The control over shared borders has become increasingly important as a result of the international trend towards the establishment of free trade areas. While opening up for trade, most of the free trade groupings have concomitantly relinquished border control restrictions for the crossborder movement of their own citizens across internal borders, and have tightened controls at external borders. Border controls must not be seen as preventing the crossborder movement of people and goods, but rather as assistance in regulating orderly legal movement. The free movement of goods and people is essential, for example, if SADC wishes to move towards a free trade area, and to grow and prosper. This article will use recent developments in South Africa to demonstrate the challenges facing the country in implementing effective border control. By implication, it also illustrates the challenges facing SADC in implementing its Protocol on Trade and the region’s free trade area launched in 2000. The total liberalisation of the SADC market is expected by 2012. In this process, free trade must be effectively reconciled with appropriate border control.

Introduction

In the context of globalisation and the general international movement towards free trade areas or collective trading blocs (economic integration), the control over shared borders has become increasingly important. The opening up of economies and markets (trade liberalisation) has largely been accompanied by the increased mobility of labour across borders. In addition, the 1990s have also seen the lifting of political restrictions on the movement of people in many regions of the world, specifically in former East Bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of South Africa, the April 1994 democratic elections saw the country rejoin the international community with the consequent increased movement of goods and people. Migratory flows have also been encouraged by the improvement of transport infrastructures.

However, while opening up for trade, most of the free trade groupings have concomitantly relinquished border control restrictions for the crossborder movement of their own citizens across internal borders (the ‘open borders’ concept), and tightened controls at all the external borders of the specific trading bloc. Examples include the Schengen Treaty for Western Europe, the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (United States, Canada and Mexico), and developments in Mercosur in South America. The proposed Protocol on the Free Movement of People in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of 1995 had initially also put forward an ‘open borders’ concept — SADC citizens having free movement within SADC — while calling for the ‘hardening’ of the external borders of SADC member states to the movement of people from third-party states.

In the modern world, border controls must not be seen as preventing the crossborder movement of people, but rather as assistance in regulating the orderly legal movement of people wanting to migrate either temporarily or permanently. Immigration controls are there to regulate this movement. The free movement of goods and people is essential, for example, if SADC wishes to move towards a free trade area, and to grow and prosper.

The SADC Protocol on Trade came into force on 25 January 2000. It is aimed at boosting development through increased trade between member countries resulting from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as at increasing investment flows. The free trade area was subsequently launched on 1 September 2000, starting a process that will take an estimated eight years to complete. Subject to global developments, the total liberalisation of the SADC market is expected by 2012. But how should free trade be reconciled with effective border control?

This article will use recent developments in South Africa to demonstrate the challenges facing the country in implementing effective border control and, by implication, illustrate the challenges that face SADC.

In recent times in a number of countries, there has been a greater emphasis on stricter border controls — the physical hardening of the borderline by means of improved surveillance technology. However, as physical borders are hardened — for example, the borderline between border posts — so pressure on ports of entry increases. Inevitably, one response has been the tightening of controls at ports of entry, among others by placing additional personnel and inspectors to deal with migrants attempting to enter a country illegally through such ports of entry instead of trying to penetrate hardened borders. This requires more intensive training in document inspection, in turn, so that border officers can better recognise and intercept fraudulent documents. In addition, further equipment is needed (for example, mobile x-ray machines or air-analysis equipment) to inspect cargo vehicles, since these are often used by smugglers to bring in undocumented migrants (in false compartments or hidden spaces among cargo or goods).

Finally, the process of hardening borders usually makes use of a second line of defence. This takes the form of a network of permanent and roving highway checkpoints or roadblocks on roads leading away from a border, and includes targeted inspections of obvious transporters such as minibus taxis in the case of aid to undocumented or illegal migrants.¹

This kind of tightening of controls at borders is usually accompanied by legislative reform to improve detection, apprehension and removal (for example, the setting up of mobile immigration courts to deal expeditiously with migrants). Furthermore, enhanced controls and improved vigilance raise the consequences of attempting illegal entry. In the case of the US, legislation made illegal re-entry a felony. By aggressively disrupting and dismantling illegal migrant-smuggling rings, the authorities were able to put pressure on the smugglers. This resulted in their services from Mexico becoming more expensive and scarce. The tougher prosecution of these smugglers coincidentally also curbed the activities of other criminals, for example, drug smugglers.

The border situation in South Africa post-1994

South Africa opened up internationally after the April 1994 elections and was exposed to global trends. It was influenced economically, politically and socially, and became vulnerable to crime to a far greater extent than before when the country sought to isolate itself from the region and from the international community. This had an effect not only on the policing of the country’s borders, but also on the activities of crime syndicates active in the crossborder smuggling of drugs, illegal immigrants, firearms and other goods, as well as on the illegal export of stolen cars and endangered species.

Since 1994, much of the efforts of the South African Police Service (SAPS), specifically those of the border police component, have been directed at dealing with the increase in these activities, particularly those of an organised nature. Efforts mainly centred around the tightening of controls at all ports of entry and the co-ordination of interdepartmental activities. Crossborder co-operation was enhanced after the establishment of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO). Moreover, the Organised Crime Investigation Units of the SAPS (national and provincial) established co-operation with neighbouring countries, particularly with Swaziland, Mozambique and Lesotho. Border police were now permanently represented on five bi/trilateral forums with neighbouring countries, while close co-operation has been established with Interpol and border control training agencies abroad.

After the launch of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) on 23 May 1996, and the establishment of an interdepartmental approach to policing the border and the combating of transnational crime, the South African border police initiated the National Interdepartmental Structure (NIDS) for border control at the end of 1997. The three major roleplayers, the Department of Home Affairs, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), including customs and excise, and the SAPS, work closely together within the framework of the NIDS to establish more effective border control.

In addition, a number of other initiatives were launched specifically to combat organised crossborder crime. During 1996, in an effort to address the existing fragmentation and lack of co-ordination, the Border Affairs Co-ordinating Committee (BACC) was initiated by the border police. Furthermore, to assist efforts to combat organised crime, a number of specific partnerships with other departments and the private sector were launched, among others the Customs Law Enforcement Task Group for the co-ordination and exchange of information about border control and the movement of goods, focusing on the non-payment of customs duties and the smuggling of goods. The Business Against Crime Border Control Project aims at the improvement of the regulation of the illegal movement of persons and goods in and out of the country through enhancing the control of ports of entry and instituting the co-ordinated management of border control. The Money Laundering Forum focuses on consultation with and the exchange of information between the banking fraternity, the insurance industry and government agencies.

Crime and borders

Some of the most important motivations for the enhancement and tightening of border controls have been the growth in crossborder crime, the globalisation of the activities of organised crime syndicates and the international dimensions of crimes such as gun-running, drug-smuggling and money-laundering. The concerns of policing agencies are that criminals may exploit the illegal entry and exit of migrants by hiding themselves in this movement, and that goods may easily move illegally across uncontrolled or poorly policed borders with high levels of porousness. These fears have been the basis for many of the calls for stricter controls at borders.

Humanitarian concerns about the trafficking and smuggling of people have also prompted supporting calls for the better screening of and control over migratory movements. This concern has also partially been based on the fact that people who are smuggled are themselves exploited and will more than likely end up in bondage or will be forced to participate in criminal activities in the country of their destination.

The current problems in South Africa with the illegal movement of goods, contraband and people — the sheer magnitude of flows that have dramatically increased since 1994 — graphically demonstrate that, without proper border control, crime will continue to increase in South Africa. As SADC moves towards a free trade area, this presents the region with a number of challenges.

The spinoffs of weak or poor controls at borders and ports of entry include the proliferation of firearms and drugs, increased criminal activity by organised crime and international syndicates, the entry of smuggled goods and contraband, fraud through non-payment of customs and excise duties, round-tripping of vehicles and other manufactured goods, and many more. Although lax controls and the porousness of borders do not cause these criminal activities, they create the space to pursue them with greater ease. Although insufficient data exists on the extent and exact size of the problem, it was estimated in 1997 that the value of illegal goods crossing South Africa’s borders was in the order of US $2.5 billion.² Such illegal movement obviously represents an enormous loss to the South African fiscus in terms of revenue and customs and excise duties through the non-declaration of values or the provision of false values and forged manifests. This has also impacted negatively on international investor confidence, apart from other serious effects such as deaths as a result of firearm crime, increased health hazards, drug use and other social effects.

Although it is difficult to prioritise specific crimes, the present flow of drugs and weapons and the illegal movement of motor vehicles are possibly the most serious crime problems facing South Africa. All three are linked to the crossborder movement of people and the exploitation of porous borders. From the mid-1990s onwards, in recognition of this situation, a number of initiatives were launched to tighten controls over the country’s borders.

Reforming and restructuring of border policing

The issue of border control was recognised during the 1993 constitutional negotiations as a policing priority. By the beginning of 1995, the situation on the country’s borders had become of extreme concern to the top management of the new SAPS (see map of land, sea and air ports of entry on p 94 for an indication of the extent of South Africa’s borders). Accordingly, and as part of the whole restructuring and transformation process then under way, the Technical Subcommittee on Border Control was appointed. A clear delineation of responsibilities was the first obvious task.

In its reports, the Technical Subcommittee argued that the SAPS should be responsible for policing all international borders and internationally accepted ports of entry (land border posts, airports and harbours). The implication was that the police would control border entry and crossing points and not the whole borderline as such. For its part, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was responsible for protecting the security of the country and the integrity of the borderline. The Subcommittee further argued that border policing should be recognised as a specialised task and that specialised training should be provided. Members of a border police unit should receive targeted training that would enable them to perform their task efficiently and effectively. The Subcommittee concluded that there was a need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the control of South Africa’s borders. It recommended that the border police should be established as an independent national component of the SAPS. It should not fall under the respective provincial commissioners, but co-ordinators should be appointed in each province. Local border posts and ports of entry should also not be controlled by the local station commissioner. This recommendation aimed specifically to avoid the use of border police for other policing duties and the siphoning off of their equipment and resources to other areas.

At the end of 1995, the national border policing component was set up within the Division: National Safety Services of the SAPS. The component was divided into four sub-components: land border posts, sea/coastal/harbours, airports, and internal tracing units (ITUs). These structures were established at the beginning of 1996, followed by specialised training and recruitment from within existing SAPS structures.

The ready acceptance of the national border policing component was a sign that the importance was recognised of properly policed borders within a nationally integrated policy framework. This was doubly important in the light of the increasing threats from organised crime and international criminal syndicates, the increased flows of illegal goods and contraband, and the growth in the numbers of illegal or undocumented migrants entering South Africa in search of employment and a better economic future for themselves.

Regional co-operation

Better regional co-operation had already resulted from South Africa’s acceptance into and membership of SADC in July 1995. By the beginning of 1996, the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee had begun to build co-operation on a regional basis, while interstate police co-operation received a substantial boost with the establishment of SARPCCO. Initial co-operation focused on particular crime types, for example, the illegal trade in weapons and the smuggling of vehicles across borders. However, co-operation has been hampered by the absence of an effective regional intelligence-sharing capacity. Moreover, the border policing function in all neighbouring states has also been and remains severely under-resourced. A number of joint interstate operations such as Operations Rachel in Mozambique have subsequently been undertaken with substantial success.

National Crime Prevention Strategy

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) identified an approach consisting of four pillars with seventeen national programmes as a framework for crime prevention.³ The fourth pillar dealt with transnational crime and contained two national programmes, Transnational Organised Crime, and Border Control and Ports of Entry. Among the specific aims of this pillar were:

"To address the ease with which commodities can be smuggled across borders



The development of focussed capacity for regulation of ports of entry



To improve co-ordination between South African agencies responsible for border regulation and the control of ports of entry



The development of a policy on immigration, in order to restrict illegal immigration into South Africa within the co-operative framework of the SADC



The mobilisation of policing resources on a regional basis, to address crime syndicates which utilise neighbouring territories



To enhance co-operation between security agencies in the region, allowing for joint operations, crossborder pursuit and the exchange of crime intelligence."⁴

A crucial acknowledgement in the NCPS National Programme on Border Control was that the co-operation between different departments involved in border control at a functional level needed urgent attention. Moreover, the establishment of monitoring mechanisms was urgently required so that more accurate information could be provided on the extent of crossborder crime and the irregular or illegal crossborder movement of people (illegal or undocumented migrants). In particular, the programme was tasked to examine the reasons for the inadequate control of a number of key ports of entry. As lead department, the Department for Safety and Security was also tasked to establish an interdepartmental task team to co-ordinate a policy response to deal with issues of border control and transnational crime.

Interdepartmental task team initiatives

As mentioned earlier, the Department for Safety and Security initiated the Border Affairs Co-ordinating Committee (BACC) in July 1996. The formation of this committee was aimed at reaching consensus on policy approaches, as well as getting the various departmental roleplayers involved in border control to talk to one another at management level. Monthly meetings were held, but co-operation foundered at times on inter-departmental rivalries and uncertainties about control responsibilities, as well as the absence of specific role clarification and the division of accountability among the different departments.

The process of implementing improved border control as mandated in the NCPS was taken further with the submission of a report by the border police/National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC) in October 1996 to the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence. It was subsequently tabled before cabinet.

In the meantime, an assessment report by US experts of the situation on South Africa’s borders was also tabled. The report concluded that there appeared to be a disjointed border control command structure in South Africa that covered all functions, not just the policing aspect. One of their main recommendations was for:

"the creation of one unified Border Police Command, with divisions including Immigration, Customs, Internal Investigations and Border Control."⁵

Another finding included in this assessment was that one of the challenges facing border control was the:

"volumes pertaining to the movement of both cargo and persons, illegal crosses, the smuggling of firearms, vehicles and drugs. Contraband and ‘round tripping’ seems to be the order of the day."⁶

Furthermore, the American assessment team found that security arrangements at major airports were problematic, since they were mainly controlled by private sector organisations such as the Airports Company and that no standard criteria were enforced. Moreover, it was found that virtually no border control systems were in place at the smaller airports. At seaports, staffing remained a problem. With the exception of the police, the other agencies responsible for border control were not physically situated in the confines of the harbour areas. A general lack of security left the ports vulnerable to the smuggling of people, goods, weapons and drugs. Border control at South Africa’s harbours had to rely on the premises and facilities provided for such functions by companies such as Portnet. The report concluded that the overall situation on the country’s land, sea and air borders was lamentable.⁷ These observations, recommendations and conclusions served as the basis for the document elaborating on the collective approach, which was tabled at the NCPS Ministers Forum, submitted to the directors-general of the three departments concerned and ratified by cabinet on 30 April 1997.

The ‘collective approach’ was always seen as an interim arrangement and a first step in the reorganisation of border control functions in South Africa. Cabinet accepted that it would be necessary to carry out further investigations that could inform its decisions on the future of an optimal structure for more effective border control based on two scenarios:

a focused single border control agency; or



border control as a co-operative venture between functionally independent units located in different government departments.

On 5 May 1997, an inaugural meeting between the head of the border police, the head of immigration of the Department of Home Affairs and the head of customs and excise of SARS was held. The establishment of the National Interdepartmental Structure (NIDS) for border control was approved at the meeting. During May 1997, joint pilot operations were launched at ports of entry such as Operation Sentinel at Durban harbour.⁸

National interdepartmental structure for border control

With the acceptance of the collective approach by cabinet in April 1997, steps were taken to implement a national structure that would result in border control being undertaken on a more organised and co-ordinated basis. The acceptance of such a national structure not only put into place a collective approach to border control, but also officially formalised a co-operative structure. Accordingly, on 10 October 1997, the NIDS Secretariat was formally established.⁹

A subsequent analysis of the border control environment identified one of the main problems as the continuing absence of uniform standards and regulatory procedures. Too much of the service delivery was taking place on an ad hoc or reactive basis as situations or crises arose between various departments. The result was a comprehensive re-engineering of border control and a business and action plan intended to set out the roles and responsibilities of all departments and structures to avoid further confusion over the precise responsibilities of the different departments. This business plan also identified the necessity for a border control improvement plan, which listed a number of strategies or initiatives to improve the situation on South Africa’s borders. Some of the aspects discussed in this plan are mentioned below.

Mobile detection units

One of the first operational initiatives of NIDS and the border police and an example of the integrated approach was the establishment of joint Mobile Detection Units to improve the overall effectiveness of static and internal border control operations through flexible and mobile service delivery.¹⁰

The first joint Mobile Detection Unit, based at Lanseria, was established between customs and excise and the border police in early January 1998. Subsequently, a number of these units have been established that operate on both national and regional levels. A 24-hour Central Control Centre was also established at national level for the joint management and co-ordination of Mobile Detection Unit activities of the SAPS, SARS and the Department of Home Affairs. In addition, technical experts from other government departments such as the SANDF and the Department of Trade and Industry were co-opted on an ad hoc basis as required.¹¹

Reclassification of ports of entry

On 8 October 1997, cabinet reconfirmed an earlier decision to reduce the number of international ports of entry. In future, there would be only ten airports designated as international ports of entry for the movement of goods (see map on p 94). In November 1997, the Department of Home Affairs sent letters to 22 airports informing them of the withdrawal of immigration services, while also confirming that only ten airports would have status as international ports of entry in future.¹² On 13 May 1998, 16 of the previous 40 international airports were formally closed for the movement of people. In effect, the international movement of goods and people was restricted to the ten airports with international status, while the remaining 30 airports remained open only for domestic traffic.

By restricting international entry to these ten airports, it was hoped that better and more effective border and port of entry control would be implemented. This was even more important in the light of manpower and equipment shortages and the abuse and exploitation of the lack of control at the other smaller airports that were previously open for international entry.

The reclassification was also extended to ports of entry on land with the designation of 19 land ports of entry for commercial purposes and 33 for tourist and local crossings. Seven seaports were reclassified into five fully fledged international seaports and two with reduced functions (see map)

In addition, the SAPS, SARS, the Department of Home Affairs, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service and the SANDF jointly launched Operation Jacuzzi in October 1997 to address poor border control at a number of priority airports. The operation specifically targeted smuggling operations at selected airports and has resulted in a number of successes since 1998. It has led to a new model for co-operation and the sharing of information and intelligence between all the agencies involved, and has had a significant impact on the control of contraband entering or leaving through these airports.

The success of the Jacuzzi model led to the formation of a Regional Information Centre on Crossborder Crime in Harare, Zimbabwe, with national information centres in the member states of SADC. South Africa also established its own National Information Centre for Border Control. NICOC has an important role to play in the centre with responsibility for the two-way flow of information on crossborder crime between itself and end users. The National Information Centre serves as the nodal or collection point for information from all roleplayers.

Logical flow process

Another project was the so-called ‘logical flow process’ that aimed at streamlining the control of the integrity of the areas where border posts are situated. Starting with a pilot project at Beitbridge, the country’s biggest land border post, the re-engineering of the way border posts were administered and controlled started with a two-week workshop in January 1998. The police were subsequently given total control of the border post control area, and assumed responsibility for the control framework to ensure the integrity of the area. As a result, the police were responsible for channelling people (and goods) to the correct desk and for securing and controlling the perimeter fencing and the two entry/exit gates. They were also in charge of reconciling the entry and exit of travellers and goods into and from the area. By formalising a ‘logical flow process’, overall controls were improved and a framework was instituted within which better co-ordination and co-operation could be maintained between the three main roleplayers involved in border control at a land border post. The ‘logical flow process’ proved so effective that, by May 1998, the pilot project was extended to three other land border posts (Lebombo, Golela and Ponto d’Oro at Kosi Bay, respectively large, medium and small posts), one airport (Johannesburg) and one harbour (Durban). It has since been implemented at all the major land border posts designated for both commercial and tourist crossings.

Capacity and equipment

In line with the cabinet’s April 1997 decision, the Department of Public Works spent US $3 million from its budget on the NIDS programme to upgrade 12 land border posts. This provided basic facilities that enable all three core departments (SAPS, SARS (Customs and Excise) and the Department of Home Affairs (Immigration)) to operate there.

Initiatives are also under way to upgrade all land border posts, possibly through partnerships between the public and private sector. Discussions have been held with Portnet to upgrade and reorganise the infrastructure of the seven designated seaports. Negotiations with the owners of the ten international airports have led to five already complying with the minimum security infrastructure requirements as laid down by the NIDS.

Finally, a major technology needs assessment has been carried out for the NIDS with the assistance of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Business Against Crime.

‘One-stop’ border posts

On 15 June 1998, the first protocol (between South Africa and Mozambique) for the establishment of an American-style ‘one-stop’ border post, linking Mozambique and Mpumalanga, was signed. The post is situated at the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border. The 24-hour post became operational in 2001 and offers travellers drive-through passport control similar to the booths currently found on toll roads. This first one-stop facility is jointly staffed by South African and Mozambican officials and would hopefully serve as a model for similar border posts with Zimbabwe and Namibia. Such a facility would go some way, in particular, to curb the abuses and exploitation of the current lax controls on the movement of goods (few inspections, no facilities for inspection, such as unpacking a big cooler truck containing fish products, the non-declaration of goods, and more).

Current problems

All stakeholders have agreed that better and more co-ordinated efforts are needed as part of the NIDS’s collective approach to border control. The approach implies that additional manpower and equipment are necessary to implement improved border control effectively. It has been acknowledged that provision will have to be made for these requirements in future budgets. Unfortunately, current budgets do not even adequately provide for the maintenance of existing structures. The shortage of funds will continue in future to impact negatively on the standard and effectiveness of controls at the country’s land, sea and air borders. Moreover, at the beginning of 1998, the SANDF border patrol component was downsized from about 5 000 to only 2 500 staff members. Furthermore, the SANDF, as a result of budgetary constraints, experienced petrol shortages and was unable to undertake vehicular patrols along the northern fence at Messina, resorting for a time instead to foot and horse patrols. Currently, the SANDF deploys a total of 19 companies in support of the SAPS of which ten are on border duty at any time.

By mid-2000, the Project Management Centre of the NIDS had completed an audit and status report that highlighted the considerable successes achieved and the shortcomings of the implementation of an incremental approach. However, the report reinforced the fact that the collective approach should only be seen as a short-term solution and that the government should continue to work towards a more institutionalised system of border control in the form of a ‘single agency’ responsible for all border control functions — immigration, customs and policing activities — at the country’s land, sea and air ports of entry. By this time, the NIDS restructuring has started to deliver substantial successes. For instance, large drug consignments were confiscated at Johannesburg International Airport.

The activities of the NIDS have led to an awareness of the need for a focused and integrated approach towards border control throughout South Africa. The audit and status report included a review and an evaluation of capacity, infrastructure, work processes and systems. The NIDS has also resulted in the implementation of a management system that has dramatically improved communication and co-operation between the various departments involved, created a uniform processing system for ports of entry and exit, reclassified all ports of entry, and much more. Technically, it has linked the SAPS Vehicle Circulation System and the Department of Transport’s National Traffic Information System (NATIS) and made these available to border control officials at all land ports of entry that are linked to departmental computer networks (approximately 90% of land ports of entry). The UNICODE system for vehicle identification with hand-held scanners is also now available at all land ports of entry. However, both systems are seriously under-utilised, mainly due to the lack of training and manpower.

Nevertheless, a number of problem areas remain. One of the most serious issues is the lack of responsibility and accountability for the management of individual ports of entry. Secondly, although all the agencies have agreed upon uniform procedures, these have not been fully implemented (no agency has been delegated to take management responsibility for such implementation). Very often, the interpretation of the regulations and the various management processes differs substantially between departments.

Although the departments involved have made great strides towards integration, they have still not recognised or fully accepted the collective and incremental approach towards border control with a single overarching authority that would simultaneously encompass several line functions (multifunctional with a single focus). Unfortunately, the collective approach currently allows for too many grey areas with gaps in functional responsibilities. Final accountability is not yet clearly demarcated.

Conclusion

In the Southern African context, greater regional co-operation in tightening both border and internal controls over the migratory and crossborder movement of goods is obviously necessary. If, like the European Union, SADC formalises co-operation on border controls by means of a Schengen-like treaty directed towards ‘open’ internal borders — open for goods and services, as well as people, with immigration and asylum control and harmonisation, closer police co-operation and the establishment of a SADC information system — there will be a number of inevitable consequences. One will be the need for closer direct police co-operation between member states, as policing and other controls are intended as measures to compensate for the consequent loss of internal security through the reduction of border controls over the internal borders of member states. For instance, the Schengen Treaty makes provision for what is called ‘more selective controls’ — for example, checks on employers and employees, schools and health services; internal ‘spot checks’ carried out by internal tracing units to check social security cards, unemployment benefits, and identification documents; the compulsory carrying of identity documents or passports; and the random stopping of members of the public on suspicion of being illegal or undocumented migrants. While the SADC Free Trade Agreement liberalises and reduces tariffs and customs requirements, it does not obviate the need for better and stricter inspection of goods aimed at decreasing criminal activities and the smuggling of goods and other contraband such as drugs and firearms. The onus is therefore on better and more effective border control management, while at the same time harmonising and liberalising the legislative regime.

Regional border controls are strongly premised on the requirement for a uniform approach to the joint issues of controlling individual states’ borders, and regulating the orderly and legal movement of people and crossborder trade. It is detrimental to all interests if there is a fragmented or unco-ordinated approach towards dealing with these issues. Inevitably, crossborder interstate co-operation will have to be based, among others, on negotiated protocols, treaties and multilateral agreements, and the establishment of forums for joint implementation. These initiatives will have to be based on a certain degree of harmonisation of policies and legislation. Ideally, SADC should provide the framework for such co-operation, but it is difficult to see how co-operation could be effectively implemented in practice, given the porous borders and lack of control over movement in much of the region. There are many problems associated with closer crossborder co-operation and the integration of border controls in any region. These not only involve questions of ‘sovereignty’ and accountability, but also more practical issues ranging from judicial harmonisation, the development of standardised regulations, ‘rules of origin’ for goods, proper processing procedures, the criminal conviction of offenders, to training standards, the utilisation, availability and affordability of technology and the implementation of open and simple channels for communication.

Crossborder policing in itself has a number of implications for border control:

It has to allow for crossborder surveillance by the police forces of other member states, including proactive observation, for example, of persons ‘under reasonable suspicion’ of involvement in a (possible future) extraditable offence (trafficking in people, drug-smuggling, and more).



It has to provide the right of ‘hot’ pursuit up to ten kilometres within a neighbouring country’s territory with varying powers of apprehension or ‘security search’.



A shared information database should be available that would include information on those wanted for arrest or under surveillance for a (suspected) extraditable offence, or even non-admissible migrants. Such information would require the harmonisation of criteria and categories for exclusion or extradition, among others.

For South Africa, a number of other issues need further attention:

An official anti-corruption drive has to be implemented to clean up the administrative, investigative and monitoring services of border control, customs and immigration.



The framework guidelines set out in the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of People in the SADC Region need to be accepted and implemented, as well as those of the SADC Free Trade Agreement, so that more effective formal controls and regional co-operative agreements can be put in place.



More personnel, training and resources are required, not only for border control (policing and protection of the borderline), but also for immigration (movement of people) and customs and excise (inspection of goods). In the interim, the existing patrol capabilities and troop strengths on the borders should be retained and increased where possible. SANDF patrols and border control are crucial in slowing down the flow not only of people, but also of smuggled goods such as firearms and drugs (over the last few years, on average, the SANDF have arrested approximately 35 000 undocumented and illegal immigrants every year on the country’s borders and have confiscated numerous illegal firearms). In the globalised version of international trade and migratory movements, border control increasingly relies on more sophisticated and improved technology to assist in the regulation and control of the movement of people.¹³ While the crossborder fight against crime has been assisted by the recent establishment of a regional Crime Information Centre in Harare and the consequent sharing of crime information, this co-operation needs to be extended into other fields of information as well.

Compared to the regional challenges, those facing South Africa appear less formidable.

Only sustained regional economic development will ultimately provide a basis for the management of South Africa’s borders. A strong and vibrant SADC regional economy is essential if the flow of illegal economic migrants to South Africa is to be reduced. In this regard, the Maputo Corridor Project and the Lebombo Spatial Development Initiative are good examples of regional economic development initiatives.

Overall, more effective and efficient systems of border control for the region, operating in a co-operative and harmonised framework, would be to the benefit of all members of SADC. While member countries are at different stages of development and integration, as well as of economic and political stability, South Africa is able to assist other countries in the region towards achieving better control. Implementing such border controls could well play a significant role in combating and preventing transnational crimes; towards encouraging and growing interstate and regional legal trade in goods and services; in facilitating the movement of people (regulated labour and people seeking employment); and in providing one of the building blocks for regional integration and co-operation on a host of other matters such as transport, water, electricity and transnational game parks.

Notes

Unless otherwise stated, this article is based on interviews and discussions conducted during May 1998 with members of the National Interdepartmental Structure for Border Control (NIDS) and members of management of the SAPS border police component. Additional informal discussions were held during April-May 2000 and February 2001 with the Director: NIDS, B van Niekerk, and the Project Manager, NIDS, M Acres.

The official term remains ‘illegal aliens’.



Operational Working Team on Border Control, Border control collective approach: Implementation plan, unpublished document, Pretoria, 1997, p 3.



The four NCPS ‘pillars’ are Criminal Justice Process; Reducing Crime Through Environmental Design; Public Values and Education; Transnational Crime — under which the National Programme: Border Control and Ports of Entry falls. Interdepartmental Strategy Team, National Crime Prevention Strategy, Government Printers, Pretoria, May 1996, pp 4-5.



Ibid, p 77.



Border Control Operational Work Group, op cit, 1997, p 3.



Ibid, p 29.



Ibid, pp 35, 37.



NIDS, Time Line: Internal Activity Report, unpublished document, Pretoria, May 1998.



The following departments are represented on the NIDS: South African Revenue Service (SARS); South African Police Service (SAPS) (Border Police and Detectives); Department of Home Affairs; National Intelligence Agency (NIA); South African Secret Service (SASS); and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The departments of Transport, Health, Agriculture and Foreign Affairs attend on an ad hoc basis. The NIDS reports to a Steering Committee which was established in October 1997 and consists of the directors-general of the SAPS, SARS and the Department of Home Affairs; the deputy directors-general of the departments of Transport, Safety and Security and Public Works, the NIA and SASS. The deputy ministers of Finance, Safety and Security and Home Affairs attend meetings on invitation. The Steering Committee reports directly to the NCPS Ministers Committee.



NIDS, Project: Mobile Detection Units, unpublished report, Pretoria, December 1997, pp 1-2, 4.



NIDS Time Line, op cit; ibid, p 3.



The ten with international designation were the Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Upington, Mafikeng, Lanseria, Gateway (the former AFB Pietersburg) and Nelspruit airports (effectively one for each province with two for Gauteng as the busiest province in South Africa, as well as the hub of business and industry).



The most important of the technological aids are the following: shared/integrated computer information databases; and improved surveillance technology (infrared lights, CCTV, overhead searchlights, touch sensitive or motion detector equipment, bodyheat or movement (seismic) sensors, helicopters with searchlights and infrared capabilities, airship patrols — which are silent).