INTRODUCTION

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has lately seen a drastic change in the decision-making environment. Members of the SANDF are experiencing the dynamics resulting from the emerging public debate on defence issues and the need for greater commitment to the well-being and stability of the region. The awareness of a growing moral commitment towards international peacekeeping efforts is increasing. These developments take place within the context of greater pressures on the national budget, due to the urgent requirement to address the social and structural imbalances in South African society.

For naval planners, there is the additional problems, not only of the impending block obsolescence of the operational fleet stemming from the years of financial neglect and the traditionally excessive landward focus of South African politicians and defence planners, but also of the steadily increasing scope of the maritime task.

An attempt will be made to highlight the nature of some of these pressures on the SA Navy and on the maritime community, as well as the urgent need for a co-ordinated approach towards addressing them.

NAVIES IN WAR

Navies are there to fight. They are designed to fight at sea and to project power when required to promote the national interests of their particular countries and the international aims and objectives of their governments. Ultimately, navies play a key role in deciding the outcome of the battle on land by creating favourable conditions for their own land forces and adverse conditions for the opposing ones.

In a recent book on How Navies Fight, and Why2, Frank Uhlig (jr) puts it like this: "Throughout history navies have fought their foes afloat, aloft and ashore in a multitude of ways. Despite the variety of wars and the changes in their instruments, there is a remarkable constancy in how navies go about their business. The ways of naval warfare that have shown themselves to be most robust, most resilient are five in number:

The strategic movement of troops (now, of armies and air forces alike);



The acquisition of advanced bases as close as possible to the scene of action (by either military force or civil means);



The landing of armies on a hostile shore;



The blockade;



And the struggle for mastery of the local sea."

He goes on to address the underlying purposes of naval warfare and makes the following observation:

"Those purposes appear to be only three in number, two absolutes and one conditional. The absolutes are to ensure first that friendly shipping can flow and second that hostile shipping can not. Once the flow of friendly shipping is ensured, then, if it is necessary or desirable, navies can risk landing an army on a hostile shore, supporting that army with fire and logistics. The last of these raises a method of naval warfare to the status of a purpose of such warfare."

FORCE DESIGN OF THE SA NAVY

These arguments constitute a clear and concise case for the existence of a navy as an integral part of the armed forces of any littoral state, particularly when such a state is highly dependent on trade across the sea, which South Africa undoubtedly is.

The South African taxpayer, therefore, invests in his or her navy in the first instance for its ability to fight at sea. Once this investment has been made and there is peace, there is every reason, however, to enhance the return of this investment by utilising the subsidiary value to meet the national commitment towards the maintenance of good order at sea.

Establishing the shape and size of the SA Navy of the future, is the result of a recently completed, two year, exhaustive qualitative and quantitative process of analysis with joint participation by all the Arms of Service to maximise the yield in terms of complementary capabilities and to eliminate duplication. The sealift capability provided by the SA Navy to the SA Army is an example. This force design will form the basis for the Defence Review that will be tabled in Parliament next year.

The force design will be evaluated annually in order to adjust it to the changing national and international environment. Presently, it is not based on any perceived or hypothetical threat, but rather on a range of generic defence contingencies. The resulting force, including its land, sea and air components, has as its main purpose, the function of preventing war (through credible deterrence), containing conflict (through the prudent and timely application of force) and defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa, should the need arise.3

The War Force

For defensive purposes the overall SANDF strategy refers to three vital areas where population and industry are concentrated. They are Gauteng, the Cape Town - Saldanha - Simon's Town, and the Durban - Richard's Bay complexes. In the latter two cases they are referred to as Local Maritime Defence Areas (LMDAs).

The defence of the secondary ports of Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth and East London has not been included as a factor in determining the size of the force, as this would be prohibitively expensive. This aspect alone constitutes a major strategic gap in the country's maritime defence. It is, however, vital that the primary ports serving sea lines of communication are defended to at least 200 nautical miles (nm) from the coast, not only to sustain the national economy, but also the economies of the region.

Considering main combat units only - ignoring the mine countermeasure vessels, the combat support ships, the hydrographic survey ship and the smaller vessels that make up the SA Navy - a prudent war force is considered to comprise at least eight larger combatants and ten light corvettes, while four submarines are regarded as adequate.

When looking at the scope of the maritime problem (in the military sense), analysts will agree that this is still an extremely modest force with many shortcomings. It is an attempt, however, to strike a balance between, on the one hand, defensive requirements, which are expensive in terms of assets, and, on the other, offensive requirements, which are vital in gaining the advantage of taking the battle to the enemy and neutralising his offensive assets before they can inflict serious damage.

Only the main combat elements of the force design have been considered, but it is important to refer briefly to the need for a mine countermeasure capability. The SA Navy has conducted numerous mine-laying and mine clearance exercises in the approaches to South African ports over many years. In the Navy's assessment, these ports all lend themselves to the possibility of mining and, in some cases, the clearing of safe channels presents a significant problem, for instance, those approaches that have rocky bottoms, such as Cape Town. It is essential, therefore, that the capability to locate and clear mines to ensure that ports will remain open, is maintained. These forces have already been reduced to the level where only the continued simultaneous operation of two ports can be ensured, and once again, these would be the primary ports situated in the LMDAs and not the secondary ports.

The Required Affordable Core Combat Force

The country cannot afford to maintain the force levels required for a war force on a permanent basis. The only option is to maintain an expandable core force that retains the required range of capabilities and can be expanded within a reasonable period of time, should the need arise.

The affordable core combat force, therefore, can be defined as the minimum force that has to be sustained in order to provide such an expandable base. In the case of the SA Navy, the core force has been determined to comprise four submarines, and four surface combatants of good seafaring capability and endurance, that can carry and operate maritime helicopters in the prevailing sea conditions (typically corvettes, but frigates with competent anti-submarine sensors and weapons would be better), and six vessels of a capability similar to that of present generation strike craft, but preferably somewhat larger for improved endurance, all-weather performance and habitability, i.e. light corvettes.

At present, the SA Navy is confronted by the reality that it does not even have a core force to speak of. It has three instead of four submarines that are already 25 years old, no patrol corvettes, and its ageing 420 ton strike craft with their first generation missiles have to fill the void left by the patrol corvettes and light corvettes.

The envisaged 'mix' of ten surface combatants is considered to be flexible and could even be made up of about eight corvette or frigate size vessels, provided they could all carry suitable maritime helicopters. It is foreseen that the SA Navy will transform into this envisaged force design as the present fleet is replaced. The larger vessels planned for at present, i.e. four patrol corvettes, represent the long overdue replacement of frigates and destroyers lost during the '70s and '80s. It must be emphasised that their acquisition is mandated by an integrated solution to the military maritime problem; it is not justified by the requirement to conduct fisheries patrols, as is believed by many people in this country.

SA Navy Core Combat Force

NAVIES IN TIME OF PEACE

Reference has been made to the fact that once the investment in a navy is made, its ships and capabilities represent a wide range of subsidiary values which can be put to use in the national interest and serve to improve the return on this investment dramatically. Below a number of peacetime tasks that modern navies typically perform, are discussed.

Peacekeeping Operations

Navies world-wide are getting involved in peacekeeping or peace support operations of varying scale. In this regard, they provide sealift to convey land forces and/or supplies, or they project force by physically maintaining a presence in, or by surveillance and monitoring of the sea areas in question.

Naval Diplomacy

Contemporary navies are as useful as ever in promoting the international aims and objectives of their respective governments by exercising naval diplomacy. This is shrewdly exploited by many maritime nations, either in their immediate geographical area of interest or further afield, or both. A state can send very strong signals of support or censure, either by having its ships pay full ceremonial visits, or by maintaining a subtle or even overtly hostile presence off the coast of another state without physically engaging in actions of war. A navy remains, therefore, a powerful and versatile instrument of diplomacy in the hands of any government.

Maintaining Good Order at Sea

Apart from focusing their force preparations on maintaining the required degrees of skill and readiness for the execution of their primary function, navies are world-wide also actively involved in the maintenance of good order at sea. Typically, this entails involvement in a whole range of activities related to the privileges, responsibilities and obligations which are incurred under International Maritime Law.

In most countries, these responsibilities are fragmented among a wide range of government departments and authorities, but the burden of providing the major share of means is either shared by navies and coast guards, or shouldered by navies alone. There are many examples of either independent navies and coast guards or hybrid variations of these two components around the world. It must be kept in mind, however, that whereas navies have the ability to perform these tasks, coast guards cannot fight, nor can they be upgraded, equipped and trained to fight within a short enough period of time to obviate the need for a navy.

The activities, in turn, are either conducted autonomously, on behalf or in support of, or in conjunction with a number of other departments and authorities. They are generally categorised as follows:

the protection of marine resources (notably oil, gas and fish) and the marine environment (by monitoring and anti-pollution measures);



the prevention of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and the smuggling of drugs, weapons and contraband;



the prevention of piracy and terrorism at sea;



disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in general;



search and rescue (SAR);



hydrography; and



oceanographic research.

SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE MARITIME TASK IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REGION

The National Maritime Policy Report

The National Maritime Policy Report, tabled in August 1994, was the first real attempt at investigating the scope and nature of the maritime task, as well as the ways and means of fulfilling it. It has been the most comprehensive and in-depth effort to date. However, the SANDF and Navy's response at the time stressed the fact that the Committee did not create sufficient opportunity for the departments involved to formally and collectively interact during the investigation. This would have enabled them to come to mutually agreed solutions to the problem of fragmentation of responsibility and the resulting fragmented and unco-ordinated application of means. This omission is considered to be one of the major reasons why there has still not been any progress towards a co-ordinated solution.

Maritime Co-Operation within the Region

During October 1994 the first conference of Navy Chiefs of the Southern African region was held in South Africa. This was subsequently followed by the inaugural meeting of the Standing Maritime Committee (SMC), a sub-committee established under the Inter-State Security and Defence Committee (ISDSC) that came into being under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

At both these conferences, the dualistic nature of the maritime dimension was highlighted, with on the one hand, the purely naval component and the general component made up of all the other role-players and their interests, on the other. It also became clear that the countries of the region all experience a similar degree of fragmentation of responsibility with respect to the maintenance of good order at sea.

There has been complete unanimity, however, that the region is highly vulnerable with respect to any potential threat to its sea lines of communication or trade. A strong feeling among the land-locked members has also been expressed that their interests and privileges in the maritime arena need to be protected.

All members should agree on the need to create naval capability in the region with the understanding that South Africa could render assistance in terms of providing the means, training and expertise. The more urgent areas of co-operation are seen as the protection of marine resources, the ability to respond to pollution contingencies, the need for hydrographic and search and rescue services, and the combating of illegal immigration, and drug and arms trafficking.

In view of these requirements it is clear that the South African maritime community, with the SA Navy as a major player, will have to equip itself to deliver a co-ordinated response to requests for assistance of this nature.

CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR THE EXECUTION OF PEACETIME TASKS

The organisation that is suited to meet the challenges of the maritime task would have to possess a number of important capabilities in order to be effective. This is also true for the component parts that constitute this organisation, as well as its assets, such as ships, aircraft and helicopters.

As has already been stated, the primary objective must be to co-ordinate the maritime effort. There is the requirement for co-ordinated patrolling or monitoring and surveillance of the maritime zones, as well as the ability to initiate a rapid and appropriate response to any contingency. This, in turn, means clear lines of decision-making authority across departmental and geographical boundaries, i.e. those of the four national provinces bordering on the sea and those of the region. This implies the existence of some form of centralised and continuously staffed operations room where a shipping plot is run and all relevant information is collated and evaluated. From here, the appropriate response can then be initiated and the relevant tasking can be done. The ability to access the full range of suitable and available assets is therefore vital, and once more, this has to be possible across departmental boundaries. On the whole, it requires a comprehensive system of command, control and communications.

The most effective means of patrol is by air, but aircraft cannot fulfil this task alone. A ship is needed on the scene to board and inspect, to apprehend and arrest, and also to escort the offender either to the nearest port or out of the area. Ships are needed to respond to reported incidents of pollution or when the need for rescue arises. The complementary attributes of both ships and aircraft are therefore essential to the overall effort.

When considering suitable ships, a number of requirements are evident. Suitable ships must have a sufficient detection capability, in other words, an effective and reliable radar system. They must have the means to determine their position accurately and to communicate with a wide range of authorities, organisations, other ships and aircraft.

Such ships must have some form of weapon system in order to be able to coerce. They must be of sound seafaring quality with suitable endurance to ensure a high degree of crew comfort and efficient performance in the prevailing operating conditions. They should in fact be better off in adverse weather conditions than any 'opposing' ships.

In addition, they must be capable of patrolling economically at slow speed, while simultaneously capable of giving chase or transiting quickly should the need arise. Here it must be borne in mind that poachers, pirates and smugglers are becoming more sophisticated and internationalised, with the stakes constantly increasing. These ships must carry one or more boats capable of transferring boarding parties, or for rescuing those in distress. They should have additional accommodation and some form of medical facility. They should preferably carry divers. They must have the capacity to carry a wide range of equipment, for instance, anti-pollution equipment. These ships must also be configured to tow other vessels. The crew and equipment have to be capable of performing all required tasks, under adverse conditions, as well as in darkness.

The required seagoing assets are fairly large ships, preferably capable of operating helicopters in most of the expected weather conditions. Helicopters provide a significant multiplier in terms of the area that can be covered and the ability to respond rapidly. They also place considerably demands on the design of the host ship.

Ship designers, taking due cognizance of the prevailing sea and weather conditions in South African waters, prescribe a maximum speed of about 25 knots, a minimum length of 58 metre and a displacement of about 950 tons for a ship meeting most of these requirements and capable of operating in the outer limits of the country's maritime zones.

Such a ship is, however, too small to include a hangar and would only have a flight deck, thereby severely limiting flight operations. To make provision for a hangar, the ship would have to be at least eighty metre in length and displace at least 2 000 tons. Conservative calculations based on the areas to be covered and the need to maintain a minimum presence, indicate an absolute minimum of four such ships.

From the preceding arguments it is clear that performing the maritime task is a complex issue that needs to be carefully planned and managed to keep costs within reasonable limits in order to show a positive return. The SA Navy has stated its need to acquire ships in excess of 2 500 tons to meet its commitment to national defence. These same ships, however, can also be employed in the maritime zones to contribute to the execution of the overall maritime task. In this regard, the SA Navy would be using its vessels in times of peace like most other countries, for instance the United Kingdom and Canada.

THE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY

It is important to illustrate how the investment made by the taxpayer in the SA Navy, i.e. its present fleet, is currently being utilised. A brief overview of the activities of the past eighteen months will follow.

SA Navy ships have been deployed on goodwill visits to Europe, West and Southern Africa, some of the countries surrounding the Arabian Sea, India and Pakistan, and also to some of the Indian Ocean island states. These visits are aimed at building or renewing ties of friendship and goodwill with these countries, in most cases on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). They also afford the Navy the opportunity to come into contact with those navies, to conduct joint exercises and to exchange professional expertise.

South Africa is back on the world map as a popular destination for warships on foreign deployments. The Navy has hosted 35 ships for fifteen different countries during 27 separate visits since January 1994. A number of visiting ships are expected in the next couple of months. In many cases the opportunity is used for joint exercises with the visitors, something which has proven to be of great value.

Three deployments to the Southern Oceans were conducted on behalf of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) in support of the national Antarctic programme. These normally entail the delivery of supplies to SANAE Base, the rotation of teams and the installation and/or maintenance of weather buoys at various locations.

Scheduled exercises to maintain operational readiness are conducted on a continuous basis. Earlier this year, the SA Navy participated in Exercise ATLASUR, a standing tri-annual exercise with the navies of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

SAS Protea, the hydrographic survey ship, which is now 23 years old, has been undergoing an extensive overhaul since November 1994. Until then, she was undertaking the ongoing coastal survey in accordance with the Hydrographer's overall plan, in this case along the West Coast to the south of the Orange River mouth. While the ship is being renovated, the survey boats are conducting a survey of the approaches to Hout Bay. She is due back in operation early in 1996.

During this period, a total of about 3 750 hours were also spent on maritime patrols within the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). These patrols were conducted in conjunction with surveillance flights by the SA Air Force and were aimed at maintaining a presence in the surrounding waters, intelligence gathering and environmental and fisheries protection. Ships on patrol are normally tasked to cover the areas of high density shipping and known concentration of fishing vessels. During the period under review, 96 vessels were inspected. Ships on routine transits between Durban and Simon's Town are also normally tasked with specific patrol duties.

The Navy allocates 1 500 sea-going hours annually, free of charge to other departments. This is in accordance with a decision taken about two years ago by the Defence Command Council, intended specifically to make a contribution to the maritime task. At present, the SA Navy is also prepared to make four mine countermeasure vessels available for activities of other departments related to the maintenance of good order at sea, on request and in consultation with the Navy.

CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that South Africa needs its navy. It is a country with major maritime assets and vast maritime zones. It is also the most capable maritime power in Southern Africa. The country and the region need the SA Navy primarily for its fighting capability, but also for its ability to maintain good order in the surrounding seas.

The SA Navy is facing block obsolescence and needs to replace its ageing fleet. The acquisition of four patrol corvettes is the first step in transforming the present ageing force design into a modest but capable Navy for the future. It will be able to safeguard the maritime trade and interests of the region, and can and should make a significant and indispensable contribution to the execution of the maritime task.

At present, the responsibilities for the country's maritime zones are fragmented, resulting in a lack of co-ordination on the one hand, and some duplication on the other. The national economy cannot sustain more than one navy or fleet of ships, and the Navy's contention is that it is unnecessary. But if different fleets must exist because state departments insist on retaining or expanding their own fleets, it is essential to have proper co-operation and co-ordination to exploit the synergy of their respective means and capabilities, and to avoid wasteful duplication and overlapping.

The scope of the maritime task facing the country and the region makes it absolutely essential that all role-players should co-operate to the fullest. It is so vast that it completely overshadows the available combined means, making it vital to put those means available to the best possible use in the best possible way. The SA Navy is capable of making a major contribution and it is willing to assist in any effort aimed at achieving a suitable, sustainable and effective solution.

ENDNOTES

Edited version of the Chief of the SA Navy's Annual Policy Review, Presented at the Annual Navy Conference, Navies in War and Peace, Simon's Town, 26 October 1995.



Frank Uhlig (jr.), How Navies Fight, and Why, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1994.



Draft Defence White Paper, Republic of South Africa, 1995.