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Somalia, arms transfer has also shown a decline. The increased delivery of arms to Angola in 1993 could be explained by the ending of the arms embargo by US and Britain against Angola during that year.

Source: RF Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994, CRS Report, 4 August 1995.

If the number of weapons delivered by major suppliers to sub-Saharan Africa is considered, there is a perceptible difference in the figures for 1987-1990 and 1991-1994. Imports of tanks, self-propelled guns and helicopters declined by eighty per cent from their earlier levels. The import of surface-to-air missiles came down by 95 per cent. Supersonic combat aircraft declined by 75 per cent of their earlier levels. The decline in the import of artillery and minor surface combatants was comparatively less at 56 per cent and 52 per cent of their earlier levels. Armoured personnel carriers and armoured cars showed a minimum level of decline of 13,3 per cent. Hence, in recent years the import of major conventional weapon systems has been reduced considerably in sub-Saharan Africa.

CHANGES IN THE AFRICAN STATE

Certain changes in the nature of African states, especially with regard to issues that give rise to conflict, provide the hope that Africa's burden of war will be eased in the coming years. Recent progress towards more open and democratic political systems has been widespread. According to an analysis, fifteen countries in Africa can be classified at present as democracies. A further ten countries have begun the process of political liberalisation and have already held one election. In fourteen countries, governments have held elections and implemented some liberalisation measures, including easing restrictions on the media and permitting the formation of political parties.4

Many observers feel that multi-party democracies based on the Western model are likely to emerge in a large number of countries. Others feel that this would weaken the central authority and deepen ethnic tensions. They suggest that uniquely African democratic forms or simply improved governance, even under authoritarian regimes, would be better options.5

These new regimes will be created largely by emerging African leaders with powerful social and popular bases, unlike Africa's first democracies that have been created mainly by colonial powers from thelocal élite. But these regimes failed on many counts, including their ability to promote social peace and progress. Colonialism left Africa with multi-ethnic states and African leaders were unable to unite the heterogeneous populations within their states into unified nations. The result was tension and violence that led to intra-ethnic conflicts. Governments resorted to the use of violence to contain the conflict, which in turn fuelled military expenditure. The ineptitude of these new governments often led to their being overthrown by military governments.

It is hoped that the new elected regimes will be more responsive, tolerant and principled, than those Africa has known in the past.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A second set of encouraging developments is at the international level, where profound changes have taken place since the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to an end to the contest for influence in Africa, between the US and Western powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries on the other. During the Cold War-period, the struggle by the superpowers for influence, control and access to military bases as part of their competition for ideological control of the world, contributed to the increasing militarisation in Africa. The governments of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia received extensive Soviet military assistance which they used against their internal opponents. Regimes in the Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Morocco were major recipients of aid from the US. The superpower assistance also strengthened resistance forces, such as the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia.

Between 1981 and 1988, the Soviet Union dominated arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa. It provided a total of $18,9 billion worth of arms, as compared to just less than $1 billion for the US.6 Soviet involvement in Africa, with its substantial arms transfers to Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, was aimed mainly at regaining some of the influence it had lost in the Middle East and its failures in the global competition during the 1980s. The strategic position of these countries may also have played its part Ethiopia's location on the southern flank of the Middle East, the mineral wealth of Southern Africa and the petroleum shipping lanes around African coasts. However, by the end of the 1980s, it was increasingly difficult for the Soviet Government to justify costly commitments in Africa, in the light of deepening political and economic crises at home.

The US' involvement in Africa was not as extensive as that of the Soviet Union during the 1980s. The main recipients of American military assistance were Chad, Sudan and Somalia, and the UNITA forces in Angola. In the case of Sudan and Somalia, their strategic location vis-à-vis the Middle East was the primary reason behind arms transfers. Providing access to Somalian ports for the US military was seen to be extremely valuable. Countering Libyan influence was a factor in US assistance to Chad. Military assistance to UNITA fell under the `Reagan doctrine', that was aimed at containing Soviet influence through aid to anti-Soviet resistance forces. By the end of the 1980s, national budgetary constraints, the instability of regimes in Sudan and Somalia, and their poor human rights record, were making it difficult for the US to continue arms transfers. With the decline and eventual disappearance of the Soviet-American rivalry in Africa, the rationale for any kind of military aid was severely weakened.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have had a significant impact on the security situation in sub-Saharan Africa. The absence of ideological rivalry between the two former military superpowers and their allies has removed some complications in specific conflict situations and has improved the prospects for negotiated solutions. The independence of Namibia, the negotiated resolution of conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, and the inception of majority rule in South Africa have been facilitated to a great extent by the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the end of civil war in Ethiopia was accelerated by the cessation of external political and military support to the Mengistu regime from the former Eastern bloc countries.

THE FALL OF THE APARTHEID REGIME

Another factor held responsible for the arms race and militarisation in Africa was the apartheid regime in South Africa. Its vast military establishment, large military budget, arsenal of highly sophisticated weapons and nuclear weapons seriously threatened peace and security in Africa. Since the 1960s, South Africa developed a formidable military machine in defence of apartheid. In 1993, a year before the dismantling of apartheid, the country spent $3 911 million on defence, approximately half of the total military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa.7 It had also established its own defence industry, under the South African Armaments Development Corporation (ARMSCOR). South Africa was thus self-sufficient in terms of major weapons and had the most powerful military force in Africa. The country also developed a nuclear weapon capability by the end of the 1970s.

In addition, South Africa followed an aggressive policy of destabilising its neighbours during the 1980s. It resulted in the deaths of more than a million of the region's people, and cost an estimated $62,42 billion.8 This created a climate of great insecurity in a number of African states, particularly the front-line states. Indeed, they were in a state of perpetual siege, not only as a result of the South African policy to pursue liberation fighters, but also through its encouragement of rebel forces within their territories, as witnessed in Angola and Mozambique. This led to a high degree of militarisation, not only in the Southern African region, but in Africa as a whole. Nigeria, for example, used to take the South African factor into account in its defence planning. South Africa's apartheid regime was thus responsible for the high rate of arms imports into the region. It can therefore be concluded that the demise of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule in South Africa would enhance security in African states and lead to the reduction of militarisation. The new South African Government has reaffirmed that it will continue to remain a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which South Africa has acceded in July 1991. In this regard, it was active in supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It has also resolved to create a world free of nuclear weapons.9 With South Africa's full support, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty was approved at the OAU Summit meeting in June 1995. Partnership and co-operation seem to be the keywords in the relationship of the new South African Government with its neighbours.10

However, South Africa exported $187 million worth of arms in 1993 to more than fifty countries. Despite the transition from apartheid to democracy, ARMSCOR has declared its intention to increase arms exports by 300 percent.11

NEW THREATS: THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS

Conflict and its attendant suffering continue to abound in Africa. Arms are still reaching the continent, even though the category of arms has changed. As discussed above, the recent changes in the international system have led to a decline in the trade of major conventional weapon systems in Africa. However, there appears to be a simultaneous increase in the trade in small arms and light weapons. A broad classification of these would include automatic assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine and sub-machine guns, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, landmines and high explosives.

Unfortunately, light weapons are not included in the categories of weapons of which sales have to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Nor do they figure in the weapons holding listed in the IISS's Military Balance or the register of conventional arms transfer published in the SIPRI Yearbook. Studies of arms transfer trends have focused on the major conventional weapon systems only. One of the main criticisms of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is that it lacks relevance to the sub-Saharan Africa region, since most of the armed conflicts in the region have been fought with small arms in recent years. The transfer of these weapons exacerbated conflicts in Angola, Somalia and Rwanda, while in Mozambique and Namibia, their proliferation threatens to subvert social and economic reconstruction. Finally, in South Africa, the proliferation of small arms poses a threat to the consolidation of democracy.

The conflict that erupted in Rwanda during May 1994 was truly horrifying. Following the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana in an airplane crash in April, Hutu extremists armed with weapons supplied by Government, began to massacre the minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus. It was estimated that in the course of a month 500 000 Rwandans were killed. During this bloody conflict, government forces made use of small arms valued at $6 million, imported from Egypt. These included rocket launchers, anti-personnel landmines, Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles. Rwandans also purchased large quantities of small arms from South Africa.12 espite the collapse of the former Rwandan Government and the UN embargo on former Rwandan forces, the transfer of arms has continued. The forces are buying arms from the black market, using government funds.

In Somalia, chaos and conflict reigned after the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which at its height involved 30 000 troops from 28 countries, helped to alleviate starvation in the country, but did nothing to restore order. The battle between the major factions for the control of Mogadishu continues. The fighting has been supported primarily by the availability of arms and ammunition. Initially, the various factions were equipped with a quantity of Soviet and American weapons procured by Siad Barre's regime. They restocked their arsenals later with weapons acquired from the black market.13

In Angola, conflict has been ongoing between the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Government and UNITA for the last twenty years. During the Cold War, the MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, while the US provided substantial military assistance to UNITA. In 1991, under pressure from the two superpowers, the MPLA and UNITA decided to halt fighting and to hold internationally monitored elections. These elections were held in September 1992 and produced a landslide victory for the MPLA. However, UNITA rejected the outcome and resumed fighting. This resumption was made possible through Savimbi's stockpiling of South African and Angolan weapons, as early as 1989. By the time US military aid to Angola ended in 1992, the US has contributed an estimated $300 million worth of weapons to UNITA, including highly sophisticated small arms and light weapons, and stronger anti-aircraft missiles. South Africa has provided an equivalent amount.14

Subsequently, in one of the largest conflicts of the post-Cold War era, mostly light and small weapons were used in Angola. With the resolution of the political crisis and the conducting of free and fair elections, peace should return. The greater danger of anti-personnel mines remains, however. British army engineers estimate that nearly 20 million landmines, covering one third of the land mass, are in place. These mines have originated from manufacturers in the erstwhile Soviet Union, the US, the Pacific Rim countries, Belgium, Italy, Germany and South Africa. Most of the mines are attributed to UNITA.15

In Mozambique, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) received armed assistance and training from South Africa from 1982 onwards. RENAMO received the usual AK-47 variants of Soviet, Chinese and Romanian origins, RPGs, Czech machine guns and landmines.16

The spread of light weapons in Southern Africa was not limited to Angola and Mozambique. South Africa's democratic process is also under threat by small arms proliferation. The porous nature of the region's borders highlights this threat. In the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, as well as in the wars of liberation in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the apartheid regime provided weapons to the rebel movements in these countries. These weapons were procured either via ARMSCOR or were captured by the SADF during their direct military action in Angola and Namibia. Much of the problem of criminal violence in South Africa is due to light arms originating from South Africa flowing back into the country. Furthermore, the negotiated settlements which marked the end of conflict in Mozambique and elsewhere, did not lead to effective disarmament of combatants. A large number of weapons have leaked into the black market. The smuggling of small arms across the borders of Swaziland, Namibia and Mozambique into South Africa is common.

CONCLUSION

In post-Cold War and post-apartheid Africa, the traditional threats to security have vanished. The ideological and military competition between the two former superpowers, which has had a pervasive influence on the course of peace and conflict in Africa, is no more. The apartheid regime in South Africa, and the military threat associated with it, disintegrated with the emergence of a democratic South Africa. The incidents of inter-state conflict in sub-Saharan Africa have declined during the past decade, while some internal conflicts are being settled in the wake of the Cold War, and new ones have arisen. The flow of light weapons has exacerbated these conflicts. Ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have had a favourable effect on small arms trade. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, government control over trade in light weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics has been eroded. As a result, there has been a significant increase in the sales of light weapons by newly privatised or decontrolled arms firms in these countries, along with a substantial flow of arms onto the black market. It is these sources that most of the warring factions in Africa tap for the procurement of small arms. The Southern African region is facing the greatest threat to its security from the proliferation of small arms.

Clear action is required at different levels to address this threat. The establishment of a regional arms register to monitor small arms trade could be one such measure. More effective disarmament as part of the settlement of armed conflict could be another. A final lasting solution could be the moving away from militaristic solutions to conflicts in the region. The current trend in sub-Saharan Africa towards democratisation would certainly help. Though democracy cannot be a panacea for all conflicts, it would encourage negotiations in disputes, and open discussions of policies and issues. Hopefully, through these measures, the goal of a secure Africa can be achieved.

ENDNOTES

Edited version of a paper presented at the International Conference on Understanding Contemporary Africa: India and South-South Co-operation, New Delhi, 15-17 February 1996.



The term militarisation is used here to imply the accumulation of weapons.



International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 1995-1996, IISS, London, 1995, p. 269.



C Lancaster, Democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa, Survival, 35(3), Autumn 1993, pp. 38-50.



R W Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace, New York, 1994, p. 157; see also D L Petrson, Debunking Ten Myths about Democracy in Africa, Washington Quarterly, 17(3), pp. 129-141.



R F Grimmet, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers 1981-1988, CRS Report No *9-434 F, CRS, Washington DC, 9 May 1988, p. 36.



IISS, op. cit.



K Booth & P Vale, Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, International Affairs, 71(2), April 1995, p. 196.



Arms Control Reporter, May 1995, pp. 455.



N Mandela, South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, November - December 1993, pp. 86-97.



M T Klare, Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the post-Cold War Era, in J Singh (ed.), Light Weapons and International Security, Delhi, 1995, pp. 20-21.



United Nations, UN Disarmament and Conflict Resolution: Project Managing Arms in Peace Processors Somalia, UN, New York, 1995.



L Mathiak, Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola, in J Boutwell, M Klare & L Reed (eds.), Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, pp. 81-97.



Anon, Landmines a Deadly Legacy: The Arms Project, Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, 1993.



J Laffin, The World in Conflict, War Annual 4, Brassey's, London, 1990.



J Cock, A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa, in Singh, op. cit., pp. 87-126.