King Leopold’s Ghost

A story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial Africa
Adam Hochschild
Macmillan, London, 1998

For some reason, King Leopold’s Ghost did not capture the attention of bookstores or readers in a number of African countries. This meticulously researched account of the history of the Congo (what is today is the Democratic Republic of Congo) during the early colonial era (circa 1880-1913) provides a fascinating and horrifying picture of the colonial experience. It offers, unwittingly, an excellent explanation of why Africa’s colonial past — though not the sole reason — still remains such an important factor in the continent’s present situation of exploitation, deprivation and poverty.

Hochschild subtitled his account A story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial Africa. These three aspects usefully summarise the content of the book. The greed was primarily that of two men: first of all the famous explorer, Stanley, who is presented here not in his guise as the first white man to cross Africa from east (Zanzibar) to west (the seaport of Boma), but as a heartless, cruel and scheming character who dreamed of turning his discoveries into fame, status, prestige and profit, no matter what the cost in human lives. The second man was Belgium’s King Leopold who railed against the confines and constrictions of the small country he ‘ruled’ and who had dreams of lording it over a huge country, thus becoming a true king and sating his thirst for riches far beyond what his position and status in Europe allowed for.

Stanley and King Leopold were a perfect match and through the services of Stanley, Leopold became the sole owner (though he would never set foot on it) of one of the largest territories in the world (the Congo would only become a Belgium colony in 1913 after the King’s death). In serving Leopold, Stanley found the ‘opulent philanthropist’ that would enable him to unlock the fabulous riches and trading opportunities offered by ‘commerce with Central Africa’. In the process, and through their collaboration, thousands of other greedy people, mostly from Belgian or other European stock, would flock to the Congo in search of riches, there to find not only their fortunes, but also to give reign to their most base and depraved impulses. In this way, a terror was unleashed that, by all accounts, would eventually halve the population of the Congo — "during the Leopold period and its immediate aftermath the population of the territory dropped by approximately ten million people" (p 233).

Behind this incredible ‘tale’ of greed and terror, though, Hochschild also tells of those who so heroically strove to expose Leopold’s reign for what it was — a system of forced/ slave labour that brought untold riches to a few (mostly the King and his business partners in Europe), while devastating the Congo in terms of its human and other resources. There were many of these heroes, ranging from courageous people such as Hezekiah Shanu who sent important evidence of the atrocities to reformers abroad and who was eventually driven to suicide by Leopold’s officials, to numerous missionaries who disregarded the warnings and threats of the Belgian officials and continued to provide information to the reformers, to Hochschild’s ‘hero’, Edmund Dene Morel, based in Liverpool, who worked ceaselessly to uncover the horrors of Leopold’s rule.

The real fascination of this book and its true value go deeper, though, in its exploration of greed, terror and heroism. The author mentions in his introduction that African voices are largely absent from the history of imperialism and colonialism, mainly because most of the cultures encountered in colonies did not have a tradition of writing, but relied on the oral tradition for social and cultural reproduction. Yet, almost miraculously, a few written accounts do exist. One of the most insightful is that of the 16th century King Affonso I, monarch or ManiKongo of the Kingdom of Kongo who had conducted a correspondence with Portugal’s King João III. It is in Affonso’s letters that much of the explanation for Africa’s contemporary upheavals, strife and civil wars is already to be found. What Affonso wrote almost 600 years ago still holds true today: that greed on both sides unleashes the terror that Africa seems to find impossible to stop. Affonso begged João to send teachers, pharmacists and doctors instead of traders — his people were being ruined by the monstrous greed exhibited by both Congolese and the foreign traders and priests. Affonso begged his Portuguese counterpart in vain. His emissaries to the Pope in Rome were detained as they stepped off the boat in Lisbon. His "despair reached its depth" when news came that ten young members of his family, sent to Portugal for a religious education, had disappeared. It turned out later that they had been sold as slaves in Brazil.

The terror and horror meted out in Hochschild’s history of King Leopold’s rape of the Congo foreshadow much of what was to come later: much of Europe moving from committing horrendous acts in its various colonies, to committing the horrors of World War II — where there is no law and order, where there is no civilising influence of the social group, or where such influence is rendered apart as under colonialism or war, only terror and destruction are to be expected. As the author points out, atrocities were not only committed in the Congo — the French used much the same methods in their rubber plantations in West Africa, the Germans practically wiped out the whole Herero population in what was then known as German West Africa (Namibia), Arab slave traders roamed the African interior long before Europeans arrived to follow their example, the British used taxes to force people off their land and into the workforce, often dislocating them brutally, in almost all instances entrenching a system of migrant labour that, in the long run, would destroy the social fabric and leave the world with some real and practical dilemmas today, not least of these the spread of HIV/AIDS.

But the heroism recounted in this book also goes beyond the movement set up by Morel to expose Leopold and the reign of greed and terror in ‘his’ Congo. Hochschild points out that this movement was the first to work and act on such a scale — its activities made possible through the technological developments of the early 20th century. The idea of globalisation and its facilitation of global organisation and co-operation is not a recent manifestation hallmarked by Seattle and the Internet. For those campaigning against economic globalisation, the success of Morel’s movement also offers some hope, but it is a hope tinged by tragedy. When considering the Congo of today (DRC), one cannot but wonder whether things have really changed all that much — Affonso’s lament about the greed of his own people and that of foreigners destroying his kingdom and ruining his people still holds true today.

Hochschild gives a detailed account of the opening up of Central Africa for commercial and trade purposes, always emphasising the people involved. His account of the development of the rubber trade is particularly horrifying, and he clearly emphasises the fact that, even after Leopold’s death, when the Congo became a Belgian colony, little really changed. In this sense, it is a depressing book — the heroism needed to tell the tale of the Congo did not bring genuine and lasting change to the country. At the time of independence in 1961, the Congo boasted less than 30 university graduates, the country was completely unprepared for self-rule and, as the Belgians moved out, the Americans moved in. For those readers who believe one can learn as much from a novel as from a work of non-fiction, Barbara Kingsolver’s The Poisonwood Bible gives a riveting account of the Congo during the early era of independence. Her account dovetails well with Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost which, though an ‘upsetting read’, is an important and timely contribution to current understanding of history and development of the DRC.

Prof Maxi Schoeman
Department of Political Science
University of Pretoria

For Humanity
Reflections of a war crimes investigator
Richard Goldstone
Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 2000

For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator is a collection of a Castle Lecture series delivered in 1998 by Judge Richard Goldstone at Yale University in the United States. Judge Goldstone is a judge in the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the former chief public prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).

Goldstone canvasses the political, legal and moral complexities of dealing with the past in transitional societies like South Africa, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Dealing with past human rights violations is indeed a daunting matter for any nascent democracy or post-conflict society. This challenge is often characterised by conflicting considerations. It involves making hard choices between, for example, blanket and conditional amnesty, and between prosecution and reparations; between the need to create a culture of human rights rather than a culture of impunity; between vengeance and peaceful co-existence; between retribution and restorative justice; and between fears and legitimate expectations.

The book has three themes: an evaluation of the work of the Goldstone Commission, the two UN tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and prospects for the future International Criminal Court (ICC). In the first part of the book, Goldstone highlights the role he played as chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation in South Africa (Goldstone Commission). The Commission was appointed by former President F W de Klerk in 1991 to investigate incidents of public violence and intimidation prior to the 1994 general election. The Commission revealed violent activities of senior members of the South African Police and produced sufficient evidence of gross human rights violations to justify the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Goldstone’s work in the Commission led to his appointment as prosecutor at the Yugoslav Tribunal, although he had no specialised knowledge of the Balkan crises, nor substantial experience in international humanitarian law. Several more obvious candidates had turned down the post, partially because many had written the ICTY off as an ineffective and largely symbolic response to the human rights catastrophe in the Balkans. It was therefore not surprising that, upon his arrival in The Hague, Goldstone was faced with sceptical press co-operation. Moreover, the international community’s failure to punish political leaders like Pol Pot (Cambodia) and Saddam Hussein (Iraq), who had indisputably been responsible for massive violations of international humanitarian law, was seen as influential in convincing the Milosevic regime that it could proceed with impunity.

But, due in large part to Goldstone’s work, the ICTY and ICTR helped to change this culture of impunity to one of accountability. The establishment of these tribunals have certainly sent a powerful message to war criminals (especially political leaders) that they will be held accountable for their actions. The jurisprudence of the tribunals has also advanced the development of international humanitarian law, which was hardly the case prior to 1993. For example, in two important judgements, the tribunals have recognised rape not only as a war crime but also as constituting a crime against humanity.

The success of the two tribunals can be attributed to a large extent to Goldstone’s tireless efforts in cajoling reluctant governments into co-operating in the investigation and punishment of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Today, countries across the world have passed domestic legislation pledging their co-operation with such UN tribunals.

Turning to the prospects for the ICC, Goldstone highlights the importance of protecting the independence of the public prosecutor of the ICC from other organs of the Tribunal. Although the prosecutor may initiate investigations ex officio under the ICC Statute, the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII may refer a matter to the prosecutor for investigation. Especially since the Security Council is dominated by the great powers, pressure from the Council could destroy the integrity and independence of the office of the prosecutor, to the extent that indictment decisions may be seen as being politicised by such pressure.

Another important challenge highlighted by Goldstone is how the ICC should deal with amnesties granted for gross human rights violations by domestic truth commissions such as that of South Africa. State practice suggests that blanket amnesties — similar to the one granted to General Augusto Pinochet in 1978 and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader Foday Sankoh in the Lomé Peace Agreement between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone — violate international law. This is why the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General have unanimously rejected the amnesty in the Lomé ceasefire agreement.

Whether the South African style of amnesties should be recognised by the ICC on the basis that they were the result of a negotiated peace settlement and subsequently approved by a democratic legislature, remains a thorny issue. Although the amnesty in South Africa was a price for peaceful transition, and was upheld by the Constitutional Court, under international law it is generally accepted that states have an obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of torture and crimes against humanity such as apartheid. The duty to prosecute or extradite forms part of the peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). A state refusing to honour its international law obligation not only violates international law, but will be violating norms of international law of the most fundamental character. Also, crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitation. The UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity prohibits any form of statutory limitation on crimes against humanity. Thus, Nazi war criminals are still being hunted down and prosecuted, almost 50 years after the Nuremberg trials.

Although not extensively discussed in this book, amnesties covering gross human rights violations as part of a transitional package are likely to become one of the sensitive and highly politicised issues when the ICC eventually comes into operation. This is due to the fact that a number of transitional societies still see amnesty as a tool for durable peace and national reconciliation. Domestic truth commissions have been contemplated or initiated in Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to mention but a few. The irreducible tension between accountability and amnesty will inevitably be felt as the ICC begins its work and has to determine whether to recognise immunities granted by domestic truth commissions.

Although very brief, For Humanity raises all of the vexing problems and challenges of transitional justice. It suggests that a determined, highly respected jurist like Goldstone can make headway in devising pragmatic solutions to at least some of those challenges. This lucid, non-academic book is highly recommended to any reader who wants an accessible introduction to the politics and law of transitional justice.

Phenyo Keiseng Rakate
Peace Missions Programme
Institute for Security Studies

Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict
Application of a process model
Thomas S Szayna (editor)
RAND, Arlington, 2000

In the post-Cold War era, intrastate conflict leading to state breakdown has characterised the international political arena. Concern over the effects of civil war on neighbouring countries and massive heavy human suffering have seen countries setting aside the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of foreign states. Such involvement has proved to be expensive in terms of resources spent and human suffering. In view of the high cost, international efforts have shifted the focus from resolving to anticipating conflicts. In this book, edited by Thomas Szayna, a model is outlined that can be used to predict the likelihood of ethnic war. While the intended audience is the United States intelligence community, it is likely that political analysts and scholars elsewhere may also find it useful. Other contributors to the book include Ashley J Tellis, James A Winnefeld, Michele Zanini, Pearl-Alice and Sandra F Joireman.

The book is divided into seven chapters, of which the first and second chapters (Tellis and Szayna) introduce and acquaint the reader with the model. The next four chapters test the applicability of the model by looking at four countries: Yugoslavia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. In the case of South Africa and Yugoslavia, the model takes a retrospective angle, while the latter case studies are prospective. The concluding chapter outlines the benefits of and the caveats to be considered by the analyst when using the model.

The process model utilises an existing body of knowledge and orders it into a theoretical framework that attempts to explain when not why ethnic conflict will occur. Before outlining the model, the authors (Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld) give a comprehensive definition of the concept of ethnicity. They make a strong case for the need to define ethnicity in such a way that, while it remains a causative variable, it does not dominate the explanatory sphere. The rigour with which they do this is indeed commendable and the reader is quite clear about the premises on which they are operating. They challenge the common argument that the existence of many ethnic groups necessarily leads to conflict. They argue that the mere existence of multiple ethnic groups in a country is not a prerequisite for conflict. What may at times look like a spontaneous eruption of ethnic violence is usually the final stage of a series of actions.. Through close monitoring, the stage before conflict erupts can be anticipated — hence the model. The model moves the reader through different phases, each having its own identifiable characteristics with the final one being that of conflict.

In the first phase, the potential that exists for ethnic conflict is explored, by examining the political, social and economic arenas. In these spheres, the pattern and extent of exclusion or dominance of some ethnic groups as opposed to others are crucial. If one group dominates any or all of the three arenas and other ethnic groups are systematically excluded, then the possibility exists of their resorting to violence to gain access, even though conflict is not yet imminent. In the next stage, the likelihood of conflict, what will need to happen before conflict is not only possible but likely, is examined.

Group mobilisation is likely in this second stage. However, the fact that this happens along ethnic lines should not detract from the fact that this mobilisation is meant for the purpose of capturing power and not necessarily to redress past injustices. The role of leaders at this point becomes significant. The authors introduce the fitting concept of identity entrepreneurs, defined as individuals who will exploit the ethnic card to gain access to the specific arena from which they are excluded. Along with leadership, the resources at the disposal of the group and how well they are organised are also important. The international system may contribute to the possibility of creating conflict by the provision of overt or covert material support.

In the third stage, the element of strategic bargaining enters. The lines are drawn and each side uses the tools available to bargain for the political space. The state has specific weapons: its accommodative and fiscal capability and its ability and willingness to use force. The mobilised group also has three possible tools: strength of leadership, resources available and popular support.

Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld place these variables against one another in a grid format and then test the one against the other, giving the possible outcome of an engagement between the state and the mobilised group. The outcomes range from negotiation to violence.

It is against this background that the four cases studies are presented. Of particular interest are the two African case studies. In the case of South Africa, an attempt is made to explain why the country did not descend into civil war, but rather entered into a negotiated settlement. This chapter by Alice and Szayna is interesting in the way it argues that a negotiated settlement was the only option available to the parties involved. The main point of concern here is that that the African National Congress (ANC) is analysed as an ethnic group. Although the authors go to great pains to prove that the ANC can be analysed as such, their argument is not convincing. This tests and weakens the strength of using the model.

The case of Ethiopia by Joireman and Szayna is slightly more convincing, but not entirely so. The potential shortcoming lies in identifying the Amhar as the contesting ethnic group. Those familiar with the politics in the country would argue that another ethnic group (the Oromo) would have been a better example.

On the whole, the book achieves what it sets out to do — helping political analysts to order their thinking when observing a political landscape. It points out to observers what they should be looking for, as well as areas where they have inadequate information and thus need to gather more information. Even though this may appear mechanistic, the issue of subjectivity is not ignored and the element of personal judgement and analysis is retained. The caveat to be borne in mind is that the model only supports, but does not take away the necessity of detailed knowledge about the particular country under review. Secondly, for African scholars, the application of this model may also be somewhat frustrating, since current data is not always readily available on population groups, for instance. Where the model calls for such figures in creating the strategic bargaining matrix, the final analysis is therefore affected.

Lucy Mulli
Arms Management Programme
Institute for Security Studies

Mozambique
The tortuous road to democracy
João M Cabrita
Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2000

In the past decade, much scholarly attention has been devoted to Mozambique’s peace and democratisation process, particularly issues such as decentralisation, development and the compatibility of tradition and modernisation. Since Margaret Hall and Tom Young’s Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence (1997), João M Cabrita’s book is one of the rare detailed and comprehensive presentations of Mozambican politics recently written in English.

Cabrita, a Southern African news media consultant, born in Beira, Mozambique and currently living in Swaziland, portrays the long and rocky path of Mozambique from the statement by União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO) in 1962 to establish a government by the people and for the people, to its assumed finalisation 30 years afterwards when Mozambique had its first multiparty elections.

However, the reader who is tempted by the title and expects an account of the peace and democratisation process, will be disappointed. The description of Mozambique’s tortuous road to democracy ends after six chapters (named "parts" in the book) in 1989 with a questionable reference to the use of the Gersony report by the United States State Department in order to destroy the credibility of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in foreign circles. The following years — 1990 to1999 — which in fact constitute the most relevant for the democratisation of the country, are summarised in a four-page epilogue.

However, the strength of Cabrita’s book is in the detailed portrayal of the genesis of Frelimo and Renamo and the differentiation between external and internal factors and actors. The short chapters — a wise decision to abstain from indulging in a chronology of events — and the provision of a rather personality-centred approach to history give the book a refreshing character while also recognising the role of key individuals. Using mainly primary sources, interviews conducted with contemporaries, radio broadcasts, classified information obtained from the US Office of Freedom of Information at the State Department and other intelligence sources, Cabrita provides provoking new historical details.

According to Cabrita, the formation of Frelimo from the anti-colonial groupings UDENAMO (Stalinist-oriented with financial assistance from Ghana), the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), supported by Tanzania and the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI), based in Malawi, was more a marriage of convenience imposed on the Mozambicans, and particularly enforced by Tanzania, than a genuine united front against Portuguese colonialism. In the creation of the movement, Cabrita recognises the roots of future divisions which he further elaborates on in part I, called ‘A tradition of conflict’. By doing so, he confronts the monolithic image that Frelimo has gained in past decades, which provoked even scholars like Patrick Chabal to speak of Frelimo "as a united and cohesive ruling party." In his analyses, Cabrita goes as far as concluding that "the war was inevitable given the tradition of conflict that had always characterised Frelimo, first as an independence movement, and afterwards as a ruling party." In order to sustain his argument, he further shows the pattern of internal dissent, persecution and physical elimination of members and opponents by the party (mainly covered in part I and II).

For Cabrita, the accession of Eduardo Mondlane to the presidency of Frelimo’s Supreme Council can largely be explained by ethnic considerations. UDENAMO members wanted Mondlane, a southerner, as counterweight to the large Makonde presence within MANU. However, as the author shows, Mondlane, his American orientation and his commitment to a negotiated non-violent settlement with Portugal were disputed within the party. Radical elements within Frelimo saw him as an American stooge who was selling Mozambique out to the imperialists. Although Mondlane was open to military support from the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and the Peoples’ Republic of China, he remained loyal to the west, thereby creating a communist-capitalist rivalry within Frelimo. The split within Frelimo, which ran along political and ethnic lines, became particularly apparent after the start of the independence war. It ran between the political leadership, based in Dar es Salaam and which mainly consisted of Mozambicans from the south, and the Frelimo army, which operated within Mozambique and consisted mainly of recruits from the Makua and Makonde ethnic groupings of Northern Mozambique. In the sub-chapters of part II, Cabrita shows in detail how Frelimo tried to consolidate its totalitarian regime and eliminate any opposition after sovereignty rights had been transferred exclusively to Frelimo in the Lusaka accords (1975). According to Frelimo, the people’s democratic revolution entailed the wholesale destruction of what had been inherited from the colonial period. With assistance by the "political police", first the colonial bourgeoisie and then the traditional feudal society had to be destroyed. In re-education camps, the homem novo should be formed. Traditional authorities had to be eradicated. The rural population were to be resettled in communal villages.

The detailed account provided by the author on Frelimo’s attempts to consolidate power by every possible means provides the reader with some insight into the internal climate that developed during this time and that also nurtured the formation of Renamo.

In his presentation of the genesis of Renamo, Cabrita emphasises the role of Orlando Cristina and the broadcasting station Voz da África Livre, thus seeking to dispute the claims that Renamo was a creation and a puppet of foreign powers such as Rhodesia and South Africa.

Rhodesia, like South Africa, initially opted for a policy of co-existence when Mozambique became independent under a Frelimo government. Only when the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the African National Congress (ANC) increased their operations from Mozambique against both minority regimes in their respective countries, did these countries try to destabilise the Frelimo government to force Mozambique to become a compliant neighbour. Although the Rhodesians favoured a small and manageable unit without any political agenda that would launch attacks on key installations in Mozambique, they supported Renamo right from the beginning and used the movement to gather intelligence against ZANU. However, in contrast to the regime of Ian Smith, South Africa linked its support to the proviso that the movement represented a viable political alternative to Frelimo.

Whereas the reader can appreciate the critical and enlightening approach Cabrita applies towards his analysis of Frelimo and the Mozambican government, it becomes evident in the second half of the book that, when Renamo is discussed, the author does not give a balanced account of Mozambique’s history and is biased in his approach.

One example of this subtle support for Renamo’s cause can be detected in the section on ‘Heading for Maputo’ in part IV. The author describes how peasant families who resisted resettlement in communal villages saw their houses and belongings destroyed by government troops and how the government’s relief agency used the withdrawal of food as a coercive measure to move people into these villages.

Atrocities committed by Renamo are summarised under the title, the ‘Nkomati Accord’, in part V. "For the rest of the year, Renamo reported road ambushes, sabotage of the Nacala railway line, attacks on FAM garrisons, and the storming of communal villages." No detailed account is provided of atrocities by Renamo. Sometimes, the presentation has an apologetic character that almost borders on cynical in its naivete. "Initially, Renamo ambushes on the south-north highway, as on other routes, were by means of road blocks. Passengers from civilian vehicles, usually buses, were ordered to alight with their belongings. Renamo says it resorted to ambushing road traffic when government soldiers travelling in civilian vehicles began shooting at guerrillas. Renamo did try to discourage civilians from travelling together with FAM personnel." The author obviously tries either to conceal or simply forgets the fact that the civil war in Mozambique was of such viciousness that, until Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, it marked the most serious degradation of human rights in Africa. From the late 1970s until the early 1990s, Renamo set about devastating the country and terrorising those who failed to support them. It was in Mozambique that, for the first time in independent Africa, Africans resorted to the systematic use of mutilation and the killing of parents by their children in order to assure subservience.

In the epilogue, the author provides only a superficial account of the most important period in Mozambique’s transition. In seeking to discredit the 1999 elections, he is also inaccurate when, for example, he states that "accredited independent observers were prevented from monitoring the counting of ballots." In reality, international and national election observers attended the counting of ballots after the closure of the polling stations on the last day of voting. They were also allowed to monitor the processing of election results at provincial level by separate monitors in the respective centres. However, as the Carter Centre highlighted in its final report on the elections, the main problem was a lack of transparency during the final stages of tabulation and the limited technical monitoring capacity of party agents and representatives. When technical problems emerged during the tabulation of votes, international observers had already left the country.

The incorrect presentation of events in the epilogue underlines the biased orientation of Cabrita’s work. Yet, when taken as complementary to the existing literature on Mozambique, this book remains valuable in that it provides new insights into historical details. Unfortunately, its evident and uncritical bias towards Renamo limits the merits that could otherwise be attributed to it.

Andrea E Ostheimer
Institute for Security Studies Liaison Officer
Maputo