The proliferation and indiscriminate effects of landmines worldwide: the US Department of State has estimated that some 85 to 90 million unexploded mines are currently scattered in 62 countries.5 Other estimates indicate that there are 100 to 110 million undetected landmines with another approximately 100 million stored in weapons stockpiles. These mines kill or maim between 600 and 1 200 people a month - most of them civilians, many of them children.6



The economic, social and medical impacts of landmines: landmines have an enormous impact on all aspects of society. At an economic level, power lines, transportation systems, water delivery systems and agricultural and grazing land are affected. The countries that are most affected by landmines, are generally amongst the poorest in the world. Landmines represent a major obstacle to development in these countries. Medical care and social services for landmine victims place an extra burden on already over-stretched medical and social services. One estimate of the costs of surgery and lifelong prosthetic care for amputee mine victims is between $3 000 and $5 000 per individual.7



New developments in landmine technology: the landmine crisis has the potential to be exacerbated by the development of new insidious forms of mine technology. For example, landmines are increasingly being made with little or no metal content to avoid metal detection.

The scale of the landmine crisis might lead some to believe that landmines represent an insoluble problem. However, the implications of not addressing this problem are far too drastic for the international community not to concentrate on developing measures that will contribute towards dealing with it. Urgent and effective action is undoubtedly needed. Such action must not only prevent the further proliferation of landmines, but must reduce, and hopefully in the long term eliminate the international landmine epidemic.

LANDMINES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A number of Southern African countries experience problems due to undiscovered landmines, although the extent of the problem varies considerably.

Angola is classified as one of the three most heavily mined countries in the world, with estimates varying between ten and twenty million landmines.8 It is estimated that there are 1-2 million landmines in Mozambique.9 Zimbabwe and Namibia have lesser landmine problems. Certain reports also list Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia as landmine affected countries.

The landmine crisis in these countries undermines development and seriously exacerbates many of the problems affecting the region. Few would dispute the view that the prospect for effective economic development in South Africa is linked to prospects for development in the region as a whole. For as long as landmines obstruct settlement and optimum land usage in countries such as Mozambique and Angola, the prospects for such development are diminished. Landmines are a major obstacle in efforts to repatriate and resettle refugees. Medical care for landmine victims in the region is an ongoing drain on resources that might otherwise have been employed for positive development. Even the problem of illegal immigrants in South Africa can be partly attributed to the displacement and social disruption resulting from the prevalence of landmines in the region. While it is difficult to quantify these effects, landmines should be seen as a contributing factor in regional underdevelopment and insecurity.

Landmines were used extensively by all sides in the course of military conflict in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe over the past few decades. Apartheid South Africa contributed to the crisis by producing landmines, and supplying them to former allies, such as Renamo, Unita and the Rhodesian Government, and through its general role in fuelling these wars. While the majority of these landmines were not produced in South Africa, the landmine problem in Southern Africa is, in part, a lasting remnant of wars which were sponsored by the apartheid government to maintain white rule in South Africa.

South Africa has a duty to provide reparation to these countries, for the damage that was done to them. In addition, South Africa is indebted to them for the support and assistance which their citizens and/or governments gave to its liberation movements. The country therefore has an interest in addressing the landmine problem in these countries, as well as a burden of responsibility towards them. Contributing to attempts to address the problem of landmines in the region can be a way of responding to these dual imperatives.

DEMINING AS A SOLUTION TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM

Extensive demining programmes have been implemented in a number of countries, including Angola and Mozambique. Demining is a slow, painstaking, dangerous and expensive process. It costs between $300 and $1 000 to clear a landmine that might have cost as little as $3 to produce. Estimates are that it would cost between $33 and $57 billion to clear existing landmines. In 1994, roughly two million landmines were laid in conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South East Asia, while demining resulted in the lifting of only approximately 100 000 mines.10

In July, the UN held the first international conference on mine clearance in Geneva, seeking finance for a trust fund to remove around 100 000 mines a year. Only a third of the meagre $75 million sought this year was pledged by member governments. Last year, about $70 million was spent on demining.11

In international terms, demining represents an essentially limited response to the global landmine crisis. Unless there is an end to the global proliferation of landmines, the international demining effort will remain, essentially, a losing battle.

Indications are that Southern Africa is entering a period of relative peace. Military conflicts which have divided a number of countries in the region have ended or appear to be close to resolution. In the foreseeable future it is possible that the depositing of landmines in the region will diminish and a concerted programme of demining may progressively reduce the scale of the Southern African landmine problem.

THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE 1980 UN WEAPONS CONVENTION

Protocol II of the 1980 UN Weapons Convention aims to restrict the use of landmines, booby traps and devices which are activated "by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time". Provisions relating to the use of landmines include the following:

mines may only be directed at military objectives, with a prohibition on their indiscriminate use and a requirement that all feasible precautions be taken to protect civilians;



remotely-delivered mines may not be used unless their location is accurately recorded or they are fitted with an effective neutralising mechanism;



pre-planned minefields are to be recorded and parties to a conflict are to endeavour to ensure the recording of those laid during hostilities; and



when hostilities end, parties are to attempt to reach agreement among themselves, or with other States or organisations to take the necessary measures to clear minefields.12

The Protocol, however, has singularly failed to prevent the proliferation of landmines or their indiscriminate use. The Vienna Review Conference considered a number of changes aimed at addressing the weakness of the current Convention. These included:

extending the scope of the Convention to include internal armed conflicts;



prohibition on mines (i) which are not "readily" detectable or (ii) remotely delivered and not self-destructing;



restriction of the use of non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines to fenced, clearly marked, and patrolled minefields;



establishing the principle that parties which use mines are responsible for their removal;



stricter provisions aimed at providing protection for UN operations, missions under regional arrangements, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations;



incorporating effective implementation and verification mechanisms into the Convention; and



the introduction of methods, including positive incentives, to promote universal adherence to these prohibitions.13

INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

These proposed amendments are not substantially different from the provisions of the Convention as signed in 1980. Delegates attending the reconvened conference therefore need to consider whether the combined impact of the above proposed amendments, or modifications thereof, will have any real impact on preventing the proliferation and indiscriminate use of landmines, and in beginning to reduce the scale of the international problem presented by landmines.

The question remains whether there is a real possibility that strengthening the Convention will have a substantial impact on the landmine problem. For the Convention to provide a solution to the landmine problem, the following would have to apply:

the Convention itself would have to be substantially strengthened;



the number of states and oppositional military groups which are party to the Convention would have to be increased substantially;



the states and oppositional military groups which become party to the Convention would have to include a significant proportion of those that are actually involved in wars; and



the parties which are signatories to the Convention would actively have to abide by its provisions.

At present only approximately fifty states have ratified the Convention. Even if substantially more states and oppositional military forces become parties to the Convention and the terms of the Convention are significantly strengthened, the means for ensuring compliance with its terms are essentially limited.

The Review Conference has revealed that there is little agreement on how the provisions of the Convention should be verified. An absence of effective verification measures - and it appears that such measures as may be agreed upon, will be essentially limited - limits the potential to enforce the provisions of the Convention.14

It is not a simple matter to prevent states from signing the Convention in bad faith. One proposal, for instance, has been that the parties to the UN Weapons Convention should agree to restrict the sale of landmines to those who are party to the revised Convention. On the one hand there is a possibility that such a provision would contribute towards limiting the access of "irresponsible" states and oppositional military groups to landmines. On the other hand, it may simply cause an increase in the number of states which become party to the Weapons Convention to ensure their access to a supply of landmines, while having no intention of abiding by its restrictions, or no capacity to make their soldiers do so.

If more states, as well as oppositional military forces, become parties to the Convention, it is substantially strengthened, and if all those who are party to the Convention actively abide by it, there may be some limiting of the humanitarian problem caused by landmines. This remains unlikely while most members of the international community continue to elevate "military utility" considerations, above humanitarian considerations.

There appears to be little reason to believe that modifications to the 1980 UN Weapons Convention will have a substantial impact on the overall landmine problem. It is because of this realisation that a number of groupings, prominent individuals and governments are now calling for an international ban on landmines.

SOUTH AFRICA’S POSITION IN VIENNA

Despite the limitations of the Convention, the Review Conference could have been an opportunity for South Africa to contribute towards preventing the proliferation and indiscriminate use of landmines. Protocol II is the only international instrument dealing with landmines, and amendments which strengthen the Convention, and move the international community closer to a ban on landmines, should have been supported.

The South African position, based on the distinction between long-life and short-life mines, is counter-productive. Short-life mines will not address the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines and represent nothing more than a defence put forth by those unwilling to relinquish the use of landmines and recognise the scale of human suffering inflicted mainly on civilians. The arguments for short-life mines should be rejected on the following grounds:

whether ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’, landmines cannot distinguish between civilians and soldiers, friend or foe;



there is evidence that self-destructing and self-deactivating mechanisms are unreliable;



smart mines are more expensive and it is unlikely that developing countries will be able to afford to use them;



the very act of self-destruction could pose dangers to civilians and livestock;



outlawing long-life mines and allowing the use of smart mines will not address the question of how such laws will be implemented and who would be able to enforce it; and



the acceptance of smart mines continues to legitimise the use of landmines in general.

While it will not be possible to get immediate agreement on an international ban on landmines, an approach which emphasises support for such a ban, in addition to the strengthening of the 1980 Convention, is the most viable option for impacting on the world-wide landmine problem.

THE CALL FOR A BAN

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was launched in October 1992 in New York by a group of organisations, including the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap International and the Mines Advisory Group. Since 1992, the ICBL has significantly broadened its support base with more than 350 organisations worldwide now supporting the campaign. The International Committee of the Red Cross, while not directly aligning itself with the ICBL, has also been involved in promoting a ban on landmines. Prominent individuals, such as Pope John-Paul II and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali have also spoken out in support of an international ban on landmines.

While fourteen governments now support a total ban,15 other governments have been less definite in their positions on the landmine issue. In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1994, President Clinton called for the "eventual elimination" of landmines. A statement by the Chinese Government observes that "it needs further study whether the ban on all antipersonnel mines export is in keeping with the legitimate rights of self defence of those countries, especially the developing countries".

In South Africa, 38 church groupings, student organisations and NGOs, as well as prominent individuals, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Dr Beyers Naude, have expressed their support for an international ban on landmines and have appealed to the government to support such a ban.

REASONS TO SUPPORT A BAN ON THE USE OF LANDMINES

In the above sections it has been indicated that it is unlikely that the strengthening of the 1980 UN Weapons Convention will have a substantial impact on the problem of proliferation and indiscriminate use of landmines, and that there is significant support for a ban on landmines, both internationally and in South Africa. In this section a more detailed motivation for South Africa to support a ban on landmines will be provided. The argument is based on a consideration of the implications of legitimising the use of landmines, the role of the SANDF and the military utility of landmines.

Legitimising the use of landmines

In the extreme and inevitable conditions of war, it is tempting, even for well intentioned soldiers, to disregard rules, such as those provided in the 1980 UN Weapons Convention, which are intended to regulate their conduct. In the chaos of war it is not always possible, even for determined generals, to ensure that their soldiers abide by such rules. In the climate of accusations and counter-accusations which characterise war, it may be impossible to know whether such rules are being followed or not.

The realities of war provide the basis for reservations about claims by the SANDF that it can commit itself, for instance, to using landmines strictly in terms of the parameters laid down by a revised UN Weapons Convention. But even if the SANDF does commit itself to observing discipline and restraint in the use of landmines, many others will not do so. By justifying the use of landmines as legitimate weapons of warfare for itself, the SANDF contributes to condoning and justifying the use of landmines by all armed forces.

While some countries and their armed forces may sincerely intend only to use landmines in a restricted manner, maintaining this position consequently neutralises efforts to prevent landmines from falling into the hands of others, who will not use them in a such a way. If it is accepted that the SANDF’s need for landmines is more important than the powerful humanitarian consideration that motivate an international ban on landmines, then it must also be accepted that South Africa will continue to legitimise the use of landmines in warfare. If it is maintained that landmines are legitimate military weapons, we, as landmine users, will continue to be party to the ongoing collective crime against humanity which results from their indiscriminate use.

The role of the SANDF

In terms of the Interim Constitution and the Draft Defence White Paper, the SANDF could potentially be deployed in three military roles:

in upholding law and order in South Africa in support of the South African Police Services;



in compliance with the international obligations of South Africa with regard to international bodies and other states. In the Draft Defence White Paper "compliance with international obligations" is understood to refer to the potential involvement of the SANDF in ‘peace operations’. There are essentially two types of peace operations:

* peacekeeping operations, where there is an existing peace and where a peacekeeping force is deployed with the consent of contesting parties;

* peace enforcement operations, where active hostilities persist and a force is deployed without the consent of one or more warring states or groups; and



in defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa.

With regard to the SANDF’s role in upholding law and order and in peacekeeping operations, it is clear that landmines are not particularly appropriate or necessary as weapons. There is no question of using landmines where they will endanger local communities or even former combatants from forces which have agreed to abide by the terms of a peace agreement.

There may be those who wish to motivate that landmines might be required in peacekeeping operations (eg. in the protection of observation posts, or in maintaining a boundary between opposing forces), but it is equally arguable that alternatives to the use of landmines in such situations do exist. Any casualties resulting from the use of landmines would detract from the SANDF’s credibility and therefore its potential effectiveness in such operations.

While there are no real arguments for the SANDF to use landmines in peacekeeping operations, the same cannot be said with regard to its potential role in peace enforcement or in the SANDF’s ‘primary role’, that of national defence. In the following section it is argued that, with regard to these two roles, while landmines may have a "net military utility", they are not indispensable weapons.

THE MILITARY UTILITY OF LANDMINES

Military opinion on landmines

Within most military establishments landmines are seen as legitimate and useful weapons of warfare. For instance, an ICRC hosted symposium on the military use of landmines which was attended by military experts from sixteen countries concluded that "anti-personnel landmines do constitute an effective military weapon, as they are used for defensive purposes in conjunction with other weapons systems". However, it was recognised that "this strict military use could not always be guaranteed, and that proper precautionary measures could not always be taken, especially in internal armed conflicts which constitute the majority of present day conflicts".16

While the weight of military opinion is that landmines have a "net utility" of a defensive kind in war, this belief is not unquestioned. One report, for instance, "suggests that anti-personnel mines are as likely to kill friendly soldiers as defend them".17

The changing nature of war and the use of landmines

In recent decades there has been a significant change in the overall nature of war. In the words of Aaron Karp, "although countries like Iraq and North Korea still cause much anxiety, rulers bent on territorial conquest appear to be a dying breed ... Among major powers, the deliberate initiation of warfare has become increasingly unthinkable ... In regions as diverse as South America, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia, there is little apparent risk of major war between states."

This declining threat of inter-state wars, however, has been accompanied by an increase in military conflicts of an ethnic, religious and/or intra-state nature. "Over 75 percent of all warfare since 1945 has been internal, not between existing states, but over the emergence of new states. And the end of the Cold War has made this dominance even more complete." 18

These changes have been accompanied by a change in the use of landmines. According to a report by the US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "[u]ntil the early 1970s, modern mine warfare evolved largely in tandem with the development of armoured forces. As better armour protection and anti-tank missiles were developed, the value of mines for defence against tanks decreased while the role of anti-personnel mines has grown. This shift in emphasis reflects both advances in mine technology and the proliferation of small wars, largely in the developing world, in which inexpensive and easily acquired and manufactured anti-personnel mines fulfil a doctrinal and tactical need for a weapon of intimidation and destruction."19

Landmines "have changed from being primarily a defensive, tactical battlefield weapon to an offensive, strategic weapon often deliberately aimed at civilians in order to empty territory, destroy food sources, create refugee flows, or simply spread terror and make ordinary people’s life impossible."20

Conventional versus unconventional war

The authors are not in a position to argue exhaustively with regard to the tactical and strategic implications of a ban on landmines for the SANDF. However, in order to examine these implications, the distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ warfare is useful:

For the purpose of this article, conventional warfare is understood to be characterised by the greater importance of tanks, and various types of armoured vehicles (eg. personnel carriers); for example, the type of warfare carried out at Cuito Cuanavale or during the UN Operation in Kuwait/Iraq.



Unconventional warfare is understood to be characterised by the greater importance of light weapons. Examples are guerrilla warfare or the type of warfare that developed during the US/UN operation in Somalia.

Landmines are currently used extensively in both conventional and unconventional warfare and the distinction between the two ‘types’ of warfare should not be understood in simplistic terms. While inter-state wars are generally ‘conventional’ and intra-state wars more likely to be ‘unconventional’, military conflicts may combine elements of both. Peace-enforcement operations and the defence of South Africa could involve both warfare of a ‘conventional’ or ‘unconventional’ kind.

Conventional warfare

In order to test assumptions about the military utility of both anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) landmines, Stephen Biddle and Julia Klare, researchers from the Alexandria Institute for Defence Analysis in the US, conducted a series of simulated battles using the "Janus Combat Model".21 They concluded that landmines have a positive net military utility, but that the degree of utility depends heavily on the circumstances.

This research is based on a conventional military setting. It may reflect certain assumptions which are more pertinent to the US military than to the SANDF. However, it does have some relevance to the considerations which underlie the position of the SANDF on the use of landmines.

The research noted that "in contrast to armoured vehicles, dismounted infantry are less commonly encountered in the assault. AT mines therefore have the potential to thwart a wider range of attacks and are often more central to successful defence. Even where AP mines are important to the outcome, they are often less important than AT mines, in that attacking dismounted infantry are more vulnerable to the defender’s other weapons than are tanks".

As pointed out above, the development of better armour protection has meant a decrease in the value of AT mines for defence against tanks. Nevertheless, with regard to conventional warfare they argue that AT mines are still important weapons. The following conclusions apply:

While AP mines can play a valuable defensive role, an army which does not use them, can compensate for this by a greater reliance on other weapons.



The SANDF argues that AP mines are useful in ‘protecting’ AT mines against being lifted by members of an opposing military force. The implication of a ban on AP landmines is that the SANDF may have to devote its attention to methods of limiting the ability of potential aggressor forces to detect AT mines, while still ensuring that such landmines can be removed when their presence is no longer required.

Biddle and Klare therefore imply that conventional warfare necessitates the use of AT, but not of AP landmines. Non-use of AP mines can be compensated for by the use of other weapons.

It has to be noted that the problem of landmines in Cambodia, for instance, while primarily associated with AP mines, is also related to continuing incidents of detonation of AT mines by civilian vehicles. The use of AT mines therefore cannot be seen as unproblematic. While there has to be a total ban on anti-personnel mines, changing the present moratorium on the export of AT mines into a permanent ban on their export should also be considered.

Unconventional warfare

As pointed out above, there has been a relative increase in military conflicts of an ethnic, religious and/or intra-state nature since 1945. Related to this is the increasing importance of unconventional rather than conventional warfare. "Many wars are long-running, internal and low intensity, often involving cash-starved militaries for whom low-technology, low cost landmines are a weapon of choice."22

‘Unconventional’ warfare has at its heart, not superiority of weapons or battlefield defeat, but the importance of the civilian population as the essential ‘element’ of this warfare. What this means is that armies which have the loyalty or are able to win the support of the civilian population, are able to operate with their assistance, even where this population are apparently co-operating and supporting the opposing force.

There is little doubt that the presence of landmines must be a substantial source of resentment to civilians. It follows that an army which does not use landmines, and makes a deliberate effort to inform civilians that it chooses not to do so because it is concerned about their well-being, will be able to use this fact to maintain civilians’ loyalty, or to win them over.

A force which does not use landmines in unconventional war can therefore secure an important tactical advantage for itself.

General tactical considerations

Biddle and Klare’s research also showed that "the magnitude of the net advantage (or disadvantage) of landmines depends on the particular balance of tactical offence and defence in the wars one fights. The more the balance tends towards the offensive the lower the net utility of mines. The more the balance emphasises the defensive (other things being equal), the greater the net utility."23

If the SANDF is to implement a ban on AP landmines, it may imply that the Defence Force would be required to have an overall orientation to tactical offence against attacking forces, at least with regard to conventional warfare. However, in recent years there have been a number of arguments in favour of alternative military doctrines. These have included arguments that ‘Western’ armed forces should give greater consideration to tactics of "evasion, delay ... surprise, piecemeal offensives and rapid disengagement" which characterise ‘Oriental’ warfare,24 as well as arguments in favour of an orientation to "non-offensive defence"25 and even to strengthening the capacity of civilians to resist military forces by non-military means. 26

A reformulation of tactical/doctrinal understanding within the SANDF should:

give consideration to the full range of these alternatives; and



if a tactical/doctrinal re-orientation means that the SANDF may be more vulnerable to landmines used by forces opposing it, (eg. because of a greater reliance on tactical offence) this may imply that the SANDF will have to enhance its already advanced capacity for anti-mine warfare.

Implications of the new political climate

At present South Africa enjoys a high degree of regional and international legitimacy. During the coming period it will have the opportunity to develop harmonious and co-operative relationships with its neighbours. While we still live in an uncertain world, it is not, in terms of external threats, a hostile world for South Africa.

As stated in the Draft Defence White Paper, "the absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalise and redesign the Defence Force". The implication is that, if South Africa were to support a ban on landmines, the SANDF will have the "breathing space" to consider how to rectify reductions in its potential effectiveness due to its lack of access to the use of landmines.

CONCLUSION

Any attempt to intervene in the international landmine crisis needs to strengthen the possibility of an actual decline in the number of landmines world-wide.

Realistically, the strengthening of the UN Weapons Convention and the substitution of "dumb" mines with "smart" mines, will not make a substantial impact on ameliorating the expanding humanitarian problem caused by the use of landmines. Efforts to restrict the access of "irresponsible" states, and other groups, to landmines revolve essentially around a programme of steadily reducing their availability on the international arms market. Such efforts have a greater chance of succeeding if a concerted effort can be made to increase support for an international ban on landmines, and for acceptance by states that landmines are, like chemical and biological weapons, not legitimate weapons of war. Commencing this mammoth task is only possible if some states are prepared to forego their "right" to use landmines.

In addressing the issue, the SANDF needs to acknowledge that the question of the use of landmines cannot only be based on military considerations, but must also take other factors into account. Justifying its own use of landmines, contributes to justifying the use of landmines by all armed forces, of whom many will continue to do so in an indiscriminate way. The interest of the SANDF in retaining access to the use of landmines needs to be weighed against a consideration of the incredibly destructive impact of landmines on people in countries throughout the world. While it is acknowledged that the potential for a ban on landmines poses difficulties for the SANDF, the weight of morality is strongly in favour of South Africa supporting a ban on landmines.

South Africa needs to engage with its partners in the Southern African Development Community to work towards a common understanding of the landmine problem. Support by South Africa for a total ban on landmines would enhance South Africa’s image as a responsible member of the international community and would have important significance, internationally, on the African continent, and in the Southern African region.

ENDNOTES 

The problem of landmines was previously discussed in an article by S. Baynham, Eternal Sentinels - The Legacy of Landmines in Africa, African Defence Review 18, August 1994, pp. 25-28.



Unless specifically indicated otherwise, the word ‘landmines’ refers to anti-personnel (AP) landmines and not to other types of landmines such as anti-tank (AT) mines.



The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is commonly referred to as the ‘CCW’ or ‘1980 UN Weapons Convention’. Protocol II of the Treaty is the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices and regulates the use of landmines.



Note that the moratorium applies to both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.



United States Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Hidden Killers - The Global Landmine Crisis, Department of State Publications 10225, 1994, p. v.



Figures quoted in S. Biddle and J. Klare, Military Utility and the Control of Land Mines, Land Mines and the CCW Review Conference, Unidir Newsletter 28/29, December 1994 to May 1995, p. 22.



J. Williams, Landmines: Their Socio-Economic Legacy, paper presented to Public Hearings on Landmines, European Parliament, 1995, p. 3.



The other two are Cambodia and Afghanistan. It is believed that there are at least 10 million uncleared landmines in Afghanistan. There are between 7 and 9 million landmines in Cambodia where one in every 236 people is an amputee because of landmine blasts (according to the US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs).



International Committee of the Red Cross, Landmines in Africa, Fact Sheet, Geneva, undated.



United Nations, Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, A/49/357, 1994, p. 7.



The legacy of the major investments made in developing an indigenous arms production capacity in apartheid South Africa is that South African companies now produce some of the most sophisticated demining technologies in the world. However, there is opposition both in South Africa and internationally, to channelling funds for demining to companies which are simultaneously involved in landmine and general arms production. De-linking South African demining technology from the South African arms industry should be considered. This should aim to increase the opportunities to use this technology in demining projects internationally. While the issue is important, this article focuses on a ban on landmines and does not examine demining.



L. D. Oswald-Beck and P. Herby, Land Mines: A Critical Examination of Existing Legal Instruments, UNIDIR Newsletter 28/29, December 1994 to May 1995, p. 6.



Ibid., p. 7.



See J. Molander, Strengthening International Humanitarian Law: The Review Conference of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, Landmines and the CCW Review Conference, Unidir Newsletter 28/29, December 1994 to May 1995, pp. 8-11.



Belgium, Cambodia, Colombia, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Slovenia and Sweden.



From ICRC calls for examination of the military use of anti-personnel landmines: military experts from 16 countries attend a symposium in Geneva, Landmines and Blinding Weapons, Africa Campaign Information Pack, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1995.



Reference to a June 1994 Pentagon Report The Military Utility of Landmines: Implications for Arms Control, The UK’s Role in Protecting Civilians from Anti-Personnel Mines, Oxfam Briefing, 1 March 1995, p. 6.



A. Karp, Small Arms - The New Major Weapons, in J. Boutwell, M. Klare, et. al., Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 20-21.



US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, op. cit., p. 7.



N. Dentico, Landmines: the silent sentinels of death, IDOC Internazionale 1, 1995, p. 10.



Biddle and Klare, op. cit., pp. 22-24.



Dentico, op. cit., p. 10.



Biddle and Klare, op. cit.



See J. Keegan, A History of Warfare, Hutchinson, London, 1993, pp. 379 - 392.



For example, see B. Moller and H. Wiberg (eds.), Non-Offensive Defence and the Twenty-First Century, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994.



For example, see G. Sharp, Civilian-Based Defence - A Post-Military Weapons System, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.