INTRODUCTION2

In any form of social intervention, the peculiar circumstances which pertain to a given community or geographic area play a key role in determining the best way to address problems that are experienced in such areas. This applies as much to development and health issues, as it does to initiatives aimed at enhancing the safety and security of people.

When exploring ways of managing violence in townships without resorting to assistance from the military, it should therefore be borne in mind that township dynamics differ from place to place and from province to province. The same applies to violence which occurs in rural areas. However, the scope of this article will be confined to violence in townships and will not focus on rural areas.

Because of vast differences in circumstances prevailing in specific townships, it is problematic to try and develop a single formula or model in terms of which violence in townships should be managed without relying on the army. The approach towards curbing violence in Katorus on the East Rand, where political rivalry is one of the contributing factors, will have to differ from that adopted in Elsies River on the Cape Flats where gang related violence is a major factor. Different factors will also have to be taken into account when addressing the random terror which often reigns in the Bambayi/Inanda Road shack settlements north of Durban. The different socio-economic, political and ethnic factors which exist in these areas need to be reflected in the different approaches which both civil society and the security forces adopt when attempting to address violence in those respective townships. This may sound obvious, but it is only recently that South Africa has moved towards practicing a more holistic approach in addressing crime and violence in communities.

Under previous governments, the antagonism which the police and the military encountered in many communities, and the reluctance displayed by political and community leaders, and civil society structures towards joint initiatives with the 'authorities' made it impossible to implement holistic approaches towards curbing violence and crime effectively. Attempts at doing so failed, irrespective of whether they were well meaning or motivated by partisan government agendas. The National Management System structures created by the state during the 1980s are a good example.

The involvement of civil society and local communities in attempts to address violence, experienced the first real breakthrough with the signing of the National Peace Accord in September 1991. Imperfect as the Accord was, it represented a commitment by political, labour, business and church leaders across the spectrum (including the security forces) to a common vision of reducing violence by way of creating a partnership between the different role players and the communities involved. A holistic approach which included socio-economic upliftment, was propagated.

Despite a new democratically elected government, and the improved legitimacy enjoyed by both the Defence Force and the Police, the transformation process has not yet reached the stage where the partnership approach propagated by the National Peace Accord is being effectively implemented on a wide scale to reduce violence in townships. The full impact of RDP projects, more effective Community Policing Forums and a greater commitment from civil society structures will be necessary to achieve that. And yet, practical experiences in some areas illustrate that new approaches that do not involve the army, are starting to bear fruit. In some areas, civil society can take the most credit for reversing a spiral of violence (for example in the Mpumalanga township of KwaZulu-Natal), while in others the combination of a new approach towards policing and the role played by civil society, has made the difference.

THE KATORUS AREA

In order to illustrate the above and draw some general conclusions, focusing on one such area may be appropriate. Katorus on the East Rand ideally lends itself to such an examination. Large scale army intervention was necessary at one stage to deal with escalating deaths in what was once one of the most violent areas of the country. It is also an area in which significant progress has been made over the past year in reducing violence with a minimum of military involvement.

Katorus is a section of the East Rand consisting of the townships of Tokoza, Katlehong and Vosloorus. The total population in the area is estimated to be 1,5 million. During the period 1990 to 1994 this area experienced some of the highest levels of violence in the country. It took the form of intra-community conflict between ANC and IFP supporters, as well as 'third force' involvement.

During the two years before the April 1994 election, the conflict reached civil war proportions, a situation which the Police were not equipped to handle. During 1993 there was an average of 140 murders per month. By February 1994 the situation had deteriorated to the extent that, with the full support of the Transitional Executive Council, two and a half to three thousand soldiers were deployed in the area. In fact, from February to July 1994 the military was in charge of operations, with the Police supporting the military, an unusual arrangement.

By the time the army withdrew in August 1994, the situation in Katorus had stabilised significantly and violence had actually been reduced. During 1995, a further marked drop in violence occurred.

Comparative statistics provided by the police in the area paint a picture of a remarkable turnaround (see table).

The sharp decreases in murder, attempted murders and armed robberies cannot solely be attributed to a general countrywide decrease in political violence after the April 1994 elections. It is clearly a factor to be taken into account, but it can be argued that a number of other initiatives involving civil society and the police have played a decisive role.

Before referring to some of these initiatives undertaken in Katorus, and at the risk of painting a too romantic picture of the situation in the area, it must be stressed that, in general, crime figures remain unacceptably high. Reported cases of some forms of violence, such as rape and common assault, have actually increased during the past three years. The police argue, with some cogency, that the normalised relationships between the police and the communities have given far more residents the confidence to report these forms of violence, something they would not have bothered to do a year or two ago.

The army has also not disappeared altogether. Soldiers from Group 72, based in Tokoza, still fulfil patrolling functions.

It is instructive to consider the contributions made by the different role players towards reducing violence and normalising the Katorus area.

The Army

The army must take the credit for its role in stabilising Katorus during the six months between February and July 1994 when it took over control of the area. By August 1994, when the SANDF pulled out, civil war conditions no longer existed, although the townships remained tense and violence-ridden. Key participants in the conflict were the ANC aligned Self-Defence Units (SDUs) and the IFP aligned Self-Protection Units (SPUs). These were community based structures involving mainly militarised youth. The SDUs and SPUs, often fraught with a lack of discipline, infighting and infiltration by criminal elements, were highly armed and antagonistic towards the police.

During this period civil society structures such as churches, community based organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs) appeared incapable of intervening in a decisive way to reduce violence.

The highly visible military presence in the area had the effect of reducing the impunity with which conflicting groups were attacking each other. Murders and shootings declined, but without the underlying causes being addressed.

The Police and the Communities

Following the withdrawal of the permanent military presence in August 1994, the police resumed their normal policing role in Katorus. A state of relative stability had been restored, but the potential of violence escalating at any moment still existed. The police set about their task with some imaginative initiatives aimed primarily at improving relations between the communities and the police.

Numerous bilateral and multilateral talks were held between the police and community leaders to discuss the new philosophy of community policing.



Small joint projects were organised between the police and the communities at schools and old age homes, and with political organisations. These projects included youth camps at police stations, exhibitions, lectures and rallies. A total of 375 such projects were undertaken during 1994.



In-service training for police members in the area became a strong focus. Numerous seminars and workshops were held to familiarise the police with local conditions and to re-orientate their approach towards policing and towards the community. Political and community leaders attended some of these sessions and were given the opportunity to participate and to question police experts.



A total of 27 Community Police Forums were established at all the police stations and satellite police stations in the area.



A shift from the previous policing style of law enforcement to one of community involvement took place. Joint police-community operational planning of rallies and meetings took place.

Non-Government Organisations

Various NGOs played an important role by providing platforms for the police and communities to interact and to change perceptions. The Community Dispute Resolution Trust (CDRT), Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA) and the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) were some of the NGOs which made important contributions in easing tensions between the police and township residents.

The Church and 'Community Constables'

Individual church people played a decisive role in facilitating communication between opposing groups and in focusing police attention on underlying causes of violence. Perhaps the most far reaching intervention came from Reverend Dandala of the Central Methodist Church who had worked extensively with SDU / SPU structures in the Katorus area. He became a strong proponent of using SDU and SPU members, regarded by many as renegades, to assist with normal policing functions. The suggestion sounded outrageous to many people. Dandala facilitated numerous meetings between the police and SDUs / SPUs to pursue the idea. The police and community leaders were eventually persuaded to accept the proposition and to embark on an experimental project of integrating some members of defence structures into the police as paid police reservists. As no funds were available from the police budget for the payment of reservists, this project was financed through the Presidential Lead Project which the government launched in the Katorus area during October 1994. This three billion Rand project was supported by the RDP and was aimed at the socio-economic development of the area.

An initial 500 members from SDUs and SPUs were selected, trained for four to six weeks, paid R26 per day, issued with SAPS service pistols and deployed as 'Community Constables' in the area under the command of the SAPS.

This project soon became and remained a controversial one. Various complaints of undisciplined behaviour, partisanship and involvement in violence and crime by these constables were received.

During July 1995 the National Commissioner of the SAPS appointed a team to investigate the role of SDU and SPU members in the Katorus area. The team found that, despite their inferior training, these members were being utilised to carry out almost all police functions, including:

the investigation of crime with special emphasis on the recovery of stolen vehicles and the tracing of suspected criminals;



attending to complaints from communities;



the staffing of satellite police stations; and



operating computers.

The team further reported that, according to regular members of the SAPS in the area, the community constables brought with them a pool of information and a network of sources in the community. Station commanders and representatives of Community Policing Forums agreed that these members made a positive contribution to the solving of serious crimes and in restoring law and order. For the first time in years, police officers could appear in public and in uniform in the townships without being intimidated or attacked. It also became possible for police members to enter previously known 'no-go' areas.

The evaluation team confirmed that some community constables had been found guilty of criminal conduct and undisciplined behaviour and that some were operating under the command of both their former commanders and the SAPS station commanders. These were issues which the police were addressing.

The overwhelming impact of the report, however, is positive. Community police relations have improved significantly and permanent members of the SAPS doubt whether they would be able to cope with the situation in Katorus without the community constables.

The Presidential Lead Project and the RDP

Some reference has already been made to this. Socio-economic reconstruction projects play an important role in stabilising communities. Under the Presidential Lead Project damaged and abandoned houses are being repaired and the refugees are returning to live in their houses. Police resources also benefit. Towards the end of 1995 a number of vehicles for the use of the flying squad in the area will be obtained with the assistance of RDP funding.

CONCLUSION

The following role players have made substantial contributions towards restoring stability and reducing violence in the Katorus area: the army, the police, community and political leaders, members of the Self-Defence Units and Self-Protection Units, NGOs, churches and state initiated reconstruction and development projects.

The Katorus experience, therefore, can provide some of the answers to the question posed by the title of this article, namely: 'Civil Society and Violence - how to manage in the Township without the Army.'

The following are some general propositions extracted from the Katorus experience:

Where violence in townships has reached the stage of being endemic and close to civil war proportions, civil society and the police are not equipped to intervene decisively to restore relative stability. Only the military can do so. There are, however, no townships in which such conditions prevail at present and it is likely to happen only in very exceptional circumstances.



In townships in which serious violence and conflict are prevalent without the conditions approximating civil war proportions, a holistic approach towards reducing violence and restoring normality can work and needs to be adopted. Depending on the circumstances in the township concerned, the role players in such an approach would be civil society, the police, political groups, community structures and state institutions.



A prerequisite for restoring peace in a township is to normalise and improve relations between those organisations or actors involved in the violence, and the police. This is dependent on effective communication, confidence and trust- building initiatives and a problem-solving approach towards issues in dispute.



Police in the townships concerned need to have intimate knowledge and understanding of issues and dynamics prevalent in a township. Extensive in-house training with the involvement of local community and political leaders is necessary to achieve this.



The police are often mistrusted in conflict-ridden townships. NGOs and civil society structures which do enjoy a degree of credibility in communities, therefore, have an important role to play in facilitating contact, communication and confidence-building between communities and the police.



Policing in townships needs to take place with the support and involvement of civil society structures and residents. To achieve this, the establishment of effective Community Policing Forums is important. Equally important is the utilisation of individuals who are part and parcel of the community concerned for policing tasks. In Katorus this was done by incorporating members of self-defence structures as paid reservists. It must be stressed that this has been an experimental project which has not been implemented anywhere else and which, because of budgetary constraints and other factors, at present cannot be repeated by the police elsewhere. It does, however, remain a concept with tremendous potential which warrants further investigation. In the absence of paid police reservists, the number of voluntary police reservists from within communities need to be expanded.



Socio-economic development within townships, driven both by the state and the private sector, is an important contributor to stability and the defusing of conflict. Businesses and industries which adjoin townships or which draw their labour from townships have a direct interest and responsibility to become involved.



Ongoing steps need to be taken to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of the South African criminal justice system as it is experienced by the township residents.

All the above principles and approaches need to be packaged in such a way that they are geared towards the circumstances of the particular township and that they form part of a holistic approach towards dealing with violence and crime. There will be no need for military involvement in townships if this approach is adopted.

ENDNOTES

This edited version of a paper read at the Annual SA Army Conference, Preparing the SA Army for the 21st Century: "A New Army for a New Challenge", Pretoria, 19 October 1995, is published as part of the Crime and Policing Project, a venture sponsored by the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.



Information for this article came from an unpublished paper by Monique Marks and Penny McKenzie, Political Pawns or Social Agents? A look at militarised youth in South Africa; information supplied by Maj-Gen Don Aspeling, Area Commissioner, SAPS, East Rand; and the police evaluation report on SDU and SPU members in Katorus.