INTRODUCTION

Debate on the necessity of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Africa has been prominent during the last three years. With a number of operations underway or completed, the effectiveness, success and future of peacekeeping operations are being assessed. These issues formed the focus of a workshop on peacekeeping organised by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Zimbabwe, held in Harare from 23 to 27 January 1995. Participants were mainly military officers drawn from all over the African continent, many of whom had gained experience participating in peacekeeping operations, representatives from African governments and ministries of Defence and regional and international organisations like the OAU, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The workshop dealt with a variety of themes, moving from larger issues with broader policy implications, to more specific ones such as the practice of conducting peacekeeping operations on the ground. The concept of peacekeeping, past examples and future political scenarios were discussed, while the second half of the workshop concentrated on the discussion of case studies of individual instances of peacekeeping, with the specific aim of highlighting decisions to be taken by individual commanders on the ground.

To some degree, both in terms of delegates and the nature of the debate, the workshop represented a microcosm of ongoing events and discussions on the question of peacekeeping over the last five years. The workshop took place during a crucial period where peacekeeping operations both in Africa and elsewhere could be assessed. On the one hand, changing political, economic and social conditions, some of which were partly brought about through the process of peacekeeping itself, meant that a watershed had been reached. It also implied that the nature of peacekeeping in an African context would have to be considered anew. The changing and possibly new role to be played by African military establishments during this period, was widely debated, although more questions were raised than answers provided.

THE RISE AND FALL OF AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING?

A new cautiousness with regard to the question of peacekeeping on the African continent was implicit in many of the debates. Most of the military staff seemed to argue that political means of achieving peace should firstly be sought before the blue helmets were deployed. The success of a brokered peace deal, such as in Lesotho, was used as example of an alternative to the protracted and costly use of armed forces.

While little was said directly on the theme, it was felt by mainly civilian delegates and especially in private debates, that the high water mark of peacekeeping operations on the African continent had passed. While Somalia had been an unnecessarily messy operation, most countries, excepting eventually France, did not show any desire to get involved in Rwanda, despite the atrocities and the resulting massive loss of life there. Even the French set a time limit on their involvement.

The traditionally protracted nature of internal conflict in Africa and the difficulty in achieving resolutions, were indicated as reasons for limited military involvement. The role of the military in peacekeeping operations was but one of many aspects within a wider strategy to achieve peace, which also included humanitarian and political means. Discussions seemed to imply that military deployment alone was not a solution in itself. The British doctrine of peace support operations further reinforced this notion: peacekeeping was only possible if consent was reached by all the parties to the dispute through mediation by the politicians concerned. If this was not the case and troops were deployed, operations would not be regarded as peacekeeping but as peace enforcement.

AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS?

Another message implied by the proceedings became clear when looking at the primarily African origins of delegates, participants and organisers alike. Furthermore, the message from the West seemed to be that Africans should take charge of their own peacekeeping operations. While these messages were hidden behind terms such as "partnership" and "co-operation", the core elements could not be disguised. This could best be illustrated by the phrase, "We will show you how to do it - so that you can get on with it".

The strongest indication of the desire to get on with the job was shown in the workshop’s concentration on the training and preparation that peacekeeping required. The question whether units should be trained specifically for peacekeeping operations or whether good soldiers could simply be adapted into good peacekeepers, led to a lively debate. Although the debate was polarised by those who thought that training in the techniques of peacekeeping was an "unnecessary softener" for combat troops, many delegates agreed that at least some training was required to ensure that African troops were prepared specifically for peacekeeping operations.

The debate on training was complicated by an additional factor. While the British seemed intent on pushing the notion of specific training to make African soldiers perform more effectively on peacekeeping operations, the British Army itself did not specifically undergo peacekeeping training to the degree of, for example, the Scandinavian countries. This fact was commented on rather wryly by some of the African participants who felt that their own standard of training was being called into question.

It was clear though, that many African nations felt that they did not have the expertise or the equipment to participate effectively in peacekeeping operations. Appeals for funding from the West and suggestions that there should be some system of linkage between individual Western powers and African countries for the supply of equipment were met with an uncertain response. A popular idea expressed at the workshop was that a standby force should be available for deployment anywhere on the African continent to avoid delays, such as in the Rwanda operation. This, however, could not be an exclusively OAU initiative, as the organisation simply does not have the financial means to fund such operations.

THE MARGINALISATION OF A CONTINENT?

Military officers at the workshop, with some notable exceptions, seemed to have little regard for financial issues. Neither the cost of peacekeeping operations, OAU funding, nor the complexities and politics of international aid transfer had any impact on the debates. Discussions of case studies and problems which "[assumed] that we have full funding and the necessary equipment", were useful as practical exercises, but were far from realistic. If the assessments provided by the workshop prove to be accurate, Western involvement on the African continent seems set to decrease, while threats emanating from the continent are likely to continue. Discussions on future threats and challenges made this only too clear. However, the nature of new threats related less to conflict between nations than to conflicts within states. These would be fuelled by ethnic and nationalistic tensions, scarcity of resources and the simple withdrawal or collapse of the African state.

Privately, some African participants expressed fears that the collapse of countries like Nigeria or Zaire, has the potential to upset the stability of whole regions. The continued marginalisation of Africa - now no longer even seen as a Cold War battle ground - and the liberation of South Africa reinforced the impression that the focus of the West had turned elsewhere.

The expected or, as some would argue, continued marginalisation of Africa and her conflict was viewed as serious. To the possible surprise and even outrage of some African politicians, their military staff generally welcomed an assertion, made to stimulate debate, that recolonisation was effective medicine to save the African continent.

ENTER A NEW PLAYER?

If the West were indeed turning their attention elsewhere, Africa would become responsible for the majority of its own peacekeeping operations. When the debate had crystallised far enough, the general solution expressed and agreed upon, both publicly and privately, was that it was time South Africa got involved.

The participation of South African military delegates attracted attention amongst all participants. African delegates seemed enthusiastic that South Africa would at least partially be able to fill the void left by the withdrawing Western powers. Southern African representatives, notably some in the Zimbabwean military and government, were less at ease. Their uncertainty appeared to be based on the fear that a larger role played by South Africa in peacekeeping operations would also herald a period of wider expansion by the "African giant".

On the other hand, the advantage of having South Africa involved went without question. On the whole, African military officers felt that they could supply troops, whereas South African money and equipment, especially heavy transport planes, were regarded as necessary to the success of future African peace operations for which Africa must be solely responsible. This was particularly applicable where a rapid deployment or stand-by force was called for. South African participants, however, were much more cautious. They pointed to the military integration process under-way at home, which prevented any large-scale deployment of South African forces externally. Further-more, it was emphasised that funding was in short supply and internal expenditure was con-centrated on domestic upliftment programmes. South Africa also wanted to avoid creating any impression of attempts at expansion beyond its borders.

FACING THE NEXT CRISIS...

When considering these factors, the possible format of future peacekeeping operations in Africa is evident. If the workshop proceedings serve as an indication, the emphasis in the African context has shifted back to regionally based political and, when required, peacekeeping initiatives. Regional initiatives potentially will be more cost effective and will enable shorter response periods in times of crisis. In turn though, such initiatives will have to rely on leading countries in each region to take the initiative. If these countries fail to do so, or find themselves involved in the conflict, regional undertakings could have limited success and possibly dangerous consequences.

Participants in the workshop agreed that the inherent problems of peacekeeping in Africa pose great and in the opinion of some, even insurmountable challenges for African states. Broad consensus was reached that military involvement in peacekeeping operations was a short-term solution, merely a way of managing conflicts, rather than the panacea it initially promised to be. It was agreed that economic, political and social change would be prerequisites for the success of peacekeeping operations. Without these, peacekeeping initiatives would simply become, in the words of an African participant, "a matter of keeping the lid of the pot on, while being drawn slowly into the stew".