The resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is considered by many as the most immediate priority of the Central African region, and rightly so. Many diplomatic efforts, including those of the European Union (EU), are geared towards bringing peace in the DRC and stabilising a country nearly the size of half a continent. In the long term, however, the Central African region needs more than ‘merely’ peace in the DRC. It needs an encompassing structural peace and security that would allow sustainable development to occur in the countries of the region. In order to achieve this, the underlying causes of regional instability should be identified and tackled in an holistic manner. An international conference on security and co-operation in the region seems to be the most appropriate mechanism to approach such an issue. But such a conference cannot be organised if the crisis in the DRC remains unresolved.

With the accession of Joseph Kabila to the presidency, a window of opportunity has opened for the DRC, in particular, and for the Central African region as a whole. The young Kabila certainly makes the right impression. He travels the world to meet his peers and apparently has, as opposed to his father, the capacity to make friends. Soon after taking on his new task, he publicly announced that his main objective is to lead his country towards peace and began to take the first steps towards reaching this goal. It remains to be seen whether he will prove to be willing and strong enough to pursue peace, and whether foreign belligerents, allies and aggressors alike are really willing to put an end to this conflict.

The immediate cause of the crisis in the DRC is the long-standing ethnic conflict in Rwanda, which resulted in the genocide of 1994. The Rwandan case is a shining example of inadequate analysis and a lack of action, and of severe mismanagement of a crisis. Serious mistakes were made by the international community, including the United Nations, as well as by the countries of the region that took over the management of the crisis. There was a persistent refusal to address and remove the political causes of the crisis, while many efforts and substantial financial resources were invested in addressing the humanitarian effects. At the same time, the countries concerned showed a dangerous preference for military solutions to political problems.

This approach has been the origin of an incredible series of mistakes before, during and after the genocide. Before the genocide, both the size and mandate of the UN peacekeeping force were inappropriate for the complexity and extent of the task. In addition, the messages of the force commander of the UN peacekeeping operation, alerting the international community that preparations for a genocide were under way, were ignored. Subsequently, when the atrocities started, the Security Council decided to pull out the largest part of its troops, giving the perpetrators of the genocide the opportunity to continue executing their plans to exterminate an entire ethnic group.

The defeated Rwandan army (FAR) and the Interahamwe militias who were mainly responsible for the genocide were afterwards allowed to settle, still armed, in refugee camps together with bona fide refugees. Since then, these highly militarised camps have been used by them as bases for recruitment and training, as well as the launch of regular incursions into Rwanda in preparation of a major offensive.

For two years, the vice president of Rwanda at the time, Major-General Paul Kagame, made strong appeals to the international community to separate the armed forces from bona fide refugees in the camps. Neither the international community nor the UN could or wanted to address this problem, which they considered too difficult and risky. The only measure taken was to supply humanitarian aid to refugees in the camps.

The absence of a solution to this problem was one of the main causes of the war in the former Zaïre in 1996 that led to the replacement of President Mobutu by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In August 1998, it was once again one of the major factors that contributed to the outbreak of the present regional crisis, one of the most complex in African history.

The problem remains and if it is not resolved, there will be no peace in the DRC or in the region. It is time for the international community, the UN and the countries of the region to understand this and to act accordingly. After many months of stalemate, the appointment of Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC seems to present a window of opportunity. The need to disarm the ‘negative’ forces, including the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, is recognised by the belligerents as an essential element in settling the crisis. In this regard, Security Council Resolution 1341 sets out a clear timeframe for concrete steps to be taken by all parties concerned.

Once the crisis is diffused, it will be possible to address the underlying causes of instability in the region — deep-rooted political, social and economic issues and problems that have never been adequately addressed. These include political transformation, the introduction of a market economy, increasing ethnic tensions and violence, ongoing insecurity aggravated by the presence of disbanded armed groups and mercenaries, a widespread culture of impunity, the long-term presence of refugees and displaced people, unresolved questions of citizenship and migration, demographic pressures especially in land-locked states, and disputes over access to diminishing natural resources.

Without properly addressing these core problems, sustainable peace and development will not be possible in the region. This should entail an holistic consideration of political, social and economic issues within a regional context and with a medium and long-term vision. An appropriate instrument in this respect could be an international conference on security and co-operation in the Central African region.

The idea of the conference is not new. It was developed by the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) years ago and was revived during the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1995, following the genocide in 1994. However, at this time, there was insufficient support among regional leaders for such a conference and the idea was set aside, but not completely abandoned. The window of opportunity created by Joseph Kabila’s arrival on the scene has breathed new life into the idea of an international conference on security and co-operation in the Central African region.

A successful conference implies firstly that parties unanimously agree on the need to solve their problems in a political manner, as opposed to the use of armed force. It also requires that countries are willing to discuss the root causes of their problems in a regional context within the framework of such a conference and through existing institutions such as the OAU and the UN. The change in leadership in the DRC may just prove to be the catalyst for these requirements to be met. However, the crisis in the DRC must be addressed first before such a conference can be convened.

The overall aim of the conference would be to achieve security, structural stability and sustainable development in the region. More specifically, it would:

address medium and long-term problems related to security and co-operation in the region;



strengthen regional capacity and mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve crises through political and not through military means;



promote the development of democratic institutions, representative governments, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and



promote sustainable growth and poverty eradication.

In order to be successful, parties would first need to agree on a set of basic principles on which the conference could be founded. Well-known and widely used (and misused) principles that come to mind are respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of international borders. Other guiding principles may also be considered, such as the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

If successful, the conference could lead to one or more stability pacts, confidence-building measures and (small) arms control programmes. It would also facilitate the exchange of ideas and experience in the field of democracy, the protection of minorities and national reconciliation.

The conference itself should be a process that follows its own dynamic over time, rather than a single event. Working groups that deal with specific, agreed upon broad issues or themes could carry out the substantive work. Themes that could be discussed include peace and security, democracy, human rights and justice, and reconstruction and development.

The OAU and the UN could jointly organise such a conference. The EU envisages support for and participation in the conference, and could contribute actively to its preparation, if requested to do so by the organisers. The EU, for example, could share extensive experiences of diplomatic processes in the field of security and co-operation in Europe over the last 50 years.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is often cited in discussions about the format of such a conference — not as a blueprint, but as a useful example of relevant experiences. The OSCE played an important role in Europe in the field of security in the broadest sense of the word since the start in 1972 of the so-called ‘Helsinki process’ that preceded the establishment of the OSCE.

In 1973, the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) formally opened in Helsinki. It was not an organisation but a diplomatic process encompassing the whole of Europe (with the exception of Albania), Canada and the United States. The talks were meant as a forum for the exchange of views between the communist east and the capitalist west on security in the widest sense of the word. The conference, as well as the eight follow-up conferences, served to deepen relations and improve security and co-operation between the two sides. For example, military confidence-building measures were agreed upon, co-operation in the field of economics, science and technology was established and cultural exchanges were organised.

In 1994, after the collapse of Communism, the CSCE was transformed into a permanent organisation (the OSCE). The organisation has 55 members and a permanent structure and is mainly active in the field of early warning and conflict prevention, crisis management and reconstruction and development. It is involved in major operations in Bosnia, Croatia, Albania and Kosovo.

Although conflicts still occur on the territory it covers, the OSCE has contributed greatly over the years to efforts to create structural stability, security and sustainable development in Europe. Through the fostering of regular contact, it created a climate in which all parties communicated and co-operated with one another, thus significantly reducing the tension between them.

The circumstances in Europe after World War II differ substantially from the current situation in the Central African region. Still, a similar diplomatic process of integrated and in-depth discussions about fundamental issues could be envisaged for the region. If successful it would address the underlying problems of instability, pave the way for opportunities for sustainable development and hence improve the lives of large numbers of people. It would allow people to move within the region according to their possibilities, needs and wishes. In other words, instead of redrawing the map of Africa, a Central African region could be envisaged where borders are open to the free movement of people and goods.

In order to be ready when the crisis in the DRC is diffused, the OAU, with the assistance of the UN, should start preparing for an international conference on security and co-operation immediately. For its part, the EU is willing and ready to assist and participate in the process whenever needed.