INTRODUCTION

Recent events in Mozambique have often been analysed in terms of a convergence of, or conflict between, internal and external dynamics. During the 1980s, the persistence of the Resistaçao Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) guerrillas came to be seen as a consequence of both foreign aggression and domestic illegitimacy. More recently, democratic transition and economic adjustment have been considered in a similar vein where the interaction between international pressures and state capacity is at the heart of the academic debate. A similar mode of analysis can be employed when looking at the creation, development and future of the Forças armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM).

In this article, the terms 'internal' and 'external' dynamics are not defined as domestic and foreign. Instead, internal refers to intra-military dynamics, such as force composition, professionalism, reference groups and others - those concepts falling primarily within the academic domain of military sociology. External dynamics, on the other hand, refer to intermilitary dynamics, amongst others, the military's relationship with the rest of the state, civil society, the economy and international actors - those factors typically the concern of scholars of civil-military relations. The ultimate objective is to understand how these various dynamics interact and effect one another. 'Military integration' must be seen as a fluid and dynamic process, and not simply as a military exercise in structural adaptation.1

The current (late 1995) state of the FADM and the pressures that are shaping it will be considered. What is the source and nature of the dynamics upon the infant FADM? What has so far been the results of these pressures? Of additional interest are the rumoured coup plot in late October 1995 and how it illustrates the complex dynamics at work in the development of the FADM. Finally, what may the future hold for the FADM and what is the potential for change in the interaction between internal and external dynamics? This article is not an analysis of the origins of this force, nor is it a strategic study concerned with the threats faced by Mozambique.2 Nevertheless, to fully appreciate and understand the FADM's current character and the forces that are pushing and pulling it in different directions, it is necessary to briefly review the force's creation.

THE CREATION OF FADM

As the child of a couple once at war with each other - the Forcas Armadas de Moçambique (FAM) and RENAMO - it should come as no surprise that there were considerable difficulties during the conception and birth of FADM. RENAMO's roots in the Rhodesian military and its support from South Africa are well known. Known too are the tactics it employed in the countryside and the economic and social impact this had on Mozambique. In contrast, little is known about FAM and how it conducted the war. It has alternatively been hailed as a David valiantly defending Mozambique against the South African Goliath, or criticised as inept, unpopular and nearly hopeless. The disparity in literature notwithstanding, it is apparent that by the late 1980s FAM shared many of RENAMO's 'military' characteristics. Physically, RENAMO was never more than a 'machine gun army' and FAM had been reduced to one, without an effective or appropriate Air Force (apart from a few helicopters) and few functioning tanks. With respect to materiel, apart from RENAMO's infamously effective communications system, both had vast logistical difficulties, including especially the movement of young, conscripted men with little formal education or military training. Politically, both were ridden with corruption and neither had a tradition of being non-political. At the end of the day neither was 'professional' (at least in the western notion of the term).

The end came in 1992. Brought to its knees by RENAMO and pressured by the international community, the government of Mozambique entered into negotiations with RENAMO to end the conflict. The creation of a new army played a vital role in the negotiations that led to the General Peace Accord (GPA) in 1992. RENAMO pushed for a small army, knowing its forces (theoretically numbering between 15 000 and 20 000) were far out-numbered by the government's (theoretically between 65 000 and 85 000). For its part, the FAM leadership wanted a large integrated force that would be FAM-dominated and on a par with the Zimbabwe National Army (at 45 000). International experts who would train the force (Britain, Portugal and France) considered a force size of just over 25 000 appropriate.3 A compromise was finally reached with a target number of 30 000, composed of 15 000 troops from each side, consisting of an army of 24 000, air force of 4 000 and navy of 2 000.

After its technical creation with the signing of the so-called 'Lisbon Declaration' of February 1993, the FADM almost immediately encountered problems. Hundreds of RENAMO and FAM troops, cantoned at assembly areas as part of the GPA and the demobilisation scheme, mutinied, demanding back pay, better conditions and faster demobilisation.4 The training of trainers, begun in February 1994 and conducted in Zimbabwe by the ZNA and British, was going slowly. Security concerns were manifest as weapons were not surrendered at the time of cantonment and rumours proliferated about both sides holding troops out of the demobilisation process with the idea of transferring them to the special police forces. Perhaps most importantly, the numbers were simply incorrect. Those who negotiated force levels for the FADM proved to be wildly optimistic about its anticipated popularity. By February 1995, the FADM had only 12 195 members (8 533 from FAM and 3 662 from RENAMO)5, and this number was decreasing. Given these pains during birth, how is the FADM doing at nearly age three? In considering this question, the internal dynamics shaping the FADM will first be considered, followed by a consideration of the external dynamics.

INTERNAL DYNAMICS

It is somewhat arbitrary to divide internal and external dynamics. The factors shaping the FADM are all simultaneously to a lesser or greater degree both internal and external. Nevertheless, for analytical reasons it is possible to identify those dynamics that are primarily intra-military. These internal dynamics that are shaping the FADM can be identified as force disintegration, elite instability, the potential for service rivalries and structural weaknesses.

As mentioned above, the creation of the FADM was not as much a practice of integration, but one of disintegration. Since its creation, neither government nor RENAMO troops were particularly interested in joining the FADM. There are several reasons for this. The overwhelming majority of soldiers had not joined the military voluntarily, but had been conscripted. Their experiences of not being paid, long service periods and generally poor conditions were not something they wanted to repeat. A 1992 survey of 13 727 FAM soldiers found that nearly seventy per cent of the soldiers had been in service since 1985, many having been conscripted before the age of eighteen. Both these facts were contrary to the government's conscription laws.6 Press reports and interviews confirmed that few had been paid, rations were often scarce and even the basic equipment, such as boots, were lacking. Soldiers were not 'sold' on the changes in the new force and most thought it would be more of the same with a new name. Furthermore, for those with advanced skills there were other opportunities. For example, the UN and other non-government organisations conducting demining operations are filled with some of the best trained and most skilled soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. The dangers inherent to this kind of work are compensated for by the assurance of good working conditions and remuneration, possibly for several years to come.7 Others find the work rewarding as they are able to use some of the 'military' skills they have acquired. These skills often went largely untapped during the war, because less-educated commanding officers were hesitant to delegate authority to their subordinates. This group of NCOs and soldiers with technical skills and a relatively high standard of education are vital to building a new military force, but are increasingly difficult to retain, given better-paid opportunities in the civilian sector. Although new recruits have been trying to enter the FADM recently, they have been unsuccessful, as the Chief of Staff has said that, although the force has not yet reached fifty per cent of its target strength or is even near the revised level of 15 000, no new recruits are presently needed.8

The second internal dynamic is elite instability. This encompasses a variety of factors, including: decreasing skill and experience levels, the potential for corruption, historical animosities and reference group conflicts. Like the NCOs, many of the qualified elite have sought greener pastures in business, state agencies, or non-government organisations. Furthermore, the largest proportional group to remain in the military has been the 'second-tier' officers. Many of these have probably benefited the most financially during the war through various 'business' arrangements. In the light of the FADM's structural weaknesses (explained below) and with rising economic expectations among its members, the potential and real persistence of military corruption are obvious. For example, just prior to the elections, 75 RENAMO officers intending to enter the FADM went on strike, demanding cars and houses like those of their counterparts from FAM.9

There is further potential for conflict along historical reference group lines. There is little parity between former RENAMO and FAM members when it comes to the officers, both due to numbers and to training levels. Many former RENAMO officers are functionally illiterate, but are 'assisted' by former FAM officers who often have higher degrees from military academies in Eastern Europe. Ongoing reorganisation in the FADM places increased emphasis on academic achievement and technical competence, further marginalising former RENAMO officers and NCOs. In addition to parity and education, a third potential conflict-zone with respect to reference groups among the elite is ethnicity and region. Historically, FAM was 'southern' dominated, while most RENAMO commanders were from the Ndau ethnic group from the centre and west of the country. The depth and strengths of ethnic and regional differences are as yet unclear, but the potential for conflict along these lines must be acknowledged.

Emerging inter-service rivalries must also be recognised as a potential impediment to the development of a common institutional culture within the FADM. Inter-service rivalries are often promoted (explicitly or implicitly) in Western countries. During the war in Mozambique, there was considerable animosity between the older generation army of the war for independence, and the younger, more educated Air Force who felt that they were not effectively utilised. Furthermore, without a strong tradition of naval or air forces, service rivalries may emerge along specialty and country of training lines. Although the pre-1992 elite forces trained by the Soviets, British (FAM) and South Africans (RENAMO) were disbanded, they created unique groups with which their members identified. In addition to these groups, there are now also Portuguese-trained marines, commandos and paratroopers and other forces in training in Italy, France and by the British / Zimbabwean team. Special treatment implies higher expectations. For example, prior to the GPA, the so-called 'Nyanga Brigade' (trained by the British and ZNA) considered themselves "by far the best brigade"10, but when they saw the reality of FAM (and later FADM), many refrained from joining or later resigned. Inter-military rivalries in Africa often do not have the benign effects that they have in the West. They often lead to one service gaining political and financial favour at the expense of the others, or becoming a factor in the creation of praetorian guards and the undertaking of coups d'état.

A fourth internal dynamic affecting the early development of the FADM are its inherited structural weaknesses. The GPA brought peace, but only the potential infrastructural development. The problems of 'logistics' experienced by FAM for years, remain the greatest concern, with transport, communications and supply throughout the country being slow and difficult.11 In an area of nearly 800 000 square kilometres, Mozambique now has one soldier for every 152 square kilometres. Transferring troops to a trouble-spot or even a training site can take days without an effective Air Force and ground support. Equally important is the lack of organisational structure at General Staff headquarters that have survived during the war by increasingly decentralising all military operations. The ad hoc systems that were inherited were characterised by informal procedures, random promotions, and a lack of norms.

Internal deterioration, divisions amongst the elite, potentially negative inter-service rivalries and inherited structural weaknesses, have combined to create an army with, as one demobilised officer put it, "a lack of military culture."12 Overcoming these challenges is no small task and one made more difficult by external factors.

EXTERNAL DYNAMICS

As stated in the introduction, 'external dynamics' is used here to describe the forces originating outside the military, thus coming from both the domestic political / economic environment, as well as from the government and society. These include threats to security, international economic pressure and foreign military training programmes.

Perceptions of the military are inevitably diverse and difficult to quantify. Opinion research about these perceptions among the public and the political elite has not yet been undertaken. It can be surmised, however, that after twelve years of civil war in which neither side 'won' and the public inevitably 'lost', the military commands little respect. At the same time, however, the population has become accustomed to a highly militarised society and there is no discernible 'fear' of the military among the population. In fact, what is noticeable is a widespread lack of interest in the military and its integration. Even the rumoured coup received almost no editorial comment in the press. Given the indifference displayed by civil society toward the new military, the retention of the historically unpopular law on conscription (Serviço Militar Obrigatório), is surprising. Debate on the issue in the Assembly of the Republic has been relatively tame and the Ministry of National Defence has supported the maintenance of the 1978 law. This may be in part because those now in government are increasingly not the heroes of the liberation (as has been the case in the 1970s and early 1980s), nor are they former military men and women themselves (as the government of the late 1980s), and are thus fearful of upsetting the precarious civil-military balance. It may also be due to their perceptions of the threats that face Mozambique, many of which are shared by the military.

Threats to the stability of Mozambique are numerous. Domestically, crime and the drugs trade are both on the increase, made more dangerous by the widespread availability of weapons left from the war. Army personnel provide security on rural routes in several parts of the country. New special forces units are being trained with the assistance of South Africa, specifically to protect the transportation routes from armed criminals, such as those in Maputo province and the Beira Corridor. However, a recent meeting of the Ministry of National Defence has confirmed that the military remains highly concerned with external threats from the region.13 Given the history of external involvement, this is understandable in a force dominated by former FAM officers. The possibility of continued links between RENAMO and South Africa should not be dismissed, nor should Malawi's historic claims to parts of northern Mozambique, Zimbabwe's reconciliation with RENAMO late in the conflict and the persistence of Zimbabwean dissidents in central Mozambique.

Probably the greatest external dynamic, and indeed threat, shaping the development of the FADM, is the economic state of the country. The stark position of the military was recently illustrated both in a government report and the military's response. The report stated that "although Mozambique cannot afford to return to the previous situation of not paying adequate wages to soldiers, the Government recognizes that it cannot allocate a high percentage of its budget to military expenditures given the scarcity of budgetary revenues. This policy has been endorsed by the Government: recurrent military expenditures would fall by 36.7 percent in real terms in 1995."14 Gone are the days when the government spent as much as fifty per cent of its budget on defence with the tacit approval of the international aid community. As US Ambassador Dennis Jett recently stated: "It is always a matter of choosing. Choosing between social expenditures and military expenditure. Choosing between guns and butter. You can't have both at the same time."15 The military response was equally grim. One officer was quoted as asking rhetorically, "How much does it cost to defend a country?"16 Another officer stated that "what we are seeking to achieve doesn't have a price ... and [Mozambique] will have to sacrifice the resources it has" to consolidate the armed forces, otherwise "we could disappear as a nation."17

Finally, the impact of military assistance from the international community cannot be dismissed. Each of the primary countries involved - Portugal, Britain and Zimbabwe - has its own agenda. Whether this includes co-operation among Portuguese-speaking (lusophone) countries, regional stability or power projection from a neighbour, involvement invariably also means arms sales, employment and political influence. The danger for Mozambique is that it will end up with a military which appears professional on the surface, but underneath retains many past habits. There is no guarantee that a NATO replica would do better in Mozambique, than the Red Army model promoted in the 1980s. Dismissing taboo factors which played a major role in the conflict on both sides during the war, such as traditional magico-religious beliefs and economics of affection (i.e. corruption), threatens both the viability and sustainability of the force.

The divergence between government and civil society of the perceived role of the military, real and imagined security concerns, economic crises and pressures, and the notion that western military professionalism is universal, all combine to form a complex dynamic of external pressures pulling and pushing at the young FADM. Whereas internal dynamics affect the creation of an indigenous military culture and a viable institution, external dynamics predominantly have an impact on the relationship between the military and the environment within which it exists. Such a simple division between internal and external in the mode of analysis, however, is misleading and unrealistic. Recent rumours of a coup plot aptly demonstrate the great complexity of the interplay between internal and external dynamics in the FADM.

RUMOURS OF A COUP PLOT

Rumours of a coup plot may seem unimportant, or at least much less important than attempted or successful coups. (Indeed, in Mozambique there is a tendency not only for rumours to precede an action, but for rumours even to precede intended action.) For the purposes of this analysis, rumours of a coup are important. Only once before, in 1992, has there been such rumours and there has never been an attempted or successful coup in independent Mozambique. Furthermore, rumours illustrate in various ways the interaction between external and internal dynamics.

The rumours began in late October 1995 when RENAMO leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, toured the central and northern parts of the country, and talked tough about the need for 'civil' disobedience. The government responded with threatening language of its own and, importantly, accelerated the reorganisation of the FADM, amongst others by reducing the number of generals and demobilising others.18 Then, on 25 October tanks were moved to the border posts of Namaacha (Swaziland) and Ressano Garcia (South Africa) for 'security' reasons.19 Two days later, South African Vice-President Thabo Mbeki briefly visited Maputo, then immediately flew north to meet Dhlakama, a meeting from which Dhlakama emerged professing that RENAMO would not resort to violence to obtain political ends. But in the Assembly of the Republic, RENAMO continued to lash out at FRELIMO's policy and an anonymous source in RENAMO stated that many generals were unhappy with their current situation. Other circumstances dramatised the rumours. Generals Mabote (past FAM Chief of Staff) and Ngonhamo (former RENAMO and second-in-command in FADM) were both in South Africa for medical treatment at the same time; various 'spins' on the events by the South African and US Ambassadors occurred; and phone calls remained unanswered and responses by the Ministry of National Defence were limited to 'no comment'. The FADM quickly dismissed rumours, stating that such rumours "permanently hurt our image in society and compromises the future of FADM."20 The military spokesperson then went on to say that "we are not PADEMO, PIMO, MONAMO, nor RENAMO, FUMO, PT, SL, nor FRELIMO. We have sworn to defend the Mozambican society and the interest of its people."21 Whatever the validity of the rumours, the fact that they arose in the first place point to the persistence of unease in the force.

Those behind the rumours were said to be former RENAMO officers and FRELIMO veterans of the war of independence. The former were likely disappointed with the way they were side-lined in the FADM and potentially had to take orders from RENAMO's political leadership, while the latter were likely still resentful of their marginalisation by FRELIMO in the 1980s. It was also suggested that possible participants might include some former RENAMO soldiers in hiding and South African mercenaries.22 Nevertheless, the capital remained quiet. There was no noticeable increase in security around government buildings likely to be targeted, such as the Presidential grounds, airport, Ministry of Defence or the Maputo City garrison. The general public, gauging from responses in the press and the atmosphere in the capital, were either unconcerned or believed that the vast international presence in Mozambique would never allow such a transgression from the GPA and the 1994 elections. Whatever the validity of the rumours and the motives of those behind it, all is clearly not well in the nascent FADM. Internally, the coup rumours point to the divisions along party lines, as well as among former FRELIMO members, and possibly to discontent over the Ministry for Defence's push for increased fiscal accountability. Externally, the coup rumours point to the precarious balance in civil-military relations, as well as the potential for involvement by South Africa (whether official or unofficial). In Mozambique, elite instability and the structural weaknesses of the FADM mix freely with the international economic climate and regional threats, creating a fragile balance.

THE FUTURE?

Will the FADM become a "small, professional, very mobile and capable army",23 as the new civilian Minister of National Defence desires and the international community is pushing for? Or will it tread water in the sea of pressures, only able to keep its head above water, maintaining a veneer of military competence and capacity? Attempts to answer these questions will be mere speculation, because there are an array of external and internal factors having a variety of influences that do not remain constant over time. Any attempt to quantify these factors, turing them into a schematic diagram would be hopeless. Furthermore, as hinted at in the introduction, the division of these dynamics is largely arbitrary and represents imported ideals. The clear dichotomy between civil and military - and hence the distinction between military-sociology and civil-military relations - is a western concept, a product of their unique mutual, historical development. The prime concern of military-sociology, namely 'professionalism', is also an inherently western notion, borne from hundreds of years of the development of the profession and the state. To say guerrilla and conventional forces can simply be 'integrated' and that this integration will at some point be 'completed', misses the point. Instead, it must be recognised that bringing together previously opposing forces is a socio-political process with several different dynamics at work. The process will ultimately shape a social institution or prevent such an institution from being built.

ENDNOTES

In a way, this is a call for a re-examination of the integration of military forces in Southern Africa. Although I do not attempt to tackle the issue in what follows, the academic interest in 'integration' has not only been limited, but unfortunately void of any real theoretical discussion of the individual or collective transformation in reference group identification, forms of authority, decision-making processes, etc. involved in the 'integration'.



See instead, Joao B. Honwana, Reflexoes sobre defensa, segurança e democracia em Moçambique, in Brazao Mazula (ed.), Moçambique: Eleçoes, Democracia e Desenivolvimento, Embaixada do Reino dos Países Baixos, Maputo, 1995, pp. 559-578.



Clive Larkin, Disarmament and Integration of Armed Forces, unpublished paper presented at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, 12 December 1994. Larkin served at the British Military in Mozambique during the GPA negotiations and was intimately involved in the negotiations for the creation of the FADM and British training agreements.



The major mutinies are compiled in United Nations Operation in Mozambique, Problems / Incidents in Assembly Areas, updated as of 2 June 1994.



AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 14, February 1995.



Gabinete de Reintegraçao, Ministério das Finanças, Banco de Dados dos Militares a Desmobolizar das FAM, unpublished paper, August 1992, p. 7. The survey was in fact conducted by a Swiss organisation contracted by the Ministry of Finance. Other general observations contained in this article are also from this report. Unfortunately, the complete United Nations database including socio-economic statistics covering the demobilised soldiers - and, therefore, those also joining the FADM - of both forces has not yet been made public, nor is it available to researchers.



Interviews with members of UN Advanced De-mining Programme platoons 8 and 10, Namaacha, Mozambique, 13 and 19 October 1995.



Noticias, Maputo, 7 October 1995.



AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 13, October 1994.



Interview with Second Lieutenant C. Ferrao (ret.), Namaacha, Mozambique, 13 October 1995.



Noticias, Maputo, 26 September 1995.



Mozambiquefile, September 1995, p. 15.



Ibid., and discussion with participants.



República de Moçambique, Establishing the Basis for Economic and Social Development: Key Policies, report prepared by the Government of Mozambique for the Meeting of the Consultative Group for Mozambique, Paris, March 1995, p. 13.



Quoted in Mozambiquefile, op. cit.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Mozambique-Inview 33, 16 October 1995, p. 12.



The chronology below is largely from Demos, Maputo, 1 November 1995, pp. 1 and 16. It provocatively titled the front page "Coup d'état or Rumor?" and pictured tanks driving down Maputo's main street (from a photo taken during a previous military parade).



Noticias, Maputo, 1 November 1995, p. 1.



Ibid. PADEMO, PIMO, MONAMO, FUMO, PT and SL are all minor opposition parties.



Mozambique-Inview, op. cit.



Ibid.