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Zimbabwe’s military forces have once again been allocated an increased portion of the 1994/95 budget, despite the fact that their activities have been curtailed by the withdrawal of troops from Mozambique and the expectation of greater political stability in the subcontinent, not least because of the diminished likelihood of security threats from its post-apartheid neighbour, South Africa.
The defence allocation, although reduced in real terms, still amounts to what many Zimbabweans regard as an unacceptably high Z$1,7 billion, to which must be added another Z$100 million incorporated in the budget of the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing. At 10,9 per cent more than last year, the Defence Ministry’s slice amounts to twelve per cent of the 1994/95 budget and represents the largest allocation after the Education budget. "In other words, and seen from another perspective", as one local observer put it, "the annual increase in the military vote is Z$67 million more than the total amount given to Environment and Tourism (Z$99,5 million), a ministry that actually generates revenue". Furthermore, as a proportion of gross national product (GNP), defence consumes approximately five per cent. This is more than double the guideline of two per cent recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is instructive to note that South Africa’s military budget, decreased by almost fifty per cent in real terms since 1989, amounts to 2,2 per cent of GNP. Military expenditure in Mozambique is set to fall from 3,9 to 1,6 per cent of GNP.
Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has increased its allocation by Z$13 million. Much of this has already been spent on a buying spree in South Africa that has done wonders for the property market in Pretoria. The vote of the President and Cabinet has gone up by Z$83 million, including Z$26,5 million for "special services", a part of which will not be subject to scrutiny by the Comptroller and Auditor-General. In addition, the allocation for political parties (in practice for the ruling ZANU-PF machine only) is raised to Z$32 million.
With these figures in mind, many Zimbabweans, including parliamentarians, are becoming increasingly critical of the government’s priorities and sense of proportion. The argument is raised that it is time for Zimbabwe to trim its military expenditure, in line with the country’s wider economic reforms and, most importantly, because regional threats to the state especially from South Africa, have all but disappeared.
The most telling factor, however, relates to the 1985 decision to deploy up to 6 000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. For eight years, between 1985 and 1993, President Mugabe’s soldiers fought against RENAMO guerrillas at the request of FRELIMO authorities. As Mugabe noted at the 1992 National Defence Force Day celebrations: "This deployment of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique is a large drain on our national resources, particularly at a time [when] we are restructuring our economy to make it more productive, create more employment and generally raise the standard of living of our people". In fact, it has been estimated that Harare’s military operations in neighbouring Mozambique consumed up to seventy per cent of the Defence budget during this period.1 But in the aftermath of the Mozambican peace accord and successful October 1994 elections, these costs have virtually disappeared. It should also be stressed that the expenses entailed in committing troops for peacekeeping operations in Angola, Somalia and elsewhere are borne not by Harare but by the United Nations.2 However, it seems clear that Robert Mugabe - anxious not to be overshadowed as top regional peace keeper by his South African counterpart Nelson Mandela - is keen to regain the initiative by sending troops to Angola.
Against a backdrop of domestic economic decline and reduced regional animosities, Robert Mugabe has promised to cut the armed forces but not the Defence budget. Indeed, in August last year, President Mugabe who is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, said that savings from a smaller force were required to modernise equipment and improve facilities. Rationalising the force, he said, would ensure long term combat capability and professional effectiveness. The first step in this direction has been the government’s announcement in March 1995 that some 3 000 personnel (out of the Zimbabwe Defence Force’s combined Army and Air Force staff of some 48 000) would be retired. In terms of the programme which commenced in January last year, these troops are expected to be demobilised by June 1995.
In the meantime, the Ministry of Defence has attacked the independent Financial Gazette for writing in 1994 that the Air Force was buying two helicopters for use by Mugabe in the (then) forthcoming 1995 general election. The Ministry also denied that the government was proposing to purchase a new presidential jet aircraft. Yet a month later, in September 1994, the Gazette reported that military officials were currently negotiating a US$1 billion deal to purchase French made ACMAT armoured personnel carriers, as well as helicopters and light weapons. According to the report, the troop carriers would be purchased over a five year period to replace ageing vehicles now in service for more than fifteen years. These arms negotiations, which represent the largest deal since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, have been confirmed by Defence Minister Moven Mahachi.3
In the aftermath of the April 1995 elections, very few observers believe that the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is willing to risk the potential consequences of demobilising large numbers of troops into the already overcrowded labour market. As Africa Confidential has pointed out for many years, the "military and intelligence top brass [have been] closely integrated into ZANU-PF’s political structure and are privy to decision-making at the highest level: this is quite apart from their large salary packages and entrées into business through state-owned companies."4 With complaints from Matabeleland that the region has been deprived of its fair share of government resources, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF feels that it is in no position to alienate the to-date carefully cultivated loyalty of generals and servicemen.5
For as long as the extravagance in the military establishment continues, however, there are very few prospects for a real economic recovery. The World Bank / IMF-sponsored economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP), that is now in its fourth year of implementation, has seen the average wage fall below the official poverty line, while both inflation (thirty per cent) and unemployment (fifty per cent) are rising. Tough fiscal and monetary measures are required to cut the cost of borrowing and to facilitate economic growth. But with defence accounting for twelve per cent of the state’s annual expenditure (which in itself accounts for nearly fifty per cent of GNP), the outlook for the cash-starved productive sector of the national economy looks far from optimistic.
In short, the much expected "peace dividend", that was expected to be the result of the end of regional hostilities, including those inside South Africa itself, has had little or no impact on the unprecedented material hardships suffered by ordinary Zimbabweans. Yet for all this, Mr Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was swept back to office for a fourth five-year term. This was doubtless not a reflection of his government’s popularity, but of the deeply uninspiring and feeble performance of the country’s incoherent and splintered opposition.6
- Interviews with Zimbabwean army officers, Nyanga Battle Camp, Zimbabwe, August 1994.
- In Angola, with the UNAVEM II observation team; in Somalia, with the UNOSOM II force.
- The deal for the helicopters was concluded in January 1995 when the government bought two Cougar helicopters valued at Z$420 million from the French manufacturer, Eurocopter.
- Africa Confidential 35(16), 12 August 1994, p. 7.
- For details of the security situation in Matabeleland, as well as a much wider overview of the security situation in Zimbabwe, see James MacBruce, Domestic and regional security, in Simon Baynham (ed), Zimbabwe in transition, Africa Institute / Almqvist and Wiksell, Pretoria / Stockholm, 1992, pp. 210-244.
- For a post-mortem of the election, see Simon Baynham, Zimbabwe’s non-elections: A hollow victory, Africa Institute Bulletin 35(3), 1995, pp. 2-3.
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