South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, in his address to the 1995 Review Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) said on 19 April 1995 in New York:

"South Africa took the decision to destroy its nuclear weapons and to become a State Party to the NPT because we saw our security being guaranteed by its provisions. It is for this reason also that South Africa has become an active sponsor of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty which will be indefinite. While there is some valid criticism levelled at the implementation of some provisions of the NPT, there is also recognition of the success of some of its basic provisions. Since the entry into force of the NPT, the number of threshold states has diminished. Several countries, including ourselves, have drawn back from the nuclear weapon option and have become a part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The NPT also remains the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear weapon states are bound. The continued existence of the Treaty will ensure that this commitment by nuclear weapon states to disarmament remains. We believe that the inequalities inherent in the Treaty as well as the criticism of provisions regarding disarmament, peaceful uses, and other aspects of the Treaty should not be dealt with in such a fashion that they threaten the security that the NPT provides. South Africa, therefore in principle supports the view that the NPT should be extended indefinitely. The termination of the Treaty - whether this comes about by placing conditions on its future existence or by extending it only for a fixed period - is not an acceptable option. ...

South Africa therefore firmly believes that a mechanism must be found to address these concerns about the implementation of the Treaty. So as not to draw these issues into the debate about the continued existence of the Treaty, it is desirable that the review process provided for by Article VIII (3) should be strengthened. This could be done by the adoption of a set of "Principles for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament" which would be taken into account when the implementation of the Treaty is reviewed."

With these proposals, the developed countries have to thank South Africa for its role in ‘delivering’ the sceptical non-nuclear weapon states, particularly the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The South African government proposed, as a compromise, a process whereby the NPT would be reviewed every five years. These, amongst others, have been accepted by the NPT Review Conference, but is a Pyrrhic victory for the non-nuclear states, in particular for the OAU and the NAM. Against the background of immense pressure from the developed Western states, specifically the United States of America, to support an indefinite extension to the NPT, South Africa’s position appeared to be contradictory. Yet, at the end of torturous discussions, considerable credit could go to South African Foreign Minister Nzo for enabling the NPT Review Conference to reach agreement on the five year review process, a transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the establishment of a full nuclear test ban. This does not mean that the five Nuclear Weapon States (the USA, Britain, France, China and Russia) are pleased with the provision for frequent reviews, as proposed by Minister Nzo. The displeasure stems from reluctance to be held to specific time frames and also to fulfil the conditions of the treaty. In addition, the imposition of disarmament measures on the nuclear states may go far in tightening the treaty’s provisions, many of which have been ignored by the nuclear states.

On pressurising for an indefinite extension, the nuclear weapon states had failed to use the opportunity to secure improvements to the global non-proliferation regime. The measures proposed by South Africa, and adopted by the conference, also include an acceptance of the principle of ‘indefinite extension’. This may be difficult to reconcile with the policy of a nuclear weapons’ free African continent. Having been the first and only state to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa has the unique opportunity of being a leader within the non-nuclear world, whilst at the same time being a member of the exclusive nuclear club. This was acknowledged by the President of the ‘Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. Further examination of the contradictions besetting not only South Africa, but the NPT as a whole, must be taken into consideration.

At the end of the NPT Review conference the non-weapons states, who came with the hope of procuring a binding commitment on disarmament from the official nuclearstates had won a concession for frequent reviews to the treaty as opposed to its finite extension. But the new set of provisions effectively maintains the status quo with regard to the NPT. It is generally accepted that more than twice the number of officially recognised, declared nuclear states actually have nuclear weapons’ programmes, or ambitions to possess these. Among these are Israel, India, Pakistan, Argentine, Brazil, Iran and Iraq, the latter’s programme being disrupted by the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.

The New York Times of Friday 12 May 1995, summarised the conferences proceedings as follows: "When the conference opened last month the United States and its allies, among them Russia, faced formidable opposition to an indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, and did not have enough declared votes for a simple majority had there been a ballot, according to independent estimates. Over the weeks, however, the opposition, led by larger developing nations - among them Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, Nigeria and Indonesia - began to split. The eventual collapse of the opposition to an indefinite extension was hastened by the decision of South Africa to back such a plan and propose a package of confidence building documents that would meet some of the concerns of the non nuclear-weapons nations.

South Africa has said it abolished its nuclear weapons programme, and signed the treaty in 1992. The treaty created a global system that reserved to only five nations the legitimate possession of nuclear arms, a cause of dissent then and now. But as a compromise the accord, which went into force in 1970, gave itself a life of 25 years, after which it could be extended again for fixed periods or become permanent. In those intervening years, most nations - though not all - have apparently decided not to pursue the nuclear option."

The danger of an indefinite extension of the NPT is that it will remove pressure from the developed nuclear states to make a commitment towards disarmament and consequently serve as a sign of tacit approval for other states. Cases in point are Israel, Iraq, India and Pakistan, who are not signatories to the NPT, but have nuclear arsenals. North Korea is somewhat unique: after extensive pressure, it recently reached an agreement with the United Sates to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. This was bolstered by the setting up of a system of international monitoring, with monitors confirming that the North Korean programme had indeed been suspended in accordance with the agreement. The agreement would not have been possible without the involvement of South Korea and Japan, the US allies in the region.

The question that arises is whether the indefinite extension of the NPT will be effective in pressurising smaller states outside the official five to allow random inspection of their nuclear facilities by outside inspectors, if most of them are not even signatories to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provisions. Furthermore, it is questionable whether this will pacify the majority of non-nuclear weapons states. The proposal by South Africa that principles should be adopted for non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as setting out obligations for the nuclear states, bodes well for its standing within the NAM and OAU, as well as the non-nuclear states in general. In addition, Minister Nzo’s proposal for a structure of committees to address progress on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, as well as a comprehensive test ban treaty, enforcement mechanisms and security assurances to the majority non-nuclear states, goes a long way in building confidence among these states. It distinguishes South Africa as a leader amongst the nations of the world, having bridged the gap between the declared nuclear weapons’ states and the large number of the ‘have-nots’ who proposed a future cut-off date and revision. It, of course, remains to be seen if the checks and balances adopted will be effective as we move into the twenty first century.

The argument for indefinite extension, that was subsequently adopted by the conference on the grounds that "it is in the interests of North-South bridge building", however, goes against the existing evidence of the effectiveness of the NPT treaty, that is inherently a ‘treaty of unequals’, dominated by the developed nuclear states. While it is the only non-proliferation regime in existence for the past twenty five years, it is certainly not perfect, having been dominated by the official nuclear sates for most of its existence. It has not been a universal agreement, but the newly adopted measures may serve to change this. In addition, the steps that have been adopted by the UN Security Council in Resolution 984 (1995) and assurances by the five Nuclear Weapon States are encouraging. However, it is not adequate, and as Minister Nzo stated, South Africa "... remains convinced that the most effective way to address this issue and which would provide credible and effective security assurances would be through the negotiation, by all the States Parties to the Treaty, of an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT."

Article II of the Treaty outlines the commitment not to develop or possess nuclear weapons as one of the obligations of the non-nuclear states, yet, nuclear states can effectively acquire more nuclear weapons. This being said, in bilateral agreements with Russia, the US has eliminated thousands of nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as nuclear warheads deployed on those systems. While the end of the Cold War has seen recent signatories to the NPT, namely Russia and the successor states of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus reducing their nuclear arsenals, there has also been regional proliferation problems, mainly in the Middle East and South East Asia.

In accordance with Article III on strengthening safeguards and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa supported more stringent monitoring mechanisms, including ongoing research into environmental monitoring. This should be an integral part of the safeguarding mechanisms. For this to succeed, greater transparency on the part of the nuclear weapons states is called for, which would be an additional measure in building confidence. These mechanisms would also strengthen non-proliferation measures.

The inspection record of the IAEA, however, leaves much to be desired. A classic example is the Iraqi inspection, where proof of the diversion of nuclear material could not be provided, even after numerous checks. The same applies to North Korea. The credibility of the NPT and the IAEA suffered when Iraqi and North Korean diversions of nuclear material were subsequently uncovered. In the past, sanctions procedures against countries violating the NPT provisions, were lengthy. The IAEA first took the matter to its governors, who proceeded in taking it to the UN Security Council, after which punitive or other measures could be implemented. After India detonated a nuclear weapon in the early 1970’s, there was an expansion of measures to test NPT treaty provisions with regard to acquisitions. These were in the form of the London Group of Suppliers and the Zeneger Group. The intention was to diminish the existing acquisitions loophole that effectively allowed developing countries to acquire their own arsenals. These groups acted effectively as the NPT supporters’ committee. Many states, however, were upset by this addition, citing prejudice when it came to the supplier regime.

The main objective of the NPT was to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which would obviously become more effective if all the proposed measures contained in the Treaty were implemented. Between its establishment in 1967 and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the NPT had not managed to stop proliferation although it might have inhibited it. Since 1970, for example, India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa developed their arsenals. Until recently, the NPT essentially remained a ‘treaty of goodwill’ - this despite the existence of the IAEA, which inspected general fissionable material. Inspections were further sanctioned by the particular state and were not carried at random. The newly proposed provisions intend to give the IAEA more teeth. This would be achieved through the use of environmental monitoring techniques namely chemical tests of minute quantities of water, air and dust near nuclear facilities to determine the kinds of uranium and plutonium being produced.

South Africa is participating in the IAEA’s Technical Co-operation Programme, according to Article IV that relates to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The article is intended to enable developed states to share their nuclear technology with developing states. In this regard, South Africa is already a leader in the African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology. As part of its commitment, South Africa’s Atomic Energy Corporation met African nuclear experts at the end of April 1995 to exchange information on nuclear science and technology. In his speech on the 19th April, Minister Nzo focused attention on the future peaceful use of nuclear technology, which, he argued, should be the prime concern of developing countries.

"With regard to Article IV, South Africa is participating in the IAEA’s Technical Co-operation Programme and we are strongly in favour of the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the developed and the developing world. In this context South Africa recognises the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for all peaceful uses of nuclear energy. South Africa is currently a host country for the training of scientists and technicians from Africa. At the IAEA’s March 1995 Board of Governor’s meeting, South Africa supported the establishment of a standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation. We also believe that the SAGTAC could usefully convene a meeting of all interested parties, particularly the developing countries, for a discussion of specific problem areas in the field of nuclear technology transfer. South Africa, with its extensive nuclear infrastructure and competencies, has furthermore pledged itself to participate actively in the ‘African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology’, and is contributing extensively to many of the registered projects covering waste disposal, food preservation, irradiation processing, nuclear instrumentation, environmental radiation detection and harmonisation, research reactor utilisation, safety and operation and improvements in clinical radiotherapy. South Africa would like to see and would strongly support greater levels of involvement on the part of the developed world in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the developing world, and especially to Africa."

However it is not its contributions to peaceful development that makes the NPT so important. The New York Times of 12 May 1995 declared:

"The result of years of negotiations in the 1960s when the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in an arms race, a space race and intense competition for the loyalty of the newly independent nations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty began the long, slow and still unfinished job of controlling and finally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction.

It formed the cornerstone on which other treaties were built on missiles, chemical and biological weapons and atomic testing. When the treaty was signed in 1968 in Washington, London and Moscow, there were fears that a dozen or more nations would soon possess the knowledge and fuel for atomic bombs. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy had sought to control nuclear weapons. ...

Malaysia’s delegate to the present conference, Hassiny bin Agam, reflected the view of a number of other developing nations when he said the treaty provided a carte blanche to the nuclear powers. [and] ... could be interpreted as ‘justifying nuclear weapons states for eternity.’

[However] in the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, one of the documents that was adopted, the nuclear powers pledged to reduce and ultimately move toward elimination of their arms.

The Statement calls for ‘the determined pursuit by nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

The NPT has obviously not stopped proliferation, but has turned a blind eye to smaller states arming, as well as to the developed states increasing their arsenals, instead of moving towards de-nuclearisation and ultimately disarmament. The main and initial objective of the NPT has therefore not been met, namely the complete disarmament of the nuclear states to a zero level, as well as the non-nuclearisation of states without any nuclear weapons. It may be argued that it was not possible to realise these objectives in the five decades since the beginning of the Cold War, and that nuclear weapons served as a stabilising deterrence. It may further be argued that it is impossible to turn the clock back to a non-nuclear weapon world and that, as a result of nuclear power and energy supply, research will continue. This does not mean that the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons should not be pursued. Yet, at this juncture, it seems practically only feasible to limit nuclear weapon production and to restrict nuclear technology and research to peaceful purposes.

Be that as it may, the situation has changed dramatically in the nineties. While the Cold War may be over, the threat of nuclear proliferation is greater than in the past. The dismantling of the former Soviet Union poses such a threat, with a number of independent states now in possession of the nuclear weapons which were traditionally stationed in their territories. These states are the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, all still under the watchful eye of ‘Mother Russia’, who also has to take care of its own formidable arsenal. Although these countries have become signatories to the NPT, the danger of proliferation and ‘nuclear theft’ by terrorists groups or gangs persists. Other regions where proliferation is possible is the Middle East, which remains volatile even as peace negotiations advance, and the South East Asian region, although the US imposed inspections in North Korea have reduced this threat. The biggest test of the NPT is the sanctions it will impose on the violators. Barely a week after the end of the conference, China, an official nuclear power, exploded a nuclear device.

South Africa’s position is unique, as it has signed most of the regimes on weapons of mass destruction, such as the Chemical Weapons’ Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention. It has expressed interest in becoming part of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It remains to be seen how South Africa’s participation in these regimes and conventions and its commitment to being a nuclear weapon free zone will advance measures to build confidence in Southern Africa, and in the rest of Africa. As the acknowledged nuclear leader of Africa, South Africa exports large amounts of uranium, possesses a nuclear power station and its industry cries out for more energy. At the same time its own supplies of fossil fuel are being depleted.

Against this background, it must be asked whether South Africa can use its existing nuclear power technology as a future option for fuel, in line with the trend followed in the rest of the world. Present developments point in that direction. South Africa has already taken steps to ensure international and regional security through complete nuclear disarmament, a goal originally aimed at with the NPT’s inception in 1968. For South Africa, the NPT Review Conference was a diplomatic coup, despite previous flaws in the agreement. The newly proposed measures, in which South Africa played a significant part, will go far towards ensuring world peace and stability where weapons of mass destruction are concerned. South Africa has perhaps set the scene for increased assistance from the developed nations in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. With the conference over, South Africa shares the credit for the final agreement, and finds itself many steps removed from its recent status as a pariah!

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REFERENCES

Statement by Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo to the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), New York, 19 April 1995.

Peter Fabricius, We Cannot afford to silence the growl of nuclear watchdog , The Star, 23 March 1995.

Peter Fabricius, Admonition from Nzo at UN - SA for indefinite extension of nuclear treaty, The Star, 20 April 1995.

Peter Fabricius, Did SA bow to US pressure , The Star, 20 April 1995.

Peter Fabricius, Nzo’s NPT idea wins approval, The Star, 10 May 1995.

Editorial comment, Making a good name, The Star, 16 May 1995.

Jeffrey Smith, Nuclear non-proliferation may be postponed , Weekly Mail and Guardian, 12 May 1995.

Edith M. Lederer, Nuclear watchdog unleashes new powers to stall evaders, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 April 1995.

The ACRONYM Consortium - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Briefings, 1995.

Western Strategy for the 1995 NPT Conference, British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Papers - Occasional Papers on International Security 8, 23 January 1995.

Anthony Lake, A Year of Decision : Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in 1995, address by the US National Security Adviser, to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 January 1995.

Barbara Grossette, Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Extended - 170 Nations Agree to Continue Pact Indefinitely, New York Times, 12 May 1995.

Simon Barber, Slap in the face for SA after triumph at nuclear talks, Sunday Times, 14 May 1995.

Peter Fabricius, Treaty extended indefinitely - South Africa helps broker nuclear deal, The Star, 12 May 1995.

Gavin Stafford, Nuclear power still an option for South Africa, Business Day, 17 March 1995.

Simon Barber, SA’s honest broker role in nuclear treaty, Sunday Times, 23 April 1995.