INTRODUCTION

Political activity is a universal phenomenon. It includes, amongst others, disagreements and the resolution of disagreements, and occurs at any level of society. No democracy is immune to conflict and the need to resolve such conflict is one of the essential elements of political activity.2 In all political systems, military professionals are personally and corporatively affected by social politics, and all officers will have certain political preferences and attitudes. In an embryonic democracy, such as South Africa, the generic tension between military and civil society is likely to increase in proportion to the level and scope of political conflict that accompanies the process of democratisation. If officers are to perform their role effectively in the emergent democracy, while at the same time remaining disengaged from political activity that is unacceptable to society, an understanding of their political system, its values, and democratic theory is essential.

Such understanding cannot be taken for granted in a defence force that has until now claimed to be "apolitical". The myth of an apolitical military has its origins in Huntington’s3 theoretical construct of military professionalism. The credibility of this model has been proven to be dubious by a number of eminent scholars in the field of Political Science and Military Sociology, as no contemporary democracy is attempting to isolate soldiers from the dynamics of civil life. The opposite is indeed true; most democratic states accept that the military must be integrated into society, and that the liberal education of military officers is essential in this regard. Those who argue that the latter is a concept more appropriate to "First World" countries, should do well to remember that this also applies to the concept of stable democratic rule.

Military education is at present receiving increased attention, with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) pressing for a review of the status and content of prescribed educational programmes for members of the National Defence Force (NDF).4 Thus far, the educational policy of the NDF appears to be somewhat incoherent. Attendance at the Military Academy, for example, is voluntary, and attaining a Bachelor of Military Studies degree is peripheral to promotion. The South African Air Force currently sponsors a significant number of officers enrolled for studies at various civilian universities. Some Defence Force officers were also enrolled for a military diploma course presented by the University of South Africa (UNISA), that has since been discontinued. There is a trend towards enrolling officers for part-time Master of Business Administration (MBA) studies, presented by post-graduate schools at various universities. Finally, a certified Defence Management Programme is presented by the University of the Witwatersrand.

The aim of this paper is to stimulate debate on the issue of military education in South Africa by presenting a philosophical perspective on the importance of educating officers expected to serve the democratic state. It is hoped that this will provide the background from which concrete proposals for a coherent policy on military education may evolve.

DEMANDS ON OFFICERS IN A DEMOCRACY

Democratic theory grants recognition to the constant conflict between liberty and equality, between individuals and institutions, and between authority and freedom. The presumption made by military professionals that such conflict must always be subdued to establish law and order implies that the dynamics of a democratic system are misunderstood. The reduction of civil-military tension in a democratising society requires the resolution of a fundamental professional dilemma, generated by the need to accept democratic premises and to reflect them reasonably in the military system, whilst maintaining an effective military posture.5

In a democracy, military officers should understand the political "rules of the game", not only of their own institution, but also those prevalent in the broader political system.6 In terms of civilian control, comprehending the proper role of the military in a democratic society and understanding the values and operation of a democratic political system, provide a rational perspective in which military officers can perceive their own positions and the limitations of military authority within the system.7 According to Von Baudissin8 "... it is of decisive importance for the credibility of the state and the social order, and also for the effectiveness of the troops, that - even in exceptional circumstances, such as the application of force under orders - officers should continue to feel bound by the laws and general assumptions of humanity."

In addition to these intellectual demands, Zoll9 has listed a number of moral burdens which confront the career officer in a democracy:

the ability to control a vast potential for destruction and the will to use it if necessary;



the tension between the "rationality" of the techniques of destruction and the total irrationality of modern warfare;learning to resolve conflict with violence in a society adhering to the norm that conflict should be resolved without violence;



the constant testing of military strength without being allowed to posit an enemy;



the defence of a form of society which is distinguished both by positive aspects and antagonism and disorder;



being the object of constant public scrutiny;



the pressure to legitimise prescribed authoritarian behaviour within the military while participatory behaviour is generally highly valued in society;



the readiness to internalise norms oriented to the common good and to express these norms through one’s behaviour in a society in which the main overt values are organised around the pursuit of personal gain; and



special sacrifices inherent to the nature of military service.

In short, the officer must be able to cope with the paradox of a society whose values may be described as "liberal", while the values of the armed forces responsible for defending these values, are described as "conservative", because of their mission to defend the status quo. He needs to understand and accept this paradox and to reduce the dissonance between the "military mind" and democratic society. As Hackett10 has stated, "the young officer ... has to be made to remember that only a person of liberal mind is entitled to exercise coercion over others in a society of free men". Professional officers thus have the daunting task of internalising two sets of potentially contradictory values11. A democratic society is not only dependent upon the functional skills of an officer, but also upon his intellectual advancement. According to Downey12, "... in principle, the State demands nothing less than sustained intellectual initiative from its armed forces. In no other way is it possible to possess an emergency service which perpetually revises its form and methods without the aid of a real test".

It is obvious that the average citizen of any state would experience great difficulty in meeting the above demands. The general calibre of a nation’s human resources, budgetary constraints, and military manpower needs may result in the commissioning and promotion of people who are incapable of meeting the military demands of a democratising society. However, expediency and compromise in this area create a substantial risk for those dedicated to the entrenchment of the principle of civil supremacy. Wakin13 has sounded a warning in this regard: "Unless the [military] profession captures the full dedication of those who are competent both morally and intellectually to meet its challenges, unless it becomes for the most talented a complete and fulfilling vocation, it is likely to fall on hard times. In the hands of the mediocre or the morally insensitive, the vocation of arms could find its noble purpose distorted with tragic consequences for all humanity".

Those members of a society possessing the qualities of moral and intellectual competence, talent, and vocational fulfilment have normally had a sound upbringing, including some form of higher education.

THE NECESSITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

There are no absolute solutions to the inherent antithesis between democratic systems and the military ethos, for societies and values change, and previously held assumptions and relationships may prove fragile and incorrect. Stable and effective civil-military relations must therefore evolve from a military understanding of social values, the manner in which the political system operates, and an appreciation of the internal contradictions and tensions between the individual and institutional conformity.14

According to Sarkesian15, the channel through which military officers can achieve such intellectual awareness while avoiding partisan indoctrination, is through higher education in an environment that exposes the individual to a variety of ideas, analyses and perceptions. These are not likely to be encountered in a focused environment such as a military school or college. It is only through broader tertiary education that officers will acquire the necessary background to understand both the domestic and international political environment, and the necessary insight to comprehend the nature and limits of military policy and military operations.

Conformity, obedience, and loyalty represent the heart of military discipline and can never be ridiculed within military organisations. In the democratic civilian realm, however, they represent the abnegation of conscience and reason, of the individual dignity and self-determination central to democracy.16 Tertiary education plays an important role in developing the capacity for independent thought, unlike military training which encourages a high degree of conformity. While the military traditionally tends to be wary of independents or non-conformists, the prevalence of conformists within the profession may have harmful effects for both civilian control and military professionalism. Sarkesian17 observed evidence in the Vietnam War, that was characterised as a "... lack of internal criticism of policy, the muting of professional military officers and civilian elites, [that] often leads to a policy that is inadequate and ineffective, perpetuated by those favouring the policy, and institutionalised to the extent that disagreement is tantamount to ‘treason’".

A study of fifty American military officers who were tested for conformity and then rated by expert psychological observers, revealed adichotomy of traits between conforming subjects and those who were inclined towards independence of judgement18 (see table below).

The liberal education of officers not only encourages independent and analytical thought, but also contributes to the maintenance of corporate balance within the military, a concept which has been described by Downey19 as "the ability to keep in view the three basic aspects of military power - its role as a public institution, the way the profession is structured, and the solutions to its operational problems". Corporate balance is achieved when the structure of the profession adequately reflects the other two elements. Without officer enlightenment, however, structural adjustments to the military profession are extremely difficult to implement; for officership is a bureaucratic profession, where profession and organisation are almost identical. Although the military system may strive hard to recruit able people, it chooses and trains them itself in its own image. The dynamic tensions that are necessary for professional adjustment within the military must be generated internally, and can only be achieved through debate by vigorous minds.20 "Vigorous minds" are not the products of traditional military training, but are cultivated through liberal education. "In the military profession, as in any profession, self-criticism is an essential prerequisite in effecting change. But if it is to be more than self-castigation, self-criticism must have significant intellectual content. Intellectual ferment very often means stimulation from the ‘outside’, even though the ‘outsider’ may be found within the profession."21

Higher education would also help military professionals to accept reasonable public criticism of the military as a normal part of the democratic political process. This is especially important in an embryonic democracy, where the preceding regime has discouraged or prevented such criticism. For example, some four years after the Chilean junta’s transfer of power to a democratically elected government in 1990, the military has remained extremely sensitive to both real and imagined challenges to its autonomy. Unaccustomed to the idea of public scrutiny, many officers have developed a "siege mentality", regarding public criticism as an escalating threat to their corporate interests, while some senior officers still harbour the suspicion that members of the government are ultimately intent on weakening the army by impairing its internal cohesion or by promoting unrealistic pacifist hopes.22

There is also an educational prerequisite for the maintenance of a meaningful distinction between officers and enlisted ranks in contemporary democracies. As armed forces modernise, and become more technologically advanced, so the level of skills demanded by those serving in enlisted ranks increases. It becomes increasingly difficult, therefore, to suggest that a highly trained enlisted person with long service and distinguished combat experience is less professional than a young and relatively inexperienced officer. In the absence of class or racial prejudice, the only meaningful distinction which remains between officers and enlisted men must be a difference in general educational levels upon entry to the service and in the breadth of subsequent professional education and training.23

In spite of the obvious advantages of an officers corps that is both professionally trained and liberally educated, it is particularly difficult to convince the military elite that the latter dimension of professionalism is essential. The inherent conflict between the traditional military view of officer education and that of Sarkesian’s "enlightened advocacy" perspective has been clearly articulated by Bunting24: "Is there not a fundamental antipathy between the twin purposes of military schooling: between training, which is either technical or aimed at getting men accustomed to doing what they are told, or both, and, education, which must be devoted to helping men learn to think critically, to establishing their minds’ standards of aesthetic and intellectual excellence against which they will implicitly weigh the value of what they are told to do?"

Perhaps the inherent tension between training and education partly accounts for the fact that in many developing countries, a secondary (high school) education is considered sufficient for entry into the military officers corps. In some cases, a high school education, supplemented by successful attendance of courses presented at military schools and colleges is deemed sufficient for progression to the highest levels of the military hierarchy. Unless the system of primary and secondary education in such countries is vastly superior to those of Western democracies, such a background appears to be hopelessly inadequate for equipping officers to function effectively in the complex civil-military environment of a democratising society.

It is also argued that liberal education can only be pursued at the expense of the functional military competence of the soldier. However, such sentiments evolve from an over-simplified perception of true military professionalism. In spite of the seemingly antithetical nature of training and education, all the recognised professions demand both as prerequisites for the conferment of professional status. If being a soldier is more than a trade or occupation, the military cannot neglect this requirement. As Bunting25 has observed, "... the truly liberally-educated soldier is the soldier who can reconcile the necessity for training and education, and be happy in both. ... For it is the man liberally educated, not the man technically educated, who will be the most sensitive to the great flux of civil life; it is the man who is both liberally and professionally educated who will be the better soldier".

INSTITUTIONS FOR AND CONTENT OF OFFICER EDUCATION

Although developed nations have agreed on the necessity for tertiary (university) education of military officers, the institutions providing such education and its content differ from country to country and even between service arms of specific countries. Aside from recruiting civilian university graduates as officer candidates and commissioning them after a period of functional military schooling and experience, most developed countries have military academies dedicated to educating those soldiers who aspire towards commissioned rank, but are not in possession of a university degree. However, the missions of these institutions has long been a subject of discussion and argument in military circles. The essential issue has been whether academies should equip students for specific duties confronting them soon after graduation, or whether they should equip them for the broader responsibilities that may confront them much later in their careers.26

In developed nations most military academies have not yet satisfactorily resolved this issue, and aim at a balance between functional training and liberal education. "The search for a balance between general education and professional preparation is reflected at West Point by the faculty’s reference to the ‘whole man’ concept - based on the assumption that a synthesis of educational objectives is possible."27 The desire to achieve such a synthesis is reflected in the mission statements of military academies. For example, the mission of the US Naval Academy is to provide "[g]raduates who are capable junior officers in whom have been developed the capacity and foundations for future development in mind and character, leading towards a readiness to assume the highest responsibilities of citizenship and Government".28 Role duality is even more explicit in the case of the Australian Defence Force Academy, which states that its mission is

"a. to provide military education and training of officer cadets for the purpose of developing the professional abilities and the qualities of character and leadership that are appropriate to officers of the Defence Force; and

b. to provide for officer undergraduates and, by way of foundation for their careers as officers of the Defence Force, officer cadets a balanced and liberal university education in a military environment".29

Thus the inherent tension between training and education is felt within military academies themselves, creating pressures for the resolution of conflict either in the direction of more liberal education or more functional training. The moment the fine balance between education and training is disturbed, however, military academies tend to be subjected to intense criticism from both the military community and from civilian defence analysts. If education is liberalised at the expense of military ethics and skills, critics argue that aspirant officers can be educated at civilian universities at a fraction of the cost. (According to a 1992 US Government Accounting Office report30, approximately $250 000 is spent on each military academy graduate, compared to about $60 000 for each officer commissioned through the civilian university system.)

On the other hand, if functional training and cost-effectiveness are pursued at the expense of a broad, liberal education, the purpose and academic status of military academies are undermined. In Britain, for example, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS) has been criticised for providing training rather than education. Unlike the military-sponsored university at Shrivenham, RMAS does not present undergraduate education which leads to the conferment of a university degree. However, the much shorter officer’s course at Sandhurst remains the primary route for achieving a commission in the British Army. Only four months of the two-year course at RMAS are devoted to purely academic pursuits, and this period has been described as "more a shock treatment than a broadening of intellectual horizons".31 The brevity of exposure to academic enquiry at RMAS means that there is no time for officer cadets to develop an adequate level of political sophistication before they are commissioned, with some of them being deployed to counter political violence in Northern Ireland. Moorcroft32 has indicated the danger to stable civil-military relations inherent in this commissioning system: "Nothing could be more dangerous for British society, and its army, than for Sandhurst to produce unsophisticated lions, whilst Westminster is led by political donkeys." Perhaps these fears are somewhat exaggerated. Britain is, after all, a well-established, stable liberal democracy with an excellent system of private and public schooling. However, the warning is appropriate in the context of developing democracies.

In many developing democracies, neither the schooling system nor the military provide a solid basis for the type of intellectual and ethical qualities outlined in the previous section. Accepting the necessity to entrust the military function to an educated and enlightened officers corps places the responsibility on defence planners to devise and maintain an appropriate avenue or vehicle for the achievement of this aim. The complexity of such a task, however, should not be underestimated. Aside from tensions inherent to training and education, and evident even in the most developed societies, defence planners in developing democracies are faced with additional constraints, such as:

scarcity of resources;

a high potential for internal political instability;

ethnic imbalances in educational standards;

an underdeveloped political culture;

a competitive demand for skilled and educated manpower in the civilian sector; and

competing national priorities, such as nation-building, reconstruction and development.

In established democracies, dedicated institutions exist to enhance military officers’ education. These institutions may be divided into two basic types: military academies and military universities. Several distinguishable characteristics are listed in the table.

In a developing democracy, defence planners who are convinced of the necessity for educated military officers, may opt for the basic model of a military academy outlined above: West Point and Sandhurst are widely regarded as archetypal educational institutions. However, this choice will ignore a fundamental point of criticism that has been directed at these institutions. The archetypal military academy is a poor vehicle for the broadening of the military mind. The Prussian Kriegsakademie, for example, contributed directly to the development of military professionalism, and indirectly to the modern problem of civil supremacy over the military in the democratic state. The philosophy of military education in emergent democracies should therefore extend beyond the imperatives of military excellence and include a dimension which would promote military subordination to civilian politics.

The military university option may be more successful in addressing the latter need, but to the exclusion of the vital formative role played by military academies. University based military education presupposes the existence of other avenues of fundamental military socialisation into the officers corps. In other words, military university students need to have been exposed to a military academy, school or college that has established the professional military value system, essential to a long-term career as an officer.

An important factor in the choice of institution for professional military education, is the manpower provision for a particular armed force and its relationship to the commissioning of officers and their career development. Traditional military academies presuppose a lengthy term of induction (typically four years) before commissioning, followed by a more or less long-term career as an officer in the armed forces. Because of time and cost constraints, this type of institution would not be suitable to a military organisation that recruits potential officers on short-term contracts. It is reasonable to expect that governments and military leaders in developing countries would be reluctant to invest in university education for short-term incumbents. In such instances, the only viable solution may be a commissioning system for junior officers that is based upon the successful completion of a relatively short period of functional military schooling and socialisation at a military school or college. Once career officers are identified, however, such schooling should be supplemented by a thorough, liberal university education. "Every professional who expects to proceed beyond the middle rank years must be ‘educated’."33

An extensive range of undergraduate and post-graduate courses is offered by most universities, and the potential diversity of educational experience is significant as individual students are able to tailor courses from a wide variety of seemingly unrelated disciplines. Advocating tertiary officer education is therefore relatively meaningless, unless specific reference is made to the content of such education. This is important in countries that can ill afford to fund education that is not essential to the optimal functioning of the state, even if it is personally enriching. From the perspective of establishing and maintaining stable civil-military relations in the democratic state, Sarkesian34 is convinced that every officer’s education should, at the minimum, include concepts associated with the following:

a sense of history;

the conflict between individual rights and system imperatives within society;

an understanding of the ideals and actualities of the national political system;

the political consequences of military decisions and military actions;

the moral and ethical issues of professional service and standards of moral behaviour; and

the problems of political change and economic development.

Although Sarkesian articulated the above educational requirements with the American armed forces in mind, they could equally contribute to the harmonisation of civil-military relations in emergent democracies.

It is unlikely, however, that the normal system of university education in developing democracies would be able to meet these requirements equally for all members of the military profession. Corps schools and military colleges seem to be unsuitable for such education, for the concepts outlined above require specific insight and understanding, and cannot be grasped through courses of instruction. Without a strong intellectual base, the inculcation of political ideas and political analysis among potential military leaders can result in political activities and views based on oversimplified perceptions of democracy and politics.

In order to meet the educational requirements of military officers in a cost-effective manner in emergent democracies, sustained civil-military co-operation may, for example lead to:

the creation of a unique educational institution catering primarily for military educational needs at university level;



the addition of a civilian-style academic faculty to an existing military educational or training institution; or



the accommodation of military students at a civilian university prepared to offer a unique curriculum and that will accept limited military supervision and input with respect to course content and student activities.

CONCLUSION

It is inconsequential if the system of military education deviates from the archetypal military academy or military university, as long as the chosen system complements technical education and functional training. By cultivating a true understanding of the dynamics of a democratising society and the role of the military within this society among military professionals, such a system will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of civil supremacy.

However, if the educational imperative is recognised, the professional educational requirements of military officers cannot be satisfied through a series of ad hoc programmes and schemes with no direct bearing on career progression. Meaningful progress in this realm must proceed from a sound philosophy of professional military education, that is translated into a coherent policy and that integrates training, education and experience as the cornerstones of officership.

__________

The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not represent the views or policy of the South African Military Academy or the South African National Defence Force.



A.R. Ball,. Modern Politics and Government, MacMillan, London, 1988, pp. 19-20.



S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Vintage, New York, 1957.



As part of this objective, IDASA has planned a two-day conference and workshop on the Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa, in conjunction with the Military Academy (the only institution within the Defence Force engaged in graduate education). This conference is to be held at the Military Academy on 1-2 June 1995.



S.C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981, p. 175.



S.C. Sarkesian and T.M Gannon, Professionalism: Problems and Challenges, in M.M. Wakin (ed), War, Morality and the Military Profession, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979, pp. 129-130.



Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 176.



W. Von Baudissin, Officer Education and the Officer’s Career, Adelphi Papers 103, 1973, p. 39.



R. Zoll, The German Armed Forces, in M. Janowitz and S.D. Wesbrook (eds), The Political Education of Soldiers, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1983, p. 217.



J.W. Hackett, The Military in the Service of the State, in Wakin, op. cit., p. 213.



P. Maslowski, Army Values and American Values, Military Review 70(4), 1990, pp. 15-16.



J.C.T. Downey, Management in the Armed Forces : An Anatomy of the Military Profession, McGraw-Hill, London, 1977, p. 54.



M.M. Wakin, The Ethics of Leadership II, in Wakin, op.cit., p. 9.



Sarkesian, op cit., p. 178.



Ibid., p. 179.



Maslowski, op. cit., p. 15.



Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 186.



D. Krech, S. Crutchfield and E.L. Ballachey, Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social Psychology, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1962, pp. 528 - 530. Conformity is defined as "the yielding of the individual’s judgement or action to group pressure arising from a conflict between his own opinion and that maintained by the group". Independence of judgement refers to "a form of behaviour in the group-pressure situation in which the individual judges and acts mainly on the basis of his own position and is neither unduly susceptible to the group norms nor unduly driven to deviate from them."



Downey, op. cit., p. 197.



Ibid., pp. 197-198.



M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, The Free Press, New York, 1960, p. 430.



F. Agüero, Chile: South America’s Success Story?, Current History 92(572), 1993, p. 133.



Downey, op. cit., p. 92.



J. Bunting, The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional, in L.J. Korb (ed), The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1976, p. 158.



Ibid., p. 158.



J.W. Masland and L.I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars : Military Education and National Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 171.



Janowitz, op. cit., p. 132.



Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 171.



Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Force Academy: Introductory Brief, Unpublished information brochure, 1986, p. 7.



M. Thompson, Who Needs Academies?, Time, April 1994, p. 41.



P.L. Moorcroft, Clausewitz and Sandhurst: Officer Training in Britain, Militaria 8(1), 1978, p. 30.



Ibid., p. 32.



Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 179.



Ibid., p. 184.