the retention of technology;

the alignment of human resources development with technological requirements;

the role of economic development;

civilian control over military matters;

training to ensure continued capable leadership for the SA Army;

transparency in all military matters; and

representativeness.

TECHNOLOGY

We are at the dawn of the age of information technology. One of the major challenges involves planning to survive this era. It will be attempted to visualise how the SA Army must prepare for the next ten to twenty years in this regard.

It is conceivable that the final constitution might change that part of the Interim Constitution that emphasises that the "SANDF shall be a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force", and replace it with "a technological affordable National Defence Force." The SA Army’s challenge in the future will then be to provide this country with a balanced, modern and technologically affordable force that will be able to meet the military threats that might endanger the sovereignty and political system of the country.

The scope of this technology must be seen in the current setting of both ‘second’ and ‘third wave’ technologies, meaning both the industrial revolution and developments in information technology. How does this influence planning for the future? The SA Army will have to develop the ability to counter armies who possess sophisticated types of technology. This must be done within an ever diminishing budget. It must be kept in mind that after each war, the three major role players in war, as Von Clausewitz described them, namely the citizens of the country, the army and the government, are in conflict as to the importance of preparing for war. The world had come out of the Second World War over fifty years ago, and has just come out of a Cold War that lasted approximately forty-five years. South Africa itself has just come out of a period of an internal national struggle that lasted for as many years. How then do we prepare for a future war, and how do we motivate credible technology for the SA Army to the Government, and ultimately to the people of South Africa? The answer to this question is possibly more complex than it seems and provides a major challenge for the years to come.

The first technological advance that can be planned for lies in the country’s lack of aspiration towards the possession of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Its nuclear capability has been dismantled before the eyes of the world. This does not mean, however, that we do not have to plan to be able to counter and/or survive threats from such weapons. What is the likelihood of a nuclear explosion? The whole world has witnessed the accidents at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear reactors. The proliferation of this technology is of major concern to the world at large, as witnessed by attempts to put an end to the potential use of nuclear weapons. The international outcry of indignation against France’s recent nuclear tests springs readily to mind.

The next war that we could be requested to assist in, might very well be similar to the Gulf War. The horror of television pictures of a whole nation cowering under the threat of chemical attack can easily be remembered. Television reporters trying to fulfil their task from behind gas masks would have been funny in the extreme under any other circumstance. In this situation, it bespoke the tragedy of the potential havoc that can be created if fanatical leaders should gain access to NBC weapons. What is disturbing is that the arms race in the Third World has, in the last decade, become focused on the search for weapons of mass destruction.

Apart from countering the effect of NBC weapons, we must concentrate on preparing for a limited war. This could be inside the country, on a regional basis, or elsewhere under the auspices of the United Nations. What technology do we concentrate on, in case of a limited war? I do not think that we have a choice of preparing for either offence or defence. We are mandated to prepare for both. In the remaining years of this century, we must determine and redetermine what our needs and requirements really are. What will actually matter in future? It will stand us in good stead to look at lessons of the past, so as to prepare for the future. A word of caution is needed, however. If one looks at military history during this century, it is obvious that after every war, a country always prepares to win the war that has just been concluded and not the one looming somewhere over the horizon. We must not fall into this trap. Lessons from the past are but a guide to the future.

Organising for the next war is one of the problems of the future. We must not have the illusion that the next war will be the same as those in Namibia or Angola. It could be a more modern version of the Gulf War, or something completely different. It must be ensured that the necessary organisation, technology and doctrine are in place. As even a casual reader of military history knows, wars have the habit of arriving unannounced. The advent of the Second World War caught South Africa totally unprepared with a total military personnel component of 18 875 officers and men, the Active Citizen Force included. Through a strenuous effort, by the end of the war, the country fielded in excess of 340 000 volunteers, of which close to 10 000 paid the supreme price. As an example of equipment, mobile artillery units could field only 65, mostly obsolete, guns, which was 33 per cent less than the Boer forces had in 1899 at the outbreak of that war. Fortunately, the SA Army is slightly better equipped today than it was back in 1939. In today’s concept of Blitzkrieg, we must take care not to slide back to the same situation as then.

At the moment we are acknowledged as a leader in the development of artillery systems and in mine detection and mine protection. We must retain this technological expertise, but we also need to focus on combat vehicles, especially infantry combat vehicles, and the anti-air environment.

The SA Army will also have to adjust its paradigm from exclusively South African equipment to equipment that is affordable. The need to go it alone in developing technology must be balanced against the possibility of joint ventures to allow for affordable technology, and again against the buying-in of already developed technology. It is as important to determine what we should not develop locally. Because of sanctions, we had to pay a premium on various kinds of technology that we acquired in the past. It is foreseen that the SA Army will have to be equipped with less expensive equipment, either locally or from abroad. This implies that we will have to look at adequate quality, instead of the best possible quality, as was the case in the past. Lowering quality to an affordable level does not mean lowering standards. We must still ensure that the lives of soldiers will not be at risk. For example, welding marks on weapons are machined and ground to a high degree of smoothness. When one looks at the artillery hardware produced in Russia, it is obvious that their welding is not ground to a smooth surface. This saves on labour costs, without affecting the quality of the equipment itself.

HUMAN RESOURCES VERSUS TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS

A fallacy that we can easily fall prey to is to say that we must only develop technology that can be operated by soldiers with a low level of educational training. We must accept that South Africa has a multicultural population, where potential soldiers are found across the whole educational spectrum. Technology required by the SA Army must be comparable with that of the rest of the world and can thus be designated to any segment of our population until such time as the educational backlog has been erased. It is better to raise the educational level of present and future soldiers to the level required to man sophisticated equipment, than to go back ten or even twenty years down the technological road to adapt the equipment to the man. In the latter case, a disservice would be done to the country that would not be in compliance with the RDP programme.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The major role players in South Africa are in agreement that the economy will play a crucial role in the upliftment of the population as a whole. If the various segments of the population cannot be lifted from the swamp of destitution and economic despair, there is no chance that the country’s internal problems will ever be solved. Personally, I would like to see the SA Army withdraw from its internal deployment role by 1999. This does not appear to be attainable, no matter how large and efficient the SAPS may become. It is not generally known that over at least the past year the SA Army was called upon to deploy more troops on a monthly average for operational use inside the country, than was ever the case at the height of the Namibian border war and the internal settlement struggle combined. This excludes training camps and elections. The average monthly cost for personnel and logistics in the deployment of an average of 5 862 full-time force troops for the period October 1994 to September 1995 is close to R32 million. These figures do not include part-time forces that had to be called up, or the costs incurred for personnel manning the support system necessary for operationally deployed troops.

It is therefore imperative that the SA Army support the RDP to help accelerate economic growth. In other countries it is referred to as four, five or ten year plans and some countries even call it modernisation plans. These names have certain limitations, but the RDP has the scope and vision this country really needs. The Army, however, must be careful not to take bread out of the hands of the private sector. It was recently called upon to aid in the construction of a road in the Eastern Cape Province. Local contractors were soon up in arms (figuratively speaking) to protest against what they saw as interference in their capacity to earn a living.

As part of its economic contribution, the SANDF already provides aid in the form of the Service Corps. It is possible, but undesirable, for the SA Army to expand its role in this regard. Not only is this a collateral function for which the Army neither trains nor budgets, but it is an encroachment on the terrain of another department. It is important that the function for which the Service Corps was established be transferred to the appropriate department, possibly the Department of Labour, as soon as possible. In such an event, the SA Army can still be called upon to second instructors, if necessary.

Because of South Africa’s vast and ever-growing economic needs, the SA Army will have to explain its expenditure and the need for it, not only within the political environment, but also to the people as a whole, in an attempt to motivate their support of the SA Army. Actions always speak louder than words. At present, the SA Army enjoys legitimacy among a large part of the population, as is already evident in the substantial number of new faces in the part-time forces. This is especially noticeable within the Commando system, and is one way of offsetting the loss incurred by the rationalisation of full-time force members through further financial cuts in the defence budget. The vast number of applications to the voluntary military service system, will soon have the same effect on the other part-time force units. It must be endeavoured to obtain legitimacy amongst the population as a whole, as the SA Army is part of the final insurance policy for peace and stability for the country. If this insurance policy fails, the whole nation will perish.

CIVILIAN CONTROL

Much has been said about civilian control of the military. Unfortunately, many viewpoints are coloured by perceptions that do not necessarily coincide with facts. It is a fact that, in the past, the SA Army was subject to civilian control. There were various mechanisms in existence at the political level. Surely the military is not to be blamed if these mechanisms have not been seen to be used. A good hunting dog carries on hunting until checked by his master’s call. It is not for him to decide when to call off the hunt or even when to go hunting by himself. Therefore, the advent of the Secretariat of Defence to provide a visible bridge between the military and civilian sectors is to be welcomed.

Civilian control over the SANDF must not be confused with civilian command of the SANDF. The military must be allowed to execute its task according to its own doctrine and training, and under its own command system. The mistake of the McNamara era in the US during the Vietnam War must be avoided. As Secretary of Defense, his implementation of the planning, programming and budgeting system approach was excellent in gaining control of the lines of supply and structuring forces in preparation for war, but was useless in fighting the war itself, where the inane policies dreamed up by civilian think-tanks had utterly failed to provide a solution to that protracted war.

If military personnel allow military strategy to become the domain of civilian analysts as part of civilian control, as happened in Vietnam, we will be failing in our duty toward the Constitution and the country as a whole. We must remain the experts in the application of military force to support the national strategy as set out by the Government. As professional soldiers, we must be allowed to wage war professionally. An emphasis on technical, managerial and bureaucratic concerns should be avoided. This should be part of the field of civilian control.

TRAINING FOR CAPABLE LEADERSHIP

South African demography dictates that the composition of the SA Army must continue to change. At present the lower ranks in the SA Army already reflect the composition of the country’s population to a large extent. This will change even further in the years to come. The majority of the approximately 14 000 recent applications to join the voluntary military service system were from black cultural sectors.

In the short term the same mix is impossible at the higher echelon of command and staff. Personnel participating in the transformation process are allocated ranks on merit by an impartial agency. This is not nearly sufficient to attain the correct mix in the short term. It takes a minimum number of years to train military leaders for the higher ranks of responsibility. Because the lives of soldiers are at stake, one cannot have officers without the required training and experience in operational command of men. There is no alternative but to continue with a focused programme of training, based on capabilities, standards and discipline, that will provide capable leaders for the SA Army of the future. This has become necessary due to a marked drop in interest among the white population segment to become military leaders.

TRANSPARENCY

There is still some scepticism about the SA Army’s intentions, as well as charges that it is not transparent enough. One of the reasons for this perceived lack of transparency is a culture of secrecy and security classification that developed within the SA Army over the years. There is a tendency to over classify material as a matter of course, which must change in the years to come.

As numerous academics have pointed out, there will always be a need for military secrets. In this instance, secrets refer to the safeguarding of certain military information from a real or potential future enemy. This kind of secrecy must not change. However, the challenge lies in maintaining a balance between the need for military secrecy on the one hand, and the desire for transparency on the other. An important area of transparency lies in the relationship that the SA Army must develop with the two Parliamentary Committees on Defence.

In the past, the SA Army has always tried to foster good relations with the media, as far as their reporting allowed it. This will be continued. A sympathetic and supportive media providing constructive criticism makes it much easier to attain acceptable levels of transparency. A hostile media tends to drive one into the defensive.

Eventually, it implies the development of mutual trust between the SA Army and interested parties. This can only develop out of a genuine desire from all sides to put their own, and sometimes short term, interests aside and work for the greater benefit of the country itself. We must accept that it will take time, but I want to state my sincere commitment to make the SA Army as transparent as possible, according to that which national interests will allow.

REPRESENTATIVE-NESS

At present a minority of the full-time force of the SA Army is white. This has been the case since before the negotiated political settlement has been reached. The inflow of personnel from outside the old SA Army has changed the ratio further to a composition even more representative of the country’s population. This should be welcomed, not feared. The various cultural groups in South Africa have a proud tradition of contributing to its military capacity, when they are allowed to do so. In 1943, for example, more than 37 per cent of the Union Defence Force consisted of black and brown members. After 1948, a programme of wholesale demotion of African and coloured personnel and the partial or entire deconstitution of their units was instituted. This situation has been reversed in the years since then.

CONCLUSION

In preparing the SA Army for the next century, we will have to meet the challenges posed by the technological age, both in remaining technologically affordable for the country and finding a way to integrate the human resource potential with technological requirements.

This will only be possible if a solution to the economic problems of the country can be found. If not, the SA Army will find itself drawn into a morass that will slowly but surely drain it of its resources.

he Army of the future must be representative of the people as a whole, have the same calibre of leaders as today, and must be seen to be transparent in its actions. This must be based on capabilities, the maintenance of standards, discipline, and must be under overall civilian control.

 Endnote

Edited version of a paper presented at Preparing the SA Army for the 21st Century: "A new army for a new challenge", Presented by the Institute for Defence Policy, the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA, 19 October 1995, Pretoria.