The International Image of the Military Professional1


John Allen Williams
Chairman, Department of Political Science, Loyola University, and Vice Chairman and Executive Director, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago

Published in African Security Review Vol 4 No 5, 1995

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to imagine a more important topic than that of military professionalism. The subject, however, is approached from the viewpoint of the social sciences rather than the military sciences. The purpose is to offer some general considerations that affect the military and civil-military relations that may be applicable in several national contexts.

FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM


It can be accepted that the profession of arms is a true profession - not in the obvious sense of its practitioners generally being paid for performing their duties, but in the sense that there is something more to becoming a ‘professional’ military officer than being paid. Indeed, that is not at all what is truly meant by ‘professionalism’. In order to begin a discussion of what is commonly understood by international scholars when they examine the topic, the work of four distinguished commentators on military professionalism will be reviewed: Samuel P. Huntington, the late Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos and Sam C. Sarkesian.

Huntington’s classic study of military professionalism, The Soldier and the State2, identified three criteria for a profession and indicated that the military profession met all three of these. The first is expertise, and plainly stated means that the professional military officer is an expert in the management of violence. This differs somewhat from enlisted personnel, who are experts in the application of violence. This expertise is "[a]cquired only by prolonged education and experience", and there are "objective standards of professional competence", which are applicable cross-nationally. This is true whether the soldier is an American, a Russian, a German, or a South African.

The second characteristic of military professionalism, according to Huntington, is responsibility. The professional performs a service "essential for the functioning of society; the client of every professional is society ... This social responsibility distinguishes the professional man from other experts." In anticipation of a later point, it is noted, in Huntington’s words, that "[f]inancial remuneration cannot be the primary aim of the professional man" or the professional woman. This does not mean that financial considerations are entirely irrelevant. There has to be a certain level of support and it will affect recruiting, retention and morale.

The third characteristic is corporateness. This is partly a sense among professionals themselves that they are a profession, with certain standards for admission to their ranks and a set of competencies that should be exhibited by its members. As Huntington says, "the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen." This is fostered by lengthy training and discipline and the sharing of their "unique social responsibility."

Civilian control of the military, again in Huntington’s terms, is what is called ‘objective’ control, as the tenets of military professionalism themselves keep the military apart from prevailing fashions and intellectual currents in society. In this view, military professionals do not need to be civilianised to be controlled. Military professionalism and service to society will take care of that.

Morris Janowitz took a more sociological approach to military professionalism. In his landmark book, The Professional Soldier3, he showed that the military will be a reflection of the society it serves, although it will not be a carbon copy. There are real limitations to the civilianisation of the military, including the military training system, in particular the service academies where students enter at a relatively impressionable age. The self-conception of military people also sets them somewhat apart, as do duty assignments and daily living conditions that may isolate military people from civilian society. Still, although the military is not completely civilianised and, it could be argued, should not be, it will and should reflect the dominant values of the society it serves. This is ‘subjective’ civilian control, and is an important part of civil-military relations in a free society that wants to remain that way.

It may seem odd to rely so much on shared values and self-restraint, rather than formal rules and regulations, in something as important as civilian control of the instruments of force. On reflection, however, these are precisely those attributes that can be effective. As US Supreme Court Justice Jackson noted in his famous dissent in the 1944 case, Korematsu vs. United States4: "Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, so centralised, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive ... If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgements of their contemporaries and to the moral judgements of history." In this context the importance of a broad liberal education on the part of military leaders becomes apparent.

There must be a distinction between economic and non-economic motives for serving your country. None of the experts believe that material considerations can or should be the primary basis for military service. There is not enough money in the world to repay military people for being separated from their families, for working long hours, undertaking dangerous duties, and being deprived of everyday comforts that others take for granted.

The work of Charles Moskos5 has been especially important on this point, distinguishing between what he calls "institutional" as opposed to "occupational" motives for military service. Institutional considerations include patriotism, love of service, and dedication. They can be summed up by the motto of the US Military Academy at West Point: "Duty, honor, country." Occupational considerations have to do with material rewards and career advancement. These will always be present to some degree, but they cannot provide the basis for a successful military establishment.

Another factor to consider is the degree to which the military itself is active in partisan politics, either as an institution or as individuals, in other words how it actively tries to affect who the leaders will be. Sam Sarkesian of Loyola University, a retired US Army airborne and special forces officer, notes that the military is a political institution in that it tries to influence policies directly affecting it, but that partisan political activity by the military as an institution must be out of bounds in a democratic state.6 However, soldiers and officers retain their voting rights as citizens. There may be different viewpoints, but a more dangerous precedent than having serving military officers stand for election to public office is hardly imaginable. Even recently retired officers can pose a problem. For example, many people who greatly admire General Colin Powell, nevertheless have deep reservations about the possibility of his becoming active in national politics so soon after his retirement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE MILITARY PROFESSION


As is apparent, the views on military professionalism expressed in this article are based on a notion of proper civil-military relations that draws from several sources. From Sarkesian comes the idea that the military may be a political institution insofar as it is embedded in a government structure and attempts to influence government decisions that affect it, but that it should not become embroiled in partisan politics. That kind of involvement is lethal for democracy.

From Morris Janowitz, the founder and intellectual father of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, subsequently headed by Sam Sarkesian and now by Charles Moskos and David Segal, comes the idea that the military and society are closely linked, and that the military can never be completely separate from society. It will reflect society in some important ways, and intellectual and other currents present in the society will find their way into the military sooner or later. An army of conscripts will soon reflect social attitudes, whether this be the 1960s drug culture in the US or, on the positive side, an increased social awareness of the need for equal opportunities in the military.

At the same time, the military must also remain somewhat aloof from society, as noted by Huntington. The military has a responsibility to defend the state, not to mirror it. Even in a democratic society the military cannot be completely democratic, and some of the privileges open to civilians are not applicable to it. While the military finds itself within society, it is not completely a part of it. And a highly developed sense of military professionalism includes more than just a willingness to risk life and limb for the state, it involves a willingness to obey the legal orders of lawfully constituted civilian authority.

Finally, as Moskos points out, for a professional soldier the military truly is "more than just a job," it is a calling. It is a fine and honourable profession to serve in defence of one’s country, and it is an especially important duty to defend a democracy that is still in an early stage of development.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY EDUCATION


It is hoped that these considerations about military professionalism will be helpful as the role of military education in a democratic South Africa is discussed. In this regard, Huntington makes a useful distinction between education and training that should be born in mind: "Professional expertise ... is a segment of the total cultural tradition of society ... Consequently professional education consists of two phases: the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the specialised skills and knowledge of the profession. The liberal education of the professional man is normally handled by the general educational mechanisms of society devoted to this purpose. The second or technical phase of professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself."

Recent work by the author and Sarkesian deals with the civilian graduate education of US Army officers.7 It has convincingly being found that this kind of broadening experience is vital to the officer corps and to the profession itself. Training in the skills necessary for the competent exercise of the profession of arms is undoubtedly needed, but so too is education in its broadest sense. However, the latter may not be best provided by the military establishment itself.

CONCLUSION


In summary, the military must defend the democratic state, not run it. This requires a profound appreciation on the part of military people of their professional responsibilities to society: Duty, honour, country. As General Douglas MacArthur said to the US Army Cadets at West Point in 1962: "Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be ... Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international ... Let civilian voices argue the merits of our practices of government: Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and as complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a tenfold beacon in the night: Duty, honor, country." The political self-restraint called for by General MacArthur three decades ago is the only sure defence of a democracy, lest its military grow too bold.

We are all part of the democratic experiment of limited government, under law, and government by the consent of the governed. Winston Churchill said that democracy is the least efficient, least satisfactory form of government - except for all the others. Thomas Jefferson said it well: men are not born with saddles, and other men born with spurs to ride them.

Freedom is a revolutionary, subversive idea, and is under attack everywhere - even in advanced democracies. Since the revolutionary example of freedom is a threat to autocrats of both the left and the right, the democratic state above all others requires a strong defence.

The second President of the United States, John Adams, said that democracy "soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide." The future is always clouded, but the best possible should be done, even with limited knowledge, and with faith in our democratic societies, our values, our institutions, and our people. However, the role of chance will always have to be confronted, as well as the possibility that even the best efforts may fail.

The wise, yet pessimistic preacher said the following in Ecclesiastes 9:11: "Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, ... but time and chance happen to them all." However, there is an addendum to this from the American popular writer Damon Runyan that is also worth mentioning: "... but I would bet that way if I were you."

In an uncertain and dangerous world, it is best to err on the side of strength. The members of the military of free societies are a vital part of that strength - not only the strength of physical power, but that of moral force. May they share the vision that their purpose is not personal advancement, nor simply to enjoy the personal and professional satisfaction of a job well done, but the defence of freedom itself. There is no conflict between military professionalism properly understood and patriotism, humanism, and support for the democratic state.

Endnotes 

  1. Plenary address, IDASAconference on The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa, Military Academy, Saldanha, 1 June 1995. The opinions expressed are the responsibility of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of any person with whom or institution with which he is associated.

  2. S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957.

  3. M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, The Free Press, New York, 1971.

  4. Korematsu vs. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Unfortunately, this was the US Supreme Court opinion upholding the constitutionality of the wartime detention of hundreds of thousands of Japanese-Americans.

  5. See, for example, C.C. Moskos and F.R. Wood (eds.), The Military: More Than Just a Job?, Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defence Publishers, Washington, DC, 1988.

  6. See, for example, S.C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981.

  7. S.C. Sarkesian, J.A. Williams, and F.B. Bryant, Soldiers, Society, and National Security, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1985.