Introduction

The modern defence forces as we know today in Zambia were a colonial creation whose role was initially that of facilitating colonisation and colonial rule. The Northern Rhodesia Regiment was a tool for the domestic task of protecting the British colony and was mainly involved in policing colonial subjects. However, the concept of a defence force predated colonialism. The question of control of the military should be looked at in a longer historical context. Ogot observed that:

“we are not likely to understand the nature and role of the military in post- independence Africa unless we also study the nature and role of the military in pre-colonial as well as colonial Africa.”1

Pre-colonial Zambian societies were generally civilian in which the king, in the case of centralised societies like that of the Ngoni, controlled the use of force. To achieve maximum rewards from the warriors, chiefs and kings maintained some form of direct control of the men who were from time to time called upon to raid other communities and defend their territory from outside attacks. It was through the control of the warriors that chiefs and kings maintained their control of society. The Ngoni in the Eastern Province of Zambia fought many wars before the arrival of the white man. Ngoni warriors, however, did not constitute a standing army in the sense of the modern armies of today. The Ngoni had, however, benefited from Shaka Zulu’s approach to warfare, and that partly explains their success as they moved from South Africa to the north before European armed forces with their superior weapons stopped them in 1898.2

Historically, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment – the forerunner to the Zambian Army – grew out of the Northern Rhodesia Police.3 The Northern Rhodesia Police was established soon after the British South Africa (BSA) Company was granted its charter and began to administer Northern Rhodesia on behalf of the British Crown in 1891. Consequently, the early history of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment forms part of the history of the Northern Rhodesia Police. It was for this reason that even after its establishment, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment remained essentially a military force engaged in mainly constabulary duties of protecting the colonial power.

In 1933, the military functions of the Northern Rhodesia Police were separated from the purely civilian functions. Henceforth, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment grew into a homogeneous unit. It was originally composed of a variety of men, units and traditions, all of which helped to shape its development. The Regiment reflected the BSA Company’s intentions for its establishment. The impact of civilian officials on the Regiment was very visible from the period of its formative stages, which spanned from 1891 to 1933. Arguably, therefore, civil control of the military in Zambia was established at the time of the creation of the armed forces during the colonial period.

What is most significant is that from its inception in 1933, the military leadership accepted and recognised civil control of the defence forces, and this tradition has proved enduring. Although there have been five military coup attempts in Zambia, the military as an institution has never tried to seize control of the government. Even during the period of one-party rule, the nation conducted regularly scheduled political events such as presidential and parliamentary elections. At the peak of the liberation wars, when Zambia suffered bombing raids from the Rhodesian and South African white regimes, the military continued to respect and accept civil control.

That the military leadership accepted civil control and that attempted military coups were successfully put down by loyalist soldiers, is testimony that the Zambian people, both civilian and military, accepted that civil control of the military is an essential aspect of democracy. From the time that Zambia attained its independence in October 1964 there was a conviction that public policy should be decided by the majority and be subject to the rule of law. Essentially, therefore, civil control of the defence forces has helped to develop a culture that ensures that decisions concerning defence policy do not compromise fundamental democratic values.

Civil-military relations in Zambia are governed by certain criteria, which over time have determined and influenced governmental structures. These criteria include civilian leadership of the executive branch of government, and judicial defence of civil control of the defence forces.

Perhaps a definition of civil–military relations is required for clarity purposes. The following definition takes into account the premise that there an institution exists that properly fits the definition of an army, and that this institution is a sub-society of a larger society in which the civilian population is a majority. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn define military institutions as those institutions with a monopoly of arms, whose expertise are in the management of violence and possess a strong sense of corporate identity that creates a purposive force.4 Civilians are those persons, constituting a majority, who are not engaged in military activities. Arising from this, civil–military relations can be defined as the interaction between military institutions and civil authorities. Such interaction is critical to the process of nation building in an evolving democracy.

Yet another useful definition of civil–military relations is one that seeks to explain the interaction between civil authorities and the defence forces in terms of the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a given country. The main concern here is to measure and evaluate the relative influence of military officers and civil authorities in decisions of the state concerning war, internal security, external defence and military policy in the country. The USAID Centre for Democracy and Governance further explains that civil–military relations function in relation to a particular political system. Thus, according to Claude Welch and Johanna Mendelson, while civil control of the defence forces is an essential aspect of democracy, it is difficult to achieve and maintain.

Civilian leadership during the colonial period

From 1924 when the Colonial Office took over direct administration of Northern Rhodesia up to independence in October 1964, the governor, who was appointed by the Queen, was the commander-in-chief of the defence forces in the territory. Throughout the colonial period, the commander-in-chief was a civilian. Governors were removed and replaced through established civilian procedures in the Colonial Office. The defence forces for their part accepted and recognised this civil control of the Regiment.

Civil control of the defence forces was further strengthened through the Ministry of Defence, which oversaw all policy issues regarding defence. This was accomplished through the office of the Secretary for Home Affairs during the colonial period. The governor appointed all personnel in the Secretariat. Arguably, therefore, the civilian chief executive stood at the head of the military chain of command during the colonial period. He was supported by the civilian subordinates who were in charge of the day to day activities of the military.5

Civil control of the defence forces after independence, 1964–1973

In Zambia, the defence forces fall under three categories. These are the Zambia Army (ZA), the Zambia Air Force (ZAF) and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). The ZNS was used to train a large number of Zambians for military duty in response to the military threat arising out of the liberation wars in neighbouring countries. It combined military training and training in agricultural skills. Those trained under the ZNS were expected to contribute to both the security of the nation as well as to the production of food for the nation. Because of this dual role, the ZNS created a bridge between defence force personnel and civilians.

After independence in 1964, the new government maintained the colonial tradition of the defence forces’ subordination to civilian political authority. Two years after independence, former President Kenneth D Kaunda reminded the Third Battalion of the Zambia Regiment in Kabwe that:

“Under our constitution, the right is given to the people of Zambia to elect their own government. This is legally exercised at the general elections and, in the same manner, the people can reject a government during properly constituted elections. Constitutionally, therefore, your role is to be loyal and to protect and defend the constitution of the land as well as other institutions emanating from the provisions of the Constitution.”6

The defence forces were therefore expected to respect the young democracy. Former President Kaunda’s speech was prompted by events elsewhere in Africa where the defence forces had taken over constitutionally elected governments through military coups.

Civilian oversight was achieved in part by the Defence Council, originally established in 1955 and adapted for the post-colonial situation. After 1964, the membership of the Defence Council included the President, the Minister of Finance and the commanders of the Army and the Air Force.

However, some of the problems associated with the constabulary role of the defence forces spilled into the independence period. For most of the colonial period, Africans perceived the defence forces as a tool for their oppression by the colonial government. This view was strengthened by the defence forces’ role in an uprising in June 1964. Alice Lenshina, leader the Lumpa Church in the Chinsali District of the Northern Province, advised her followers not to participate in politics. This led to clashes between members of the Lumpa Church and followers of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in some parts of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The high-handedness with which the government dealt with the problem created ill feeling among the people. The people of parts of the Northern and Eastern provinces developed very unfriendly attitudes towards the defence forces.

For these reasons, as well as the fact that the top leadership of the defence forces were white, Africans never trusted the defence forces. At independence, the Zambian government found itself with the task of transforming the defence force from a colonial force created to serve the interest of the colonial authorities to one that would serve the interest of the independent government.7 Due to the nature and background of the colonial defence force, it was British officered. Consequently, and perhaps taking lessons from the experience of Tanzania which experienced an army mutiny in January 1964, the Zambian government decided to ‘Zambianise’ the top positions fairly early on. To achieve this, President Kaunda had to quickly promote Zambian officers to enable him to replace the British officers. This was inevitable because of the on-going liberation wars in the region and a genuine fear that British officers were sympathetic to white regimes in the countries where Africans were yet to be independent. This development was complemented by other measures aimed at ‘Zambianising’ defence matters in the country.

One of the changes was the opening up of the Combined Cadet Force to Africans. From January 1964, steps were taken to form a cadet force in all schools that was non-racial – previously cadets had been for white children only. This opened a window for the civilian population into the military world. The cadets mixed with soldiers under whom they trained and learnt military discipline, and some of them took up military careers when they completed school.

Civil control of the military during the Second Republic, 1973–1991

The political change from the multiparty system inherited at independence to the one-party state system of government in 1973 did not significantly alter civil–military relations from a constitutional point of view. The president remained the head of both the executive wing of government and the military affairs of the nation. If anything, the president became more powerful in exercising his powers regarding the control of the defence forces.

However, many changes took place in the management and organisation of defence. Military personnel, including army commanders who were considered insufficiently submissive to the ruling UNIP, were either retired ‘in the public interest’, or were sent into the foreign service. Civil control of the defence forces was very strong during this period. Since the defence forces were expected to play a significant role in the one-party participatory democracy of the Second Republic, the government initiated a number of measures to facilitate civil–military interaction. The opening up of the Cadet Force to Africans and later the introduction of the Zambia Youth Service, with a military component, were among such measures.

During the Second Republic, however, civil–military relations became strained because the defence forces were used to enforce politically motivated policies that were generally unpopular. Furthermore, there was lack of contact between defence force personnel and the civilian population. From the time that the defence forces were established, military personnel were confined to barracks and operational areas, both of which were generally out of bounds to the civilian population. This situation naturally led to suspicion and mistrust. Civilians perceived the defence forces as a society of self-centred and heartless people trained to fight and kill. There was nothing to be gained by interacting with them. They were to be avoided at all costs. These views developed during the colonial period, but stuck in the minds of the people long after independence.

The politicisation of the defence forces

Jacques van Doorn8 has identified four types of civil–military relations in which the armed forces are regarded as an embodiment of a legitimate political order. The politicisation of the military in the Second Republic fits into the third type of civil–military relations, where the legitimacy of the armed forces no longer reflects a spirit of nationalism in general, but a political ideology. The military identify themselves with a political myth, for which they receive in return recognition of their task to defend and extend the political system. In the Zambian case, the defence forces identified themselves with the political myth that one-party participatory democracy was an alternative form of democracy, which the defence forces had to defend.9

As chief executive of the civilian government formed by the only legal party in the country, and Commander-in-Chief of the Zambia Defence Forces, Former President Kaunda deliberately politicised the military. Party organs commonly referred to as Works Committees found their way into the barracks. Members of the defence forces enhanced their chances for political appointment by becoming party members and being loyal to the authorities. Although promotion adhered to laid down procedures, appointment to positions of authority within the defences forces reflected a deliberate attempt on the part of appointing authorities to promote those believed to be loyal to UNIP.

The politicisation of the defence forces affected the professional conduct of defence force personnel. In some cases, it even affected the military chain of command because some officers were appointed to civilian positions, which were superior to their senior officers. Some army officers were appointed as district governors ‘to oversee the running of the party’.10 While this development could be seen as positive in that it assisted in narrowing the gap between military personnel and the civilian population, it actually led to apprehension among the rank and file in the defence forces.

The negative impact of this development in the context of this paper is that the defence forces became increasingly hostile to any suggestion of professional conduct and call for improvement. This was expressed through defence force hostility to criticism from the public. This hostility was worsened by the national intelligence network, which ensured that no dissent was tolerated. In the end, army officers who were appointed to run for political offices where ordinarily civilians would have been appointed, were seen as informers and were not trusted by the civilian community. Arguably, therefore, civil–military relations deteriorated.

Former President Kaunda’s politicisation of the army went beyond appointing defence force personnel to civilian positions. In keeping with his strategy of controlling the defence forces, political education was introduced in the defence forces. Members of parliament (MPs) questioned the wisdom of this, since doing so could undermine the professional conduct of the defence forces.11

In some cases the defence forces were used in civilian governance, such as when government decided to hand over the administration of the Mechanical Services Department (MSD) to the military. The government put this arrangement in place because there were reports of theft in the MSD. It was hoped that under military administration, pilfering would be reduced. All civilians employed by the MSD were subjected to military discipline. However, there was little improvement and the defence force was eventually withdrawn from the institution. The style of administration by the military at the MSD seems to have created hostility between the military and the civilian personnel.

The use of military personnel in civilian institutions was seen as a conspiracy between former President Kaunda and a few privileged military officers to oppress the majority. Consequently, civilians and the disgruntled military officers teamed up to remove the Kaunda regime from office on several occasions. These coup attempts were nipped in the bud because of the well-structured intelligence network, which covered even the military institutions.

The incidence of these coup attempts contributed to poor civil–military relations during the Second Republic. It is plausible to suggest that the politicisation of the military did little to improve civil–military relations and certainly worsened relations between the military and the civilian population.

When UNIP lost the multiparty elections in 1991, the officers who were heading civilian institutions were recalled. However, most chose to retire from the defence forces because they found it difficult to fit back in. A number of such officers became actively involved in politics and some became MPs.

Quasi-military institutions and their role in civil–military relations

Soon after independence, the Zambian government amended the law to facilitate the admission of Africans into the Combined Cadet Force. As noted already, the idea was to bring the military closer to the civilian population, and to attract children to learn military discipline and consider a career in the defence forces.

Another quasi-military institution that brought civilians and military personnel closer together was the Home Guard Unit. It was established under the Home Guard Act No. 32 of 1971. The Home Guard Unit was meant to assist the military in dealing with security concerns, which arose as a result of insufficient military personnel in border areas. It is important to place the establishment of the unit in its proper historical context. It was a way in which Zambia’s commitment to the liberation movements in neighbouring Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe would be secured. The unit also functioned to promote contact between civilians and military personnel.

The unit consisted of Zambian volunteers, both men and women, aged between 18 and 45. These civilians from all walks of life performed specific military roles under the direct supervision of military personnel. From time to time, they were exposed to rudimentary training in some military tactics and the handling of weapons.

The civilian members of the Home Guard Unit provided much needed intelligence reports in the operational zones regarding the movements of enemy soldiers. Undoubtedly, close co-operation between the military and the civilian community was achieved.

The Home Guard Unit was most active during the 1970s and 1980s when the liberation wars in the region were at their peak. Although the act is still in force, the unit is no longer functional. Nonetheless, the government can invoke the act and call upon Zambians for Home Guard duty if the security of the nation is ever seriously under threat.

In addition to the Home Guard Unit, retired military personnel from the Army and the Air Force form a reserve force to be called upon when there is need. Retired military personnel are an important link between the military and the civilian world. Because of their special training, they are a valuable source of public relations for the defence forces and can be used to improve civil–military relations. Sadly, in the Third Republic many retired military personnel are disgruntled as a result of having received poor retirement benefits, which were not paid on time. Undoubtedly, such a demotivated reserve force cannot be relied upon in times of need.

Civil–military relations in the Third Republic

Evidently, the politicisation of the defence forces and especially the introduction of the Home Guard Unit in 1971 facilitated some close ties between military personnel and the civilian population. Yet, despite this development, former President Kaunda’s one-party participatory democracy suffered four attempted military coups in 1976, 1980, 1986 and 1990. The incidence of these coup attempts raised questions about the state of civil–military relations in Zambia, and the professionalism of the defence forces.

Consequently, when the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) came to power in October 1991 under President Frederick T J Chiluba, it proceeded to professionalise the defence forces. The MMD believed that only a professional defence force would defend the constitution and protect the ethos of democracy. In the view of the MMD government, the defence forces should be politically neutral and truly under civil control.

The first step taken by the MMD government to bring the military under closer civil control was the decision that Ministry of Defence Estimates of Expenditure would be subject to parliamentary debate and scrutiny. This was a clear departure from past practice. In 1993, the Estimates of Expenditure for the Ministry of Defence were debated in parliament for the first time in the history of the Zambia Defence Forces. This development was complemented by the introduction of a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, National Security and Defence. The reforms are expected to facilitate improvements in civil–military relations in Zambia and enable civilians, both in and outside parliament, to debate military expenditure and other related issues without the fear of being accused of undermining national security, as was the case in the Second Republic.12 No doubt, the reforms reflect the democratic environment of the Third Republic, and facilitate the professionalisation of the defence forces with a view to improving civil–military relations.

Civil control of the defence forces in the Third Republic has also been reinforced through the strengthening of the Defence Council, which is now composed of the Minister of Defence, who is the Chairperson; the Minister of Home Affairs; the Minister of Legal Affairs; the Minister of Finance, a ruling party representative; the Commanders of the Army, Airforce and Zambia National Service; the Inspector General of Police; and the Director of Intelligence, who serves as the secretary. The Minister of Defence ordinarily chairs meetings of the Defence Council. However, when there are security matters that require the President’s attention as Commander-in-Chief, he chairs the meeting.

The Defence Council regularly meets to deal with matters pertaining to promotion of defence force personnel and submits names of those recommended for promotion for the assent of the president. The commanders of the various wings of the defence forces are responsible for the day to day affairs of their forces, but the Defence Council is responsible for advising the president regarding policy matters.

The role of civil control of the defence forces in a democracy is also enshrined in the current constitution of Zambia. In the first instance, this is founded in the powers conferred on the president as commander-in-chief. These include:

the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces;



the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make appointments or promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss any member of the armed forces.13

Furthermore, this civil control of the defence forces is regulated by parliament, which oversees the exercise of the powers conferred upon the president. In essence, therefore, the democratic principles of the country ensure civil control of the defence forces.

Civil control of the defence forces are meant to guard against military subversion while ensuring that military strategy remains a tool of national political goals under the civilian government. To this end, the executive branch of government plays a significant role in maintaining civil control of the military, while the legislative branch of government maintains a strong influence in military affairs. This is achieved through the principle of separation of powers, an essential element in democracy.

Attempted coups and their impact on civil–military relations

At least two of the five coup attempts in Zambia were engineered by an alliance of civilians and military personnel. The first two attempts were uncovered before they were executed.

The 1980 coup attempt was allegedly engineered by civilians who were influential and wealthy, but unhappy with former President Kaunda’s economic policies. The civilians were well-placed businesspersons. They are alleged to have instigated Zambia Army senior personnel to overthrow the government. The coup plotters were arrested, tried and sentenced to death in January 1983. However, on 25 July 1990 they were pardoned following the commuting of their sentences to life imprisonment.14

Civilians and military personnel conspired again to overthrow the government in 1988 and were again put on trial, although they benefited from a general amnesty for all political prisoners on 25 July 1990. Both the 1980 and 1988 coup attempts were plotted with civilian influence and participation – an aspect of civil–military relations which has escaped the imagination of civil–military relations analysts. Those involved in these two attempts were people occupying privileged positions and enjoying high social status. The defence force personnel were senior defence force officers who also enjoyed high social status.

In contrast, Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe’s coup attempt of 30 June 1990 and that by Captain Stephen Lungu (alias Captain ‘Solo’) on 28 October 1997, were led by relatively junior army officers. These two attempts do not appear to have been engineered by civilians. In both cases, the coup plotters announced their actions on Radio Zambia, but loyalist forces crushed them both after fighting and loss of life.15

The background to the October 28 ‘Solo’ coup attempt during the Third Republic can be found in the intolerance of some members of opposition parties who did not have the patience to follow democratic channels to address their grievances. Sadly, former President Kaunda contributed to this state of affairs by threatening violence and stating that there was going to be an uprising by Zambians against the MMD government.

On 27 October 1997, he was reported to have said “something big will come and of course MMD will blame UNIP for that ... But it won’t be UNIP. It will be the people of Zambia who are going to act.”16 The former President did not disclose the nature of the explosion. However, on Tuesday 28 October 1997 Captain Stephen Lungu, following the footsteps of his traditional cousin, Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe, announced on the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio 2 and 4 that the army had taken over the government. He further announced that all defence force service chiefs had been dismissed and appealed to President Chiluba to surrender. Captain Lungu claimed that he was representing the National Redemption Council, a political wing of the defence force. There is no evidence that such a council was ever put in place.

Soldiers loyal to the government thwarted the coup attempt. At the end of the attempted coup, about 40 soldiers were arrested. More were picked up in the course of the week. President Chiluba addressed the nation on both radio and television to assure the nation that the constitutionally elected government was still in power. He thanked the soldiers who quelled the coup attempt. Several military personnel and civilians were arrested and tried. Former President Kaunda was arrested on treason charges. All the civilians were later released when they were found to have no case to answer, and former President Kaunda was also released.

Consequent to the coup attempt, the government declared a State of Emergency on 29 October 1997, which was supported by the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Unity Party for Democrats (UPD), although opposed by UNIP and the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC). The State of Emergency lasted until 24 March 1998.

The civilian reaction to the 1997 failed coup demonstrated two perceptions of the defence forces. On the one hand, the instigators of the coup were seen as villains, while the loyalist soldiers who crushed the coup were regarded as heroes. However, because no coup has ever succeeded in Zambia, the defence forces have largely been considered the defenders of democracy and the constitution, amid changing political circumstances. This view is supported by the fact that all the attempted coups in Zambia did not enjoy much support in the defence forces. Both the Luchembe and ‘Solo’ coup attempts were not followed by massive support from the barracks around the country. The coup attempts failed because only a handful of soldiers were involved.

Nevertheless, the Luchembe and ‘Solo’ coup attempts were a reflection of serious political tensions. The general view was that the failure by government to respond to political demands by opposition politicians in the political arena influenced some soldiers to seek changes using unconstitutional methods. It is important to point out that the response by Zambians to the two coup attempts was different. The Luchembe coup attempt received a lot of support from the civilians because it came at a time when Zambians wanted President Kaunda out of State House. Zambians greeted the ‘Solo’ coup attempt with contempt.

Although there were some misgivings over the 1996 Presidential and parliamentary elections, boycotted by UNIP, there was a general feeling that a coup was not the answer. Even Lieutenant Luchembe, leader of the failed coup attempt in 1990, joined those who condemned the 1997 coup attempt. In his view, the era of military take-overs was long gone. He argued that there was no cause for them because democracy was in place.17

It is difficult to say with certainty whether conditions for a coup have been removed from the political scene in Zambia. Although the MMD government made deliberate attempts to professionalise the defence forces, there are still signs that this attempt has received only lip service.

Reports of delayed salaries for soldiers and delayed payment of retirement benefits could easily be used as rallying points for a coup plot. Coupled with the politicians’ failure to deal with issues of poverty and good governance, the problems in the defence forces outlined above may become a real threat.18 Arguably, the prevention of coup attempts seems to lie in finding lasting solutions to economic and political problems in the country.

Conclusion

The paper has examined several areas in which civil–military relations have been exercised and it has demonstrated that at times, relations between the military and the civilian community have been characterised by suspicion and mistrust. However, through quasi-military institutions, civil–military relations were generally improved.

Civil control of the military has also been reasonably effective, particularly in the Third Republic. Zambia is, and has been, surrounded by neighbouring countries that have been at war. Both former President Kaunda and President Chiluba exercised maximum restraint in military affairs, in the interest of the civilian community.

Arguably, therefore, civil control of the military has not only been a catalyst for good civil–military relations, but has also been largely responsible for ensuring that the military in Zambia plays the role of defenders of the constitution and other institutions emanating from it.

Notes

B.A Ogot (ed.), War and society in Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.



On the suppression of the Ngoni by a European force, see B Phiri, A history of Indians in Eastern Province of Zambia, Lusaka: High Quality Printers, 2000, pp 8-10.



See W.V. Brelsford, The story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1954, pp 22.



G. Harries-Jenkens and J van Doorn, Editorial Introduction, in G. Harries-Jenkens and J van Doorn (eds.) The military and the problem of legitimacy, California and London: SAGE Publications, 1976, p 3.



C. Welch and J. Mendelson, Civil-military relations: USAID’s role, Washington DC, Centre for Democracy and Governance, July 1998, p.1.



J.J. Mphaisah (ed), The state of the nation Vol. 1 politics and governance, Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation 1988, p 172.



For a detailed discussion on the origins and purpose of the colonial army see, M.F. Oke, The Army in Africa, Africa Quarterly 9(1), pp 23-32



J van Doorn, The military and the crisis of legitimacy, in G. Harries-Jenkins and J van Doorn (eds.), The military and the problem of legitimacy, California and London: SAGE Publications, 1976, p 26.



See B.J.Phiri Zambia: The myth and realities of ‘one-party participatory democracy’, Geneva-Africa, 29(2), 1991, p 21.0



P.M. Wele, Zambia’s most famous dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe, Solwezi: PMW, 1995, p.iii.



National Assembly of Zambia Parliamentary Debates, p 661-662, Lusaka, 1988.



G. H.M. Haantobolo, The role of the Zambian legislature in the transformation of the Zambian Defence Forces 1964-2000, p 22, A draft paper submitted to the African Civil-Military Relations Project, June 2000.



The Constitution of Zambia, CAP 1 Section 54 (2).



B.S. Chisala, Lt. Luchembe coup attempt, Lusaka: Multimedia, 1991, p 34.



Ibid.



KK warns of explosion, The Post, Monday 27 October 1997.



Times of Zambia, 30 October 1997.



Anonymous, Squabbling politicians arouse fears of military coup, Zambian News Online (2), 27 September 1996, <http://www.sas.upenn.edu/ African_Studies/Newsletters/zno2.html8>