In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function in isolation of each other. The return to the debate on small arms and light weapons echoes post-World War I and II periods. The fact that small arms control is back on the agenda within the context of the UN may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose – preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.

Introduction

From 7 to 10 July 2001, United Nations member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. This upcoming conference represents one part of a broad international effort to work towards establishing controls on small arms and light weapons. For those working on nuclear arms control issues, the existence of a major international effort to develop such controls will be of interest, but is not likely to be something that affects their own efforts or something that they feel is directly connected to their work. At one level, it is possible to argue that conventional and nuclear arms control represent two ends of an arms control continuum, sharing common goals related to national and international security with a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. Along these lines, a decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The lessening of the threat of nuclear war has opened up the opportunity to deal with conventional weapons in a way that was not possible during the Cold War. In practice, however, the existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control within the context of a global arms control agenda is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function very much in isolation of each other, with different actors and different issues driving progress and setbacks.

In light of the work being done on small arms and the upcoming UN conference on illicit trade, the purpose of this article is to examine and discuss where and how small arms control fits into the broader international arms control and disarmament scene. In doing so, the article will briefly outline the current status of both the nuclear and non-nuclear arms control negotiations and proposals. The main focus, however, will be on discussing how and whether the two entities are indeed connected. If there is a connection, what is its nature? Can and should lessons and mechanisms from one form of arms control be carried over to the other? Should existing connections between the two be strengthened? What does all of this show about arms control as a process?

Although they are sometimes defined as differing concepts, for the purposes of this article the terms ‘arms control’ and ‘disarmament’ are used interchangeably, with both being used to mean a process that seeks to control and/or reduce the unfettered access to and accumulation of arms, either nuclear or conventional. Similarly, the term ‘small arms’ is used inclusively to mean both ‘small arms and light weapons’ and small arms and light weapons are defined as "weapons that are designed to military specifications to be used either by an individual or a crew as lethal instruments of combat."¹

Background

There is a certain symmetry, and perhaps a certain unhappiness, to be found in the fact that this century begins just as the previous one did — with efforts to find ways to prevent and control the excessive accumulation of arms. Attempts to control conventional weapons — including small arms — and limit their use are not new and predate nuclear arms control.

Arms control efforts in the 20th century have their origins in the efforts to codify and strengthen the laws of war. The Hague Peace conferences in 1899 and 1907 attempted, among others, to respond to technological developments that could change the nature of warfare, such as the development of expanding bullets and the use of poison in weapons.² After World War I, the sense that an arms race between major powers had contributed to the onset of the war prompted efforts through the League of Nations to place limits on the accumulation of arms beyond the basic requirements for national security. Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations subsequently states:

"The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments."

In article 8, states agreed that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections" and that states agree to exchange "full and frank" information about their military holdings and military-related industries. However, small-scale conflicts still continued in Europe in the aftermath of World War I and states were hesitant to pursue such controls with any vigour. While the League experienced some arms control success with the creation of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 (a somewhat unexpected outcome of negotiations on limiting the arms trade),³ the League’s arms control efforts faltered along with the League itself for the most part.

However, the idea of a linkage between excessive armament and conflict persisted. During the deliberations and negotiations on the development of the UN Charter, there was disagreement about the logistics and details of how measures against ‘excessive armament’ should be carried out, but there was no disagreement about the need to establish, as quickly as possible, a system that would limit states’ levels of armament.⁴ Accordingly, in the final provisions of UN Charter, article 11 gives the General Assembly the ability to make recommendations on the "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments" to the Security Council. Article 26 of the Charter makes the Security Council responsible to develop a system of arms control.

"In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee … plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

The idea was that the UN system of dealing with international peace and security would provide states with a level of confidence that any conflict or impending conflict would be dealt with promptly by the international community. This would reduce the need for states to maintain armed forces sufficient to meet any challenge to their security solely on their own. In order to fulfil this goal, article 43 of the UN Charter requires that states make armed forces available to the Security Council for such collective security operations. Arms control limits, as developed by the Security Council, would therefore not only have to take account of what states needed for their national security requirements, but also what states were required to provide to the UN for military operations under article 43 of the Charter. These ideas and the associated Charter provisions have never been pursued.⁵

Within a few months of the creation of the UN, the first atomic weapons were exploded. This event immediately changed the disarmament scene at the UN. As one of its first acts, the UN General Assembly created the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the issues associated with the advent of atomic weapons. A separate Commission for Conventional Armaments was created the following year. This division of labour was a source of controversy that plagued UN disarmament efforts until a single Disarmament Commission was formed in 1950. During this time and through the 1950s, large-scale proposals for disarmament were put forward and discussed at the UN.⁶ The debate about disarmament was active and a number of serious proposals were put forward. But the politics of the growing enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union took hold almost immediately in the UN, bringing an end to any hopes of serious co-operation between the two powers in the context of the Security Council, and making agreement on major arms limitations unlikely. While some countries, particularly the Europeans, continued to propose and discuss general disarmament proposals that incorporated measures dealing with both conventional and atomic weapons, these proposals generated little positive response or momentum.

More than any other factor, the development of atomic weapons by both the US and the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the international arms control environment. The sheer destructiveness of the new weapons placed them in a category of their own, and the need to control them became a priority that was an order of magnitude higher than the need to establish controls on conventional weapons. This brought about a basic divide between nuclear and conventional arms control issues. Although the UN did merge the atomic and conventional disarmament commissions, the coalescence was not successful and the division of labour between the two fields has stuck. Nuclear arms control became the purview of the two powers that possessed such weapons.

Cold War nuclear arms control

The two superpowers did not commit to any form of control on their nuclear arsenals until the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The Treaty prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, under water and in the atmosphere. However, it left the option of testing underground open. The treaty, therefore, forced the nuclear powers to move their testing programs underground. Since testing was still possible, it did not constrain the development of nuclear weapons. Two years later, in 1965, multilateral negotiations began on limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968. At the heart of the treaty is an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Non-nuclear weapon states agree not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapon states agree in exchange to pursue negotiations:

"in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."⁷

It was not until 1969 — 24 years after the use of atomic weapons in Japan, the acquisition of thousands of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the development of nuclear weapons by three other states — that the two superpowers sat down in formal negotiations aimed at placing limits on their nuclear weapons. The negotiations were the result and symbolic of a new period of détente between the superpowers but, inevitably, were difficult and protracted. The result, three years later in 1972, was two treaties: the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). The SALT I treaty placed upper limits on the number of launchers maintained by both sides, essentially freezing the numbers at current levels. But this was the extent of the limitation. There were no constraints on the quality of the weapons, no requirement for dismantling weapons and no limitations on the number of warheads that could be placed on missiles using the launchers. In 1979, another seven years later, agreement on SALT II was reached. Again, the treaty focused on the number of launchers rather than warheads, but this time there was a limit on the number of launchers that could carry multiple warhead missiles (MIRVs). While SALT II represented progress, it was of a fairly limited kind as both sides still maintained massive nuclear arsenals. The new limitations did place new constraints on the two sides, but they had little effect in reducing the overall numbers or quality of the weapons.

Shortly after the SALT II treaty was signed, the era of détente came to an abrupt end and the two superpowers returned to high levels of political tension. Progress on nuclear arms control slowed down to a snail’s pace and then ground to a halt. Negotiations on deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, know as START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks — began in 1982, but broke off a year later when the Soviet Union walked out in protest against US plans to pursue research on a strategic defence system. Talks resumed again in 1985, but by now serious changes were under way within the Soviet Union and, within a few years the Cold War, came abruptly to an end.

During this period, conventional weapons were also an issue of concern, but of a very specific kind. Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks began between members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1973. The objective of the talks was to develop an agreement on the reduction of conventional military forces in central Europe. Although focused on conventional weapons, the negotiations were so inextricably tied to the nuclear equation between the US and the Soviet Union that it is difficult to view them as anything other than an extension of the nuclear arms talks. Indeed, the MBFR talks were eventually overtaken by Soviet announcements of unilateral force reductions and the end of the Cold War. The end of the superpower nuclear rivalry quickly brought an end to the issues of contention in conventional arms. In 1989, the MBFR talks were replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, which very quickly reached agreement on a treaty that was signed the following year.

Post-Cold War arms control

During the Cold War, nuclear arms negotiations took a very specific form. They were very formal and occurred behind closed doors. Negotiations on limiting nuclear arms were both symbols and products of the reduced levels of tension that détente brought to the Cold War. Even so, the negotiations were lengthy and difficult, with every aspect and every number the subject of intense discussion. This format lasted for almost 30 years. Then, almost overnight, when the Cold War came to an end, the dramatic change in the political context of the two superpowers brought about an equally momentous change in how arms control discussions took place and the kinds of limitations being considered.

On 31 July 1991, presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START I treaty in Moscow, which concluded the negotiations that had begun 10 years previously. The START I treaty established, among others, a limit of 6 000 deployed warheads. This meant that, for the first time, the two superpowers would undertake actual significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals.⁸ But even as the treaty was being signed, there was a sense that the two sides had only scratched the surface of the potential for reductions. Within a few months, the two sides were trading announcements of unilateral measures.⁹ In less than two years, on 3 January 1993, Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II treaty, which required them to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 3 000 to 3 500 warheads each, a reduction of an order of magnitude different from levels being considered only a few years previously. The speed of completing this second treaty and the significant reductions it prescribed reflected the fundamental change that had occurred in the nature of the superpower relationship.

But this fundamental change put the arms control scene on an uncertain path. The US Senate did not ratify the START II treaty until January 1996. Ratification was delayed by the Russian Duma first in response to the expansion of NATO and then in response to NATO’s involvement in Kosovo. The Duma finally ratified the treaty in April 2000. But the lack of ratification was not a significant impediment to further progress. Although both sides have stated their willingness and desire to pursue a START III treaty process, a number of events have inhibited progress. Russia experienced tremendous economic and political changes and upheaval during this time. Reductions of nuclear weapons take time to implement and must be done with great care. The US has given considerable financial and material support to Russia to assist it in the reduction process. And, gone are the days of formal, closed-door negotiations where even the smallest concession was hard won. The changed political relationship, and especially the extent to which the US has been assisting Russia in dealing with its nuclear reductions have meant that the need for treaty-based, extensive, detailed verification measures of the reduction process has faded. In addition, as lower levels of nuclear weapons have been reached and contemplated, the question when other nuclear powers should become part of the process has become increasingly pertinent. Similarly, as very low levels are contemplated (START III focuses on a level of 2 000 to 2 500 warheads and Russia has floated the idea of a reduction to 1 500 warheads), it prompts the need to deal with the question of the number of weapons constituting minimum deterrence and how such a concept is defined.

There have been other developments during this time involving the other declared nuclear powers. The Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), banning all nuclear testing, was opened for signature in September 1996. Russia ratified the treaty in June 2000, but the US Senate voted against ratification in 1999. In May 2000, the review conference of the NPT reached agreement that included language committing the nuclear powers to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

At the bilateral level, both Russia and the US have continued to show a propensity for trading unilateral measures. This reflects the changed nature of the relationship between the two countries, but also the extent to which this changed relationship has meant that security for both is no longer defined definitively by what the other is doing. This last point is most evident in the ongoing pressure within the US for the development of a national ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. The push for this system is driven by a desire to protect US territory from a variety of known and unknown threats in the future, and not by fears of a specific enemy or threats posed by Russia or by hopes that such moves might generate arms control concessions.

The end of the Cold War has therefore brought about some fundamental changes in the way nuclear arms control occurs. Russia and the US no longer engage in formal protracted negotiations. Instead, there is a distinct trend towards exchanges of unilateral undertakings and technological and financial support for the reduction process (although the latter is a one-sided affair) rather than closely negotiated limits discussed and implemented under a veil of deep mutual suspicion.

Where, then, does the concept of small arms control fit into this picture? Obviously, the end of the Cold War and the accompanying willingness to undertake substantial reductions in nuclear weapons have not brought with them a new linkage to conventional weapons. The separation of nuclear and conventional weapons control that occurred after World War II has continued.

Controlling small arms and light weapons

With the Cold War over and significant nuclear reductions in process, the move to develop controls on small arms and light weapons seems a logical next step. But the efforts to develop measures to control small arms are not the result of this process, at least not directly. Rather, they are the product of the intractable, destructive conflicts that took hold after the end of the Cold War and the sense, similar to that after World War I, that the presence of excessive quantities of arms contributes to, prolongs and exacerbates conflict. For this reason, it is natural that the forum for developing controls on these weapons is the UN. As a UN document states:

"Virtually every part of the UN system is dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts fought mostly with these weapons. Small arms and light weapons are increasingly used as primary instruments of violence in the internal conflicts dealt with by the UN, they are responsible for large numbers of deaths and the displacement of citizens around the world, and they consume large amounts of United Nations resources … The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence."¹⁰

The UN efforts are the result of various studies of small arms undertaken in the past decade.¹¹ The July 2001 conference in New York will focus on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons as a first step in what will hopefully be an ongoing process that will extend to other aspects of the problem over time. The objective of the conference is to "develop and strengthen international efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons." The conference will therefore work to strengthen and develop national and international norms against illicit trade, agree on measures that will prevent illicit trade, help mobilise political will to deal with the problem, and promote state responsibility in dealing with the issue.

These are tough tasks. Though different in nature, the kinds of problems and obstacles posed by small arms control match those associated with nuclear arms control in complexity and political sensitivity. In fact, for those accustomed to nuclear arms control, the requirements of controlling small arms and light weapons present difficulties of almost nightmarish proportions. Light weapons are everywhere. They are readily available, used legitimately by every state and by any number of other groups and individuals. They are easily hidden, easily smuggled and no special technological knowledge is required to manufacture, maintain or use them.

In contrast, the specific characteristics associated with nuclear weapons and their inherent destructiveness lend themselves to the development of mechanisms for their control and monitoring. Nuclear weapons are high-technology weapons. They require considerable maintenance. The presence of radiation requires special measures be taken on an ongoing basis. Add to this the fact that strategic nuclear weapons are of a significant size and therefore visible by satellite. All of these factors are markers for those monitoring the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. While these characteristics do not guarantee full and accurate knowledge of the capabilities and arsenals of other countries, they do mean that very specific methods of control and verification can be devised and that the states concerned have a desirable level of confidence in their knowledge about existing and potential nuclear weapon states.

The two issues also differ in terms of their context. As discussed, the realm of nuclear arms control has primarily (though not exclusively) been the purview of the nuclear weapon states and has mostly taken place in bilateral or multilateral negotiations outside the UN. The small arms and light weapons debate involves all UN member states, as well as non-state actors, and is therefore being pursued within the context of the UN.

On the surface, it appears that there may be little in the way of lessons that can be taken from one process to the other, or even that the two processes are connected. But this is a misleading impression. The two processes are indeed deeply, inextricably linked to each other at the political level. As this overview has indicated, arms control, whether it is about nuclear weapons or small arms and light weapons, is first and foremost an effort by states to develop ways to ensure that the accumulation of arms does not reach a point where it endangers international security by prompting or prolonging conflict. The debate about controlling small arms, therefore, takes one back to the start with the realisation that first came after World War I that the excessive accumulation of arms beyond the requirements of state security is itself a threat to international peace and security. In fact, the point is not that the world has come back full circle, but that it never left the starting point. Both nuclear arms control and small arms control have this basic premise as their starting point. The need to control nuclear weapons had a special urgency during the Cold War as a result of the global level of destructiveness that would be experienced in any military confrontation between the superpowers, but the driving force behind nuclear arms control — the desire to lessen the possibility of conflict — is the same one behind the push to develop ways to control small arms and light weapons. The shift to mutual unilateral undertakings and reductions of nuclear weapons — based more on individual national security needs than as a response to what the other side is doing — that came with the end of the Cold War, affirms this fact.

Conclusion

Where the world has come full circle, at least in one sense, is the return to the debate on the concern about small arms and light weapons, a concern that echoes that of the immediate post-World War I and II periods, both in terms of the substance of the discussions and by virtue of the fact that the efforts to pursue small arms control are occurring within the UN. This last point is important. The permanent members of the Security Council, although they did not have these characteristics when the UN Charter was first designed, are not only the five main nuclear weapon powers, but are also the top suppliers of arms to the world, between them providing 85% of worldwide arms exports from 1995 to 1997.¹² While it is a long road to the days of the debates about general and complete disarmament that took place in the early days of the UN and an even longer one to a situation where articles 11 and 26 are used as they were originally intended, the fact that small arms control is back on the agenda and within the context of the UN may mean that there is at least now recognition that arms control, of whatever kind, serves the same purpose — preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.

Notes

This definition is taken from material provided by the Canadian government. See the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms /convweap3-e.asp>. This definition corresponds to the definition used by the UNs.



The texts of the conferences can be found at <www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/lawwar.htm> (17 January 2001).



The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. It was signed in Geneva in 1925 and entered into force in 1928. It prohibited the use of such weapons in war but did not prohibit their development, stockpiling or possession.



For more information, see R B Russell, A history of the United Nations Charter: The role ofthe United States 1940—1945, Brookings, Washington DC, 1958, pp 264-271.



For more information, see J Boulden, Prometheus unborn: The history of the Military Staff Committee, Aurora Paper 19, Canadian Centre for Global Security, Ottawa, 1991. During its first two years, the MSC worked to establish the levels of contributions states should make to UN security forces. Discussions on arms control proposals were waiting on final decisions on these numbers. The MSC was unable to agree on states’ contributions and came to a stalemate in 1948. The MSC has continued to meet since then, but has not dealt with issues of substance since 1948.



For more on these issues and the various proposals put forward, see UN, The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970, United Nations, New York, 1970.



Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI.



The treaty required the two to reduce to levels of 6 000 "accountable" warheads. At the time the treaty was signed, the US was estimated to have 10 563 warheads and the Soviet Union 10 271 (1991 data provided by parties to the treaty).



In September 1991, US President Bush took long-range bombers off 24-hour alert and proposed that short-range nuclear weapons were removed from Europe. In January 1992, President Yeltsin announced that Russian nuclear weapons would no longer be targeted against US cities. Four days later, he announced a series of unilateral cuts, including the ending of various nuclear weapon modernisation projects.



UN, United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects: About the Conference, <www.un.org/Depts/ dda/CAB/smallarms/about.htm> (17 January 2001).



For example, the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and the Group of Experts on the Problem of Ammunition and Explosives.



Figures from the United States Department of State report: Bureau of Arms Control: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998, <www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98/wmeat98.html> (17 January 2001).



JANE BOULDEN is a research fellow at the Centre for International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University in the United Kingdom.