On 7 July 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lomé Peace Agreement to end the civil war. A central component of this agreement called for the RUF to disarm. A year later, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was in custody and the future of the peace accord in grave doubt. Far from disarming, all parties have been rearming at an alarming rate, in contravention of a 1997 UN arms embargo and despite a regional moratorium on the production, procurement and sale of small arms and light weapons. The political and security situation remains extremely fragile. This article explores the ease with which small arms and light weapons can be obtained, and questions the efficacy of existing armament and disarmament policies. Given the availability of arms, the weakness of the current government, the relative strength of the RUF, and the fluidity of alliances among the country’s armed groups, the likelihood of continued conflict in Sierra Leone is great.

Introduction

An accord between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was signed in 1996 in Abidjan. At the time, the South African private security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), had made considerable military advances against the RUF since Valentine Strasser acquired its services in 1995. Strasser himself was overthrown by his Chief of Defence Staff, Julius Maada Bio, in January 1996. As part of the peace agreement concluded with the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, whose Sierra Leone People’s Party won the February 1996 elections, the RUF agreed to cease its hostilities in exchange for the government terminating its contract with EO. The RUF quickly resumed the war after EO left the country in January 1997, taking control of ever more territory. Executive Outcomes did not return.

When elements within the SLA overthrew Kabbah in May 1997, the RUF formed an alliance with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the new government. Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the AFRC leader, offered to make Sankoh his deputy. Sankoh accepted and Koroma also appointed several RUF officials to his government.

Many countries within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did not welcome the coup in Sierra Leone and took steps to reinstall the democratically elected government. Diplomatic initiatives gave way to military action in February 1998 and Kabbah was reinstalled in March, 10 months after being deposed.

While the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) succeeded in retaking Freetown, the capital, it proved incapable of securing the countryside and human rights violations continued unabated. In January 1999, AFRC and RUF rebels laid siege to the capital, the culmination of an offensive that had begun in eastern Sierra Leone during the final months of 1998. ECOMOG managed to repel the attack, but only after thousands were killed and many more maimed and abducted.

Unable to defeat the RUF, the focus shifted to diplomatic solutions. After tens of thousands of deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million people, negotiations were held in Togo and, on 18 May 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed to a cease-fire. On 7 July, the two sides signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. In exchange for calling a halt to the war and disarming, the RUF was granted a general amnesty, included in the government, and guaranteed the right to form a political party to contest elections. Moreover, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was appointed to chair a new body to oversee the country’s diamonds and other natural resources.

Although ECOMOG had to monitor the military provisions of the peace agreement, these tasks were soon assumed by the United Nations (UN). Until then, the UN had played a minor peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone. In July 1998, the Security Council authorised the small UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to serve alongside the subregional force. After it became clear that Nigeria, the largest troop contributor to ECOMOG, was going to withdraw its troops, the Security Council decided to replace the mission with a larger peacekeeping force, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The last ECOMOG troops departed Sierra Leone on 2 May 2000.¹

In May 2000, less than a year after the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, it unravelled when the RUF abducted and murdered UN peacekeepers. Although disarmament had begun in October 1999, the RUF had not participated in the programme since March 2000. This changed in April when disarmament centres opened in the RUF strongholds of Makeni and Magburaka. A few RUF soldiers reported to the camps against the wishes of their commanders.

The UN refused to heed the RUF’s demands to close the centres and return their men. Fighting erupted when the RUF killed a member of the Kenyan peacekeeping contingent. Several hundred members of the Zambian battalion sent to assist the beleaguered Kenyan contingent were taken hostage by the RUF outside Makeni. A week later, Sankoh’s supporters opened fire outside his house into a crowd of civilians demonstrating against the abduction of the peacekeepers. Several protesters were killed. On 17 May, the government of Sierra Leone arrested Sankoh.

The international community responded to events in Sierra Leone with alacrity. The Security Council quickly moved to expand the mission’s presence to 13 000 troops and banned the sale of unauthorised Sierra Leonean diamonds.²

Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and Canada also contributed individually to the UN efforts to restore peace. In May and June 2000, more than 4 000 peacekeepers arrived in Sierra Leone — an increase of almost 50%. Several ECOWAS member states and other countries put pressure on Liberian President Charles Taylor to help win the release of the abducted peacekeepers.

Recognising the important role of small arms and light weapons in exacerbating conflict, the international community and the Security Council have tried to control the flow of weapons into the country. Prior to UNOMSIL, the Security Council responded to the 1997 coup by placing the country under a variety of sanctions. The arms embargo was amended in June 1998 after Kabbah had been reinstalled. Sanctions were lifted against the government, but were retained against the rebel forces.³

In October 1998, ECOWAS member states approved a three-year moratorium on the production, procurement, and sale of small arms and light weapons for the subregion. At the same time, the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was set up to support the moratorium’s implementation.

Arms suppliers to the Revolutionary United Front

Relatively little concrete information is available on arms suppliers to the RUF. The government of Sierra Leone has recovered some weapons from the RUF over the years, but has never tried to trace their origins. An attempt was made to introduce a registry of RUF weapons in 1994, but without success.⁴ As a rule, any weapons captured from the rebels were distributed to local units of the SLA or the pro-government militia, rather than sent back to Freetown for investigation. Until recently, the UN Security Council’s sanction committee on Sierra Leone has not been particularly active.⁵

Moreover, there is substantial evidence that President Taylor of Liberia remains actively engaged in supplying arms the the RUF. Initially, Taylor’s assistance to the RUF was limited, particularly with regard to small arms and ammunition, early during the Liberian insurgency. Indeed, the RUF provided materiel to the NPFL for Taylor’s offensive against Monrovia in October 1992.⁶ Taylor continued to provide weapons to the RUF even after he assumed the presidency following the 1997 elections that ended Liberia’s civil war, and after ECOMOG left late in 1999.

Before it gained independence, Liberia profited from selling Sierra Leonean diamonds — at the latter’s expense.⁷ However, the degree to which Liberia has become dependent on the revenue generated by these diamonds has become much more significant.

Taylor depends on an overlapping network of competing security organisations to monitor external and internal threats, and to report on one another’s activities. However, he has few resources available to pay for these services as the Liberian economy is poor and foreign aid scarce.⁸

Access to Sierra Leonean diamonds therefore provides Taylor with significant financial resources to keep him solvent and in power. According to Richard Holbrooke, the former US permanent representative to the United Nations, the RUF earns at least US $30-50 million a year from diamond sales. Most of this trade goes through Liberia.⁹

The extent of the present relationship between Taylor and the RUF is difficult to document. Reports of arms shipments to the RUF have been described as only the "tip of the iceberg."¹⁰ Proof of this activity is scant, however, with those directly involved being silent about their activities.

The international presence in the border area between Liberia and Sierra Leone is thin, and humanitarian aid workers are hesitant to comment on military activity. Médecins sans frontières (MSF), one of the few international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) currently active in Lofa County, said that none of its personnel had witnessed any convoys or suspicious activity across the border.¹¹

Not all arms delivered to Liberia are destined for the RUF. As Liberia remains under a UN arms embargo,¹² Taylor has been forced to relinquish thousands of weapons as part of the disarmament programme that led to the July 1997 elections. Under significant international pressure, the weapons collected under this programme were destroyed. Many were new and not yet unwrapped.¹³ Taylor has not only been able to defy international arms embargoes, he has also managed to overcome significant logistical constraints. For example, Liberia suffers from poor infrastructure and has limited aircraft. Although the government’s ‘fleet’ consists of only two small Mi-2 light helicopters recently acquired from Libya, Taylor also uses private aircraft companies in the region. While his military rationale for aiding the RUF may no longer be valid, economic and security considerations ensure that the relationship will remain strong.

While Taylor was securing the release of the UN peacekeepers detained in Sierra Leone, he stepped up his support to the RUF. Since July 2000, RUF troops under the command of Sam Bockarie were being trained and encamped in Liberia. They are said to be heavily armed with "surface-to-surface missiles," assault rifles and anti-tank weapons.¹⁴

The BBC, citing Sierra Leone police documents, reported that truckloads of small arms and ammunition were sent from Liberia on 1 June 2000 to the RUF in Sierra Leone.¹⁵ Taylor is also believed to have provided the RUF with 200 fully armed Liberian soldiers, as well as with artillery.¹⁶ On 31 July 2000, it was reported to the Security Council that Taylor had stepped up his support for the RUF. Supplies of arms, ammunition, fuel, food and medicines are routinely flown into RUF-controlled areas from Liberia.¹⁷

The RUF has also received military assistance, including weapons from Libya, a known provider of RUF training. Documents allegedly written by Sankoh record Libya as providing funds for weapons purchases.¹⁸ In 1995, for example, the Sierra Leonean government captured boxes of ammunition with Arabic writing, suggesting Libya as the origin, from the RUF.¹⁹

According to Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, Libya continues to ship weapons to the RUF. Libyan transport aircraft fly materiel via Burkina Faso to Liberia. From there, the weapons are flown by helicopter to RUF strongholds. Airdrops to locations within Sierra Leone have also been made.²⁰

Côte d’Ivoire has also supported the RUF, although indirectly through aid to Taylor. Former Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny provided sanctuary and safe passage through his territory for materiel transported to the NPFL. Houphouët-Boigny’s successor, Henri Konan Bedie, has also assisted Taylor. There are reports that Ivorian assistance has included direct flights of materiel to the RUF.²¹ It is unclear if General Robert Gueï, who overthrew Bedie in December 1999, supports Taylor.

Most weapons that reach the RUF through Liberia first arrive on the continent in Burkina Faso. A UN Panel of Experts investigating arms shipments to the União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) reported that Burkina Faso trans-shipped weapons to UNITA and others.²² There is little doubt that the RUF is also a beneficiary of this supply route.

The Washington Post reported that the RUF obtained at least five planeloads of weapons from Burkina Faso in 1998 and 1999. The weapons were flown directly to the RUF in Sierra Leone and also indirectly via Liberia.²³ According to Pattison, Burkina Faso has supported — and continues to support — the RUF with soldiers, weapons, training and advice.²⁴

Many of the weapons destined for the RUF originate in Eastern Europe with brokers from Western Europe serving as intermediaries. Details of such transactions are seldom publicised.²⁵ One known transaction is believed to be typical: Human Rights Watch detailed a 67 ton shipment of small arms from the Ukraine to Burkina Faso in March 1999.²⁶

The RUF also reportedly obtained weapons from Bulgaria and Slovakia. In January 1999, both the UK-based Sky Air Cargo and the Belgian-owned Occidental Airlines flew arms from Bratislava to The Gambia and Liberia, from where another company flew the weapons to Kenema in Sierra Leone for the RUF.²⁷ According to the US government, a diamond dealer in Sierra Leone arranged for the Dakar-based Continental Aviation Company to transport 68 tons of weapons from Bulgaria to the RUF in July 1999.²⁸

The RUF also receives weapons from Guinea, but on a smaller scale and not as part of official policy. Little of this trade is documented and government officials in Conakry play down reported incidents of arms-trafficking across the border with Sierra Leone. Officials from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintain that Sierra Leonean refugee camps in Guinea are not militarised. However, the Guinean army routinely confiscates weapons from Sierra Leone rebels, government soldiers or pro-government militia crossing into Guinea. Aid workers in the border area acknowledge that a ‘live and let live’ policy exists with local officials, police and military personnel dealing frequently with the RUF who control most of northern Sierra Leone. Whenever this status quo is altered, the RUF has made its displeasure known. In the Forécariah region of Guinea, the RUF attacked the Moola and Tassin refugee camps in 1999, but only targeted corrupt government officials and soldiers in retribution for not providing weapons as agreed.²⁹

The RUF also receives considerable weaponry from the government of Sierra Leone through seizure. Colonel K S Mondeh, a former Supreme Council Member of the NPRC, acknowledged that the RUF "thrived on what they got from [the army] in ambushes." He added that the rebels also obtained weapons that the SLA had abandoned.³⁰

Widespread corruption within the government and armed forces of Sierra Leone also netted the RUF substantial quantities of weapons. According to Mondeh, SLA troops, including officers, sometimes sold their weapons to the RUF.³¹ There is speculation that the corruption reached the highest official levels. For example, Maada Bio, who became president in January 1996, claimed that he overthrew Strasser because the president was not committed to the announced elections. More likely, Maada Bio had sought to cut a deal with Sankoh to ensure maintenance of the status quo from which both parties profited. The week before the elections in 1996, representatives of Maada Bio and Sankoh began peace talks in Côte d’Ivoire with Sankoh claiming that he would only negotiate with Maada Bio and would not recognise the outcome of the elections. By some accounts, the SLA did more to try and derail the elections (without success) than the RUF.³²

Weapons seized from peacekeeping operations

The RUF seized weapons from ECOMOG troops. The Nigerians lost significant quantities of small arms and ammunition in pitched battles as the rebels advanced on Freetown. In December 1998, the RUF routed ECOMOG at Kono, where the West African force had stationed most of its materiel, capturing all its weapons, including three tanks.³³ ECOMOG is also reported to have lost small arms on occasion from ambushes after the RUF had been driven from the capital.

There are allegations that ECOMOG troops sold their weapons. According to a senior RUF rebel, his men received arms and ammunition from Nigerian ECOMOG troops in exchange for cash, diamonds, food and medicine.³⁴

The circumstances surrounding the loss of equipment in September 1999 from the Guinean battalion serving in ECOMOG are furthermore not clear. However, there is reason to speculate that the weapons may have been sold. Besides communication gear and two vehicles, the Guineans lost some AK-47 rifles, pistols and boxes of ammunition.³⁵

The Guineans were the first UN contingent in UNAMSIL to lose their weapons.³⁶ On 10 January 2000, a small group of RUF rebels detained a reconnaissance element from the Guinean battalion near Kambia. The unit was relieved of its weapons, including armoured vehicles, a self-propelled gun, an anti-tank gun, an anti-tank weapon, AK-47 rifles, mortars, light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and pistols.³⁷ At least two tons of ammunition were also taken. The third time a contingent from Guinea lost its weapons was the result of a commercial transaction. Officially, the RUF ‘seized’ the weapons from the Guinean battalion.³⁸ However, Western diplomats, as well as UN and UNAMSIL officials agree unofficially that someone was paid off.

In all subsequent instances, the UN’s ‘Blue Helmets’ were relieved of their weapons as a result of hostile action. For example, elements of the Kenyan battalion were twice ambushed in January 2000. The Secretary-General attributed the initial incident involving the Kenyans to the ex-SLA, but UNAMSIL and others believe the RUF to have been responsible.³⁹ The RUF seized a total of eight G-3 rifles, one pistol and several hundred rounds of small arms ammunition.⁴⁰

The largest single incident was the detaining of the Zambian contingent on 2 May 2000. The force commander sent the battalion to support Kenyan peacekeepers who were under siege in Makeni. Shortly before the Zambians reached Makeni, the RUF managed to detain and disarm them. The peacekeepers were eventually released, but without their equipment. In an effort to play down the incident, while ensuring the well-being of the hostages, UNAMSIL officials were reluctant to discuss what was taken. It is believed that the battalion lost some 500 AK-47 rifles, a few dozen machine guns, assorted mortars, and several tons of small arms ammunition.

The Kenyan battalion also lost considerable materiel to the RUF. UNAMSIL officials speak admiringly of the Kenyan troops’ esprit de corps as they fought their way back to Freetown with limited firepower and depleted stocks of ammunition through a number of RUF roadblocks. Yet, Kenya’s Minister of State for Defence, Julius L Sunkuli, painted a sobering picture of what Kenya had lost to the RUF. He stressed that Kenya was a "poor country [and] to lose that amount of equipment is not good at all."⁴¹

Nigerian Blue Helmets in UNAMSIL were relieved of their weapons by the RUF in Mange in April 2000.⁴² A more significant incident occurred in Kambia on 3 May when a company of Nigerians was briefly detained and relieved of its weapons.⁴³

The Indian contingent also lost weapons to the RUF. The detachment of 21 Indian peacekeepers in Kuiva, whom the RUF detained in May 2000 and relocated to Pendembu, was relieved of all their weapons. However, another group of over 200 Indian peacekeepers, plus 11 UN military observers, whom the RUF surrounded in Kailahun in the same month, were never disarmed.

Disarmament in Sierra Leone

Weapons collected …

The government of Sierra Leone’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme predates the Lomé Peace Agreement. In the wake of ECOMOG’s counter-offensive in February 1998, several thousand rebels and former government soldiers turned themselves in or were captured. These combatants constituted the first candidates for a DDR programme, for which the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) was established in July 1998. All were disarmed, but only 1 400 fighters graduated from the programme. The remainder escaped from detention during the rebel offensive on Freetown in January 1999.⁴⁴

The DDR programme envisioned in the Lomé Peace Agreement was to commence within six weeks of the signing of the treaty.⁴⁵ However, disarmament only officially began on 20 October 1999, when the first disarmament site was declared open. This date was essentially ceremonial as the centre at Lungi already existed before the peace agreement was signed. The programme only got under way on 4 November when four new centres were opened at Port Loko, Daru and Kenema. Four additional disarmament sites were opened on 17 April 2000, in Bo, Magburaka, Makeni and Moyamba.

By the time the disarmament process effectively collapsed after the RUF attacked UNAMSIL peacekeepers in early May 2000, some 12 500 weapons and 250 000 rounds of ammunition had been collected.

The weapons collected were from virtually every major arms-producing country. Rifles included various makes of AK-47s (including Chinese, former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,)⁴⁶ Belgian FN FALs, German G-3s⁴⁷ and Mauser 98ks, and British SLRs and Lee-Enfield no. 4s. Machine guns included the British GPMG, Chinese 12.7mm machine guns and RPDs from Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union.

A few sub-machine guns were also recovered: the German Sten and the Israeli Uzi. Grenades included mostly Chinese varieties. Anti-personnel mines included Chinese and Italian models. No anti-tank mines were turned in as part of the disarmament programme, although the SLA recovered some from the border with Guinea. Mortars included 60mm, 82mm and 120mm, with Chinese 82mm mortars being the most common.

Other weapons included unexploded bomblets from French Beluga cluster bombs (dropped from a Nigerian Alpha Jet), a British Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile, a Soviet Spigot anti-tank guided weapon, two Soviet SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and 23mm anti-aircraft guns and Katyusha 122mm rockets from the former East Bloc. Besides receiving a variety of small arms ammunition, US 105mm shells (including white phosphorous ammunition) — presumably brought to Sierra Leone by a contingent from ECOMOG — were also turned in.⁴⁸

The quality of many of these weapons was suspect. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged the generally "low quality" of the arms collected.⁴⁹ Those who enjoyed a closer view of the process were less diplomatic and charitable in their assessments.

While it is natural that warring factions would be reluctant to turn in their best weapons and their best-trained troops, the laissez-faire attitude of ECOMOG, UNAMSIL and the NCDDR did not help matters. Individuals were permitted to turn in weapons that should not have been accepted. During the early stages of disarmament, homemade hunting guns and single grenades were accepted.

While taking weapons out of circulation was rightly seen as a priority, the means by which this was accomplished created problems. Individuals who registered at disarmament sites and submitted their weapons were deemed eligible to receive a transitional safety allowance payment of US $300. Clearly, when a person can ‘sell’ a grenade for US $300, this creates a demand for weapons. There are reports that the programme resulted in weapons brought into Sierra Leone from Guinea. Moreover, by failing to ensure that individuals handing in weapons were actually combatants, the number of former combatants’ was inflated, suggesting that progress was being made when, in fact, it was not.

ECOMOG reportedly captured numerous weapons from the rebels during its counter-offensive early in 1999. These weapons were not turned in to the weapons storage centres (WSCs), but were kept to replenish its depleted stocks. Nigerian troops returning from Sierra Leone reportedly sold smuggled weapons to criminal elements active in Nigeria.⁵⁰

Relatively few of the weapons seized from UNAMSIL have been retrieved. However, UNAMSIL retrieved weapons outside of the formal disarmament process. When UN troops successfully freed the peacekeepers detained in Kailahun in July 2000, they recovered a large quantity of weapons and munitions from the RUF.⁵¹

... but not Destroyed

Most of the weapons collected under the DDR programme were not destroyed. ECOMOG, which oversaw the disarmament process and administered the WSCs until February 2000, only dismantled weapons that had been surrendered. Working parts were removed and separated, but many of these weapons are easily reassembled. AK-47s permit the complete interchangeability of parts.

It is unclear why these weapons were not destroyed. One reason posited is that ECOMOG wanted to recover weapons previously lost to the rebels. The same reason may have motivated the government of Sierra Leone. Kabbah may also have wanted to keep any weapons recovered for future use. The UN maintains that it instructed UNAMSIL to destroy the weapons, and if this is true, the instructions clearly did not reach the peacekeepers overseeing the process. They began to change their policies only in April 2000.

Even well intentioned initiatives went awry. A ceremonial bonfire to destroy weapons was meant to show that something positive was happening in Sierra Leone. The plans began to unravel when Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, the Chief of Defence Staff, died on 18 April. Kabbah declared a period of national mourning and postponed the scheduled arms destruction. Before the bonfire could be rescheduled, the WSC in Masiaka where the weapons were being kept, was overrun and the RUF stole some 400 rifles.⁵²

Conclusion

Despite the relatively bleak picture described above, the situation in Sierra Leone is not without hope:

The country is relatively fortunate to have been at war for ‘only’ 10 years. Prior to 1991, the country had not engaged in armed struggle for independence and had only a very small army. The government limited the size and power of its armed forces.



Combatants’ lack of professionalism has generally resulted in their weapons being in a state of disrepair. Failure to maintain and clean weapons degrades them, especially in a wet and humid climate such as Sierra Leone’s. The same is true for ammunition, which must be stored in a dry, cool place to maintain its effectiveness.



The UN has acknowledged that its earlier approach to the conflict was inadequate. Insufficient resources have been devoted to resolve the problem and authorising additional troops for UNAMSIL cannot be continued without regard for countries’ willingness and ability to supply them.

But it is evident, more than a year after the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, that the situation in Sierra Leone remains fragile. Despite international arms embargoes and a regional moratorium on small arms and light weapons, the government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and other non-state actors are all arming at an alarming rate.

The RUF continues to obtain weapons illegally, while the government of Sierra Leone has recently received substantial weaponry from the UK. Given the easy availability of arms in the country, the weakness of the current government, the relative strength of the RUF, and the fluidity of alliances among the country’s armed groups, the likelihood of continued conflict in Sierra Leone is great.

Notes

Edited version of Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One year after the Lomé Peace Agreement, Occasional Paper 1, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2000.

See UN Document S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998; UN Document S/RES/1270 (1999), 22 October 1999; and UN Document S/2000/455, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 19 May 2000, paragraph 59.



UN Document S/RES/1299 (2000), 19 May 1999; UN Document S/RES/1289 (2000), 7 February 2000; and UN Document S/RES/1306 (2000), 5 July 2000.



See UN Document S/RES/1132 (1997), 8 October 1997; UN Document S/RES/1171 (1998), 5 June 1998.



Interview with Brig-Genl (ret) K O Conteh, former Chief of Staff, Sierra Leone Army (1994-95), Freetown, 2 June 2000.



For the Committee’s reports, see UN Document S/1998/1236, 31 December 1998, and S/1999/1300, 31 December 1999.



Interview with Col K S Mondeh, former Supreme Council Member, National Provisional Ruling Council, Freetown, 4 June 2000.



I Smillie, L Gberie & R Hazleton, The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds & human security, Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000, pp 45-47.



For example, the European Union announced in June 2000 that it was suspending US $48 million in development aid to Liberia. See <www.sierra-leone.org>.



R Holbrooke, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the US to the UN, New York, Statement before the UN Security Council’s Exploratory Hearing on Sierra Leone Diamonds, 31 July 2000, US UN Press Release #102(00), 31 July 2000.



See, for example, the reporting of James Rupert of The Washington Post.



Interview with Benoît Leduc, Technical Coordinator, Médecins sans frontières, Monrovia, 9 June 2000.



UN Document S/RES/788 (1992), 19 November 1992.



Interview with M Tafirenyika, Political Officer, UN Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia, Monrovia, 7 June 2000.



D Farah, Liberia reportedly arming guerrillas, The Washington Post, 18 June 2000, p A21. It is likely that the ‘surface-to-surface missiles’ are rocket launchers. Interview with J Potgieter, Senior Field Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Geneva, 8 September 2000.



Liberia selling arms for diamonds, BBC News, 6 July 2000. See also Sierra Leone: Document One, BBC News, 18 July 2000, and Sierra Leone: Document Two, BBC News, 18 July 2000, <news.bbc.co.uk>.



Sierra Leone: Document Two, ibid.



S Pattison, Head, UN Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Statement before the UN Security Council’s Exploratory Hearing on Sierra Leone Diamonds, 31 July 2000; also written correspondence with C Mackenzie, First Secretary (Press), UK Permanent Mission to the UN, New York, 15 August 2000.



The government of Sierra Leone has copies of letters dated 26 June 1996, and 4 December 1996, that it claims to be from Sankoh to the Libyan Embassy in Ghana, acknowledging receipt of US $500 000 and requesting an additional US$ 1.5 million for supplemental arms purchases. Documents courtesy of a Western diplomat, Conakry, May 2000.



Conteh, op cit.



International terrorism becomes a feature of Sierra Leone’s war, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 25 July 2000 (CD-Rom).



Written correspondence with P C Andersen, Publisher/Editor, Sierra Leone Web, 19 August 2000.



UN Document S/2000/203, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, 10 March 2000, enclosure, paragraph 21 and 22.



J Rupert, Diamond hunters fuel Africa’s brutal wars, quoted in Sierra Leone, mining firms trade weapons and money for access to gems, The Washington Post, 16 October 1999, p A1; and D Farah, Rebels get arms through Burkina Faso, sources say, The Washington Post, 6 May 2000, p A15.



Pattison, op cit.



For an authoritative report on this global network of arms merchants and brokers, see B Wood & J Peleman, The arms fixers: Controlling the brokers and shipping agents, PRIO Report 3/99 and Basic Research Report 99.3, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1999.



See Neglected arms embargo on Sierra Leone rebels briefing paper, Human Rights Watch, 15 May 2000, <www.hrw.org>.



D Leppard et al, British firms arming Sierra Leone rebels, Sunday Times (London), 10 January 1999.



Holbrooke, op cit.



Interview with S Terrefe, Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR, 25 May 2000, Conakry; Interview with an NGO official, Conakry, 22 May 2000.



Mondeh, op cit.



Ibid.



I Douglas, Fighting for diamonds: Private military companies in Sierra Leone, in J Cilliers & P Mason (eds), Peace, profit or plunder?: The privatisation of security in war-torn African societies, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1999, pp 184-85.



A-F Musah, A country under siege: State decay and corporate military intervention in Sierra Leone, in A-F Musah & J Kayode Fayemi (eds), Mercenaries: An Africa security dilemma, Pluto, London, 2000, p 109.



G Gbanabome, ECOMOG sold weapons to rebels Arnold Quainoo, Africa News Service, 20 January 1999, <www.nisat.org>; The NINJAS, 28 January 1999, <www.sierra-leone.cc/news128.html>.



Internal UNAMSIL document, February/March 2000.



The UN stresses that the Guineans were not under UNAMSIL command when the incident occurred as they had yet to report officially to the duty station. It is common practice, however, for the UN to assume responsibility for troop-contributing countries’ equipment on its way to the mission area.



Internal UNAMSIL document, op cit.



UN Document S/2000/186, paragraph 11.



Ibid.



Internal UNAMSIL document, op cit.



Sierra Leone Web, 23 May 2000, <www.sierra-leone.org>.



UN Document S/2000/455, paragraph 61.



Ibid.



Summary Programme Information, Executive Secretariat, NCDDR, February 2000, pp 2-3.



UN Document S/1999/777, Peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 12 July 1999, article XVI, p 20.



According to Brian Johnson-Thomas, many recovered AK-47s were of Ukrainian origin. See B Wood, Testimony before the Security Council, 31 July 2000.



Many of these G-3 rifles were of Iranian manufacture. Ibid.



Interview by telephone with I Biddle, former Qualified Technical Representative, NCDDR, 24 August 2000.



UN Document S/2000/186, paragraph 24.



See, for example, A Okoro, Crime upsurge linked to Abacha, P M News (Lagos), 1 September 1999.



Written correspondence with Maj M Evanson-Goddard, former UN Military Observer, UNAMSIL, 11 October 2000.



Interview with an informed observer, Conakry, 18 May 2000.

ERIC G BERMAN is an independent consultant based in Arlington, Massachusetts. He previously served in a variety of United Nations departments and authorities and has published widely on UN and African security issues.