As an institution of state, the military in Lesotho was marred by controversy and steeped in intrigue from the start. For much of the post-colonial period the military was used as a politicised and partisan tool, which even seized power and governed in its own name. The current problem, as this brief history aims to demonstrate, is essentially two-pronged. It involves putting in place structures, mechanisms and philosophies designed to promote the military’s acceptance of civil supremacy. The process should also include alterations to political society’s perception of the military as a tool to be used in partisan games that almost always have calamitous outcomes. Lesotho’s political development is classified in this article into four broad phases and the type of civil-military relations is assessed under each phase. The reasons for the military coup in 1986 are analysed, the emergence of a democratic order and the challenges facing this order are highlighted, and the reform measures that have thus far been instituted are evaluated. The essay concludes with a few projections into the future course of events.

Introduction

As an institution of state, the military in Lesotho was marred by controversy and steeped in intrigue from the start. On the eve of independence, the main contestants for political power perceived the military as a tool that could be used for or against them by their rivals. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in the debates around future control of the military that raged alongside other constitutional issues of the day. Indeed, for much of the post-colonial period the military was used as a tool — politicised and partisan. Later, the military seized power and governed in its own name. The current problem, as this brief history aims to demonstrate, is essentially two-pronged. On the one hand, it involves bringing the military back in — putting in place, as it were, structures, mechanisms and philosophies designed to promote the military’s acceptance of civil supremacy. On the other hand, it ought to involve significant alterations to political society’s perception of the military as a tool to be used in partisan games that often involve a series of underhanded methods that almost always lead to calamitous outcomes.

In order to understand the historical context of the current pattern of civil-military relations, Lesotho’s political development is classified into four broad phases and the type of civil-military relations is assessed under each phase. The first phase could be characterised as the era of embryonic democracy during the period 1965-1970, when civil-military relations were generally stable, given the relative stability of the political system. Although this period is not analysed in any detail, for reasons of space and time, it is contended that the bulk of the problems experienced later had their seeds sown during this period, notwithstanding its projected outward stability.

The second phase — the starting point for the analysis of Basotho civil-military relations in this essay — was the era of de facto one-party authoritarian rule between 1970 and 1986, which was marked by unstable civil-military relations predicated upon patronage and the politicisation of the armed forces, both of which compromised the professionalism and ethical integrity of the defence force. During this period, the Basotho National Party (BNP) government exercised stringent control over the armed forces and constructed the armed forces after its own political image in order not only to ward off external threat, but also to emasculate internal opposition. Yet, this was also the era of intense disagreements, faction fighting, and leadership squabbles within the BNP. Not only did these disagreements throw the ruling party into disarray, they also pitted it in intense conflict with the armed forces, primarily over issues of internal law and order and the regime’s sour relations with apartheid South Africa. The relations between the ruling party and the armed forces deteriorated so drastically that, in 1986, the army undertook a military coup that dislodged the BNP government with tacit succour from apartheid South Africa.

The 1986 military coup therefore ushered in the third phase in Lesotho’s political development — the era of military authoritarianism between 1986 and 1993 that was a continuation of deteriorating civil-military relations as the military assumed executive functions. Once again, professionalism was sacrificed on the basis of political expediency and internal paralysis within the defence force was noticeable. Witness, for instance, the frequent revolts by junior officers that not only changed the leadership of the army but also gave rise to a succession of military administrations. A severe crisis of governance occurred precisely because the military lacked the moral title to rule. This situation also affected civil-military relations adversely with dire consequences for political stability and economic progress.

The fourth phase was the era of fragile democracy spanning the period from 1993 to date. This followed the withdrawal of the military from direct political control over the state due largely to internal and external pressure towards democratisation and demilitarisation that led to the ascendance of civilian authority after the 1993 general election. Initially, problems of adjustment to the new political reality saw protracted conflicts between the executive authority and the defence force. These included faction fighting within the forces over the army’s relationship with the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) government, the temporary displacement of a democratically elected government by King Letsie III in 1994, and tensions that surfaced in the aftermath of the 1998 election. Despite the conflicts of 1994 and 1998, this current phase marked major shifts in civil-military relations as a result of the momentum of legal, institutional and policy reforms that have thus far been put in place.

In this essay, the reasons for the military coup in 1986 are analysed and the chequered history of military rule is outlined. The emergence of a democratic order and the challenges facing this order are highlighted and reform measures that have thus far been instituted are evaluated. The essay concludes with a few projections into the future course of events.

The rise and fall of military rule

The reasons for the military coup in 1986 vary in terms of the preferred vantage points of observers. For some the coup represented the successful destabilisation of Lesotho by South Africa.¹ For others power struggles between BNP factions, which included the military, were responsible, because they caused insecurity among some BNP members, opponents of the regime, and the nation in general.² Still others pointed towards worsening relations between King Moshoeshoe II and the BNP government over his constitutional status.³ These reasons notwithstanding, the fact remains that the Lesotho military was severely compromised not only because of its association with the BNP government, but also because of its close association with the apartheid security establishment — an association that continued even as the government expressed anti-apartheid rhetoric and even as the army itself used sophisticated weaponry originating in the eastern bloc.

The military-monarch alliance and its problems

Lesotho would henceforth be ruled by a military regime that had the King at its helm. In addition to dissolving parliament and government, Lesotho Order (No 2) of 1986 vested executive and legislative powers in the King, and provided for the establishment of a six-member military council headed by Major-General J M Lekhanya. This order also provided for the appointment of a council of ministers chosen by the King on the advice of the military council and chaired by the Major-General, which would "assist the King in the general administration of Lesotho." Another significant piece of legislation was the Suspension of Political Activities Order (No 4) of 1986, which suspended all political activity in the country "until such time as the goal of national reconciliation had been achieved." To this point, the King and the military were in agreement on the takeover of political power and on the need to all but ban political parties. As such, the new regime was characterised variously as military-monarch powersharing,⁴ as a military kingdom,⁵ and as a military-chieftainship-bureaucratic alliance.⁶ But here similarities ended and disagreements began.

One area of disagreement was the nature of relations between Lesotho and South Africa. Following the coup, the African National Congress (ANC) and other South African refugees were deported from Lesotho. Those who remained did so precariously as they were hunted down by local and South African hit squads. A military hospital at Makoanyane Barracks was built with South African aid. The Highlands Water Treaty was signed between the two countries after decades of disagreement. The regime in Lesotho frequently warned Basotho miners to disassociate themselves from the activities of the South African National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). When, on the occasion of the Pope’s visit to Lesotho, a bus full of pilgrims was hijacked by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), South African assistance to put an end to the hostage crisis was sought and obtained.⁷ Certainly, these events suggested a vast improvement in relations between the two countries. This warming of relations did not amuse the King and his allies. An alternative position, which they recurrently advanced, was much more pragmatic: fully aware of the country’s vulnerability and yet sensitive to international dispositions to apartheid.⁸

Another area of disagreement was corruption within the regime. Allegations of corruption against leading members of the regime began to appear in the pages of the Maseru weekly, The Mirror. Correspondence between the King and the Major-General suggests that the King was eager for these allegations to be cleared and anti-corruption measures to be put in place. However, the distance or proximity between them on other controversial issues that plagued the military regime remains unclear. These issues included, for example:

the murder of two Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) colonels, Sehlabo and Ramots’ekhoane, in the immediate aftermath of the coup;⁹



the murder of two former BNP cabinet ministers and their wives in November 1986;¹⁰



the declaration of a state of emergency in August 1988;¹¹



the adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank structural adjustment programmes and the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the activities of the academic staff at the National University of Lesotho;¹²



the deportation of the editor of The Mirror;¹³ and



the regime’s hostility towards organised labour, exemplified by the 13-week long strike by the Lesotho Teachers’ Trade Union.¹⁴

Yet another area of disagreement centred on how precisely Lesotho was to be ruled in future. In 1986, the new military regime spoke incessantly about its mission to promote peace, stability, national reconciliation and democracy. Very little was said about the precise manner in which this was to be achieved. First there was talk of an advisory/national council that, though advisory, would form the apex of a structure with multiple levels ranging from village, to ward, up to district level. The intention had been to accomplish this without the participation of political parties as their activities had been suspended by the regime.¹⁵ It was only due to disagreements within the regime that this plan was abandoned.¹⁶

The end of the military-monarch alliance

Disagreements within the regime were brought to a head when, on 23 December 1988, Major-General Lekhanya fatally shot a 20-year old male student, George Ramone, at the Lesotho Agricultural College. Attempts to persuade the Major-General to resign were unsuccessful.¹⁷ In October 1989, he was cleared by a judicial inquest that ruled that the murder was a ‘justifiable homicide’.

In February 1990, citing pressure from ‘captains’ in the RLDF, the chairperson of the Military Council terminated the services of three members of the Council and one member of the Council of Ministers. All four were colonels in the RLDF and they were known allies of the King. Attempts by the King to resist this move were unsuccessful.¹⁸ In a strident speech announcing the changes in government, Major-General Lekhanya painted a grim picture of a palace faction comprising the King and his relatives whose sole purpose was to find ways of delaying or even subverting the country’s return to democratic rule.¹⁹ This was bitterly denied by the King who claimed instead that the Major-General and his allies were solely responsible for the delay in restoring constitutional rule since the Major-General insisted every time the matter was discussed that such issues first had to be discussed by the armed forces.²⁰

The second military administration

In February 1990, divisions within the regime culminated in the passage of Lesotho Order (No 2) of 1990. The King lost executive and legislative powers and the vast majority of the members of the Council of Ministers who were associated with the King had their services terminated. This time, however, changes in government did not result in the euphoria that had welcomed the military coup in 1986. For the new regime, two main issues had to be resolved: the status of the King, and the country’s movement towards a constitutional order.

On 10 March 1990, King Moshoeshoe II was exiled to the United Kingdom on a ‘sabbatical’, as spokespersons of the regime sarcastically termed it. Citing the high cost of maintaining the King in London, the regime later sought to persuade him to return to Lesotho as a constitutional monarch. Talks between the King and representatives of the regime collapsed when the King insisted that he would not return under these conditions. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly where the decision to dethrone the King was announced, the chairperson of the Military Council informed members of the assembly and the nation as a whole that the King had declined the offer to return by making impossible demands that the regime rejected. According to the Major-General, the King demanded the dissolution of the military government and the formation of a government of national unity. The King also demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the lifting of the suspension of the 1966 Constitution, and the abrogation of Lesotho Order (No 2) of 1990.²¹ Changes envisaged by the Military Council were embodied in the Office of the King Order (No 14) of 1990. After a brief hesitation, Prince Mohato Bereng Seeiso (Letsie III) succeeded his father, deposed King Moshoeshoe II, on Monday, 12 November 1990. The monarchy was virtually stripped of all power.

In pursuit of the objective to return to the barracks in June 1992, the military regime established a Constituent Assembly, with the brief to produce a new constitution. They were to use the 1966 Constitution as a working document, in terms of Order No 4 of 1990. The Constituent Assembly consisted of 109 members. It would include 20 members from development councils, 22 principal and ward chiefs, 10 members from civil society organisations, 10 representatives from urban centres, eight members of the armed forces, 17 members of the Council of Ministers and assistant ministers. Party political activities, however, remained suspended. Leaders of the BNP, BCP, the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) were initially reluctant to join the Constituent Assembly because they objected to a number of issues:

The assembly was merely an advisory body.



They wanted the ban on political activities lifted.



The presence of members of the army and police in the assembly would deny them freedom of expression.



They were uneasy serving as appointed and not as elected members of the assembly.²²

However, by the time the inauguration ceremony was held in June, all but the interim leader of the BNP had joined the assembly. To the extent that political leaders joined the assembly without any of their demands being met, the plausible explanation belong to Southall who mentions the central role played by the British High Commissioner in this regard.²³

The fall of the second military administration

The regime’s success in convening the Constituent Assembly and in dethroning the King camouflaged its impending crisis. There was general discontent among civil society groups, largely brought on by the effects of structural adjustment and perceived corruption within the regime. The latter was exemplified by the decision to increase the salaries of military councillors, ministers and deputy ministers in March 1991. The regime responded to public discontent by employing heavy-handed methods against what it termed civil unrest and a general refusal to be governed. But the society had decidedly turned against military rule in favour of a return to constitutional rule. The army, for its part, had become restless once more. In combination, these grievances posed a significant threat to the regime.²⁴ On 30 April 1991, junior officers in the RLDF forced the chairperson of the Military Council to resign. Also dismissed were three of the chairperson’s trusted allies — one member of the Military Council (Colonel Ts’otetsi) and two of the Council of Ministers (E R Sekhonyana and T Thabane).

The third military administration and the transition to democracy

Colonel P Ramaema, who had served as military councillor since 1986, was named as the new leader of the military regime. Perhaps in recognition of the pressure on the regime, its new leader was quick to reassure the local population that the democratisation programme would continue. South Africa was reassured that the new regime intended to honour the Highlands Water Treaty and to continue a friendly foreign policy. The IMF and World Bank were also reassured that the regime intended to continue with the enhanced structural adjustment programme.

In September 1991, the Constituent Assembly finished its work and proceeded to solicit people’s views on the new Constitution. Preparations for elections were almost entirely in the hands of international organisations, notably the Commonwealth that seconded Noel Lee from Jamaica and Jocelyn Lucas from Trinidad and Tobago, who served as the chief electoral officer. As a result of delayed preparations for voter registration and the delimitation of constituencies, the mid-1992 date that was set earlier was first postponed to November 1992 and later to March 1993.²⁵ Basotho went to the polls on 27 March 1993 for the first time since 1970. Local and international observer groups thoroughly monitored the election. The election was plagued by a myriad administrative problems that included delays in opening polling stations because of a shortage of voting material. Some of these problems caused the extension of voting to the next day so that people could get the chance to vote. These problems notwithstanding, observers unanimously declared the election to have been free and fair, and the BCP was declared the victor. The army for its part duly handed power to the new civilian administration on 2 April 1993.

A number of issues were not satisfactorily dealt with as part of the transition. As such, they continue to threaten the new dispensation in fundamental ways. Although the military had managed to dethrone the King and to install a new King, and the last military administration was reluctant to tamper with the decision of its predecessor, the issue remained unresolved and was to cause all manner of problems for the country’s civilian administration. Emerging national coalitions for democracy that were so prominent in the late 1980s and the early 1990s were demobilised by the lifting of Order No 4 and the return, under the guise of party political affiliation, of old forms of bigotry that characterise Lesotho politics. As a result, the new democratic dispensation was robbed of meaningful citizen participation. Nowhere is the supremacy of party political concerns over national concerns (if these actually exist) more evident than in the cynicism of the bigger parties towards the idea of a national conference.²⁶ All in all, Lesotho’s transition left the basic character of state institutions intact with their attitude towards a democratic order remaining largely unknown.

Civil-military relations since 1993

In its 1993 election manifesto, the BCP had argued for:

efficient and disciplined security forces to maintain law and order and to protect lives and property;



professional and non-partisan security forces under the command of the head of state and the Defence Commission; and



a defence force based on quality, not quantity, in order to promote efficiency in the maintenance of law and order, as well as in the defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.

This was the position of the party that assumed the reins of state power after eight years of military rule and after having won all 65 constituencies.

Furthermore, the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho, which is the principal law that establishes the army as presently constituted, states in article 147 that there shall be a defence force for the maintenance of the internal security and defence of Lesotho. The Lesotho Defence Force Act of 1996, which repealed the 1993 Lesotho Defence Force Order, gives meaning to this constitutional provision by elaborating the structural, administrative and operational aspects of the LDF. This Act stipulates that the LDF shall comprise the regular force, the reserve force and the volunteer element. According to the Act, the LDF shall be employed in defence of Lesotho; in the prevention or suppression of terrorism and internal disorder; and in the maintenance of essential services including the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime. Both the Constitution and the Act provide the basic legal framework for civil-military relations.

Besides the legal framework, key institutions that play a part in regulating and controlling the army in Lesotho include the monarchy as the pinnacle of the state, the prime minister as the minister of Defence, the Defence Council, and the Ministry of Defence. With the advice of the prime minister, the King appoints the commander of the armed forces and orders the deployment of the forces in part or in whole outside the borders of Lesotho. The prime minister, both as the head of government and the minister of Defence, plays a central role in civil-military relations. He is the chairperson of the Defence Council and liases with the commander on a regular basis on defence and security issues. The Defence Council comprises the minister of Defence, who is the chairperson; the principal secretary of the Ministry of Defence; the commander of the LDF; the secretary, appointed by the minister; and two other members, appointed by the minister. The three main functions of the Defence Council are:

to make recommendations to the cabinet on the formulation and implementation of defence policy;



to make recommendations to the cabinet on the terms and conditions of service of members of the defence force; and



to inquire into and deal with complaints and grievances by any member of the defence force.

The composition and functions of the Defence Council are a major improvement on Chapter II of the 1993 Lesotho Defence Force Order in terms of efforts towards establishing stable civil-military relations. Due to the efforts of the Defence Council, the Ministry of Defence had developed a defence policy which aims at transforming the LDF into an apolitical, accountable, capable and affordable defence force. The establishment of the Ministry of Defence itself represents another attempt by the executive authority to strengthen civil-military relations. The Ministry has the primary responsibility of administering, organising and accounting for the activities and operations of the LDF. It does seem that there are expansive institutional mechanisms (including a policy framework) in place for ensuring stable civil-military relations. However, the major missing link in this institutional arrangement is effective parliamentary oversight over the armed forces and defence policy. The challenge lies in the reform of the parliamentary system in a way that provides room for the establishment of portfolio committees, including a parliamentary portfolio committee on defence and security.

Yet another area for security sector reform in Lesotho involves the resource endowment of the country and how scarce resources are allocated. The state of economic growth and development plays an important role in influencing civil-military relations, because the economy determines the amount of resources that the executive authority is able to avail to the security forces. This is crucial for the defence budget that often competes with other demands for the country’s scarce resources. Thus far the defence budget has always ranked among the traditional top three — education, health, and defence. For instance, in the current national budget, the three top sectoral allocations for recurrent budget are education with M518.2 million (US $62.8 million), health with M172.1 million (US $2.1 million), and defence with M170.3 million (US $2.1 million). Defence expenditure should not amount to the diversion of scarce resources away from socio-economic goals to militaristic ventures under conditions where no serious military threat exists.

Herein lies the challenge for a fine balance between state security and human security in the allocation of scarce resources. Lesotho does not face any external or internal military threat. It does not intend to become an aggressor to any one of its neighbours. Besides, the post-Cold War world is generally undergoing disarmament and demilitari-sation. Furthermore, with the demise of apartheid in South Africa, which unleashed military and economic warfare against its neighbours, including Lesotho, in the 1970s and 1980s, Lesotho faces no immediate security threat. Efforts are already under way to establish security co-operation among the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries through the newly established SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security together with its critical arm, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Ideally, these regional efforts at security co-operation ought to contribute to security reform processes in individual SADC countries by scaling down the size and cost of the armed forces, while at the same time enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency.

Although Lesotho’s transition to civilian rule in 1993 was perceived by many as a positive development for the county’s democracy, tense relations between the executive arm of the state and the armed forces still lingered on. In October 1993, scarcely six months after the elections, junior officers of the RLDF staged a mini-mutiny at their barracks, forcing the resignation of four senior officers. In January 1994, disgruntled RLDF members kidnapped the chief of the air force, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Majare, after shooting him in an armed confrontation. A number of Lesotho pilots flew across the border to South Africa in their helicopters, claiming they were in fear of their lives. There were reports of shooting in the streets of Maseru.

This tension bred the seeds of the political instability that followed and became more manifest during the 1994 and 1998 political turmoil in the country. Undoubtedly, these tense relations further undermined the impact of major efforts towards establishing stable civil-military relations. Following the 1993 election, the armed forces were unsure whether to work closely and collaborate with the new government or whether to undermine the government in order to support the return of BNP rule. Perceptions within the force were sharply divided on this thorny issue. As a result, the BNP took advantage of this by trying to lure the army to its side in an effort to undermine the BCP government. The faction fighting within the armed forces in 1994, which invited external intervention by the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and SADC countries, was precisely as a result of disagreement within the forces whether to accept or undermine the authority of the BCP.

Under these circumstances, the BCP itself could not institutionalise mechanisms for ensuring effective civil control over the army as envisaged in its 1993 manifesto. Furthermore, sour relations between the BCP and the monarchy accentuated the problem as the BNP was able to enlist the support of some sections of the armed forces and the palace in its bid to unseat the BCP. In part, this explains why King Letsie III temporarily displaced a democratically elected government and replaced it with an appointed six-member Council of State. An uneasy peace had prevailed in Maseru after the fighting in January, until April when shots again rang out in the streets of the capital. Four government ministers were taken hostage by mutinous soldiers. In one of the skirmishes the deputy prime minister, Selometsi Baholo, was killed. International and regional pressure mounted as did pressure from the BNP for King Letsie to abdicate in favour of his father, Moshoeshoe II. During August, Letsie suspended part of the country’s Constitution and announced that he had disbanded the BCP administration in what amounted to a ‘royal’ coup. Following significant external and internal pressure, including South African military exercises along the countries’ common border, King Letsie handed back power to the Mokhele government in September 1994. Subsequent to these developments, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe have remained official guarantors of Lesotho’s democracy and have been joined in this role by Mozambique after the 1995 SADC Summit in Mauritius. The events of the immediate aftermath of the 1993 election show vividly that Lesotho’s fragile democracy has not yet entrenched stable civil-military relations and that the challenge for security reform is still as great as it was three decades ago.

Even five years later, when Lesotho held its second election on 23 May 1998 after the era of military authoritarianism, the executive arm of government has not fully established civil supremacy over the armed forces. This became abundantly clear during the post-election violent conflict that engulfed the country as the BCP joined the BNP and the MFP against the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), alleging that the electoral process was not free and fair. Although the Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission and international observers had declared the election process and its outcome free and fair, the BCP and others were angered by the way in which the prime minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, had outflanked them by forming the LCD with a majority of BCP parliamentary members just before the elections. The LCD subsequently won 79 of the 80 parliamentary seats, Mokhehle retired and Pakalitha Mosisili was appointed as prime minister. Although the primary protagonists in 1998 were the ruling party and opposition parties — BCP, BNP and MFP — the secondary players with a vested interest in the conflict were the monarchy and the security forces. The armed forces were therefore clearly directly and indirectly involved in the 1998 conflict. Evidence abounds that suggests that the armed forces were again sharply divided into those supporting the opposition protest against the election outcome and thus sympathetic to opposition calls for the dissolution of the LCD government, and those supporting the outcome of the election and the authority of the LCD as a legally constituted government. Having declared the election results a fraud, the opposition alliance staged protests outside King Letsie III’s Royal Palace in Maseru, calling for the formation of a government of national unity to steer the country towards new elections. The alliance urged King Letsie III to pronounce a ‘royal’ coup and dissolve the government as he had done in 1994. During August 1998, a senior South African delegation visited Lesotho where they persuaded prime minister Mosisili and his LCD government to submit the election results to an independent review. Judge Pius Langa completed his work the following month and, although pointing to several administrative irregularities, did not annul the election results. The opposition started to mobilise and obtained arms from its allies in the military. It started to destabilise Maseru, preventing public officials from going to work and impounding government vehicles. Tension mounted as junior officers forced Lieutenant-General Makhula Mosakeng, the army chief, and 28 other senior officers to resign.²⁷

It was in these circumstances that Botswana and South Africa undertook a military intervention in Lesotho at the request of the Lesotho government (Operation Boleas). Part of the mission of this external military intervention was to neutralise the military’s involvement in the conflict and to seek a political solution.

In the aftermath of the intervention, South Africa resumed its mediation efforts. The result was an agreement on a transitional structure called the Interim Political Authority that was established in November 1998 by Act 80 of 1998. This interim arrangement is a compromise agreement as the ruling LCD agreed to new elections within 18 months, while the opposition alliance recognised the legitimacy of the LCD government in the period leading to the elections.²⁸

After the political settlement of the violent conflict, a major restructuring of the armed forces is still ongoing. It includes, among others, the downsizing of the forces and the training of the officer corps in order to ensure both efficiency and professionalism.

Conclusions

The fast-changing global political order requires states to revisit their security and defence strategies. The end of the Cold War has removed the perception of most states that their major security threat came from outside their borders and was ideologically driven. With the end of the Cold War, ideologically propelled interstate conflicts have subsided, whereas resource-driven intrastate conflicts are on the increase. This is also the case in Lesotho and, as such, the challenge for security sector reform has to tackle this stark reality. Linked to the end of the Cold War as a major security challenge until the early 1990s, the world is also undergoing another sea change in the form of globalisation which, among others, weakens the state, whittles away state sovereignty and renders political boundaries ineffective. This poses another challenge for security reform in small states like Lesotho.

Besides the end of the Cold War and the rapid forces driving globalisation, a critical factor for security reform in Lesotho in the recent past has been the demise of apartheid in South Africa. Whereas Lesotho used to perceive apartheid as its major security threat, the two countries have maintained cordial relations since the advent of a democratically elected government in South Africa in 1994. Both countries are active members of SADC which, among others, strives towards a regional security co-operation scheme through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and its active arm, the ISDSC. Furthermore, South Africa is one of the external guarantors of Lesotho’s fragile democracy and has been actively involved, together with Botswana, in the current efforts to reform the country’s security sector.

Stable civil-military relations cannot be premised upon patronage or the politicisation of the armed forces, although this should not suggest that the armed forces are apolitical. What should be stressed, however, is that the army should not be involved in partisan politics in a manner that portrays it as aligned to one or another political party. This can only undermine its professionalism and effectiveness in discharging its national duty. Civil supremacy over the armed forces has to be ensured through effective control over and regulation of the armed forces by the executive and through parliamentary oversight. To this end, a parliamentary portfolio committee on security and defence would form an important institutional mechanism for civil control over the armed forces. Besides parliament, the institutional capacity of the new Ministry of Defence must be enhanced in order to help formulate and implement appropriate security sector reform policies. The ministry must act as a pivotal link between the LDF, parliament and civil society at large. The mythology of the sacrosanctity and secrecy of security and defence issues must be debunked without compromising the need to protect classified information.

Stable relations between the army and the executive must proceed in tandem with stable relations with the larger civilian population and must be premised upon mutual trust and interdependence. To this end, state security issues must be linked to and harmonised with human security concerns. A clear understanding of the state and its inner workings, together with its interrelationships with government and the governance process, must inform the current process towards the reform of civil-military relations. The state refers to the permanent institutions that run the national affairs of a country, with the judiciary, the executive and the legislature being primary. The secondary organs of the state include the bureaucracy and the security establishment. The primary organs provide oversight and exercise supremacy over the secondary organs. Herein lies the significance of the concept of civil supremacy over the armed forces, which is exercised by the executive and legislative branches of the state.

Besides the civil control over the military that has to be ensured by the executive and the legislature, civil society also has to play an important role in the process of building stable civil-military relations. A major aspect of this role could come through public dialogue forums that could be held to provide the public with an opportunity to contribute to the ongoing restructuring of the armed forces. The effectiveness of this strategy, of course, will critically depend upon how well organised civil society organisations are and the extent of their capacity to engage in issues as complex as security sector reform. The type of relationship between the state and civil society will also be crucial in sustaining this dialogue and maximising its positive impact on the security reform process.

Notes

Africa Events, February 1986.



This view ran through many government pronouncements in the early days of the first military administration. See, for instance, Department of Information, Encounter the new Lesotho: Many voices, one people, Maseru, September 1986.



Lesotho: After the coup, The Star, 21 April 1986.



T Mothibe, The rise and fall of military-monarch power sharing, Africa Insight 20(4), 1990.



F K Makoa, Lesotho’s military kingdom: An undemocratic political experiment, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly 4(3-4), 1990-91.



N Pule, The military and political institutions, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly 4(3-4), 1990-91.



R Edgar, After the coup: South Africa’s relations with Lesotho, in G Moss & I Obery (eds), South African Review 5, Ravan Press, Braamfontein, 1989, pp 244-246.



Address by His Majesty, King Moshoeshoe II to the State President of the Republic of South Africa, 25 October 1988.



Lesotho: After the coup, op cit.



Rex v Sekhobe Letsie and Anor, Lesotho Law Reports, 1993-94.



The Law Society of Lesotho v the Minister of Defence and Internal Security and the Attorney General (CIV/APN/111/88).



Report of Commission of Inquiry into the instability at the National University of Lesotho, 15 December 1989.



Johnny wa ka Maseko and Attorney General and Commissioner of Police (C of A (CIV) No 27 of 1988; M wa Dikgang, Lesotho editor’s arrest another sign of ongoing power struggle, 19-25 November 1988.



BBC World Service, Focus on Africa, 30 August 1990.



Report of the ad hoc Committee of Ministers for a review of certain constitutional issues, 6 April 1989; Lesotho Order 1989 (Version according to Palace), 25 July 1989.



M Sejanamane, The politics of intrigue, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly 4(3-4), 1990-91, pp 6-9.



King Moshoeshoe II in a letter to the chairman of the Military Council, 21 February 1990.



Ibid.



Press statement by His Excellency, the chairman of the Military Council and the Council of Ministers, 30 April 1990.



King Moshoeshoe II in a letter to the chairman of the Military Council, 22 February 1990.



Puo ka Mohlomphehi Major General J M Lekhanya ka Lekhotleng la Sechaba la Popo ea Molao oa Motheo, 6 November 1990.



Joint statement by leaders of political parties, 30 May 1990.



R Southall, Lesotho’s transition and the 1993 election, in R Southall & T Petlane (eds), Democratisation and demilitarisation in Lesotho, p 25.



M oa Basotho, Authorities take the lion’s share, 28 April 1991; Transformation Resource Centre, The return to democracy in Lesotho?, 13 December 1990; Winds of change blowing in Lesotho, The Star, 31 August 1990.



J Daniel, You United Nations have delivered us: Monitoring the 1993 election in Lesotho, in Southall & Petlane, op cit, pp 93-102.



N P Selinyane, Civil society, electoral politics and the retrieval of democracy in Lesotho, Lesotho Social Science Review 3(2), 1997.



P Mathoma, South Africa and Lesotho: Sovereign independence or a tenth province? in SAIIA, South African yearbook of international affairs 1999/2000, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1999, p 74.



Ibid, p 75.