INTRODUCTION

During March 1995 the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) embarked on an extensive policy support project on South African preventive diplomacy and peace support operations. The purpose of the project is to:

examine international experiences with preventive diplomacy and peace support operations, particularly in Africa;



evaluate the domestic and foreign policy implications for South African participation in such endeavours and thus inform policy formulation; and, finally,



stimulate further debate, research and discussion.

The first tangible result of this project was a round table seminar on South African Policy on Global Peace Support Efforts hosted by IDP in Cape Town on 17 and 18 May 1995. The purpose of the seminar was to engage key South Africans in a debate on preventive diplomacy, and more specifically, the role of the country in peace support operations. In particular, the criteria for, modus operandi of and restraints on South African participation in peace support operations were discussed within the context of the changed international world order. To this end, Members of Parliament, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and a number of academics were isolated in a venue above the cold storage warehouses in Cape Town harbour for what proved to be a productive exchange of information and points of view.

This article provides a broad overview of the debate and the issues discussed during the course of the seminar. It presents an interpretation of the proceedings and does not carry any official status, nor does it carry the sanction of any political party, individual or organisation present at the seminar.

The article is divided into the following sections:

terminology;

the legal, constitutional and co-operative framework;

the New World Order: implications for peace support operations;

South Africa: policy making in relation to peace support operations;

financial implications;

command and control; and

logistics.

TERMINOLOGY

The terminology associated with ‘peace-keeping’ has changed since the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued his ground-breaking report, An Agenda for Peace, in June 1992.1 Recently, it appears as if South African analysts and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence are gravitating towards the terminology that has been adopted by NATO in an attempt to provide a greater degree of conceptual distinction between operations and engagements that are often difficult to distinguish from one another in practise. The two broad categories that collectively cover the spectrum of these activities are those of preventive diplomacy and peace support operations.

According to NATO, preventive diplomacy is defined as "action designed to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain them and resolve their underlying causes. Several instruments may be available to achieve this: measures to build confidence; fact finding; early warning; and negotiations to establish demilitarised zones. Preventive diplomacy may be activated on a bilateral or multilateral basis, not only under the auspices of the United Nations or its Security Council, but as the need arises on varying levels and including non-government actors and agencies.

With some exceptions, certain categories of peace support operations are exclusively conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, as will be shown in the following sections. Peace support operations describe a range of activities including conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping, humanitarian aid, peace-enforcement and peace-building. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the distinctions between them are often unclear.

1. Conflict prevention ranges from diplomatic initiatives to the preventive deployment of troops to "prevent conflicts from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading".

2. Peace-making is the range of diplomatic actions aimed at establishing a peaceful settlement once conflict is in progress or has resumed.

3. Peace-keeping is the "containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within states through various mediums so as to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace".

4. Peace-enforcement is defined under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations as "using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict". The most vivid instance of peace-enforcement was the US led Operation Desert Storm that re-established the territorial integrity of Kuwait following Iraq’s invasion.

In theory peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement are required to end armed hostilities, should it prove impossible to prevent conflict in any other way.

5. Peace-building is generally seen to be actions taken after conflict to identify and support structures that strengthen and solidify a peace-settlement in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Pro-actively, peace-building could also include concrete co-operative projects that would link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking to enhance the mutual confidence fundamental to sustained peace. In terms of conflict and the avoiding of conflict, the term peace-building reflects more closely on those programmes that serve to pre-empt conflict, enable national and regional defence and support confidence-building measures.

6. Humanitarian relief operations are missions conducted to relieve human suffering, normally where the local authorities are either unable or unwilling to do so. South African involvement in such operations may follow upon natural or man-made disasters, such as floods, drought, pollution, etc.

A recent example of preventive diplomacy and peace-making is the involvement of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in recent disputes in Lesotho, culminating in the restoration of democracy and reinstatement of the previous monarchy. It was acknowledged during discussions that the intervention did not resolve the structural problems in the country. A second example, still unfolding as the seminar proceeded, was the involvement of the South African government, and President Mandela in particular, in assisting to reconcile the impasse stalling the implementation of the Lusaka agreement in Angola.

THE LEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CO-OPERATIVE FRAMEWORK

In the course of his presentation at the seminar, Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils repeatedly emphasised that South Africa’s security policy was founded upon compliance and adherence to international law, the United Nation’s Charter and the policy guidelines emanating from the UN Security Council. South African commitments also take the policy of organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into account, and is ultimately subject to the South African constitution. Participation in peace support operations would not place South Africa outside the constraints and guidelines set by these criteria and commitments.

Important commitments in terms of the UN Charter are as follows:

Article 1 of the Charter commits the organisation to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustments or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."



Article 2(3) of the Charter requires all member states to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered." Article 2(4) demands that all Member States "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."



Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides that, if peaceful means fail, and on the decision of the Security Council, various means may be used to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."

Deliberate transparency, the utilisation of available resources in the region to ensure regional stability and a pragmatic commitment to co-operation and peacemaking will therefore lay the cornerstones for future inter-state co-operation by South Africa, in its efforts to ensure regional and international peace and stability.

The Charter of the United Nations also encourages regional arrangements where organisations such as the OAU can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by taking the initiative to procure peaceful settlements to local disputes within their regions. South Africa, however, will not co-operate in efforts to enforce settlements without prior authorisation of the Security Council.

Various seminar papers described the evolving mechanisms for conflict prevention and co-operation in the region. Delegates at the seminar broadly concurred with the evolving regional security architecture pursued by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Important characteristics of these arrangements are briefly summarised in the following paragraphs.

South Africa is a member of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution established by the OAU on 30 June 1993. The Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment of the Mechanism, committed the OAU to co-operate closely with the United Nations in respect of peacemaking and peace-keeping. Moreover, the Mechanism is also committed to close co-operation with regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its proposed political arm, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). The seminar concurred on the importance of the SADC/ASAS to promote peace and stability in Africa.

The 1992 OAU Summit in Dakar and the 1993 OAU Summit in Cairo endorsed conflict resolution mechanisms, but not a specific OAU peace-keeping force or security structures for any of the regions. Further investigation into these issues is presently underway, as is shown by discussions at meetings in Accra (October 1994), Cairo (January 1995) and the United Kingdom/Zimbabwe Workshop on African Peace-keeping in Harare (January 1995). As a member of the OAU’s Central Mechanism for the Prevention and Management of Conflict, South Africa is committed to explore the best way to prevent conflict on the continent. However, South Africa considered it premature to establish either an African or Southern African peace-keeping or rapid reaction force for peace support operations. The practical, logistic and financial implications of such a force, apart from the questions regarding respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states of the OAU and SADC, would indicate that a substantial degree of additional negotiation and preparations would be required for such an objective to become attainable.

South Africa, as a new but important member of SADC, fully subscribed to the founding statement of that organisation which states that "War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security ..."

In pursuit of this objective, members of SADC have recommended the establishment of the Association of Southern African States as the political arm of SADC under Chapter 7, Article 21(3)(g) of the SADC Treaty, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Harare on 3 March 1995. Should this decision be ratified at the SADC Heads of State Summit scheduled for August, ASAS will replace in essence the now defunct Front-Line States co-operative framework and be the primary mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa. South Africa played a leading role in this initiative, demonstrating its commitment to preventive diplomacy and peace-building.

Although ASAS will be independent from the SADC Secretariat, it will report directly to the SADC Summit. ASAS will preserve the key features of the Front-Line States arrangement, namely an informal and flexible modus operandi with unimpeded access to the SADC Heads of State, while keeping bureaucracy to the minimum. Through ASAS, South Africa will seek the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation and/or arbitration.

In line with the principles and objectives agreed on in Windhoek and contained in the SADC Foreign Ministers’ Document of July 1994, any military intervention in the affairs of a SADC member shall be decided upon only after all possible remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the OAU Charter and only with the sanction of the United Nations.

The seminar confirmed South African adherence to the proposed terms of reference of ASAS:

to protect people of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and from external aggression;

to co-operate fully in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;



to mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage them to observe universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the OAU and the United Nations;



to promote peace and stability; and



to promote peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.

The OAU and regional arrangements such as ASAS are meant to complement one another. ASAS does not have an extra-regional focus, but is aimed at the prevention of conflict within the sub-region.

The proceedings of the seminar showed clearly that the South African Government would not support the creation of a regional peace force for Southern Africa in the foreseeable future.

The Government of National Unity is convicted that Southern Africa should proceed with enhancing security, stability and co-operation on a multilateral basis. The Government (and delegates to the seminar) supported the further expansion of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), possibly as the military and police/justice and intelligence sub-committees of ASAS. In this form, the ISDSC could provide an additional forum for regional multilateral co-operation. Although the exact organisational structure has to be finalised, it is intended to focus on training and co-operation and not on the creation of either a regional peace-keeping force of any nature or a regional military command and control type of organisation. It is important to structure the ISDSC to promote multilateral co-operation, as well as to provide the intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in the case of pending or actual hostilities. It must also be able to plan combined operations, such as staff procedures, drills, tactics and telecommunications.

While delegates agreed that a regional early-warning system would be useful, consensus was not reached that it should be a permanent structure (part of the ISDSC, for example) or that this role could be fulfilled through co-operation among members based on information provided by non-state actors like NGO’s and academic institutions. Although extensive information is readily available to the researcher, it is often not in a suitable form. In Southern Africa, South Africa is the only country with a diversity of research institutions, which may lead to some form of domination. In this context, the establishment of a regional security ‘think-tank’ may be an appropriate consideration.

It was recognised that short term security arrangements between states on specific issues of mutual interest were necessary, for example to counter weapon smuggling. Ultimately, regional arrangements would be necessary to manage inter-state conflicts and deal with specific problems. During the discussion, some delegates expressed the view that bilateral initiatives were outdated and could lead to the unravelling of a regional identity.

section 227(1)(b) of the South African Constitution (Act no. 200 of 1993, as amended) provides that "The National Defence Force may ... be employed ... for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states." This is echoed in Section 3(2)(a) of the Defence Act (No. 44 of 1957, as amended) read together with Section 1(1), which provides that "The South African Defence Force or any portion or member thereof may ... at any time be employed by the State President to be used by the executive military command ... in service ... in connection with the discharge of the obligations of the Republic arising from any agreement between the Republic and any other state."

The Interim Constitution specifically enables the employment of the SANDF in peace support operations outside the borders of South Africa, but leaves it to the discretion of the President to order such employment. The final constitution is unlikely to differ from this.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The seminar discussed the end of the Cold War and the consequent introduction of new dynamics into the international system. Although the shape of the new world order has not yet been defined, a number of trends which could affect South African involvement in preventive diplomacy and peace support operations, have been discussed at the seminar. Delegates reflected the sentiments of the Agenda for Peace: "The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons."2

In global thought and in the debate on stability and security, the focus has shifted from order and stability based exclusively on the nation-state, towards an emphasis on the peace and security of the individual, the community, the region and the globe. It implies the need to balance national interest with regional and international obligations. "It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."3 The concept of security has also changed - both at a local and an international level - to include the full spectrum of political, social, military, economic and technological factors that can bring about instability and impede development. Conflict, migration, disease, terrorism and unemployment are relevant examples.

In the case of South Africa, the ‘institutional memory of the state’ often allows outdated security concepts to prevail. Without a deliberate decision, and through bureaucratic influence and the natural tendency to revert to familiar frames of reference, South African foreign and defence policy may readily revert to practices of yesteryear.

Discussions at the seminar further reflected on the Agenda for Peace: "We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen co-operation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means."4

In reality, present conflicts are largely intra-state. The root causes often lie in social inequalities and the absence of political and economic opportunities. Complex as they are, the situation is further aggravated by mistrust, religious fanaticism and ethnicism. Old animosities are kept alive and the development of a culture of tolerance remains evasive.

When states such as Zaire collapse, the consequences are felt across the whole region. Despite this, there are limits to the role foreign governments can play in alleviating the suffering in a country of the size and complexity of Zaire.

Reference was made repeatedly at the seminar to the ‘Africa fatigue’ of many countries who had attempted in the past to intervene in Africa, either as part of a United Nations initiative or on a bilateral basis. At present, there is a discernible trend within the United Nations, that can be described as ‘peace-keeping fatigue’. In five years the United Nations’ peace-keeping budget for peace-keeping has increased by 1 565 per cent to US $3 600 million for 1995.

In Africa and Southern Africa in particular, the legacy of apartheid, colonial exploitation and policies of the ruling elite contributed to refugee problems, economic migration, smuggling, drug-trafficking, poaching and piracy. The nature of these problems has created an extremely complex situation should South Africa become involved in either preventive diplomacy or peace support operations.

In discussing conflict which might and has required intervention, the Defence Secretariat listed the following characteristics that would influence deployment and decisions on military involvement:

These conflicts are usually fought, apart from regular armies, by militias or armed civilians with rudimentary and unclear command structures and little discipline.



There are seldom clear front lines in these, often guerrilla, wars.



Civilians are often the main targets, and certainly the main victims.



Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace and local authorities, where they exist, lack the capacity to cope with such emergencies. Refugees and internally displaced persons are an ever-present and increasing problem.



The collapse of state institutions and the severe disruption in the functions of governments may also lead to military involvement.

In this context peace-making and peace-keeping involve constant danger and are more complex and expensive than the classic monitoring of cease fires or the control of buffer zones. It implies that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the re-establishment of effective government and the promotion of national reconciliation. The potential difference between the needs of the population who require assistance and the national interest of the intervening power or the host government of the operation, need to be accounted for. These factors serve as a challenge for the international community and for individual countries such as South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA: POLICY MAKING IN RELATION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Consensus was reached on the following at the seminar:

South African policy on participation in peace support operations would be guided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and not by the Department of Defence, except in technical matters.



Secondly, while military force is considered by South Africa to be a legitimate means of defence against external aggression, it is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and settling disputes.



Finally, South African and African initiatives and mechanisms should continue to shift the emphasis from expensive, and often unsuccessful peace-keeping operations to more attainable conflict prevention policies.

Any decision to take part in peace-keeping operations would have to balance factors such as local political considerations, socio-economic and security priorities. In the discussions, delegates from NGO’s emphasised that decisions should be publicly accessible and as transparent as possible. An appeal was made for a clearer definition of areas of responsibility for politicians and the various arms of the bureaucracy, as well as increased public involvement in debates on these issues.

Despite the caution applied by the Government of National Unity thus far (and the reservations of some political parties represented at the seminar), expectations regarding South African involvement in peace support operations remains high. As a signatory to the Charter of the United Nations, South Africa is expected to contribute towards the escalating efforts by the UN to maintain international peace and security. During March 1995, for example, the United Nations was involved in thirty separate efforts to prevent conflict world-wide, including sixteen peace-keeping operations and utilising approximately 64 000 United Nations military personnel. Calls have already been made for South Africa to contribute to operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Angola and elsewhere.

South Africa would, however, have to walk a tightrope in its relations with other countries in the region. It will have to assume leadership on some issues but also be prepared to follow the lead of others. Given the history of the region, South Africa should be careful not to project itself as the regional hegemon. At the same time, the seminar recognised that South Africa need to balance these concerns with the fact that it occupies a position of power within the region and should assume the responsibilities flowing from this. The extent of South Africa’s engagement in the region, however, clearly differs between some of the political parties in the Government of National Unity, and between some of the policy analysts participating in the seminar.

Potential South African involvement in military peace-keeping operations within Southern Africa evoked considerable discussion. On the one hand, such involvement is constrained by the memory of the country’s past military involvement in the region, but on the other hand it is advanced by the expectations that emanate from the continent. While delegates accepted that any country requesting the deployment of peace-keepers within its borders had the right to preclude some countries from participating, the expectation amongst delegates, despite earlier reservations, was that South Africa would become involved in peace support operations in the sub-region and that its limited resources should not be spread too thinly further afield.

It was stressed repeatedly during the seminar that South Africa had a vested interest in regional peace and security and that it had an obligation to ‘export’ its successes to the North when called upon to do so by the international community.

These sentiments were reflected in an address by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo to members of the parliamentary standing committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1995: "We (South Africa) have a limited capacity, but will, as far as possible, assist in efforts aimed at the furtherance world-wide of peace and democracy; human rights; sustainable development; protection of the environment; and disarmament ..." In terms of foreign policy objectives and priorities, he said that "... Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead."

The seminar accepted that regional co-operation was essential in ensuring a favourable security environment. Increased regional co-operation in military matters could diminish reliance on external assistance and facilitate the retention of regional finances. In a regional context, suggestions were made for potential co-operation which would build trust and prevent armed forces from becoming sources of regional instability. These could include:

the mutual secondment of soldiers, including regional



training co-operation; equipping and assisting African forces in, for example, landmine clearance



goodwill visits and informal liaison;



conducting combined exercises;



a non-threatening force design;



the development of common doctrine and procedures;



participation in multilateral co-ordination structures; and



co-operation in terms of logistics.

In discussing operations that would contribute to peace-building, the Ministry of Defence proposed three categories. The first would enable the defence of Southern Africa as a whole, as well as that of individual states. A second would support a proactive programme of confidence building measures, such as the mutual secondment of personnel and non-threatening force design. Finally, South Africa would follow a clear and transparent policy, sensitive to human rights and committed to advance democracy in the provision of defence services and exports.

The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence described the procedure whereby South Africa would become involved in peace support operations as follows:

In a situation that requires the deployment of peace-keeping forces, the Secretary-General would normally approach the UN Security Council for a mandate to assemble and deploy forces for a specific purpose. A resolution to this effect must be passed by the Council.



Following approval by the Council, the United Nations normally invites contributions from all its members, or it requests a regional body such as the OAU to become involved, or individual countries are approached by the Secretary General to contribute forces.



A request by the United Nations for South Africa to become part of a multinational force will therefore be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Government. It would be referred to cabinet for a final decision, on advice of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Although parliament may debate South African involvement, the Government clearly felt that the decision to become involved lay with the executive and not with the legislature.



Parliament, however, must be informed within fourteen days of any external deployment and has the authority to reject or affirm this decision. The deployment of the SANDF is an executive responsibility, but parliament has an increased ability to influence executive decisions via its parliamentary committees, than was the case in the past.



Other activities forming part of the above steps or parallel to them, would be the finalising of contracts between South Africa and the United Nations, internal reconnaissance, planning procedures, refresher and additional personnel training, briefings by the United Nations, etc.



Ideally, the following would have to be secured prior to the deployment of South African troops:



a peace-settlement that is in place and agreed to by all belligerent parties;



an established time frame for the operation;



clarified aims and objectives;



approval of South African participation in the peace forces by all parties to the conflict;



sustainable and feasible deployment;



a clear disengagement strategy and plan ; and



acceptable command and control arrangements (see below).

Finally, any decision to deploy troops will have to justify the risks involved and the Government will have to be satisfied that sufficient measures have been taken to prevent the loss of life among the civilian population.

The SANDF emphasised the importance of restraint, absolute impartiality, patience and tolerance during the employment of soldiers in peace support operations.

Apart from the deployment of military liaison and observer teams, the next step towards full participation by the Department of Defence in peace support operations would be the contribution of technical, medical or logistic support elements rather than combat troops.

The SANDF listed the following tasks that the Department of Defence could undertake in peace support operations:

electoral support such as the provision of air transport (Mozambique, 1994);

humanitarian assistance (Rwanda, 1994);

engineering operations, especially mine-clearing (Mozambique and Angola);

observation and verification of agreements such as cease-fire or troop withdrawal;

preventive deployment;

medical assistance;

demobilisation and arms control;

securing the delivery of humanitarian aid; and

disarmament of paramilitary and irregular forces.

The SANDF felt that, in many respects it had intimate knowledge of African conditions. Others argued that there was a urgent need for specialised expertise on Africa, which included input from academics and NGO’s.

While South Africa’s participation in peace support operations is ultimately a political decision, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs have argued that two factors mitigate against South African involvement in the near future:

The SANDF is still being created through integration and transformation and units sent on peace-keeping operations would still reflect the old order at this stage.



The deployment of troops outside the borders would have to be justified against domestic security, socio-economic and development priorities.

In the light of the above, while it is unlikely that South African troops will be committed to a United Nations peace-keeping operation in the near future, the Department of Defence has to proceed with preparations for possible involvement, through appropriate curricula, training, education, liaison, military liaison officers at the United Nations’ offices in New York, as well as the deployment of military observers to monitor and learn from existing international peace-keeping operations. Learning from the experience of other African countries, doctrine development and logistic preparations will, in due course, ensure that the SANDF will be competent to participate in international peace support operations in a responsible and fruitful manner.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

It is common knowledge that the United Nations peace-keeping operations are experiencing a financial crisis. Unpaid arrears to troop-contributing countries stood at over US $ 800 million in 1992, while the cost of approved peace-keeping operations were estimated at US $ 3,5 billion. South Africa’s annual obligation to UN peace supporting operations is approximately R60 million (or less than 0,5 per cent of the overall budget). Yet, apart from Libya, South Africa is the single largest contributor on the African continent, paying about twice the amount expected from Nigeria and five times that of Egypt.

From the discussions, and statistics and information provided by the SANDF, it was evident that South African participation in United Nations peace support operations would imply a heavy financial burden and that prior budgeting for such operations was very difficult. According to the SANDF, each unit contributing to United Nations operations would have to provide for itself for the first sixty days of deployment, after which support becomes the responsibility of the UN. Although the United Nations pays allowances depending on status, qualifications and area of deployment, and reimburses governments for the use of contingent-owned equipment, these payments are often late and do not represent the full cost of participation.

Due to the difficulties experienced with repayment by the United Nations, and given the rates for participants (US $988 per person for infantry; US $1 279 for engineers and specialists), parliament would have to provide for South African expenses for participation in peace support operations, since the existing budgets of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence would not be able to finance it.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The SANDF was not in favour of establishing dedicated military units for peace support operations. It planned to include additional training requirements in the curricula of its Rapid Deployment Force from which it would be able to draw units for participation in these operations.

In terms of doctrine, the SANDF appeared to be in the process of producing appropriate training manuals for participation in peace support operations, drawing upon its own experience as well as that of other countries.

Other important elements emphasised by the SANDF were:

effective liaison structures between the SANDF forces and United Nations peace-keeping authorities;



integration and familiarisation with other peace force elements in the region, including telecommunications, language, doctrine and procedures.



According to available information, the SANDF expected that:



The Secretary General of the United Nations would appoint a Civilian Executive to exercise overall control over United Nations involvement in an affected country or area.



The United Nations would also appoint a Force Commander to exercise operational control over all national forces assigned to the United Nations peace force. Such control would normally exclude administration and logistic support.



A separate Chief Administrative Officer would be appointed who would be responsible for specific aspects of administration and logistic support as directed by the Secretary General.



The Chief of the SANDF would appoint a Chief Executor, normally one of the Chiefs of an Arm of Service to co-ordinate SANDF participation in United Nations peace support operations. The Chief Executor will, in turn, appoint the SANDF Force Commander for all SANDF elements involved in the operation.



The Chief of the SANDF would keep the South African Minister of Defence informed.



Ideally the United Nations Force Commander and the various National Force Commanders and their staffs should form a combined headquarters and operations centre, but other options could be pursued to ensure that the operations, personnel and logistic matters proceed effectively.

LOGISTICS

The SANDF was adamant about the importance of logistic preparation and planning. They argued for a formal memorandum of agreement on logistic matters between South Africa and the United Nations to precede any force deployment. Furthermore, logistic staff officers should be placed at the UN headquarters in New York, apart from those with the UN forces in the field.

Should the SANDF be deployed in a peace support role, it would have to use its own resources to support itself logistically for about sixty days, after which UN support should become available.

As a matter of policy SANDF troops would be provided with medical support by the SA Medical Services.

CONCLUSION

The most interesting discussions emanating from the seminar related to South African participation in peace support operations in the region or further afield. Delegates were inclined to prefer the deployment of available South African forces within the region rather than elsewhere, though this could meet with resistance from the United Nations and had to be clarified at the earliest possible stage.

At various stages during the seminar the question of South Africa’s leadership role in the region was discussed. Whereas the initial approach of the South African Government of National Unity to the region was extremely cautious, the seminar appeared to reaffirm an increased South African confidence in engaging the region - a confidence that appeared to see South Africa’s leadership role as making an important contribution to peace in Southern Africa.

A second theme repeated during the course of the seminar was the necessity for capacity-building in South Africa and the region, with regard to peace-keeping training, knowledge and area expertise. This was a challenge facing academics, NGO’s and the Government alike.

In conclusion, the seminar is part of a larger programme to debate South African participation in preventive diplomacy and peace support operations. Some of the seminar papers and a number of articles commissioned by IDP will soon appear as a special edition of the African Security Review, devoted entirely to preventive diplomacy and peace support operations.

Finally, in conjunction with the South African Institute of International Affairs, IDP will also be hosting a major international conference on preventive diplomacy and peace support operations in Johannesburg on 13 and 14 July 1995.

__________

The Secretary-General distinguished between preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.



Boutros Boutros-Gali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York, June 1992, p. 2.



Ibid., p. 9.



Ibid., p. 6