Ghana achieved a victory for democracy on 7 January 2001 when Kufuor, the presidential candidate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), was inaugurated as its president. For Kufuor, this was the end of a ‘political wilderness’ that lasted 29 years. His victory was celebrated with a nationwide sense of relief and joy. Almost 100 days after the government assumed power, it still enjoys massive support from the people and a new tolerance level that is unique in competitive Ghanaian politics. This article highlights areas of concern where the new government must tread carefully, particularly in respect of issues dealing with the military and the need for security sector reform to enable the military to accept civilian control. The discussion on foreign policy demonstrates the need for a more nuanced approach to the concept of ‘good neighbourliness’, situated within a clear differentiation between party and national interests. The economy has to improve and offer benefits to the public if such tolerance is to be sustained. The election results showed a need for consensus and coalition-building in parliament to consolidate this important victory.

Introduction

Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa’s first independent country, chalked up a veritable democratic victory on 7 January 2001 when Mr John Agyekum Kufuor, the presidential candidate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), was inaugurated as the president of the third parliament of the fourth republic. The victory, captured in the religious song Aba mu awie (it has come to pass), adopted by the NPP after its victory, aptly captured the national sense of relief and joy. For Kufuor, this was the end of a personal and a professional odyssey, an odyssey that had led to 29 years in a ‘political wilderness’ after the then Progress Party (PP) government in which he was a deputy minister of Foreign Affairs was overthrown in a coup d’état on 13 February 1972.¹

By the December 2000 elections, Ghana had gone through a democratic transition and consolidation, which in several ways reflected the struggles for democratic accountability, transparency and sustainability with broad support from different sections of the community. These conform to the general democratic developments in the 1980s and 1990s, which suggest that the role of the military in politics is receding. Yet, such developments do not necessarily imply that the military will automatically obey civilian leaders in the new regime. There is a need to understand how and under what conditions democratic governance and civilian control over the military can be encouraged as a means of entrenching the gains of democratic governance.

This article analyses the impact of the NPP victory in the December 2000 Ghana elections and its significance to democracy in Ghana. With this in mind, the transformation is contextualised by providing a short background analysis of the events leading up to 7 January 2001. Such an approach will provide a framework within which to position and analyse the actions and activities of the new government. A few specific cases are examined, in particular the military, foreign policy and economic programmes. In conclusion, suggestions and ideas are offered on what is needed or expected from the government in the coming years.

Background

When a young and energetic Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings overthrew two governments — the Supreme Military Council (SMC) II on 4 June 1979, after which he launched his House Cleaning Exercise (HCE),² and again on 31 December 1981, when he initiated his ‘Holy War’³ — both intrusions into national politics were widely supported by different sections of the Ghanaian populace. However, the anti-élitist, economic austerity programmes and anti-corruption platforms that were used to justify these incursions were rapidly shelved. Instead, as the wave of domestic and international demands for democracy took hold and the ‘velvet revolutions’ of Eastern Europe succeeded, with bilateral disbursements from donor countries made contingent upon more inclusive forms of governance, Rawlings had no alternative than to succumb to these demands. A constitution was drafted and Ghanaians overwhelmingly voted in support of a democratic form of government. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was eventually transformed into a National Democratic Convention (NDC) party, and was forced to return to a democratic process it had earlier disrupted — an open, democratic system of accountability and transparency.⁴

In December 1992, Ghanaians went to the polls for the first time in 11 years. Accusations of electoral fraud and malpractices marred this event with the main challenger to the NDC party, the NPP, accusing the PNDC of having won an election through ‘a stolen verdict’.⁵ Despite the evidence of malfeasance, international electoral observers declared the elections to have been free and fair. In 1996, the NDC won a second four-year mandate. When campaigning for the December 2000 election began, so confident was the NDC — a behemoth of a party with offices and branches in all towns and settlements in Ghana — that there was complacency on the part of the NDC party apparatus. By December 2000, the party was mired in its own quicksand of corruption and ethnic favouritism. With different power enclaves within the party hierarchy jostling for power, it increasingly became clear that the party was rotten from within and lacked internal democratic structures.⁶

On 7 December 2000 when presidential and parliamentary elections took place, the country’s people had lost confidence in themselves, with a sluggish economy on the verge of collapse, and an uncaring government led by individuals who spouted rhetoric concerning economic growth and well-being without people having any real access to this wealth. Underscoring this were donor governments and organisations based in Ghana that constantly employed spurious data and analyses to support the NDC government, creating a false impression of a country on the verge of economic take-off. Therefore, when Kufuor took the oath of allegiance to serve the people of Ghana faithfully, people broke down in tears and the Akan spiritual, Aba mu awie was sung amidst the waving of white handkerchiefs (the traditional Ghanaian sign of victory). Several overlapping interests converged, but the main emotion was one of bitter-sweet relief.⁷ Another message that went out clearly from Ghanaians was that what was wanted and demanded was in fact captured in the slogan of the NPP: An agenda for positive change.⁸ Never again in the nation’s history would one group of people be permitted to rule for so long with so little accountability.

From opposition to governing party

The transformation of the NPP from an opposition party to a governing party was long and arduous. The party was in power only once (from 1969 to 1972) since its establishment in the late 1940s. The party presented a major campaign manifesto to the Ghanaian population, a document that set out its alternative plans for transforming Ghana. The party promised the people of Ghana — in both the president’s first sessional address to parliament and in the party manifesto — that it would seek to:

"liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property owning democracy in this land … as the principles to which the government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen."⁹

This desire to initiate a growth process towards ‘a property-owning democracy’ smacks of Lockean dynamics of times past. Assuming that it is possible to establish such a class within the constraints of Ghana’s weak position in a globalised world, the extent to which an NPP-led government can transform Ghana in relation to the challenges it faces with respect to the military, the state of the economy and foreign policy still needs to be analysed. These areas are considered here in some depth, not because others are unimportant, but because the perception is that they can potentially pose the greatest challenges to the government.

The security and military albatross

Discourses about Ghana’s internal security issues vis-à-vis the military have shown that these are given very high priority by the NPP government. Security will be high on the agenda of the new government because of the extremely politicised nature of the military and its penchant for intervening in national politics. This fact is underscored by a recent study, which showed that Ghanaians were very reluctant about the military playing a role in national politics.¹⁰ But if society, in general, were concerned about the military’s role in politics, then getting to grips with the rot within the military establishment is a difficult process — taking the military through the reprofessionalisation process necessary to enhance its credibility as an institution. One of the primary issues is that of the military hierarchy. In the campaign manifesto, the NPP saw the role of the security services as follows:

"Their main concern will be the survival of the state and the protection of its territorial integrity and its democratic system. They will not be part of party apparatus and they must not be party members. Security service personnel will thus be expected to show absolute neutrality in political conflicts and will be guaranteed secure tenure, subject to normal disciplinary measures."¹¹

In spite of the manifesto’s promise to guarantee secure tenure, the actions of the government have so far alienated several sections of the forces.

Two examples demonstrate the increasing sense of frustration within the military. Firstly, there have been significant changes in the security sector, particularly in the police, the intelligence services and the military, with its hierarchy of seven top generals having been asked to proceed on leave. Secondly, the new appointments oversee much more senior officials who now have to subject themselves to men who were previously their juniors. Discussions held with some serving officers paint a picture of one ethnic group replacing its favourites with another. Suddenly, the politics of ethnicity, which characterised the December elections, is perceptible in the way in which security-related appointments and decisions are being made. So serious is the concern that senior military and intelligence officials have had to sound notes of caution under the protection of anonymity.¹² Inversely, the government has been forced to explain that there were certain officers from specific ethnic groups who were disproportionately represented in the intelligence services and who thus would be naturally affected if mass reassignments were made.¹³ This is an apologist’s argument, which gives the impression that the government’s critics of its mass dismissals and reassignment actions are "creat[ing] a consciousness of a situation that does not exist."¹⁴

The second problem concerns older soldiers who should be discharged and reintegrated into society.¹⁵ This is another area of military restructuring that can pose difficulties for the government and needs to be handled sensitively. It is estimated that there are 2 000 over-aged soldiers who have to be discharged. There are serious economic and social implications for such a decision.¹⁶

The third area of concern is the critical and delicate issue of civilian control over the security sector.¹⁷ While all these issues are important, the focus of attention in this article is on civilian control and the transformation of the security sector. For the Kufuor administration, discussing civilian control over the military is critical because transitional democracies have to deal with the fundamental issue of establishing civilian control, as well as of establishing the institutions that augur well for democratic governance under circumstances of political instability and security threats, weak state institutions and a weak institutional capacity of the state amid economic hardships.¹⁸ Civilian control over the military under such circumstances is less than obvious, because the issues at stake transcend the military and encompass the security sector as a whole — the police, the judiciary and the penal system.

‘Security sector’ refers here to those bodies that are, or should be responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it. This includes:

groups with a legal mandate to wield instruments of violence — military, paramilitary and police forces;



institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector — civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmental organisations;



bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law — the judiciary, penal system, human rights ombudsman, particularly where these institutions are weak; and



the intelligence community for which the issue of the military is anything but settled.

There are important issues that need consideration. It is necessary first to define civilian controls with regard to the military in policymaking. The critical issue is to prevent interference in government and policymaking by the military, and to ensure the supremacy of civilians in military affairs.

Some questions of a more procedural nature also confront the new administration. Which policies and structures lead to civilian control? How can civilian control be measured and evaluated? What role can the international community play in strengthening civilian control?

Civilian control and the security sector

Creating democratic, civilian control over the security apparatus requires the involvement of a wide range of actors. However, the security forces are not the only national security actors. Civil authorities have important policy development and oversight functions and responsibilities. Civil and political societies have a role to play in developing policy and monitoring the activities of the security forces, as well as those of the civil authorities. Importantly, the activities of other non-state actors such as informal armed groups and private security firms must also be considered.

All these groups in the ‘security family’ must adhere to certain fundamental principles of good governance in the security sector. Among some of the basic criteria for such codes of conduct and behaviour are:

The security sector must be accountable both to the elected civil authorities and to civil society, while acting in a non-partisan manner.



The security sector should operate in accordance with international and domestic constitutional law.



Information about security sector planning and resourcing must be widely available both within the government and to the public. This must be defined by a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of the sector. It should be subjected to the same principles of public sector management as other government sectors, with relatively small adjustments for appropriate national security-related confidentiality. However, the new Minister of Defence, Dr Kwame Addo-Kufuor, is not comfortable with this kind of development. In a recent statement on civil-military relations, he said categorically that, "though the military is subjected to civilian authority, there is a limit to which military spending should be exposed to the public."¹⁹



The relations between the military and civilians must be based on an articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and defence forces, and with civil society based on a respect for human rights.



The capacity of civil authorities to exercise political control over the operations and the resourcing of the security forces must be improved. Civil society must have the capacity to monitor the security forces and provide constructive input into the political debate on security policy.



The political environment must be constituted in such a way that civil society can actively monitor the security sector and can be consulted on a regular basis on security policies, resource allocation and other relevant issues.



The security forces must be trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent with the requirements of a democratic society.



Fostering an environment supportive of regional and subregional peace and security must have a high priority for policymakers.

 Reinforcing good governance in the security sector

Since Ghana has joined the community of democratic nations, it is imperative that its government makes efforts to strengthen good governance in the security sector. Looking at military and security spending as simply ‘unproductive’ is passé. Instead, the focus needs to be on the institutional framework that determines how budgets are established, implemented and monitored. To strengthen security sector governance, particular attention must be paid to the following:

professionalising the security forces;

improving the capacity and capability of civil authorities;

placing a high priority on human rights protection;

enabling and capacitating civil society to engage in research and advocacy;

promoting transparency; and

promoting regional security.

Regional security will require attention because of the regional security environment within which the country finds itself and to which the government needs to respond soon. Most Ghanaian governments in the post-independence period have carried out policies that can be broadly characterised as ‘positive neutrality’ within which is situated the country’s drive for economic growth and good neighbourliness. But to what extent can the security and military interests of the government be achieved if the volatile security situation in which Ghana finds itself is taken into consideration? Can Ghana continue to be an island unto itself when the subregion faces serious security threats?

In An agenda for positive change, the NPP in opposition sought to "grant a two-month amnesty for all assault weapons and ammunition currently held by unauthorised persons in private homes and thereby outlaw private possession of AK47 and allied weapons …"²⁰ Despite this campaign promise, the government initiated a weapons-for-reward programme, which sought to retrieve excess and unlicenced weapons from society. Launching a joint military and police operation dubbed Etuo mu ye sum (the barrel of a gun is dark)²¹ to mop up excess unregistered guns in the country, holders of such guns were given a two-week ultimatum to hand in their weapons or face the full might of the law. The government has since extended the joint military and police campaign for some time into the future. What is worrying, however, is that no codes of conduct or behaviour were established for the police to guide their operations, and apart from a few public examples of seizing arms caches, there is a general uncertainty about how many weapons have been retrieved.²²

Foreign policy options

What foreign policy options are open to the Kufuor administration? If the utterances in its campaign manifesto are considered, then the major rationale of an NPP-led foreign policy thrust would be:

"the vigorous promotion … of the vital interests of the country and its citizens, with the goal of achieving prosperity and dignity for all Ghanaians and ensuring the nation’s security."²³

Interestingly, in the entire policy document the national interest is not defined. More often than not, it is impossible to differentiate ‘regime’ interest from ‘national’ interest. To differentiate between the two, the foreign policy actions of the government since its inauguration into office would have to be analysed and compared to the extent to which the undefined ‘national’ interest has been achieved.

An early indication of the kind of foreign policy that would characterise the NPP was hinted at during the inauguration of the president on 7 January 2001. Among the more interesting heads of state who were present in Accra were Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.²⁴ While the inclusion of Nigeria and its leader as the special guest of honour at the celebrations was understandable (Nigeria is Ghana’s major supplier of oil on very favourable credit lines and is also the hegemon in the subregion), the invitation to and inclusion of the Togolese and Burkinabe presidents at the inauguration generated heated debate and speculation in Ghana.

Using An agenda for positive change as the point of departure, the NPP in opposition spouted the standard rhetoric of "peaceful co-existence and very close co-operation with all our neighbours, especially in the West African sub-region."²⁵ Accepting that good neighbourliness is both welcome and acceptable, it is nevertheless a legitimate question whether all neighbours should be welcomed irrespective of their norms and values with respect to what the NPP itself claims to be its rejection of:

"illegal overthrows of government anywhere in the world … [and its wish to] emphasize respect for the rule of law and human rights [in] African and world politics."²⁶

It is apparent that there is a contradiction between the rhetoric of foreign policy and the reality of its praxis by the NPP government. Two examples will suffice. Six days after his inauguration as president, before the cabinet had been formed, Kufuor accepted an invitation from the Togolese leader, Gnassingbe Eyadema, to pay a state visit on 13 January 2001 and participate in celebrations of the 34th anniversary of the overthrow of the previous government. During the visit, the Ghanaian president was awarded the highest civil order of the Togolese.²⁷ According to two editorials in The Ghanaian Chronicle, the

"president received an award from this misanthropist who parades himself as the president of a nation! … What is the understanding between Kufuor and Eyadema that made it imperative that the Ghanaian leader had to be physically present in Lomé on that day? What was the award for? Which services have Kufuor rendered to Eyadema that he had to be honoured? … These questions are begging to be answered."²⁸

Despite public criticism, the government has so far steadfastly refused to answer any of these questions. For a government that has consistently refused to democratise and has put impediments in the way of its National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), it was not surprising that the Ghanaian public were highly critical of this trip.

Several reasons explain the disappointment with this first foreign visit. While it can be argued that the NPP administration was grateful to the Togolese for closing the latter’s side of the border and thereby preventing the expected influx of NDC supporters from crossing over to vote, an effusive NPP administration also serves the interest of the undemocratic Togolese administration by preventing anti-Eyadema activists from using Ghana as a base.

More importantly, however, are the potentially adverse international implications for the new Ghanaian administration of being too friendly with the Togolese administration, which is increasingly seen as a pariah and a rogue state for its support for West African rebels and Jonas Savimbi’s União Naçional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA).²⁹ After the international outcry over its role in mining of and trading in conflict diamonds, UNITA has shifted its base and headquarters to Lomé, Togo, where these are headed by Marcelo Moses Dachala and João Katende.³⁰ Already, there are reports in the international media that "Kufuor ... is an old ally of Savimbi and that he will probably use his influence to try to restart international negotiations on Angola."³¹ It is probable that there are long-standing relations with Savimbi stretching back to the early 1970s when the Progress Party, of which Kufuor was deputy foreign minister, initiated a policy of dialogue with the apartheid regime in South Africa that was supporting the anti-communist Jonas Savimbi at the time.³² All these interlinkages and interconnections do not paint a picture of positive change. Consorting with Blaise Compaore — his role in the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts, as well as his own links with Savimbi, diamonds, oil and small arms are well documented — and the Togolese leader does not create the investor confidence and the leading role that Ghana expects to play in the subregion.

The reality and challenge of Ghana’s economy

In An agenda for positive change, the NPP focused mostly on the economy. The party promised in its campaign manifesto to the people of Ghana:

"a change that will be reflected in a lowering of the intolerably high cost of living and a reduction in the depressingly high rate of unemployment, a change that will bring jobs and a living wage for the majority of our people …"³³

But what are the real economic challenges that the new government has to face, taking into consideration that was stated in the manifesto is more campaign rhetoric?

During the president’s sessional address to parliament, Kufuor promised to "[lead] the country into an era of the golden age of business."³⁴ However, before this promise can be fulfilled, the new economic team would have to tackle the critical issues of:

mismanagement of the economy;


mass unemployment;


low wages;


a rapidly depreciating currency (see table 1);

Table 1: Trends in cedi/dollar exchange rate since 1996

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Cedi/US$	1 754.39	2 272.73	2 325.56	3500	7000
% rate of depreciation	17.4	22.8	23	33	50

Source: International Monetary Fund; Bank of Ghana Quarterly Economic Bulletin; Interbank forex rates in the Ghanaian media.

a huge national debt comprising both domestic and foreign debt and totalling 41.3 trillion cedis or almost US $7 billion. According to the budget statement presented to parliament by Minister Yaw Osafo-Maafo, Ghana has had to join the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative because it now finds itself in a debt trap. According to the minister, Ghana spent a third of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 on debt servicing. In 2001 alone, it is expected to spend 4.4 trillion cedis on external debt and 2.1 trillion cedis on domestic debt interest payments;



high dependence on foreign aid. This is crucial since Ghana depends on external aid for its development plans. Although there are no consistent figures, almost 45% of government recurrent and development expenditure come from external sources;



extensive corruption in public life;



a demoralised private sector;



run-away inflation (see table 2); and


Table 2: Inflation trends calculated from the end of year CPI (1996 - 2000) (percentage)



Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Inflation rate	34	27.9	14.6	13.8	40.5

Source: International Monetary Fund; Bank of Ghana Quarterly Bulletin; and Ghana Statistical Services.

the high cost of living. To improve the lives of Ghanaians and increase the amount of disposable income available to people, the recently presented budget announced a number of tax relief measures and incentives to cushion people from the high cost of living. Retroactive from January 2001, the minimum taxable personal income was raised from 900 000 cedis to 1.2 million cedis.

These are the major factors that will pose challenges to the government’s plans of restructuring and resuscitating the Ghanaian economy. Another overlooked, yet crucial indicator that can affect the government’s economic success is the economic impact of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Ghana, which is now one of the country’s major health challenges standing at about 4% of the total population.

What, then, must the government do if it is to attain its economic objectives? The first problem is the issue of corruption. Undoubtedly, corruption has been a major impediment to the socio-economic and political advancement of Ghana since independence. Its pervasive influence on public decisionmaking processes has been both cause and consequence of structural and economic decay. A recent diagnostic study of the problem showed a veritable culture of graft and rot in several government institutions. Some of the institutions which rated low in terms of honesty and integrity were the police, government ministers, political parties, the customs, excise and preventive services, the judiciary, the Ministry of Finance and the Lands Commission.³⁵ In response to the public outcry that met the publication of this report, Vice President Alhaji Aliu Mahama promised the establishment of a code of conduct and an office of accountability in the president’s office to combat corruption.³⁶

Compounding the issue of corruption is the fact that the results from the last 17 years of structural adjustment programmes are mixed, at best. The major exports of the country, cocoa and gold, have seen a steady decline in prices since both the international coffee and cocoa agreements and the gold price collapsed. This means that, while the agricultural sector contributes 70% of export income and almost 40% of economic activity overall, the government’s room for manoeuvre is tight. Probably worse for the government was the need to increase fuel prices immediately upon taking office by a little over 60% because of the unsustainability of the daily US $900 000 deficit support for fuel imports. Coupled with the fact that the national currency has progressively lost almost 73% in value since January 2000, it can be argued that the main challenges for economic policy in the coming months would be to:

eliminate subsidies for fuel, particularly crude oil which are currently estimated at 8.3% of the fiscal deficit, and depoliticise fuel price-setting;



improve the tax regime as a means of eliciting compliance;



reconstitute the divestiture implemen-tation committee (DIC);



tie wages to productivity;³⁷ and



harmonise fiscal and monetary policy.

The new government of the National Redemption Council (NRC) was headed by the late General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. He was one of the leaders executed by Jerry John Rawlings in 1979. Interestingly enough, the families of these executed officers have handed the Kufuor government a potentially dicey political and security problem by appealing to them for help in locating the mass grave where the bodies were dumped so that they can be given a proper burial. This has generated heated debates in the country. See, We want the bodies, The Guide, 20 March 2001.



At this time, Rawlings established an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council headed by himself and a council consisting of 14 other officers and junior ranks.



Rawlings again made incursions into the body politic, overthrowing the government headed by Hilla Liman of the Peoples’ National Party (PNP). Rawlings eventually established a Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and a host of supportive organs, among these the Peoples’/Workers’ Defence Committees (P/WDCs). He eventually changed this name to the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and other Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs).



The slogan of this party, Akatamanso, represented by an umbrella, symbolised a party that is inclusive and which welcomes all shades of people and opinions.



For details on the accusation and the evidence compiled by the NPP and levelled against the PNDC, see NPP, The stolen verdict, Accra, 1992.



BOGarblah, Lack of internal democracy brought the NDC down, The Ghanaian Chronicle, 22-26 February 2001, p 8.



It can probably be posited that the election of 2000 was the most ‘spiritually’ influenced in Ghana’s contemporary political history. For one such example, see O Lartey, Kufuor’s victory is an act of God, The Ghanaian Chronicle, 8-9 January 2001, pp 4-5. A more detailed analysis, on Spirituality in contemporary Ghanaian politics, 1992-2000, is forthcoming.



NPP, An agenda for positive change: Manifesto 2000 of the New Patriotic Party, Accra, 2000.



Ibid, p 1; First sessional address of President J K Kufuor to the 3rd parliament of the 4th Republic, p 2.



CDD, Civil-military relations in Ghana, CDD Report 6, Accra, 2000.



See Agenda for positive change, op cit, p 40.



AK Salia, Move to overhaul CID: Don’t rush it, Daily Graphic, 20 March 2001, p 1.



The Chronicle, 20 March 2001; see also Purging the armed forces: The secret behind the changes in military, The Free Press, pp 1, 8.



M Bratton & R Mattes, Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or instrumental? Michigan State University, East Lansing.



These points have been explained in detail during several meetings with General E Sam, former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) under former President Hilla Liman’s rule, and presently Associate Executive Director of the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), a security policy think-tank in Accra, Ghana. Take control of military for stability, Daily Graphic, 6 February 2001, p 17.



Statement by the Minister of Defence.



For a detailed analysis of the difficulties involved here, see EK Aning, Democratic governance and the security sector, Governance 6(4), June 2001 (forthcoming).



A Kofoya-Tetteh, Take firm control of military for stability, Daily Graphic, 6 February 2001, p 16.



A K Salia, Military spending can’t be exposed, Daily Graphic, 28 February 2001, pp 16-17.



Agenda for positive change, op cit, p 8.



Daily Graphic, 6 February 2001, p 1. This was joint police and military led by Chief of Police Operation, Yaw Adu-Gyimah.



In an interview with Yaw Adu-Gyimah in Accra on 22 March 2001, he indicated that the number of guns retrieved was a national security issue and could not be divulged to the public.



Ibid.



Also present were Vice President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and a host of other dignitaries. In a statement, Zuma characterised the smooth transfer of power as "a celebration of democracy in the continent. It is further evidence that Africans can run their countries peacefully and efficiently." Zuma completes visit to Ghana, Panafrican News Agency, 21 February 2001.



Agenda for positive change, op cit, p 45.



Ibid.



For a crude, biased and unsophisticated apolitical analysis of the Kufuor trip, which blatantly attacks critics of the maiden foreign policy trip of the President as an "open demonstration of paranoiac impudence", see F K Koranteng, The furore over President Kufuor’s visit to Togo, The Ghanaian Chronicle, 6-7 February 2001, p 6.



Two editorials in The Ghanaian Chronicle of 15-16 January 2001 and 17-18 January 2001 are more balanced in their assessment of the President’s trip and raise interesting questions and issues.



See Final report of the monitoring mechanism on Angola sanctions, UNSC Document S/2000/1225, which was established by UN resolution 1295 of 2000, pursuant to Resolution 864 of 1993 concerning Angola. For the specific sections dealing with the Togolese role in sanctions-busting, see pp 16-17. With respect to Burkina Faso, see pp 17 and 19.



J Kamara, Closing in on arms and diamond rackets, West Africa, 15-21 January 2001, p 17; J Cilliers & C Dietrich (eds), Angola’s war economy: The role of diamonds and oil, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000; Kufuor’s security dilemmas, Africa Analysis 364, 26 January 2001, p 3.



P Fabricius, Glimmer of hope for Angolan peace talks resuming, The Star, 12 February 2001.



Jonas Savimbi has had the use and support of some of the apartheid regime’s most efficient forces to fight his anti-communist campaigns. Among these are the 32 ‘Buffalo’ Battalion; the Reconnaissance Commandos (Reccies); the Parachute Brigade (Parabats); and the paramilitary ‘Koevoet’ (Crowbar). Their duties were to destabilise apartheid’s enemies. One of these groups, the 32 ’Buffalo’ Battalion, deserves special mention. It was established by the South African government as a special unit to recruit Angolans into the South African army. It was mainly composed of former Frente Naçional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) forces, Portuguese-speaking Angolans who co-operated with Jonas Savimbi’s União Naçional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and became South Africa’s most decorated combat unit since 1945. Comprising 70% Zimbabweans and black South Africans, most of whom were described as ‘soldiers of fortune’, these men had fought for Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and in Angola and Namibia against the MPLA and SWAPO, respectively. For a detailed analysis of the interconnections between Savimbi and other mercenary groups, see EK Aning, Africa’s security in the new millennium: State or mercenary induced stability? Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 15(1), April 2001.



Agenda for positive change, op cit, p vi.



See Sessional address of the president, op cit; Y Osafo-Maafo, The budget statement and economic policy of the government of Ghana for the 2001 fiscal year, presented by the Minister of Finance, 9 March 2001.



World Bank & Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance, The Ghana governance and corruption survey: Evidence from households, enterprises and public officials, CDD, Accra, August 2000.



See speech delivered by Alhaji Aliu Mahama at the official launching of the above publication, 8 February 2001.



Two documents are helpful in understanding the economic plight of both the government and the people of Ghana. See K Armah, Proposed policy measures for the new administration: A recipe for good economic governance, mimeo, February 2001; K Kote-Nikoi, Fiscal trends and the implications for poverty reduction, mimeo, October 2000.