INTRODUCTION

The momentous events of April 1994 gave rise to a reborn South Africa with a potentially new face, new values and a new identity. The driving force behind this change was the transfer of power to a majority party through a democratic process. With such fundamental power changes, some form of restructuring in public sector institutions, including the military, can be expected. Presently a new defence force, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), is in the process of being formed through the integration of, amongst others, former revolutionary forces, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) into the former conventional South African Defence Force (SADF). The aim of this article is to question the possible contribution of former revolutionary groups in the formation of a regular, conventional army. This is especially relevant in the light of events like the mass walkout by former members of MK from Wallmansthal and other disciplinary problems. This article will suggest that value can be derived from the integration of these forces. This is not simply in the form of greater legitimacy for the regular defence force, as common wisdom would have us believe. The contention is that there are at least four other areas in which a revolutionary force can contribute to a conventional force through integration, namely

intellectually, in the quality of soldiering as a result of the introduction of different leadership qualities;



changes in doctrine, i.e. adaptational doctrines, strategies and tactics;



integrating community knowledge in defence preparation and policy-making; and



integrating community knowledge in interim reconstruction.

BACKGROUND: REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

The course in Defence Management of the Witwatersrand Business School’s Programme in Defence Management describes a professional soldier as one "that emerges when civilian authority establishes political control over the military" and who is "thus controlled by the civilians, who rarely intervenes in politics; when interventions do occur, they are usually of short duration"1.

The revolutionary soldier has a different character. Debray 2 points out that the revolutionary soldier and army is involved in armed self-defence and armed propaganda in order to counter the ruling hegemony. Practical problems for the revolutionary army include logistical and military dependence, lack of single command structures that result in difficulties in the co-ordination of leadership and offensive and defensive strategies from an improvised political front. This is echoed in Amilcar Cabral’s essay, Revolutionary War in Africa 3.

Guerrilla or revolutionary soldiers, in contrast with professional or praetorian ones, have to rely far more on creativity in their actions. They also have to be able to conduct operations while subjected to technically superior surveillance and a political environment of constant flux. Their position is one of searching for the positive, both in armed action and in propaganda, amidst the constant premises of mostly superior forces. Within a repressed civil society, they have to operate, mobilise and build networks in order to effect on a military level what Gramsci calls a political "war of position" and a "war of manoeuvre"4. A new civil hegemony is to be formed, that will be powerful enough to undermine and ultimately defeat the ruling hegemony5. In this process, the revolutionary soldier is an essential element.

Revolutionary soldiers are dedicated to mass military mobilisation, representing no specific social class and sometimes trained to be professional soldiers. Lateral integration of other professional skills into this type of military can introduce valuable innovative elements of military organisational format, strategy and tactics. At times, such doctrines may be reflecting eclectic and even anarchic approaches. The strongest characteristic of revolutionary soldiers is probably that they are rarely bureaucratic in orientation. They are exponents of a spontaneous community resistance network with an innovative instead of a managerial imperative. Their driving force is the fact that the task is more important than the procedure.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL ARMY TO THE CONVENTIONAL

Intellectual Approaches to Soldiering

While an intellectual approach to soldiering is associated with a qualitatively different leadership style and form, these two will be described separately.

An intellectual approach to soldiering is not unique amongst revolutionary armies. However, many scholars make it clear that the revolutionary in general, and revolutionary soldiers in particular, have a broader understanding of the world of politics and of the practical action or praxis necessary to overturn the ruling hegemony into a participating hegemony6. This understanding is irrespective of whether the soldier is a Spanish rebel/guerrilla of 1812, an Israeli Hashomer or Haganah, a Palestinian rebel, a Boer War guerrilla or kryger, a Latin American guerrillero or an MK or APLA soldier. Whether the guerrilla uses a Marxist-Leninist, Gramscian, Althusserian, Castroian, Maoist or anarchistic intellectual approach as a tool of analysis to further his or her practical involvement, the advantage to the revolutionary is that the thought patterns socialised into the guerrilla or leader are analytical, creative, adaptive and pragmatic. This can be of great advantage when the revolutionary soldier is integrated into the conventional defence community. The impact of this fusion between the more creative, adaptive and even anarchic thinking of the unconventional guerrilla and leader and that of the conventional, more harnessed and structured approach towards the planning and execution of strategies and tactics, can enhance the creation of a qualitative better defence force.

The above does not ignore the fact that intellectuals of a high calibre are found amongst members of conventional armies. Macnab7 points to the example of the French soldier and officer, Georges de Villebois-Mareuil, who was a top student of the French Military Academy. After the Franco-Prussian War around 1879, with Hubert Lyautey he became part of a new breed of intellectual officers with avant-garde approaches to military strategy and tactics. De Villebois-Mareuil and others successfully introduced this intellectual approach to the Anglo-Boer War8. In Strategy for Revolution, Debray9 points out that politically conscientised and intellectually oriented soldiers with conventional military training provided by the old regime, in many cases turned out to be brilliant guerrilleros in struggles in Latin America, for example in Cuba.

There is clearly also a potential negative side to the "intellectual soldier". Too much intellectualising may lead to disciplinary problems, especially where a soldier realises that his or her best interests do not coincide with those of the (guerrilla) army. This problem was faced by the Boer Commandos in the second Anglo-Boer War. When it came to battles with the British forces, some Boer Commandos and even commanders did not maintain the pressure. Desertion by "independent" / "intellectual" / "anarchist" / "gatvol" thinkers was a constant problem10.

It was once said that the British won the war largely because Tommy was too dumb and disciplined to question the wisdom of his commanders’ orders. In a similar vein, the Boers lost the war mainly because everyone kept questioning the orders of the Boer generals! The challenge is thus to make sure that the guerrilla soldier has enough freedom to bring his creative and inquiring mind into his work, yet at the same time has enough discipline to ensure that orders are diligently carried out. The integration of a regular army such as the former SADF with non-conventional armies (MK, APLA, AZANLA) could potentially introduce such a fusion. Hard work, however, remains a prerequisite for the realisation of such an objective.

Changes in Leadership Patterns

Tied to the previous section is the issue of leadership patterns. Regular armies tend to follow specific doctrines and tend to be resistant to change. This also affects the leadership style of the conventional officer.

Carl von Decker pointed out in 1822 that "insufficient importance is attached to partisan warfare"11. He pointed out that "(p)artisan war can be more difficult than large-scale war since the partisan rarely possesses adequate resources. Such warfare requires special talents in the commander and unusual qualities in the men ...". Amilcar Cabral12 argues in a similar vein that revolutionary military leaders must, like all other military leaders, command discipline through example. At the same time "(o)ur armed forces must be fully aware that an armed force is more efficient the more mobile, trained and active it is. ... Our armed forces must recognize the principles of economy, economy of human life and of supplies and weapons...". Great emphasis is placed on leadership qualities, both in commanding respect and maintaining discipline, and should be applied while reflecting, thinking and analysing the military and the prevailing socio-political situation.

In The Philosophy of Leadership, Hodgkinson argues that "executive (leadership) are not adverse to wisdom; they are - or should be wisdom seekers, and if that objective could be gained through the study of philosophy they would not be antagonistic (towards it)". He adds that "Socrates is supposed to have said, by way of justification for such study, that the unexamined life is not worth living". Hodgkinson13 extends this motto to : "unexamined administration is not worth doing" (i.e. of men, material and warfare). If this holds true for a conventional army, it is even more true for the revolutionary army and leadership by imposed material conditions. In addition to this, Von Decker14 says: "Almost always, the partisan is weaker than the enemy he confronts; method therefore, no longer applies, for all method is based on some equality of forces".

The implications are clearly that a revolutionary leader in the military, before or after integration, can potentially bring unconventional thought, doctrine, tactics, strategies and treatment of fellow soldiers to the conventional. Attempts should be made to nurture these potential advantages. On the negative side, the revolutionary soldier, leader and cadre, often with their slightly anarchic thoughts and actions, should be drawn into the realm of discipline carefully and consistently, where discipline is lacking. Administrative and military tasks cannot be done speedily and effectively in a regular army without discipline. In analysing and applying thought to the (re)building and (re)development of doctrine in an adaptive way, the creative, more free thinking members of the guerrilla leadership or revolutionary soldiers can make a qualitative difference to a conventional army. Cabral’s15 interpretation of discipline is of further importance: "In any army or armed band, there must be a leader and a leader must be obeyed. A leader is no man’s master; he is a leader in order to set an example and give commands, but no man is his slave. Discipline and respect work both ways, from lower to higher and from higher to lower".

An example here is the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). The revolutionary Haganah brought more freedom into the development and application of doctrine during the post-revolutionary process of creating a unique defence community16. So did the Boerekrygers who brought into the Union Defence Force a more open and free style, namely the Commando system of home defence or the use of camel-patrols, derived from Police activities in the North Western Cape and the Kalahari-desert, and used with success in German West Africa (now Namibia). These advances were unfortunately lost to some degree when the optimum fusion of the partisan element and regular army was disturbed during the post-1948 purges of the SADF by pro-Nationalist ministers and an increasingly pro-National Party army corps leadership17.

Integration of Community Knowledge in Defence Preparation

The revolutionary army, having developed from within the community, constitutes a unique (sub)defence community. It brings together intimate knowledge of the community from which it came, coupled with the essential elements of defensive and offensive strategies and tactics.

Revolutionary army not only brings its active participants to the integration process, but also its established communication channels, and the co-operation and command of the broader community from which its functions and structures have developed. Through creative means, it attempts to overthrow a usually stronger army, that is numerically superior and better armed and equipped. In order to effect the establishment of a new hegemony that will enable an inclusive social transformation, the revolutionary army is left with a positive legacy of adaptive response capability to its surrounding environment. For this reason, it employs creative means of command and control and is doctrinally adaptive to an environment that reflects the paradox of what Gramsci calls war of position and war of manoeuvre. It takes "the matter of defence policy beyond a consideration of ‘the military institution’" itself18. According to Roherty18 this applies to the need for new approaches to defence and management in the conventional army, but does not necessarily refer to the integration of revolutionary armies with conventional ones. Yet, when such integration takes place, one of the benefits will certainly be that the newly constituted army, derived from a former guerrilla or revolutionary army and a former institutional or regular army, will fuse a closer and more useful understanding of the needs of the broader community on the one hand, with the already standing order of a well-equipped and well-trained army on the other. This will impact on the legitimacy of the new force, co-operation between community and the new army, for instance, with the formulation of policy and the gathering of intelligence. The latter is less important, as legitimacy largely eradicates the need for extensive internal intelligence gathering. An important question for debate remains: Should an army be involved in military intelligence gathering inside its own country and vis-à-vis its own citizens through a military intelligence wing? It is felt that an army should deal with external threats and, especially in a functioning democracy, should not act against its own citizens as if they were the "enemy".

The result of integrating former contending armies will not only be a more legitimate state and public institutions, such as the army, but will also attain community co-operation in the preparation for defence. Moreover, this will occur in what Habermas refers to as a nation of citizens who willingly and within the parameters of a social contract contributes to the defence of the country, its citizens and its constitution. This could have a positive impact, for example, on defence policy formulation and implementation. Referring to "the dynamic process", Hodgkinson19 argues that "(t)his must then be entered into the political process of persuasion. This is the domain of (legitimate) power, resource control and politics, and we have moved from the level of ideas to the level of people. Coalitions must be formed, levers pulled, persons persuaded as power and people are marshalled around the project or plan ... (the process) can be subsumed under the rubric of policy-making". The revolutionary army, by introducing legitimacy and adaptational doctrines into the integration process, and simultaneously being in touch with its community of origin, can be of great benefit in the formation of a new defence force.

However, the proper integration of the new military is not the only task at hand. Other areas, such as the commandos, citizen force and self-defence units (SDU’s) will also require attention. This will be no easy task and once more creative thinking as well as professionalism, discipline and codes of conduct will have to be fused creatively.

Utilising Community Knowledge in Reconstruction

It has to be stressed that no army should ever become of a tool of social reconstruction, especially where other tools or bureaucracies are available. The interim reconstruction process, however, points towards a secondary role for the integrated army in this regard on a regional and local level. While the issue is controversial, it could be argued that certain types of defence force elements such as the medical, engineering, technical and signals corps can be used to assist with the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

In the long term, the SANDF will become smaller, but it may have to expand initially as a result of the integration process and because attempts are made by the state not to increase current unemployment.

The issue of the usefulness of a development corps (the Service Corps) should also be debated. It should be questioned whether the SANDF must assist in the creation and training of such a corps or brigade. It could supply manpower for reconstruction purposes, assist in the creation of jobs and the development of skills during the interim. It could also assist in rural and urban local government development and reconstruction. While such a corps should resort under the Department of Manpower or a similar department in the long run, the SANDF can assist with training, expertise and ad hoc administration when required. This should be strictly a temporary measure, with assistance schedules planned in advance, and should not undermine ongoing attempts at making the SANDF cost-effective, while retaining core capabilities on all its levels.

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that the revolutionary army could potentially bring a qualitatively different approach to the regular army. This would include new and creative leadership styles, more free and pragmatic thinking on doctrine and would contribute to greater legitimacy for the new army. It also offers possibilities to create a truly constitutional army from the people, in the service of the people, with the potential to act.

While thoughts on doctrine need to be creative and adaptive, discipline within standing and conventional armies should be maintained. This also refers to constitutional discipline, seeing the army as a legitimate defence resource, strictly within the parameters of the Constitution and a Bill of Rights. The notion of a constitutional army, needless to say, is and will stay an imperative for the constitutional state. Furthermore, the integration process can assist in the creation of a defence community that is less class-based. This in itself is a social advantage and could contribute to greater reconciliation within the South African community or the "nation of citizens".

Seeing the army as a potential secondary tool of assistance during the interim reconstruction period, while controversial and debatable, could be valuable as a temporary measure. Constant communication and interaction with civil society - the media, pressure groups, lobbies and civics - in order to debate such short term involvement, are critical. The role of a defence force in the final analysis is to defend a constitution and not to become a public tool for reconstruction.

Module three on Civil Military Relations, Witwatersrand Business School’s Programme in Defence Management.



Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1967 and Strategy for Revolution, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1972.



Amilcar Cabral in W. Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology, New American Library (A Meridan Book), New York, 1977, p.238 ff.



Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction, Lawrence and Wishart Press, London, 1982, p. 69 ff.



Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, p. 240.



See Laqueur, ibid.; Gramsci, ibid.; Debray, 1972, 1967; and E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays, Quartet Books, London, 1966.



Roy Macnab, Die Franse Kolonel: Villebois-Mareuil, Vegter vir die Boere, 1899-1900, Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town, 1977, pp. 7 and 8.



Ibid., p. 8 ff.



Debray, 1972, p. 127 ff.



H.P. van Coller, Generaal Piet Cronje en die Stryd aan die Westelike Front, in J.H. Breytenbach (ed), Gedenkalbum van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, National Press, Cape Town, 1947, pp. 116-124. He provides an exposé of guerrilla desertions following the Boer victory at Magersfontein and before and during the defeat and mass-surrender of Cronje at Paardeberg.



Von Decker, in Laqueur, ibid., p. 58.



Cabral, in Laqueur, ibid., p. 241.



Christopher Hodgkinson, The Philosophy of Leadership, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 7.



Von Decker, in Laqueur, ibid., p. 61.



Cabral, in Laqueur, ibid., p. 241.



Ian V. Hogg, Israeli War Machine: The men, the Machines, the Tactics, Hamlyn Books, London, 1983.



Rocky Williams, Civil-Military Relations and a Democratic South Africa: Whither the Man on Horseback?, paper read at the Centre for Constitutional Analysis, HSRC, Pretoria, 1993.



James M. Roherty (ed), Defence Policy Formation: Towards Comparative Analysis, Carolina Academic Press, Durham (North Carolina), 1980, p. 9.



Hodgkinson, ibid., p. 27.