INTRODUCTION

There has been little or no political stability in Lesotho since independence. The enclave country has been plagued by violent power struggles, politically motivated assassinations and coups. The restoration of constitutional rule in March 1993 has not brought stability to the kingdom. Yet, there has not been a dearth of explanations for this situation. The explanations proffered for the lack of political stability in Lesotho have either ignored the feebleness of the Basotho nation-state or merely treated it as a dependent variable or as a prize for which various political forces compete. Thus, conspicuously absent from all the studies of political problems in Lesotho, is a methodology defining the state as a unit of analysis. Consequently, issues such as hegemony and the state’s capability to penetrate civil society, in order to establish political consensus and to set standards and norms, have received little or no attention.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it proposes an addition to the methodology employed in analysing Lesotho’s political problems, arguing that debates or studies about the anatomy of what appears to be endemic political instability in the enclave Kingdom need to entail a close examination of the economic characteristics of the Basotho nation-state and its capacity to mediate or manage conflict, and to perform distributive functions expected of the State. Second, it attempts to demonstrate that, like its predecessor the colonial State, Lesotho’s post-colonial State has failed to develop into a hegemon; it lacks the ability to manage or give coherence to Lesotho’s political process. Rather than attempting a critical analysis, however, the article only points to the need to ask whether the State in Lesotho can claim to be a source of society’s political and social standards, hence a force for national unity.

The article examines the various explanations given for the persistent conflict and/or political instability in Lesotho, suggesting an expanded methodology that will place the Basotho nation-state at the centre of the analysis. Some of the key incidences of political instability since the kingdom’s return to constitutional rule in 1993 are discussed. These are defined as violence, threat of violence and popular uprisings or stand-offs with implications that threaten peace and state security. An analysis of the economic characteristics of the Basotho nation-state is provided, trying to find out whether it has the capacity and/or resources needed for managing political conflict, and a broad conclusion is drawn from the analysis.

EXPLAINING POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN LESOTHO

A myriad explanations have been offered for the lack of political stability in Lesotho. These divide into two clusters. The first cluster includes those explanations attributing the problem to the history of relations between Lesotho and South Africa. Most of the explanations in this cluster present Lesotho’s political instability as the consequence of South Africa’s imperialist designs which originally entailed a strategy to incorporate Lesotho.2 The destabilisation thesis - fashionable and widely used in analysing Southern African geopolitics in the 1980s - is a sophisticated variant of what used to be termed ‘South Africa’s imperialism’.

South Africa indeed wanted to incorporate Lesotho. In 1932, the Hertzog/Smuts coalition government formally asked Britain to hand over the territory’s control to the South African Government, because Basotho had access to jobs in South Africa.3 As it became clear that Britain was not prepared to accede to this demand, South Africa issued a veiled (but strong) warning to Lesotho (Basutoland until 1966), that its independence was a threat. As Verwoerd put it in 1961, an independent Lesotho "could well become a danger to South Africa."4

The second cluster encapsulates explanations and/or perspectives linking Lesotho’s instability to Leabua Jonathan’s seizure of power and abrogation of constitutional rule in 1970. Thus Jonathan has been dubbed the "author of political crisis" in Lesotho.5 The Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF) appeared to share this view when, soon after staging a coup in January 1986, it accused Jonathan of plunging the country into a political crisis.6 South African newspaper editors also attributed Lesotho’s political problems to Jonathan’s rule. For example, commenting on Jonathan’s overthrow, the editor of The Star’s African News Service argued that, "[t]wenty years of iron-fisted rule by Chief Jonathan have subverted traditional Basotho democracy and alienated South Africa."7

Notwithstanding their plausibility, the above explanations have clear limitations. Those falling within the first cluster tend to concentrate only on factors external to Lesotho, for example, South Africa’s pressure or destabilisation programme,and ignore forces operating within the enclave country and the characteristics of the Basotho nation-state. Explanations in the second cluster, on the other hand, exaggerate the power of Jonathan, portraying him as the sole force behind political developments in Lesotho and underestimating the role played by his opponents in shaping Basotho’s political attitudes, hence the character and nature of instability in Lesotho. They assume that constitutional rule guarantees political stability. In fact, constitutional rule in Lesotho between 1966 and 1970 was characterised by intermittent violence which claimed scores of lives.8 Both sets of explanations tend to ignore or gloss over the critical issue, namely the extent to which the Lesotho State can be said to be the repository of social values or a source of ethical and political standards in Lesotho. In other words, is the state in Lesotho capable of winning, what Carnoy has called, "the active consent of those over which it rules"?9 More importantly, to what degree is the Basotho nation-state able to influence the economic and social activity of its citizens?

One analyst has argued, without directly addressing the influence that the Basotho nation-state has over the citizenry, that "strong elements of national identity have not forestalled domestic conflict" in Lesotho.10 It is easy to argue that persistent political instability in Lesotho indicates the lack of a hegemonic state, hence the absence of organic unity or shared values between state and society. Clapham argues that this is one of the most serious problems afflicting Third World states. In particular, he argues that "incorporation into the global economy and political structure is the single most basic reason for the fragility of the Third World State."11 In the case of Lesotho this problem is compounded by the uniqueness of the kingdom’s geopolitical situation. Completely surrounded by and inextricably linked in a dependent manner to the Republic of South Africa, the Basotho nation-state has remained fragile. Indeed, clearly not visible in Lesotho is not just the lack of a ‘general will’ or the Gramscian type of state, that is, a hegemonic state or "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing ... all state morality, customs, religious and political principles and all social relations..."12

Such a state, however, does not emerge from clichés and slogans or monopoly of force, but from a society underpinned by an economically, socially and religiously grounded value system. This article argues that, while the Basotho nation-state possesses the monopoly of force necessary to control its citizens, it nevertheless lacks the capacity to generate the national consensus essential for political stability and social harmony. This does not mean that the Gramscian state is good for Lesotho or that such a state would not be an arena for political power struggles. In fact, the state historically has been both an object of attack and a theatre of political contestations.13 More importantly, "the state almost never is a coherent and encompassing unit of action,"14 that is, its constituent bodies which are relatively autonomous and interdependent, often have conflicting functions and objectives.

Admittedly, political instability in post-military Lesotho should also be seen against the backdrop of the historical role of the armed forces. In fact, one of the most serious dilemmas confronting the BCP regime since April 1993 has been how to impose its authority over the country’s politicised army which has ruled the kingdom for more than six years. Apart from protecting Jonathan’s unconstitutional government between 1970 and 1985, Lesotho’s army had ruled the country for seven years between 1986 and 1993 before it relinquished power to an elected government.15 Yet years of praetorianism in Lesotho and bloody battles between the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) should not be ignored. But the degree to which it can be argued that the LDF would inevitably undermine the BCP government is a moot point. Indeed, the policies pursued by the military government that replaced Jonathan’s administration suggest otherwise. After taking over the country’s administration in January 1986, the military regime declared an unconditional amnesty for all BCP exiles and the BCP’s South African-backed LLA which had engaged the LDF in battles since 1979.

The military government’s conciliatory gestures towards the BCP included the appointment of BCP members to ministerial positions and top government offices. The present Minister of Justice, Kelebone Maope, held the posts of Attorney-General and Minister of Justice respectively, during the seven-year period of military rule from 1986 to 1993. More importantly, there were no reported cases of harassment and intimidation against the BCP and its supporters by the army or the police during this period, neither were there attempts to disarm the LLA.16

POLITICAL INSTABILITY SINCE THE RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN RULE IN 1993

The military rulers handed over power to an elected government in April 1993. The March 1993 general elections, which paved the way for a civilian administration, were won predictably by Ntsu Mokhehle’s Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The army’s decision to restore constitutional rule had to do with the February 1990 coup, which stripped the King of legislative and executive powers acquired after overthrowing Chief Jonathan in 1986. This created a legitimacy crisis for the junta, for which the solution lay in making a major concession to the nation. Yet, this meant finding someone to blame for its earlier dithering on the issue. It found a convenient scapegoat in the King, who was accused of resisting efforts at returning the country to civilian rule. The King was subsequently banished from Lesotho under the pretext of being assisted to take his sabbatical in London. Soon after stripping the monarch of executive and legislative powers, the junta announced its intention to "steer the nation to democracy by 1992."17 In pursuit of this goal, it hastily established a constituent assembly which amended the 1966 Constitution and eventually guided the country to civilian rule.18

The BCP-led civilian government inherited a system characterised by deep political polarisation and a high degree of uncertainty engendered by Jonathan’s fifteen years of unconstitutional rule and seven years of military dictatorship. Ntsu Mokhehle’s government seemed ill-equipped for these challenges, particularly the nagging issue of redefining the role of the army in a democratic Lesotho. Ambivalent and/or equivocal on the issue, Mokhehle’s regime has been sending conflicting signals to the army. Among these are the BCP government’s statements about the fate of the LLA and the Prime Minister’s public condemnation of the LDF as ‘Jonathan’s army’. The Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers declared that the LLA had been disbanded while simultaneously alluding to their plans to use it as a countervailing force to the national army. Not surprisingly, the LLA has been glibly flaunted as a bulwark against the LDF by some of the cabinet ministers.19While rhetorically it is committed to national reconciliation, the BCP regime has done little or nothing to achieve this objective. Reporting after their peace mission to Lesotho in January 1994, the presidents of Botswana and Zimbabwe said: "It was and remains our very clear impression that, notwithstanding a recognised need for national reconciliation, little if any progress has been made towards the implementation of such policy or towards the promotion of a truly national dialogue."20

Political instability in Lesotho since April 1994 should also be understood against the background of the attitude displayed by the BCP administration. Indeed, if anything, the BCP adopted contentious - if not scary - policies which tended to engender scepticism about majority rule among minority groups, civil servants, police and soldiers. Soon after attaining state power, the BCP replaced all the Principal Secretaries and board members of public corporations with its own functionaries and supporters.21 The regime has recently replaced the Kingdom’s High Commissioners and Ambassadors with BCP members, ostensibly as a measure to consolidate its grip on the civil service. Whatever their raison d’être, however, these policies did not augur well for national reconciliation. As should be expected, they only caused bitterness among those affected and their political parties, thus deepening the mutual suspicion permeating Lesotho’s politics. The opposition presented by the BNP to the regime’s description of the LDF, the dangling of the LLA as a weapon against the army, and the expulsion of BNP inclined civil servants, serve as evidence of a witch hunt against BCP opponents.

As already noted, the advent of constitutional rule brought no stability to Lesotho. The BNP refused to accept the election results, arguing that they had been rigged. Despite a ruling by the High Court that the claim had no basis, the BNP remained adamant that the BCP’s electoral victory was fraudulent.22 Following its open criticism of the way the High Court handled the issue, the BNP leadership was charged with, and convicted of, contempt of court.23 Thus at the outset the BNP, Lesotho’s biggest opposition party, did not accept the BCP government as legitimate. Together with the factors highlighted above, the BNP’s position has undoubtedly undermined political stability in Lesotho. But the BCP government has also done little to promote stability. In fact, Lesotho faced a serious political crisis when the BCP refused to recognise the BNP government as legitimate in 1965/66. The ensuing political instability claimed scores of lives.24 Thus the BCP and the BNP have traditionally been sceptical, if not contemptuous, of democracy. Yet, they have played a critical role in shaping or moulding political attitudes in Lesotho.

Similarly, the BNP’s refusal to accept the March 1993 general election results was followed by a trail of threatening political episodes. In January 1994 the country’s army of 2 000 soldiers split into two rival factions which squared up against each other in a twelve-hour gun battle that left five soldiers dead. The factional fighting within the army was a sequel to the government’s controversial decision secretly to increase the salaries of cabinet ministers and parliamentarians by nearly 300 per cent, and its subsequent refusal to accede to the army’s demand for a hundred per cent salary rise.25 The episode not only led to widespread panic in Lesotho, but also to a high degree of political uncertainty. Dazed, the Lesotho Prime Minister appealed to South Africa for military intervention to protect his beleaguered administration. However, the appeal apparently failed to persuade South Africa of the need to send troops immediately into Lesotho. The South African government merely warned instead that "any attempt to replace the government of Ntsu Mokhehle by force would be unacceptable."26

On 14 April 1994, Selometsi Baholo, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, was killed by what The Guardian’s Johannesburg reporter termed "army rebels" while his four cabinet colleagues were briefly detained by a group of soldiers at the Makoanyane barracks.27 In May 1994, the rank-and-file members of the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) struck, in support of their demand for a sixty per cent pay increase. An upsurge in criminal activity - mainly looting and robbery - added to the panic and sense of insecurity among the country’s rulers. Two cabinet ministers fled to South Africa - where they lived as ‘unofficial’ refugees for over three months. In what appeared to be a twist of irony, the army, which had seemingly been a major threat to the stability of the BCP regime, took over police functions - protecting property and maintaining law and order in the country.

As confusion mounted, the then King Letsie III announced the dissolution of the BCP government and its replacement by an appointed council. Letsie III’s overthrow of the government not only evoked an angry response from the BCP, but led to tragic deaths. Four BCP supporters, who had joined a protest march to the palace, were shot dead by palace guards.28 Mokhehle’s government was, however, eventually reinstated on 14 September 1994 at the behest of the presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana after the Prime Minister had promised to observe a set of conditions imposed by the three leaders. Among the conditions were that the reinstated BCP government should immediately disband the commission of inquiry set up to investigate King Moshoeshoe II; to assess his relationship with the various governments in Lesotho since he was crowned as King, and to reinstate him to the throne. King Moshoeshoe II was formally reinstalled on 25 January 1995.29 This followed the enactment of the office of King (Reinstatement of Former King, Act No. 10 of 1994). Section 2(1) of the Act provides that, "[u]pon the abdication of His Majesty King Letsie III from the office of king of Lesotho, His Majesty Moshoeshoe II shall assume the office of King of Lesotho."30

The presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana, who should aptly be dubbed the authors of this constitutional change, saw Moshoeshoe II’s reinstatement to the throne as crucial to political stability in Lesotho. After their fact finding visit to Lesotho from 11 to 12 February 1994, presidents Mugabe and Masire of Zimbabwe and Botswana respectively, concluded that, "[t]he question of the monarchy appears to be a very important traditional question, and one that goes to the very heart of the Basotho society and underlies its present problems..."31

However, King Moshoeshoe II’s reinstatement is being challenged by a Maseru lawyer, Thabang Khauoe, who is petitioning the High Court of Lesotho to declare that the enthronement is unconstitutional.32 Whether or not it will succeed, Khauoe’s action does not augur well for stability in Lesotho. After all, King Moshoeshoe II owes his re-enthronement to neither the courts of law nor the present government; rather, he owes it to a coup by his son which prompted external intervention and placed his case back on the country’s political agenda.33

THE BASOTHO NATION-STATE AND HEGEMONIC CRISIS

Like the majority of former colonies in Africa, Lesotho has not experienced the process of state formation as it occurred in what are today termed ‘developed countries’. Not only did the colonial administration supplant or interfere with Basotho’s pre-colonial forms of state organisation, but it turned Lesotho into South Africa’s labour reserve. The colonial state primarily fostered labour migration because the interests of the colonial power, Britain, lay outside the enclave country. As the Resident Commissioner for Basutoland reported in 1898/99, it was in Britain’s interests to perpetuate Lesotho’s labour reserve status. He argued that, "[t]hough for its size and population Basutoland produces a comparatively enormous amount of grain, it has an industry of great economic value to South Africa, viz, the output of labour... Primarily the native labour industry supplies a dominion want, and secondarily it tends to fertilise native territories with cash which is at once diffused for English goods."34

The colonial state’s labour policy was accompanied by measures which made the development of a sustainable national economy in Lesotho difficult. The colonial state took little trouble in stimulating or bolstering economic activity in the territory. This is borne out by the fact that with the advent of independence, Lesotho barely had a modern communications system. Only a small road network existed. Yet, as Cobbe observed, this did not only militated against the growth of a self-sustaining economy in Lesotho, but also reinforced the territory’s labour reserve status. He notes that, "[t]o a large degree, the economic life of the country was fragmented into a number of rural hinterlands that interacted economically with the closest South African market across the border and the more distant mines and urban centres where migrant workers earned cash income."35

The Basotho people were thus transformed into a nation of migrants with little direct economic links with their nation-state. Undoubtedly, the state’s influence over its citizens’ trade and economic institutions is certainly negligible under these circumstances. Arguably, therefore, this could only lead to a hegemonic crisis or what can aptly be termed the failure of "the process of state formation."36 The colonial state inhibited - to borrow Clapham’s phrase - a "merging of state and society as common expression of a set of shared values."37 The state has thus since then not mirrored or represented the country’s internal economic activity and its Dynamics. Instead, it has been a force presiding over a nation whose future and livelihood lie largely outside Lesotho’s borders.

There has been economic and political modernisation in Lesotho since the early 1960s. However, the country and its people remain without a national economy that would increase interaction between the state and the citizens. The cash economy that has followed modernisation efforts may have triggered competition for control of the state, but it has certainly not solved the hegemonic crisis of the Basotho nation-state or strengthened its influence over the character and direction of politics in Lesotho. Most of the cash on which the Basotho people depend for their survival derives from outside their country’s borders, coming largely in the form of migrant workers’ remittances, foreign aid, customs union receipts and loans. Through these structural problems, the state and its citizens are tied in a dependent relationship to external forces.

However, this should not be misconstrued as a suggestion that there is something wrong with Lesotho’s integration into the World economy in general, and the South African economic system in particular. Neither is it suggested that subordinate economic relations impede development, for, as one analyst has argued, "Basotho do not believe that economic independence is the only measure of development."38 Rather, the argument is that Lesotho’s chronic economic dependence and weak economic base undermine the citizen’s social interaction with and loyalty to the state. Indeed, one of the most glaring features of the Basotho nation-state is its inability to accumulate and redistribute wealth among its population. Yet, as has been indicated earlier in this analysis, the economic viability of the Lesotho state has been accorded little or no space in the debates about the political problems plaguing the enclave country. As defined by one renowned scholar, economic viability refers to "the capability to exist and develop as a separate state in a world of highly economically interdependent states. It refers not to self-sufficiency but to the ability of [the] territory’s population to perform within the larger global economy."39 The following factors are now acknowledged as being critical to the state’s economic viability:

the functioning or performance of the economy;

the ability to produce goods and services that can be sold in competitive global markets;

the extent of infrastructural development;

the level of development of industrial and service sectors;

geographic proximity to potential markets; and

the degree of self-sufficiency with regard to food and energy supplies.

As will be shown below, the Lesotho state scores very low when judged against each of these factors.

The kingdom’s dependence on labour migrancy, foreign aid and customs union receipts has deepened since independence, while its trade deficit with South Africa and its foreign debt have increased. In 1974/75 the total earnings of Basotho miners in South Africa were estimated at R95 million, while the value of goods imported into Lesotho by migrant workers was about R20 million. Migrant remittances during this period amounted to about R30 million.40 In 1992, migrant earnings amounted to R1 299,06 million or about 87,4 per cent of the country’s gross national product (GNP), while Basotho miners’ remittances stood at R347,4 million.41 The country’s total imports in 1974/75 amounted to about R86 million against exports of only about R10 million.42 In 1992, Lesotho’s trade deficit was R2 931,53 million while its exports were valued at just R310,91 million.43 Government revenue, of which R547,7 million consisted of customs union receipts, amounted to R1 019,6 million in 1992/93, or about eighty per cent of migrant earnings. Income tax amounted to R165,4 million. Company tax, on the other hand, stood at R53 million, having fallen by over half a million from R53,6 million in 1991/92.44

The country’s manufacturing sector provided only 11 065 jobs in 1991/92,45 while the entire formal sector created no more than 70 000 jobs.46 Lesotho’s labour force, estimated at over 600 000 in 1989, has an increased annual rate of more than 20 000 new entrants to the labour market.47 The predominantly subsistence agriculture, which depends almost entirely on migrant earnings, has bleak prospects in the face of numerous constraints, such as atrophying land resources due to erosion and population pressure. Only nine per cent of Lesotho’s land is suitable for crop production.48 Foreign aid - grants and concessional loans - remains a critical component of the government’s development budget. In 1992/93 it accounted for over 91,1 per cent of the country’s capital expenditure.49

The above figures are not only significant indicators of the low level of industrial development in Lesotho and the Kingdom’s tenuous tax base, but also evidence that the Basotho nation-state can play only a limited social role. With this tenuous economic base, the state has been unable to assume a dominant political role in society. It can neither create a most basic ‘welfare state’ covering every adult citizen, nor exert control or influence over the country’s politically conscious migrant workers, whose earnings support in excess of eighty per cent of rural households,50 and whose remittances finance nearly 57 per cent of merchandise imports.51 This suggests that, for the majority population in Lesotho, the state is neither a facilitator of accumulation nor a factor in economic life. If it cannot influence the economic activity of the bulk of its population or maintain itself, can the state be a force for unity? It cannot rally its citizens around a particular political course or programme, and as a result, it can only become the focus of political power contestations.

The significance of the statistics on migrant earnings and customs union receipts goes beyond showing Lesotho’s chronic dependence on labour migrancy and customs union. It is indeed, a demonstration of the degree to which the Lesotho state and the majority of its citizens compete for a share in the wealth existing outside their country, or perhaps more precisely for a permanent niche within the South African dominated economic system. Both participate as separate forces and independently of each other in the South African political economy, with little political and social interaction between them. Thus, arguably, Lesotho migrants in South Africa, estimated to be no less than 121 000 in 1991,52 have little to do with their country - the Basotho nation-state having no immediate relevance as far as their survival is concerned. The same can be said about the migrants’ dependants. They exist largely outside of the state’s economic purview. But, as has been argued elsewhere,53 competition for state power has always been intense and perennial. It is simply something to be captured and used in political power battles - struggles aimed at gaining access to or controlling the meagre economic resources of which most are not obtained internally. This situation is certainly not conducive to political stability. As has been shown in this article, general elections in Lesotho and their aftermath have seen tension, serious political disagreements and blood baths, as losers have refused to accept the results.

CONCLUSION

Political instability in Lesotho has many causes and intensifiers, and it is indeed a consequence of Basotho’s political behaviour, as well as the country’s unique geographical situation. There is a need for a research methodology that encompasses or generates varied tools and models which would facilitate, among others, a critical analysis of the enclave kingdom’s economic attributes and the way they might have shaped political power contestations. In sum, the centrality of the state to the process of accumulation and overall economic activity, and how the state relates to and/or interacts with the citizens politically and economically, should constitute the core or unit of such an analysis.

Admittedly, this article has not nearly achieved this kind of analysis. However, it has highlighted the areas that should be explored in order to gain further insight into the political crisis in Lesotho, while also demonstrating the peculiar features of the Basotho nation-state. The absence of ‘meaningful’ economic activities and the chronic dependence of the Basotho people on South Africa for sheer survival, may have undermined the growth of a value system essential to national unity. For the majority of the Basotho people, the Republic of South Africa is a source of income and livelihood. Thus Lesotho has little, if any, relevance as far as their basic economic needs are concerned.

This edited version of a paper read at the workshop on the Lesotho Political Crisis, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 14-15 September 1995, is published as part of the Human Security Project, a venture jointly sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation of Germany and the Foundation for Global Dialogue.



See, for example Lord O M Bailey, The Republic of South Africa and the British High Commission Territories, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 108.



D K Kowet, Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1978, p. 113.



Bailey, op. cit., p. 108.



See, for example B M Khaketla, Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p. 8 - 10.



Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 32(12), pp. 34786 - 34787.



The Sunday Star (Review), 26 January 1986.



F K Makoa, King Letsie III’s Short Lived Coup, paper read at the Social Sciences Staff Seminar, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 2 February 1995, p. 6.



M Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 66.



R F Weisfelder, The Basotho Nation-state: What Legacy for the Future?, Journal of Modern African Studies, 19(2), 1981, p. 221.



C Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 42.



Carnoy, op. cit, p. 66.



J Coleman, Against the State, BBC Books, London, 1992, p. 12.



B A Rockman, Minding the State - or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative Conceptualisation of the State, Comparative Political Studies, 23(1), April 1990, p. 34.



Makoa, op. cit., 1995, p. 10.



Ibid., p. 10.



F K Makoa, Lesotho’s Military Kingdom: An Undemocratic Experiment, Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, 4(3 & 4), December/January 1990/1991, p. 3.



Work for Justice, 30, Maseru, September 1991.



Makoa, op. cit., 1995, p. 11.



R G Mugabe and K Masire, Report on the Presidential visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho on 11 - 12 February 1994, cited in Makoa, op. cit., 1995, p. 12.



See, for example Moeletsi oa Basotho, November 1993.



In a 97-page judgement, Chief Justice B P Cullinan held that the "election was free and fair"; see CIV/APNS/182: Election Petition, 1993, p. 95.



Civil Application No. 323 of 1993: Judgement, the High Court of Disputed Returns of Lesotho, Maseru, 31 August 1993, pp. 77-78.



See, for example J E Spence, Lesotho: The Politics of Dependence, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p. 53.



The Guardian, 20 January 1994.



The Guardian, 27 January 1994.



The Guardian, 15 April 1994.



Makoa, op. cit., 1995, p. 1.



The Star, 25 January 1995.



Lesotho Government Gazette Extraordinary, 39(101), December 1994, p. 1103.



Report cited in Makoa, op. cit., 1990-1, p. 13.



Moeletsi oa Basotho, April 1995.



Since this article was written, King Moshoeshoe II died in a car accident on 15 January 1996 while inspecting his cattle. His son King Letsie III replaced him on the throne shortly thereafter.



1898/99 Report of the Resident Commissioner for Basutoland, cited in The Kingdom of Lesotho, Five Year Development Plan, 1980 - 1985, p. 11.



J Cobbe, The Changing Nature of Dependence: Economic Problems in Lesotho, Journal of Modern African Studies, 21(2), 1983, p. 295.



J F Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, Longman, London, 1993, p. 108.



Clapham, op. cit., p. 42.



S Wallman, The Modernisation of Development: A Further Note on Lesotho, Journal of African Studies, 3(1), October 1976, p. 107.



G E Schroeder, cited in D Geldenhuys, Perspective on Afrikaner Self-determination, Strategies Review for Southern Africa, 17(1), May 1995, pp. 39 - 40.



Kingdom of Lesotho, Second Five Year Development Plan, Volume One, 1975/76 - 1979/80, pp. 6-7.



Central Bank of Lesotho, Quarterly Review, 12(4), Maseru, December 1993, pp. 19-87.



Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975, op. cit., p. 7.



Central Bank of Lesotho, op. cit., p. 87.



Kingdom of Lesotho, Budget 1994/95, Annexure I.



See, for example J E Bardill & J Cobbe, Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985, p. 27; also J Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic State Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 34.



Makoa, op. cit., 1995, p. 9.



Central Bank of Lesotho, op. cit., pp 12 - 17.



Kingdom of Lesotho, National Environment Development Plan, paper prepared for the United Nations, Brazil, 1992, p. 6.



Kingdom of Lesotho, Budget 1994/95, Annexure I.



See Kingdom of Lesotho, Fourth Five Year Development Plan 1986/87 - 1990/91 Fiscal Years, Volume One, December 1987, pp. 19 - 20.



Central Bank of Lesotho, op. cit., p. 19.



Kingdom of Lesotho, Fifth Five Year Development Plan.



F K Makoa, Lesotho’s Political Crises in the 1980’s and the Role of South Africa, in M Sejanamane (ed.), From Destabilisation to Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 1994, p. 154.