INTRODUCTION

During April 1996, South Africa donated R12,6 million to the United Nations in aid of international peacekeeping operations in Africa. The amount, equal to about eighty per cent of South Africa’s regular UN budget assessment, was ‘over and above’ other voluntary contributions. According to a spokesperson for the SA Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, the donation honours an undertaking given in December 1995 by South Africa’s permanent representative, Khiphusizi Jele, that South Africa would make a voluntary contribution. Mr Jele’s promise followed the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 50/83 which absolved South Africa of its membership arrears accrued during the apartheid years.2 While this contribution may have temporarily staved off South Africa’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, it will not be long before the country is requested, and morally obliged, to provide a troop contribution to the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or a regional peacekeeping organisation. In fact, during his recent visit to Washington, the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), General Georg Meiring, remarked that the SANDF would be ready to consider joining in international peacekeeping operations by the end of 1996.3 These developments, once more, bring South African involvement in peacekeeping operations to the fore, particularly in view of the widely held expectation that South Africa’s primary involvement may be in Africa, the continent which has seen the largest number of peacekeeping operations in recent years. The latter has given rise to acute peacekeeping fatigue among countries traditionally contributing to peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The 1990s have been witness to the renewed salience of ethnic divisions in many parts of the African continent, as brutal civil wars raged in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia. The UN’s goal to bring peace and stability to such countries, while noble, has not been nearly effective. Their experience with peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola have led to an increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers and the traditional troop-contributing member states to deploy soldiers on African soil. African countries and organisations will clearly have to accept an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent. Given the traditional weaknesses of the OAU and its limited capacity to harness resources and to intervene, there is an equally strong feeling emerging that the capability for peace support operations could best be created through co-operation at a subregional, as opposed to a continental level.

Following the rapprochement within the region, the institutional framework for peacekeeping in Southern Africa is provided by the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) newly announced Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

Commenting on the role of the ISDSC at a recent conference co-hosted by the IDP during March 1996, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations of the SANDF, Maj Gen F E du Toit, stated that, "[t]hrough the ISDSC Operations sub-subcommittee we have already started liaison for combined planning and exercises, which could also include combined exercises to prepare for participation in Peace Support Operations. It is now important for the members of the ISDSC countries to get together and decide on certain Peace Support issues, which include:

Responsibilities of the different countries as far as geographical location is concerned

Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures

Command and control

Training

Tasks

Standardisation of equipment

Logistic support

Medical services

Communication and signals"4

At an institutional level, developments within SADC and the ISDSC potentially provide a framework for co-operation and assistance within Southern Africa, without which peacekeeping and co-operative security would not be possible. But, impressive as the organisational developments may appear on paper, it is important not to overstate the contribution that could be made to peacekeeping, defence and security by either SADC or the ISDSC in the near future. The following two sections, in turn, will examine the motives for South African involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the will and capacity of the various countries to support peacekeeping operations. This is followed by two further sections looking at the doctrinal and organisational dilemmas facing the region in this regard.

THE MOTIVES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING

There are several motivations for countries to participate in peacekeeping operations.5 South Africa ascribes to most, of which public opinion is one consideration.

In South Africa, public opinion is a factor which has not yet played a consistent role in foreign policy considerations. With many citizens still numbed by the extent of internal conflict, death and atrocities, the country has yet to experience the impact of public opinion on government foreign policy in the face of a humanitarian tragedy such as that experienced in Somalia. Thus far, even the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, visually displayed on South African television every night, could not raise more than a murmur of concern. As a result, South Africa escaped involvement in the international effort to relieve suffering and restore the peace in Rwanda with the token delivery of foods and the excuse that it was still too preoccupied with its own transition. This ‘easy way out’ no longer exists, and Parliament may find it increasingly difficult to ignore international pressure and domestic public opinion in the future. During 1995, for example, a nation-wide opinion poll, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council and the Institute for Defence Policy, indicated that almost two-thirds of respondents wanted South Africa to have a peacekeeping force that could be utilised externally to help other countries maintain peace. Support for such a force was particularly popular among supporters of the traditionally black parties, namely the ANC (72 per cent), the PAC (71 per cent) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (69 per cent).6 This is a fair indication that South African public opinion may underpin the tone of international morality with which South Africa attempts to portray its foreign policy dealings.

Until fairly recently, some of the ‘older’ peacekeeping countries, such as Canada, Norway and Sweden, equated participation in peacekeeping with ‘good international citizenship’. More recently, there have been indications that considerations of altruism are on the wane, to be replaced by considerations of national prestige and self-interest - particularly with the entry, since the late eighties, of literally dozens of ‘new’ peacekeeping countries to the peacekeeping domain. South Africa, aware of its human rights abuses under apartheid and the debt that it owes the international community for its help in bringing democracy to the country, has attempted to infuse its increasingly schizophrenic foreign policy with a particular moralistic tone. Peacekeeping is the epitome of international morality. Participation in peacekeeping, therefore, is a way of repaying the debt that the ANC feels it owes to the international community. However, flirtations with leaders such as Gaddafi and Castro, and close relations with countries such as Iran, sit uncomfortably with appeals of morality in the capitals of the developed nations. The lack of focus among the new incumbents in the Union Buildings has seen the country flounder and rapidly squander the goodwill and prestige that it enjoyed in the wake of the 1994 elections. In fact, it would probably be fair to comment that South Africa’s inconsistent and selective ‘morality’ is watched with increasing alarm and irritation by the country’s more important trading partners.7

Pretensions of altruism, on the other hand, can also serve national prestige and influence. Similar to Japan, Germany, Brazil, India and Indonesia, to name only a few, South Africa aspires to a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council. With the expansion of the Council now firmly on the agenda, aspiring nations will have to demonstrate a firm and consequent commitment to international peace and security. This, as yet unspoken ambition, has been strengthened by the central role that South Africa has played in important international initiatives which support the international agenda for peace, such as the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the conclusion of the Pelindaba Treaty on Africa as a nuclear-free continent. Aspirations for international prestige and leadership necessarily make South Africa less resistant to international requests and pressures to fulfil its international obligations.

Security Council ambitions aside, South Africa is an African leader, and the dominant state in Southern Africa. Inevitable responsibilities and commitments flow from its position of economic and moral strength. The other SADC countries (with the petulant exception of Zimbabwe) eagerly look to South Africa both for moral and material leadership, and it is clearly in its economic interests to do everything within its power to stabilise the region. South Africa cannot prosper in a sea of African poverty, anarchy and destitution. The country will inevitably be overwhelmed by the surge of people fleeing their own desperate countries, of whom some will try to survive through trade in drugs, weapons and contraband - a lawless anarchic situation within which crime and criminals prosper. For South Africa, peacekeeping in Southern and even Central Africa, therefore, may be considered as action in direct pursuit of its national security and economic interests.

There are a number of other reasons why countries participate in peacekeeping operations. Fear of a regional hegemon may be one such reason. This is arguably why the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, participate in peacekeeping, as they live under the shadow of Russia. In effect their participation serves "... as a down payment for the day when they themselves will need the assistance of the international community ...",8 when Russia tries to reasserts itself in the region. Yet another reason, often ascribed to Argentina, and possibly to Nigeria, is that peacekeeping is a means of keeping the armed forces gainfully occupied (rather than contemplating military intervention in domestic political affairs), as well as a means of infusing these forces with professionalism and a respect for civilian authority which they often lack. It is difficult to estimate the influence that this consideration may have in South Africa, although the distrust with which the ANC views the security forces, still essentially under white senior management, is evident as it boils to the surface with increasing frequency. On 3 May 1996, for example, Deputy President and presidential heir apparent, Thabo Mbeki, again directly accused the security forces of being involved in organising the violence in KwaZulu-Natal,9 following closely on a similar accusation by Mandela himself. If the attitude of key ANC members of the Parliamentary Defence Committee is anything to go by, the SANDF is still perceived as an instrument of racial oppression, intent on defying the wishes of the majority party in Parliament at every turn. In contrast, the National Party and the Freedom Front, traditionally white parties, are increasingly concerned about what they perceive to be a severe ‘lowering of standards’ and the politicisation of the armed forces. Keeping the men and women in uniform gainfully occupied may be a salient future consideration in the party-political discourse on South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping operations.

It is a truism that participation in peacekeeping operations will provide the SANDF with invaluable experience in its new peacetime role. The SANDF would benefit from the inevitable cross-fertilisation which occurs during multilateral operations, leading to enhanced interoperability practices and an injection of new doctrine. It also stands to demonstrate in practice that many of its operational systems, such as its wheeled mine-protected vehicles are indeed well suited to peacekeeping operations and deserving of close acquisition scrutiny by other countries.

For the SANDF, forced to justify itself to a sceptical public and a hostile Parliamentary Defence Committee, peacekeeping provides a politically correct raison d’être. Such a justification is certainly less ludicrous than the attempts of the Department of Defence to justify itself through its contribution to the Reconstruction and Development Programme. In time this consideration will surely replace the view, prevalent among former SADF officers in the SANDF, that too much participation in peacekeeping may detract from the primary focus of the armed forces, which in their view should be preparation for defence against an external attack. The centrality of preparation against external attack as the driving factor in SANDF force design, however, is increasingly a contested point of departure. The real involvement of the SANDF in what are often listed as its ‘secondary functions’, such as its internal role in support of the South African Police Services (SAPS) and in border protection duties, will inevitably dominate all other considerations.

Yet another motive, often listed by UN officials when commenting on African participation in UN peacekeeping operations, is the desire to profit from the reimbursement of costs for troop contributions. Not only do poor countries profit from this relationship, but their troops receive remuneration well in excess of their normal packages at home, on a regular basis. Admittedly, the manifest managerial incompetence and bureaucratic red tape of the UN and its agencies, compounded by the real debt trap within which the UN has found itself, during recent years has dispelled this perception. In fact, the SANDF has repeatedly stressed the financial burden of peacekeeping and made it clear that the defence budget at its present levels, would not be able to sustain anything but the most modest contribution. As a result, participation in peacekeeping operations will inevitably be used as a domestic motivation for additional defence or foreign affairs funding. The fear is that South Africa will be forced to pick up a very large tab when participating in peacekeeping operations.

THE WILL AND CAPACITY TO ACT

The enthusiasm of SADC member states to create a regional standby capacity of peace keepers depends largely on South Africa demonstrating the necessary will to become involved in peace operations, even though it has not yet provided troops for such operations. In contrast, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania have all previously contributed to peacekeeping operations. As the most powerful state in Southern Africa, South Africa has a strong international voice and will exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region. Economic domination aside, South Africa has armed forces which number nearly twice as many as any other in the region, and (with the exception of Angola), spends fifteen times more on defence than the closest SADC contender, Zimbabwe.

Thus far, South Africa has committed itself to utilising conflict prevention and management approaches, rather than peacekeeping. For example, South Africa was part of the Southern African triad (the other being Botswana and Zimbabwe) that used diplomatic persuasion backed with a direct threat of military intervention to resolve the political crisis in Lesotho in 1994. The South African government has also been actively involved in OAU efforts "...to reduce tension, prevent conflict and solve existing conflict situations elsewhere on the continent."10 A practical example is the role played by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo in visits to Burundi, Angola and other areas of conflict.

South Africa’s attitude towards peacekeeping has been summarised as follows by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad: "A fundamental objective of South Africa’s policy must be preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance and disarmament. However, should international and regional consensus exist on the need for military involvement, the following considerations will have to be taken into account. South Africa should be satisfied that the situation poses a real threat to world peace and security and to regional stability. Any action taken should be in conformity with the charters of the UN and the OAU. In this regard, the South African Constitution and Defence Act provide for the deployment of the SANDF for peace support operations outside the borders of the country at the discretion of the President. In the event of such a decision being considered, it should be discussed by Cabinet and in Parliament."11

Furthermore, South Africa’s past destabilising influence in the subregion is undoubtedly reason for a cautious approach. Suspicion and uncertainty among other SADC countries of South Africa’s future foreign policy still prevails. Given its unfortunate history, South Africa is hesitant about being perceived as a regional hegemon. There are increased signs that the ANC wishes South Africa to follow an assertive foreign policy role, however, which is bound to include peacekeeping activities.

The political will of national governments to contribute material and human resources to peace operations depends in no small measure on the orientation and advice of the military. In this respect, the stance of the SANDF is critical. The SANDF seems to have accepted the inevitability of future involvement in peace operations, but remains cautious on the issue of troop commitment. For example, the Chief of the South African Army has stated that, "[p]eace operations is a priority area. As a regional and continental leader, and a country bestowed with moral credibility within the international community, South Africa will inevitably be called upon to participate in peace operations ... [however] it is not advisable for South Africa to field combat troops until such time as the integration process is completed..."12

More recently the White Paper on Defence has summarised and reaffirmed many of these views, adding a list of conditions which are to be met, namely:

"There should be parliamentary approval and public support for such involvement. This will require an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and risk to the lives of military personnel.



The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.



There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.



The operation should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council.



Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and should be undertaken together with other SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the Organisation for African Unity."13

In preparation for a peacekeeping role, the South African armed forces have embarked on a steady learning curve in an attempt to get abreast of the international peacekeeping debate from which it was effectively excluded by its past pariah status. Military officers are being sent on international courses, while peacekeeping has been included on all major military courses. A number of large map and field exercises have also been held. Several research institutes and non-government organisations have also become active in infusing the debate and providing expertise on the subject of peacekeeping. South Africa is planning to escalate its inevitable involvement in peacekeeping in a cautious manner: ideally, by first providing observers, then becoming involved in a non-combatant capacity (communications, logistics, etc.), and finally, as a last priority, by providing troop contingents.

Although the SANDF has no experience of participation in multilateral operations, nor in operating within the political constraints of UN peacekeeping operations (strict Rules of Engagement, etc.), it is, by African standards, a highly competent and modern military. The SANDF also points out that many of its vehicles, systems and equipment are tailor-made for deployment in the inhospitable African terrain, which is characterised by poor infrastructure, inadequate repair and maintenance facilities, and long distances. However, the SANDF has suffered constant and severe budget cuts since 1989 (about 50 per cent in real terms), and it is involved in a process of dramatic downsizing and restructuring that will obviously have an impact on its will and ability to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the focus of the debate in South Africa is not ‘if’ but ‘where’, ‘how’ and under what circumstances the SANDF will engage in peacekeeping operations.

However, a fundamental problem which mitigates against the establishment of a viable regional peacekeeping capacity, is that some of the larger countries in Southern Africa are wrestling with the problem of controlling the military under conditions of fundamental and rapid domestic political change, conditions which are often associated with the revolution in the post-Cold War strategic environment. In a number of cases, political reform has entailed a complete break with the old political order. This, in turn, necessitates the development of entirely new civil-military relations. South Africa is a prime example of this phenomenon.

The process of force transformation is at an advanced stage in Zimbabwe and Namibia, although intra-military ethnic tensions are still evident in the former. Mozambique and South Africa each has barely completed the first phase of force integration, and the real challenges of creating effective and cohesive armies still lies ahead. Angola still has to run the full course of post-conflict transition under extremely adverse circumstances. Thus, four of the largest armies in the subregion are at various stages of coping with the challenges of amalgamating diverse and previously adversarial armed forces into a single national military. For each of them it comes in the wake of rapid and fundamental political change towards popular rule and requires the fostering of loyalty to a new political order and incumbent regime.

It is not only the countries with large armies that are faced with fundamental challenges. Civil-military relations in Lesotho are volatile, and it remains to be seen how the Swazi Defence Force will react to the mounting pressures for democratisation in their kingdom.

Repeated calls have been made by the OAU and by leaders, such as the President of Botswana and the Executive Secretary of SADC, for the establishment of either an African or a Southern African peacekeeping force. Given the obvious burden that this would place on South Africa, the South African Government, thus far, has treated these suggestions with a great degree of caution and scepticism. Emotionally, South Africa leans towards focusing its efforts on Africa, despite the obvious risks that such involvement hold. Africa clearly cannot sustain an autonomous peacekeeping force of any significant capacity without substantial international assistance. With the exception of South Africa, no country within SADC can independently mount a complex peace operation into a neighbouring country - and even South Africa’s capacity has been demonstrably cut in recent years. As a whole, the vast majority of African states lack the resources and experience to conduct peace operations independently of the international donor community. In fact, the real question is to what extent the international community is prepared to support, fund and assist peacekeeping in Africa by Africans in material terms.

Against this background, it comes as little surprise that the White Paper on Defence is cautious of being too ambitious in its approach, stating that "... the creation of a standing peacekeeping force in the region is neither desirable nor practically feasible. It is far more likely that the SADC countries will engage in ad-hoc peace support operations if the need arises. ... It may .. be worthwhile to establish a small peace support operations centre, under the auspices of regional defence structures, to develop and co-ordinate planning, training, logistics, communications and field liaison teams for multi-national forces."14

Having briefly looked at the political motivations for South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping operations on the continent, it is equally appropriate to look more closely at its practical implications. In analysing the costs and benefits of the involvement of countries in peacekeeping operations in their own back yard, the spectre of the experience of the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia (ECOMOG), and the Russian role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) must inevitably cloud the picture. In the former case, the West African peace keepers soon found themselves embroiled in an internal feud between a number of political groupings and criminal gangs, without the resources or the capacity to engage in classic third-party involvement. Peacekeeping in their own backyard soon undermined the tentative neutrality that the Nigerian forces wished to subscribe to. In the case of the CIS, as in Liberia, area of influence peacekeeping soon degenerated into classic military intervention strategies where restraint and due regard to human life and rights came a poor second to national political interests and order. Two issues warrant elaboration in this respect. Firstly, to what extent is it politically advisable and or practically possible for the UN to devolve peacekeeping in (Southern) Africa to a regional or subregional organisation such as SADC or any of its organs? Secondly, to what extent will area of influence peacekeeping in Southern Africa inevitably degenerate into peace enforcement such as in Liberia and the former Soviet Union? These two issues are examined below under the respective headings of ‘Devolution of Responsibility’ and ‘Doctrinal Dilemmas’.

DEVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

The benefits and constraints of regional organisations’ involvement in peace operations can be analysed on two levels. Firstly, seen from the perspective of a cash-strapped UN, regional organisations offer the benefit of alleviating financial problems for the world body by assuming some of its peacekeeping responsibilities. Politically, such a devolution of responsibility for action threatens to undermine UN guidance and control, and thus, in the process, the impartiality and legitimacy of the UN. It could also further undermine the already parlous state of UN finances, should the UN look towards the region to carry at least some of the burden itself - which seems inevitable. As a result, if a country such as South Africa, Botswana or Zimbabwe was directly contributing to the peacekeeping activities of a regional organisation such as SADC or the OAU, it could readily complain that it is carrying an extra burden in addition to its assessments for UN peacekeeping.

Secondly, whereas peacekeeping missions during the Cold War-era were exclusively UN affairs, the UN has recently come to share responsibilities in the field with regional organisations, such as the CIS and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Georgia, and with a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in former Yugoslavia. Although a regional organisation such as NATO has greater operational force coherence than any multinational UN force, this does not hold true in Africa and neither within SADC, where there is little prospect of doctrinal, command and equipment coherence in the short to medium term, despite the laudatory rhetorical commitments to this objective made by the ISDSC in Southern Africa.

A further complication arises in cases where the UN hands over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, as happened in Somalia (from the UN Organisation in Somalia (UNOSOM l) to the UN Transitional Authority (UNITAF)), or where the UN takes over authority and jurisdiction from such a force (as happened in Haiti). These arrangements have not only complicated the role of the UN, but also that of peace keepers in general - a development exacerbated by the increased civilianisation of peacekeeping. This occurred largely as a result of the growth of UN involvement in second-generation peacekeeping: in situations where the humanitarian assistance and nation-building responsibilities of the UN have expanded dramatically in response to the collapse of normal state institutions.

The most important, and potentially most dangerous development, however, is that the use of a regional organisation in peacekeeping operations could lead to the loss of control over an operation by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General. While authority to establish a force rests solely on the sovereign powers of the overarching organ, e.g. the UN, authority to deploy is derived, in part, from the consent of the host country. The principle of consent and request by the host country is essential for the establishment of a peace support operation in any sovereign territory, except when the mandate of the responsible international organisation indicates otherwise, or where there is effectively no host government to which the UN can turn - as was the case in Somalia.

Regional organisation, on the other hand, could also be constrained by the UN resolutions which provided its mandate to such an extent, that it is not able to operate successfully. Resolution requirements specifying modes of operation and principles of impartiality sometimes diminish the ability of a regional organisation to be effective and, as a consequence, tarnish its reputation. This is particularly salient, given the limited resources that may be made available by the UN in a region such as Southern Africa, or that are available in the region itself.

A UN peace support force is strictly an impartial international force. In the sense of the UN Charter, such a force, authorised by the competent organ of the UN and operating under its supervision, is a subsidiary organ of the UN: in effect, a UN agency. Clearly, the UN cannot easily abrogate its responsibility for execution of a particular mandate to a regional organisation without ensuring that the practice will not undermine the UN and its integrity. This challenge is compounded by the requirement for clear command-and-control relationships. Regional organisations are often unwilling to co-operate fully with the UN mission and may differ in their recommendations of what action is required, placing them at odds with the UN. Yet, command and control of an operation should be placed clearly in the hands of either the UN or the regional organisation, not in both. Therefore, the UN may be hesitant to allow too great a degree of latitude for the regional organisation. Moreover, neither the OAU, nor SADC, nor the ISDSC as yet, have the capacity to manage, co-ordinate or direct anything beyond observers and diplomatic missions. This does not imply that such a capacity could not be developed in the long term, but such a development remains well in the future.

Negional organisations, it could be argued, have a particular knowledge and responsibility for their region. In an area such as that of NATO, the regional organisation is more likely to be militarily effective (and logistically cost-effective) because of its greater coherence and closer proximity to the theatre of conflict. Proximity, however, does not imply enhanced effectiveness in a peacekeeping role, and is no substitute for organisational competence. There can be little doubt that there are vast differences in the level of skills, training and education between individual members of the armed forces of the majority of African states and those of the so-called developed world. In contrast with some Scandinavian countries, peace keepers from Africa are not volunteers who are carefully selected and psychologically tested - the cream of a highly educated military force. Instead - and at the risk of gross generalisation - they are more likely to be run of the mill soldiers, possibly infected with HIV, poorly trained and educated by international standards, and extremely conscious of their tribal and ethnic identity. Peacekeeping as practised and taught by the UN is a demanding task, particularly because of the restraint required and the need for the highest quality of leadership at the lower tactical levels. In this context, the harsh reality is a vast difference in standards and quality between soldiers in Africa (including, increasingly, those of South Africa) and those of the developed world. It is sad to note that, with the expansion of the demands for peacekeeping in recent years, the Secretary-General had to lament that the UN has had to settle for second or third best - that many of the soldiers from troop contributing countries were simply not up to scratch.15

Finally, a regional organisation operating under UN auspices (as it must) will inevitably be viewed as less impartial than a multinational UN force drawn from further afield. Further, there has always been the risk of the perception of domination by a regional hegemon, a notion which could be applied to Nigeria in the case of the ECOMOG operation in Liberia, the United States in the case of the Organisation of American States (OAS), and Russia in the case of the CIS. There can be little doubt that South Africa will suffer a similar fate in Southern Africa and perhaps even further afield on the continent. Therefore, the military effectiveness of a regional organisation (such as SADC or the OAU) might be outweighed by a reduction in its political effectiveness.

This being said, there are, of course, two vital areas within which peace keepers from the region will have a decided advantage. The first is that of local knowledge, acclimatisation and language. African culture, customs and traditions are often foreign to European troops or troops from Asia. This is a vital factor. Equally important, a number of African countries have or are contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, including Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Congo. Within SADC alone, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania have all contributed troops. There is therefore a considerable pool of experience within the region, even though larger capacities and support systems may be lacking.

A second advantage of regional involvement relates to the fact that it is often impossible to reflect upon the internal dynamics of any society, particularly in Africa with its notoriously porous borders, without looking at the larger, neighbouring and even regional situation. Few intra-state conflicts are entirely internal affairs. More often than not there is a willing neighbouring country or group which either actively supports a particular warring faction, is willing to close its eyes in silent consent, or a government which is incapable of effectively ensuring that its territory is not used as a refugee or support base by groups active in a neighbouring country. The most common reasons for involvement in other countries’ problems are ethnic affinity and political sympathy. Recent examples of such involvement are that between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ghana and Togo, and Sudan and Uganda. Within this context, the OAU and SADC, working in tandem with the UN, will be able to bring considerable pressure to bear to reduce active support from neighbouring countries to a conflict or potential conflict situation.

The few advantages of regional peacekeeping are perhaps negated by the complex nature of contemporary peace support operations, and the doctrinal dilemmas which they pose for a region such as Southern Africa.

DOCTRINAL DILEMMAS

Neither effective mechanisms, nor appropriate doctrine have yet been devised for responding to the challenge of the ‘grey zone’ in peacekeeping, the slippery slope between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Confusion between peacekeeping and enforcement action, including the tendency to slide from peacekeeping to enforcement action and then back again, has proved to be very dangerous. This is essentially what has been witnessed in the operations in Somalia, Liberia and in former Yugoslavia prior to the multinational implementation force (I-FOR), often with disastrous consequences. Typical situations which would be problematic are when peace keepers are taken hostage, a ‘safe area’ under UN protection is attacked or taken over by a party to the conflict, or factions forcibly attempt to redirect the distribution of humanitarian supplies to suit their own interests.

These situations are typical of ongoing armed conflict within a state where several factions are contending for control, where there is no general agreement about the role of peace keepers, or where initial co-operation has collapsed. It is typical of the situation that could be expected in many African countries where the peacekeeping environment may be akin to that approaching the characteristics of the now popular ‘failed state’ psychosis. In such a situation, the operational environment is that of factions, militias and armed gangs with rudimentary and unclear command structures, and little discipline. Combatants (if they could be called that) are often indistinguishable from the local population, often part and parcel thereof, and women, children, and the aged and infirm more a target of violence than the armed opposition. As a result, there is no ‘frontline’ or clearly demarcated or identifiable areas controlled by opposing forces, no existing systems of local government, and no clear differentiation possible between the general populace and refugees, displaced persons and impoverished local residents. What remains of the security agencies are perceived to be partial and torn by factionalism - often acting and reacting with a callousness and brutality which is astounding in its disdain for human life and suffering, as the world has so clearly seen recently in Liberia.

Highly trained and professional forces from advanced countries have found it extremely difficult to respond in an appropriate manner to the challenges of peacekeeping in the grey zone. The UN has repeatedly found that the challenges of peacekeeping in the grey zone place peace keepers in an untenable position in various ways. At the operational level, lightly armed peace keepers normally lack the capacity for escalated armed response, while their reaction inevitably undermines the moral authority conveyed by their multilateral presence. For peace keepers to engage in a military confrontation with a particular faction is to compromise their impartiality and thereby forfeit their political usefulness in the conflict situation. In a situation characterised by a total collapse of moral authority, even peace keepers from carefully selected, highly educated, well-trained and equipped forces would find themselves tested to respond in an appropriately restrained manner. In a situation of doubtful or eroding consent, peace keepers need to be better trained and equipped to defend themselves and their mission and to be in a higher state of alertness than in a situation of assured consent. When evaluating the potential reactions of African peace keepers, the spectre of ECOMOG abuses in Liberia are sure to haunt peacekeeping in Africa by Africans. Without considerable training, education and preparation, firm UN control, an infusion of more than nominal UN observers, commanders and lines of authority, peacekeeping by the member states of the OAU or SADC will inevitably degenerate from peacemaking to enforcement action.

CONCLUSION

Sympathy and support for Africa within the international community is declining. Donor fatigue has become endemic, big business is finding investment opportunities elsewhere, and Western governments and electorates are markedly more reluctant to commit peacekeeping forces (and lives) to the resolution of African wars. Yet, paradoxically, the new international security agenda comprises precisely those issues with which Africans are currently grappling, among them environmental degradation and dwindling resources, rampant poverty, infectious diseases, mass population shifts, arms and drugs traffic, and the mushrooming of crime syndicates.

Clearly, Africa has to accept some responsibility for peace and security on the continent. It is important for Africans to accept this greater responsibility, not in isolation from the broader international community, but in partnership with its many friends and funders from across the world. Should Africa, and the OAU in particular, prove its commitment and ability to tackle African problems, both material and other assistance may be forthcoming.

There are some powerful reasons and motives for the creation of a Southern and South African capacity for greater involvement in regional peacekeeping endeavours. Regional security arrangements could play an important role in stabilising the continent, although such arrangements are only part of the recipe that will eventually enable sustainable development and stability. Subregional organisations, such as SADC, have the potential to act as building blocks in a system of preventive action, as well as early warning. Increased military co-operation in the region could diminish reliance on external assistance and provide additional stability in a volatile area.

Neither Africa nor Southern Africa can ‘go it alone’ in providing the stability which is essential for development. The region simply does not have the means, in terms of doctrine, training, trained manpower, finances, and resources. Tentative democracies and de facto one-party states will find it difficult to transfer the values of respect for human rights and impartiality to the armed forces of neighbouring countries, when they have been unable to inculcate the same within their own borders.

Should the international community attempt to delegate the international role of the UN in peacekeeping to either the OAU or a regional organisation such as SADC in the foreseeable future, the result is entirely predictable. The consequences of such abrogation of responsibility have been aptly illustrated by recent events in Liberia, where peacekeeping, peace enforcement, military intervention and banditry have become synonymous with one another. Despite the infusion of capacity and resources which South Africa has brought to the region, peacekeeping in Africa by Africans can only work if it occurs in close collaboration and collusion with the UN and the international community. This will remain the case for years to come.

African armed forces, therefore, should prepare and co-operate with the international community. In effect, the only feasible scenario for keeping the peace in Africa, is the creation of an internationally sponsored UN rapid reaction force in Africa for Africa. Such a force should consist of designated units which are placed on standby, and trained in their respective countries by the UN, for common deployment by the UN, in collaboration with organisations such as SADC or the OAU.

Regional and subregional involvement in peacekeeping by African countries under the auspices of the UN, or even on the initiative of an organisation such as the OAU or SADC, is inevitable. This implies that Southern Africa must consider its responsibilities in this regard and put its own house in order. If the region is to accept its responsibilities, it is essential that discussion, negotiation, commitment and co-operation should occur presently at the level of the UN, OAU, SADC and individual countries, before the next major crisis erupts. If decision-making bodies are necessary, if joint military ties must be established, if combined exercises must take place, then now is the time to start.

The major immediate challenge in the region, however, is not peacekeeping, but the design of mechanisms and practices that will effectively contain the destabilising role of the security forces in their efforts to oust democratically elected governments, that will entrench civil and legislative control over these forces, and inculcate a culture of accountability, transparency and professionalism. This challenge is of much greater importance to the region than peacekeeping, but will predictably receive much less attention.

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a joint venture between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP).



Anon, SA to donate R12,6m for African Peace, The Citizen, 18 April 1996.



Anon, Keeping the Peace, Salut, 3(5), May 1996, p. 7



Quoted in Training for Peace, Salut, 3(3), March 1996, p. 26.



T Findlay, The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping, in T Findlay (ed.), Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report 12, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 7-10



J Cilliers, B Sass, T Motumi & C Schutte, Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues, in J K Cilliers & M Reichardt (eds.), About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, 1996, p. 225.



Interestingly, the thorough work by senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stands in sharp contrast to the much more public and damaging forays into international affairs by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Mandela in offers of mediation in Ireland, the Koreas, the two Chinas, Cuba, Nigeria and Libya. There is thus a worrying dichotomy between the officialdom and the senior politicians in South Africa’s foreign policy practice, which is rapidly undermining the prestige in which the country has basked since the early nineties.



Findlay, op. cit., p. 8



V Yoganathan, Mbeki calls for Probe of Violence in Natal, Saturday Star, 4 May 1996.



J Pretorius, Integration, Rationalisation and Restructuring of the SA Army: Challenges and Prospects, African Security Review, 4(1),1995, p. 27.



Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, p. 30.



A Pahad, South Africa and Preventive Diplomacy, in JKCilliers & G Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, Institute for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs, Halfway House, 1995, p. 163.



Ibid., p. 164.



White Paper on National Defence, op. cit., p. 24.



See, for example his remarks quoted by Findlay, op. cit., p. 20.