

UNITA's diamond mining and exporting capacity

Christian Dietrich

Throughout the 1990s, the export of diamonds bankrolled the activities of the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). This reached a peak from 1993 to 1997 when the rebels occupied Angola's most lucrative diamond fields, allowing them to control nearly 10% of global diamond production by value.

This position was diminished after the rebels lost their principal mines in the Cuango valley and eastern Lundas to the *Forças Armadas Angolanas* (FAA). While UNITA's diamond holdings have been reduced in size, and revenue thus significantly diminished, the rebels mine more diamonds at present than has been generally assumed. UNITA currently profits from a patchwork of alluvial deposits in the Malange, Bie, Kwanza Sul and Lunda provinces, and controls sizeable reserves in Cuando Cubango and Moxico, enabling the rebels to mine in the range of 1,2 million carats valued at US \$300 million in 1999.

While the intensity of international commitment to embargo UNITA gems has increased during the last year, little is known about the rebels' diamond mining and smuggling capacity. The United Nations and the British government have attempted to name, shame and prosecute sanction busters. The campaign, although sensational, has been limited because it has not been accompanied by a greater understanding of the intricacies, as well as the broader mechanisms of UNITA diamond sales. States have yet to enact legislation prohibiting business between their citizens and UNITA, while those individuals named by the UN Panel of Experts¹ are expendable actors, leaving the real players unnamed, untarnished and out of court. Instead, analysing how UNITA produces rough and where the rebels interact with *diamantaires* would enable those implementing the embargo to do so more effectively.

This chapter will first consider UNITA's historical exploitation of Angola's diamond reserves. This will then be juxtaposed with UNITA's industrial mining operations in the mid-1990s, as well as the rebels' current mining capacity. Furthermore, an assessment of real and speculative mechanisms for exporting, including the barter and cash trades, will assist in defining what UNITA does with its mine production, and how this has changed over time. Country case studies (elsewhere) will further augment the above by placing UNITA within a regional and continental perspective. Indeed, the 1998 UN embargo of UNITA diamonds and the more recent *Report by the Panel of Experts* do not appear to

have had any appreciable effect on curbing UNITA's diamond export capacity or involvement with both respected *diamantaires* and criminal elements. Rather, this chapter will show that the location of UNITA's diamond mining ventures has instead been affected by Angola's altering military geography, with the rebels' export capacity not influenced by sanctions but by procurement patterns in the region and financial considerations relevant to foreign diamond dealers.

Pre-industrial mining

Contrary to popular belief, UNITA did not start mining diamonds *only* with the termination of Cold War military assistance by South Africa and the United States. While UNITA was forced to increase its revenue from mineral resources significantly after proxy aid declined, the rebel organisation actively utilised non-renewable resources even during the height of foreign military assistance. It was responsible for the sale of ivory from poaching during the 1970s, and the export of hardwoods to Namibia, possibly Zambia and the former Zaïre as well. Both of these resources represented only a fraction of the possible revenue from diamond extraction and UNITA exchanged diamonds for cash or specialised goods (war materiel or other) that was not supplied by Washington or Pretoria.

Unfortunately, evidence of UNITA's diamond revenue in the 1970s and early 1980s does not exist in the public domain. One source does cite an increase in the rebels' mining capacity during the late 1980s, with US \$14 million from 45 000 carats exported in 1989, as compared with only US \$4 million in 1984.² According to this same source, UNITA obtained rough from the local population. It also initiated more spectacular mining operations in the late 1980s through open pit mines and river diversions, and then brought the diamonds back to Jamba by foot.³ UNITA's increased diamond revenues were largely concurrent with the targeting of formal mines controlled by the government. Two of the most devastating rebel incursions were against mining operations in the Cuango in 1984 and then Andrada (now Nzaji) in 1985. UNITA used these opportunities to disrupt government revenue, as well as to extend its own influence in the Lunda diamond fields, probably digging with machinery stolen from government mines. The export of rough most likely occurred through South Africa, where several diamond dealers were associated with prominent members of the apartheid regime, and the former Zaïre where numerous American and Belgian *diamantaires* worked with Mobutu.

Tenuous peace after the Bicesse Accords in 1991 legitimated UNITA's diamond resource base as far as UNITA was a contender in the national elections scheduled for November 1992. The rebels joined the massive influx of *garimpeiros* to the mining areas during the cessation of military hostilities in 1991 and 1992. The free-for-all included soldiers from both sides as well as Angolan and Congolese diggers chasing after alluvial diamonds. This urgent scramble for riches after years of debilitating war was mostly devoid of technology or oversight. There was

little control over the small mining bands because strongmen with access to the diamond fields chose to mine rather than exercise authority. UNITA's central commanders may have attempted to implement some structure to the *garimpeiro* prospecting bands to increase profits, although this would have been a difficult task without the increased use of violence and militarisation in the Lundas.

Building an industrial capacity after 1992

When Savimbi rejected the results of the national elections and returned to war, UNITA immediately occupied the country's most lucrative diamond fields. The rebels used the diamond reserve mapping carried out by the Portuguese before independence to plan the seizure of the most lucrative 'reserve blocks', isolating the government's diamond holdings to mines close to Lucapa and Andrada (Nzaji). The greatest trophy was the Cuango valley with Odebrecht's new infrastructure upgrades captured intact and ready for use. Through military advances UNITA was also capable of establishing exclusive domination over most of the Lundas. UNITA thus began a process of incorporating diamond mining as its primary industrial and financial base, necessitating proper expertise and bureaucratic oversight.

UNITA first harnessed the *garimpeiro* workforce by reducing the extensive and unregulated nature of alluvial diamond reserves through bully tactics as will be discussed in a separate chapter. This first stage in the militarisation of the Lundas, whereby actual and threatened violence was blended with financial dividend, assured cheap labour, but could not adequately regulate the profitable exploitation of diamond reserves as a whole. UNITA was capable only of levying a fee, paid in diamonds, of approximately 20% on *garimpeiro* diggers, who were controlled and taxed – generally during the process of washing diamondiferous sediment.

To build a solid economic foundation out of alluvial diamond reserves UNITA needed to initiate industrial operations and move away from the unreliable and inefficient levying of tax on *garimpeiro* diggings. To do this, Savimbi cultivated internal expertise, training divers, sorters and evaluators in South Africa. This enhanced capability was further reinforced by the presence of foreign miners operating under UNITA's military protection, who were required to train a constant rotation of UNITA personnel. UNITA technicians would assist in overseeing mine operations and manage labour, but this system did not require soldiers to do the digging, nor were finances risked in buying and maintaining equipment. UNITA controlled the resources and those foreigners who wished to profit from diamonds, whether they were South Africans, Belgians or Congolese, paid any number of fees for a chance to make their millions. Labour at the industrial mines entirely comprised *garimpeiros* who received one in five bags of sediment, with the remaining four bags split between UNITA and the foreign mine operators. Compared with low technological *garimpeiro* diggings, these formal mines

achieved a massive output through the use of earth-moving equipment, water pumps and river diversions.

UNITA would collect its 50% cut at the end of the month, and to avoid cheating the rebels chose the pile of diamonds they wanted. For their remaining 50% cut, foreign diamond miners paid for all mine overheads with the exception of security – which was supplied by UNITA. Despite the levies, profits were very high for foreigners, especially in the Cuango valley. Two of the longest running operations were the Rial mine under Zollmann and the Cuango Mining Consortium under De Decker, the former reportedly UNITA's largest mine in the Cuango. Mining by the consortium occurred in partnership with Rindel, reportedly associated with jewellers in South Africa. UNITA also profited from the sale of diamonds mined by *garimpeiros* through the licensing of foreign rough dealers, with a particularly large buying operation headed by a man known only as 'Manu'. Profits were further derived from the *garimpeiro* workforce through the sale of goods at artificially high retail prices, enabling substantial income through taxation. UNITA also mined alone at a number of reserves, although the capacity of such operations cannot be determined. Similarly, the extent of alluvial mining undertaken by *garimpeiros* indirectly under rebel control cannot be ascertained. Specifics concerning UNITA's diamond output are sparse because Savimbi divided foreign miners so that no one fully knew of other ventures, or the prices paid for concessions.⁴

The occupation of Angola's richest alluvial reserves after 1992 proved to be a catalyst for the development of UNITA's capacity to centralise its profits.⁵ Although not all diamonds mined by UNITA have apparently gone back to Savimbi, the vast majority were funnelled through a centralised network dominated by the rebel leader during this period. Luzamba became the headquarters for diamonds when UNITA took the Cuango valley. The rough mined by UNITA or obtained through production 'sharing' agreements with *garimpeiros* or foreigners was brought to this central location, sorted and evaluated, and essentially prepared for sale or export under command of the organisation's ministry of natural resources. Those stones mined at more distant locations were also transferred to Luzamba, sometimes aboard weekly flights starting around 1995.⁶ The Luzamba airfield served as a major supply depot as well, making the location a key strategic point.⁷

Savimbi was able to control rebel diamond production in the mid-1990s for several reasons. First, the geographic location of the mines, basically clustered in the finest demarcated reserves in the Lundas and Cuango valley in particular, enabled effective oversight by UNITA's administration. Second, large-scale industrial operations conducted by foreigners facilitated centralisation of the rough, unlike the scattered *garimpeiro* diggings. Lastly, relative peace from late 1994, which coincided with intensified mining operations, was the most important factor enabling direct control over profits. The cessation of overt military hostilities reinforced Savimbi's administrative oversight in many cases and also allowed for a static system of control over labour and centralised sorting and exporting.

Moreover, the international community, in effect, endorsed UNITA's diamond revenue because diamond mining was seen as a legitimate method for UNITA, as an official junior partner in a unified government, to oppose the MPLA politically, which relied upon oil revenue.⁸

Diamond decentralisation

The rebels forfeited their diamond domination in late 1997 when government offensives in the Lundas outmanoeuvred UNITA and isolated the rebels' primary diamond mines. The FAA captured many rebel diamond reserves, but the return to war in mid-1998 saw UNITA's heightened capacity in the Lundas. The rebels "recaptured more than 100 localities – mostly in the north and north-east – which it had previously handed over to central government in line with the Lusaka protocols."⁹ Toward the end of 1998, UNITA also launched multiple attacks against mining sites forcing foreign companies to reduce their exposure at newly awarded concessions. UNITA's initial advantage in the heavily contested portions of the Lundas was then lost at some point in 1999, particularly after UNITA forces were repelled from the lower Cuango valley in October. Luzamba still represents a significant strategic value for UNITA command with the rebels devoting an organised force to the area, probably numbering upwards of 2 000 soldiers. Central oversight was also directed from numerous rebel strongholds such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kamina and Alfa 2 among others) or in the Lundas (such as from Cuilo). Outside the main strategic locations, peripheral rebel cell structures extend UNITA's influence.

Tactically, a significant chain of command must be maintained over peripheral units, but when it comes to collecting proceeds from the myriad of small alluvial pickings controlled by various UNITA bands, decentralisation is the most likely scenario. Central military control in peripheral UNITA ranks has been eroded to a certain degree since 1998 – except for the ever-present fear of being reported to Savimbi by a dissatisfied compatriot. Thus, the rebel leader may have initiated a degree of diamond democracy, possibly laying claim only to larger stones mined by lower ranking troopers. A Zambian diamond broker working on the border with Angola in 1998 noted that Savimbi had told his troops to use diamonds for survival. This same source indicated that the rebel leader had ordered a price cap on rough sold by outlying UNITA units to attract foreign buyers, but it was not witnessed that this was actually implemented. In either case, the use of diamonds by peripheral UNITA bands to buy much needed, or desired commodities¹⁰ has been largely out of Savimbi's hands from 1998 to the present. Importantly, some of these rebel 'bands' are actually led by officers looking after their own needs, as well as those of the UNITA organisation, exemplified by a UNITA colonel brokering diamond deals for personal gain in south-western Zambia. UNITA cannot provide supplies to roving guerrilla bands or remote strong points, forcing outer units to look after their own needs. This suggests that

UNITA's rebel structure has been facilitated by a degree of diamond democracy for many years.

Insurgency warfare does not necessarily preclude diamond mining. While static industrial operations may be difficult to defend, small rebel bands roaming in the massive no-man's-land in the Lundas, and portions of Malange, Kwanza Sul, Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces experience little difficulty in producing diamonds. Controlling *garimpeiro* groups during the process of washing diamond-bearing sediment is the easiest means to profit from extensive alluvial reserves. More substantial revenue can be achieved through the use of gravel pumps to process sediment in any number of rivers or tributaries. Such a procedure requires, at least, diesel, generators and sorting machines, among other substantial equipment, but which can be moved at short notice by human porters. UNITA's internal diamond expertise, as well as its extensive knowledge of the diamond fields enable rough production even if Lunda Norte appears unstable and plagued by banditry. Similarly, peripheral UNITA bands can mine in Malange, Kwanza Sul and Bié provinces while exerting pressure on government forces or supply routes. UNITA bands can potentially mine any locality not controlled by the FAA, leaving a vast proportion of Angola's alluvial reserves open to rebel prospecting. Smaller mining operations consisting of several dozen *garimpeiros* and their UNITA bosses leave few traces and are rarely targeted by organised FAA offensives.

Savimbi's diamonds after Luzamba

While remote UNITA bands, in certain cases, may send a proportion of their rough back to the central authorities, Savimbi maintains core diamond stockpiles through organised mining ventures. Savimbi lost the most lucrative portions of the lower Cuango valley by 1998, and his authority over peripheral alluvial diggings, especially in the north-eastern Lundas, diminished from late 1997, but sufficient control was exercised over other diamond reserves dominated by the rebels.

During UNITA's industrial mining operations in the mid-1990s, the rebels relied most heavily on Luzamba and certain reserves in eastern portions of Lunda Norte, but also maintained a strong presence in other mining centres in north-central and south-eastern Angola. Towards the end of UNITA's occupation of Luzamba, however, production increased in Bié, and Kwanza Sul provinces in 1996/1997, forming an axis of rebel diamond output in north-central and north-eastern Angola. With the loss of Luzamba in January 1998, the axis was altered to incorporate reserves in the Cuando Cubango province as diamond output increased from the south-east in late 1997/1998. Mines in the northern Cuango valley (in Lunda Norte, Malange and Uige provinces) and eastern Lunda Norte also bolstered rebel diamond output from 1998 to the present, with many reserves still under central oversight. Each mining centre and epicentre will be analysed below.

From early 1993 to the end of 1997, UNITA's main mining operations were based in the lower Cuango valley in western Lunda Norte around Luzamba, about 30 km north of Cafunfo. At the time, UNITA's central command probably did not have the resources to develop other mining areas adequately, a move that would have strained central oversight and necessitated the diversion of scarce resources that could be put to better use in the rich Cuango. Since UNITA handed Luzamba over to the government administration in January 1998, the rebels have been incapable of retaking this vital airfield and surrounding diamond reserves despite other military advances in the Lundas. The rebels, however, do continue to hold significant diamond deposits to the north and south of Luzamba in other parts of the Cuango valley, spread through the Lunda Norte, Malange and Uige provinces. UNITA protects these diamond mines with large and well-organised troop contingents, reportedly under the command of General Dembo, UNITA vice president and chief of staff, which have launched several large attacks against the Luzamba-based *Sociedade Desenvolvimento de Mineira*, and prevented access to the America Mineral Fields concession in the northern Cuango valley.

During the occupation of Luzamba, UNITA production was not industrialised to the same degree in the eastern Lundas. However, richer reserves such as Cassanguidi, Chitotolo or Maludi must have been a major focus of the rebels before 1997. FAA offensives in 1997 reduced Savimbi's hold on mines in the eastern Lundas, although UNITA advanced back into scattered portions of the region in late 1998 and early 1999. The current extent of UNITA's mining activities in the eastern Lundas is unknown, but the rebel presence is far from negligible as UNITA bands move unhindered between government garrisons.¹¹ Although UNITA cannot be omnipresent in these diamond fields, FAA does not control areas outside of garrisoned towns, main roadways and formal mining sites, leaving a patchwork of alternating nodes of power conducive to massive *garimpeiro* activity. While some UNITA bands may have become more integrated into the *garimpeiro* economy, organised military headquarters such as in Cuilo, or smaller towns such as Djirobo (which UNITA lost to FAA in 1999), have enabled effective oversight over certain diamond extraction points by UNITA commanders, with a portion of the diamond output centralised to UNITA leadership.

Throughout the mid-1990s, centralised UNITA units also oversaw mine operations in Bié, Kwanza Sul and Malange provinces at several locations north-east of Nharea, and between Mussende and Malange (town). The extent of these mining activities is not known, but was probably not a primary focus when the Cuango valley dominated UNITA production. These mines grew in importance at the latest in 1997, however, when UNITA was supposed to relinquish its Cuango holdings in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, simultaneously with FAA attempts to outmanoeuvre the rebels in the Lundas. The mines in Bié and Kwanza Sul thus formed an axis of production with Luzamba in 1997 as UNITA attempted to disperse its risks, and later with reserves bordering Zambia once control over Luzamba was relinquished. The capture of Andulo and Bailundo by

government forces in November 1999 presumably pushed UNITA out of several mines to the north-east of Nharea (or at least forced the suspension of operations). However, it remains unclear whether diamond reserves near Nharea have been fully relinquished as UNITA has advanced back into several areas previously occupied by FAA. Despite the government offensives in central Angola in late 1999, UNITA has countered with attacks closer to Luanda and was recently active in the vicinity of Andulo, suggesting inadequate FAA presence in the area, and enabling the rebels to sustain diamond mining operations in Bié and Kwanza Sul provinces. Conversely, the proximity of the FAA suggests that high levels of investment in these mines would be minimised. UNITA may be able to prospect areas left uncontrolled by the government, but the rebels must rely, to a certain extent, on economies of scale for the protection of mines, supply of diesel and spare parts and for the safe centralisation of diamonds. Disparate UNITA bands can move through the diamond fields at random, scratching at sometimes rich gem deposits, but Savimbi must rely on a more durable and constant form of rough accumulation.

Operations at UNITA's diamond reserves in the south-east Cuando Cubango province and portions of Moxico province must also have intensified in 1997 due to the imminent handover of Luzamba. By 1998, these mines formed a new axis of rebel production with the mines in north-central Angola near Andulo. Epicentres such as Mavinga and Cazombo in the south-east probably represent UNITA's core clustered diamond holdings and reportedly include kimberlite exploitation north of Mavinga. As many hydrological features in the Cuando Cubango and Moxico provinces are diamondiferous, although not to the extent of the highly concentrated alluvial reserves in the Lundas, diamonds can be produced from any number of localities. Industrial input is logically not comparable to the level witnessed in Luzamba during the cease-fire in the mid-1990s, but a large workforce can be more efficient than costly earth-moving equipment, and the FAA's deployment in south-eastern Angola does not represent a substantial threat. Economies of scale can thus be used for supplying the mines and labourers, and rough centralised to a great degree with oversight bolstered in less militarised zones.

UNITA's exploitation of Angolan diamonds is probably further augmented by mining in southern portions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Just as Angola's high quality diamonds have drained into southern DR Congo through centuries of kimberlite weathering, the arbitrary border between the two countries means little in practice. The FAA cannot even control northern sections of the Lundas, allowing rebels to move freely to the DRC where Kabila and his regional allies have few means to deny access to UNITA. Savimbi has historically maintained rear bases in the southern DRC and, although Mobutu was replaced, these rear garrisons and weapons depots have become integrated into the Congolese economy over the last three decades. Most of the rear bases, such as Kapanga, Kamina and Alfa-2, are staggered in close proximity to Angola's northern border and remain peripheral to Kinshasa's war effort in the eastern DRC. It is likely that UNITA is mining in the southern portions of the Bandundu

and Kasai Occidental provinces close to the Angolan border. These activities can be loosely identified by diggings along the Cuango and Wamba Rivers; around the Kapanga base; in the vicinity of Tshikapa; and along both the Kasai and Lulua rivers close to the north-eastern Angolan border with DRC. Indeed, it is likely that Kabila's cronies have profited from UNITA's presence, since the rebels sell high quality Angolan gems through towns such as Tshikapa in the Kasai Occidental province, integrating UNITA's mining activities into the DRC's informal diamond market. As the FAA pushes UNITA out of higher profile mining areas in Angola, Savimbi must disperse his risks while maintaining adequate supplies of rough diamonds, thus lending great importance to the uncontrolled yet highly lucrative opportunities in the southern DRC.

Even without direct evidence, it is possible to surmise that Savimbi maintains proper control over those areas close to his military/administrative centres, but has had a diminishing influence over mine production in contested or peripheral parts of the Lundas, Bié, Kwanza Sul and, to a lesser degree, Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces. Battlefield losses in late 1999 may have reinforced the desire of outlying units with low morale to bolster the tenuous military positions with mobile wealth for foreseeable hardships. Conversely, UNITA's battlefield losses in 1999 will require the replenishment of weapons and materiel even if the rebels have reverted to guerrilla warfare. Without other methods of substantial and centralised forms of financial gain, diamond reserves controlled by Savimbi will continue to be the lifeblood of UNITA. Moreover, Savimbi's rule over UNITA has not been severely diminished as some reports suggest, and the rebel leader continues to control the accumulation of diamonds by commanders in operational zones far from central headquarters. These commanders can wage war while also deferring personnel to mine, with diamond production involving the use of *garimpeiros*, light industrial operations, or even the capital intensive exploitation in some localities. Profit is also extracted from the *garimpeiro* labourers who must buy their commodities at highly inflated prices and will often sell their stones to diamond dealers licensed by UNITA authorities. UNITA's diverse methods of profiting from diamond mining will make it impossible to curtail Savimbi's access to this resource base unless substantial control over all diamond reserves can be achieved.

Diamond sales

UNITA uses diamond sales to fund most of the organisation's pursuits, including foreign representation, travel, commodity procurement and arms purchases. Despite the high cost of mining (where large proportions of profits must repay operating costs), UNITA maintained relatively low overheads during industrial operations in the mid-1990s by externalising the costs of mining to *garimpeiros* and foreign mine operators. Costs may have since risen with the departure of foreign consortiums and the brutality of *garimpeiros*, forcing the rebels to pay higher mine overheads for equipment and labour sustenance. The rebels' declining

mine output does not afford UNITA the luxury of selling diamonds much below market value. Indeed, it appears that the rebels continue to sell to international dealers within Angola as well as to barter or sell diamonds for commodities in neighbouring countries with impunity. Unlike *garimpeiros* who are not connected to the global diamond market and must sell rough at reduced prices to various middlemen, UNITA is actually part of the international diamond trade, representing the largest single source of illicit gems.

It is widely estimated that diamonds sold by UNITA fetched about US \$300 million in 1993, US \$400 million in 1994, US \$600 million in 1995, US \$700 million in 1996, and US \$600 million in 1997. However these figures are not substantiated and often derived from speculation alone.¹² UNITA's production fell considerably with the loss of principal mining sites in the Lundas and the return to war, but rebel production was estimated around US \$250–300 million in 1998. While De Beers cites UNITA's production as no more than US \$150 million in 1999, these figures are only based upon rebel output in the eastern Lundas (where De Beers can recognise the diamonds) and minor output in the south-east (where De Beers cannot recognise the diamonds) and underestimates UNITA's diamond harvest.¹³ UNITA's diamond mining has been seriously reduced, but may still be about half of the output of earlier industrial operations, putting the figure close to US \$300 million in 1999. Importantly, there are no estimates of the rebels' net profit from diamond sales, which must be reduced as a result of production overheads after the departure of foreign mining consortiums.

Before sanctions in 1998, foreign *diamantaires* were eager to gain access to the rebels' steady supply of rough, allowing UNITA to sell diamonds to the highest bidder, whether the purchasing agent operated in southern Zaïre or flew directly to UNITA's diamond headquarters. Substantial quantities of rough moved out of Angola to numerous buying houses licensed by the Mobutu regime, bolstered by UNITA's use of diamond auctions in Angola. These auctions took place in Luzamba, in the Cuango valley, and later, or perhaps at times concurrently, in Andulo in the central highlands. Luzamba was very safe due to its proximity to the Zaïrian border and the auctions drew large numbers of foreigners. UNITA utilised direct sales since 1993, although the main influx of foreign bidders may only have begun as late as 1995 when UNITA began mining more substantial quantities of diamonds and the security situation improved after the Lusaka peace accords.¹⁴ Despite the capture of Cafunfo by FAA forces and mercenaries in July 1994, the bulk of UNITA's Cuango diamond fields remained under rebel control and evidence suggests that aerial deliveries to Luzamba were not curtailed either before or after the Lusaka process. One foreign miner working with UNITA in Luzamba recalled that the deployment of government MiGs to Saurimo did not pose any problems and he was never forced to fly at night before 1998.¹⁵ Tenders at Luzamba lasted until the end of the dry season in 1997 when the FAA pushed UNITA out of its higher profile mines in the Lundas, including those in the lower Cuango valley (technically handed over by the rebels after prolonged negotiations concerning the legalisation of UNITA's mining ventures).

When UNITA lost the Luzamba airfield, the headquarters for diamond auctions moved to Andulo until the FAA captured the rebel stronghold in late 1999. It could be assumed that the new location for diamond sales in the central highlands would have been too dangerous for international *diamantaires*. But, the fact that no flights carrying diamond dealers were reportedly forced down by the Angolan air force testifies to the fact that flying into UNITA airfields, even those deep in Angolan territory, was not an undue risk at this time. Certainly, FAA MiGs did not disrupt UNITA's arms procurement even when it upgraded to a semi-conventional military capacity in 1998.

Satellite phones and Lear jets at the disposal of *diamantaires* meant that UNITA was never too far removed from dealers who were willing to pay top dollar and risk flying directly to rebel auctions. One reported case of cash paid to UNITA in Luzamba by De Decker does not mean that all transactions were based upon the direct payment of cash in Angola. Funds could just as easily have been transferred between European bank accounts before the buyer was allowed to depart with the diamonds. UNITA also continued to sell rough to purchasing agents in southern Zaïre, but it is unknown whether the quantities sold were reduced at the height of auctions in Angola. Furthermore, UNITA appears to have sent parcels directly overseas during the high profile auctions. UNITA's developed system of auctions in Angola did not preclude other means of selling rough, although it is not known exactly why direct sales through neighbouring countries or overseas would have been implemented when *diamantaires* were prepared to fly to Angola. If all sales were indeed paid for in cash in Angola, then the rebels may have been bolstering their foreign liquidity by selling rough overseas to pay for arms procurement or fund UNITA representation abroad. Basically, a diverse array of diamond export routes must have been the most efficient method of disseminating cash to UNITA's regional and global needs.¹⁶

It would be convenient to assume that, after the UN embargoed UNITA diamonds in July 1998, the rebels faced higher costs to export rough. As international pressure mounted against Savimbi, a logical conclusion is that international diamond dealers sought more devious, and hence more expensive methods of completing transactions with UNITA. Such an assumption is reinforced by the military achievements of the FAA, resulting in greater danger when flying into secure airfields in territory exclusively controlled by the rebels. There may be merit to these postulations, but logic and circumstantial evidence suggest that, while large auctions in Luzamba and Andulo have ceased, as has UNITA's industrial mining capacity, rebel gems are still sold with impunity to *diamantaires* inside Angola, within the region and overseas. Indeed, auctions in Andulo continued for some time after the imposition of sanctions and direct purchasing from the rebels appears no less risky today than it was two years ago. Flying to UNITA is not dangerous and buying rebel rough in other African countries or Europe only risks exposure. Without laws that prohibit dealings with UNITA, coupled with the unlikelihood that the diamond community will shame and bar *diamantaires* who purchase UNITA exports, profits from buying rebel rough far outweigh possible penalties.

In late 1999, one Antwerp diamond dealer remarked that purchasing rough from UNITA required exceptional knowledge of diamonds because the potential buyer would be bidding against any number of other dealers flying directly to the rebels. *Diamantaires* will go to great lengths to secure a steady supply of rough and to meet the demands of a seller, especially one of Savimbi's magnitude. While it may have become too risky for large dealers to venture into Angola, couriers could provide the link.¹⁷ Flying to Savimbi's territory in a plane rented from a neighbouring country is relatively safe and cost-effective, since the danger of discovery by government MiGs is negligible and profits are high.¹⁸ Thus, the most logical system of export for UNITA is to hand over the diamonds in Angola to foreign representatives of large buying houses that had flown in for that purpose.¹⁹ A system of foreign dealers competing for rough theoretically maximise profits. Deals could be settled through cash transactions in Angola, or the foreign *diamantaire* could deposit payment in a UNITA bank account after which point the courier would depart from Angola with the parcel and the rebels could immediately utilise the cash as they saw fit. In this manner, the *diamantaire* has internalised the risk of transporting the diamonds from Angola and the rebels have deposited their cash overseas.

Savimbi may have started to stockpile rough after the 1998 UN sanctions as it was only a matter of time before *some* foreign assets would be scrutinised or frozen.²² The establishment of a strategic stockpile from 1997 until the end of 1998 also made sense due to the unsteady and often faltering world stock markets that also adversely affected the price of diamonds. Therefore, the period after sanctions may have seen the rise in indirect bartering for weapons and direct bartering for other commodities as UNITA reduced its overseas liquidity. One assumption is that expensive arms procurement was settled through payments from Savimbi's strategic rough stockpiles. The payment would presumably go to an arms broker also proficient in gemmology who would then pay cash to an arms dealer. Such diamonds-for-weapons transfers would no doubt also involve the 'sale' of rough to the arms broker below market value to augment commission. It is unlikely, however, that diamonds are exchanged directly for weapons. Instead, diamonds-for-weapons exchanges probably follow a triangular pattern involving an overseas bank account, an arms dealer and a diamond broker.²³ As a result, the most logical scenario is that UNITA diamonds will turn up where the rebels procure commodities, although arms deliveries (except perhaps for the broker's commission) are most likely paid for in cash unless dealers require payment in an easily laundered commodity.

Some UNITA diamonds may move through Eastern Europe as a result of arms procurement, or be flown directly from Angola to trading centres in Belgium and Israel. Conversely, UNITA diamonds also appear in regional procurement hubs used by the rebels. Suggesting that UNITA sells or sometimes barter stones from its Angolan headquarters does not assume that complex arrangements between diamond sales and commodity imports from the region are marginal. On the contrary, UNITA receives the majority of its supplies from Angola and neighbouring countries.

UNITA sells an unknown quantity of diamonds through official and illicit buyers in the Lundas. The high prices paid by these satellite dealers purchasing from any source suggests that this export route for rebel rough could be substantial, especially given the existence of money-laundering operations based in Luanda that increase rough prices to European standards. Angola's rough market is comprised of purchasing agents licensed by the government (now under a state monopoly) and illegal buyers with the legitimacy of Angola's artisanal production defined by whether the rough passes through the 'informal' sector or the illicit sector, with UNITA²¹ stones passing through both. Peripheral UNITA bands have become integrated into Angola's *garimpeiro* economy, but UNITA's central command also sells rough to enable the purchase of commodities, war supplies and weapons from Angolan entrepreneurs and certain FAA members. One example of major domestic procurement was the exposed sale of Sonangol petrol to UNITA by government employees.

Neighbouring countries serve as transaction points between the export of UNITA diamonds and import of materiel. While *diamantaires* transporting rough from the rebels' Angolan bases to outside markets can deposit transaction fees into UNITA's overseas bank accounts, it is easier to deposit/hide funds in Kigali or Lusaka. Cash generated through the sale of rough in these capitals, among other locations in neighbouring countries, can be immediately used or deposited locally rather than relying on transfers from European accounts. To generate liquidity, it makes sense for UNITA to sell diamonds to dealers in countries that provide supplies rather than selling rough at one location and transporting cash to another, which could increase risks. For example, a UNITA general can fly to Windhoek with several million dollars worth of diamonds hidden on his person, sell the diamonds through a prior arrangement and purchase commodities through yet another prior arrangement, either with the help of the diamond buyer or independent of him. Alternatively, UNITA may have become more reliant on banks in neighbouring countries where sizeable foreign reserves are maintained through the sale of rough, used to finance procurement at a later date.²⁰

UNITA's present relationship with Rwanda is based upon mutual support, while the rebels maintain an historic friendship with Zambia, and rely on rear bases and procurement networks in the southern DRC despite the fall of Mobutu in 1997. UNITA's costs when negotiating with gem brokers in Kigali and Lusaka are necessarily low due to the rebels' degree of free movement in these cities. Exporting rough to dealers in the southern DRC can also be more efficient than sending the stones to neighbours further away. Buying commodities close to UNITA rear bases allows for the risk of transporting materials to be externalised to the rough dealer. Much evidence supports the fact that UNITA obtains a substantial proportion of its materials from southern DRC where diamonds are sold or traded for supplies and are transported to UNITA bases by human porters. A similar scenario is also played out on the Angolan border with Zambia. As a result, UNITA stones are amassed at a local headquarters in northern Angola and brought to the DRC to pay for the transaction, at which point these diamonds

could move anywhere. Thus, rough could be sold directly in Europe or moved circuitously to cities such as Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Libreville, or Bangui for resale to international *diamantaires*.

Reports of an auction in Libreville in early 2000, attended mostly by Israelis, as well as other reports of UNITA diamonds surfacing in Equatorial Guinea suggest that UNITA may be channelling more diamonds to external countries than could be explained by direct commodity procurement or regional diamond routes. While UNITA laundering to circumvent UN sanctions seems plausible, a more realistic reason could be that it is cheaper or safer for UNITA aircraft to fly stones out of Angola from northern airfields than it would be to fly through potentially hostile Angolan skies to UNITA's central or southern hideouts. Given UNITA's tight financial and fuel reserves, ferrying diamonds to the central stockpile by air would be expensive; while one plane could carry UNITA's total annual production, the rebel leader would not entertain such a risk. It is plausible that rough, mined under UNITA commanders in parts of the Lundas and especially the northern Cuango valley, is centralised to a degree at nearby airfields and sent to a neighbouring country rather than shuttled to Savimbi's strategic reserve located in Angola. UNITA's disparate mining activities and the lack of security in transferring all rough to one geographic location may determine the rebels' export routes to a certain degree. Moreover, Kabila's diamond sector reforms since early 1999 have raised costs for *diamantaires*, making Libreville safer and cheaper for transactions with UNITA.

It is unlikely, however, that stones mined around Mavinga are so openly or commercially dispersed. These stones are probably sent to Savimbi's stockpile for later sale to *diamantaires*. This is supported by reports that there are some UNITA parcels for sale in Lusaka, but of a very limited quantity, which are certainly not offered at auctions.²⁴ Sizeable numbers of diamonds appear instead to move through prearranged structures in Zambia. Lebanese, Israelis and other foreign nationals purchase rough directly from Savimbi, or wait for the stones to arrive in Zambia aboard UNITA flights. Unlike the cited Libreville auction, rough bought from Savimbi by Lusaka-based *diamantaires* probably does not even reach Zambia's illicit diamond market. It is more likely to be exported for polishing overseas, in exchange for substantial materials supplied to the rebels by business consortiums also consisting of ranking Zambian elite. Thus, Libreville's positioning as a market for resale may differ from Zambia's more hidden use as a base of operations for only a handful of dealers supplying UNITA, who, like the Zambian government, are likely to spurn the idea of high profile auctions drawing attention to their operations.

The Lusaka and Libreville export routes suggest that UNITA's diamond sales can overlap with procurement mechanisms in certain instances (as is the case of Zambia), but the two can also be completely independent (as is the case of sales in Gabon). Diamond dealers purchasing from UNITA conduct business where access to rebel rough is assured and investments are secure making Savimbi's neighbouring allies safe and cost-effective commercial intersections. When UNITA

exports rough directly from Angola, the dealer flies the diamonds to his base of operations for export licensing from a non-embargoed regime or smuggles the stones directly to an overseas trading centre. Alternatively dealers buy UNITA's rough in neighbouring states once the rebels transfer the diamonds from Angola. These regional interfaces between *diamantaires* and UNITA can also serve as procurement centres, such as Kigali or Lusaka, or can be more export-orientated commercial intersections where procurement is marginal such as Libreville. Therefore, diamond exports do not necessarily overlap with UNITA's import mechanisms. Moreover, when rough is exported to certain transshipment points in the procurement route, the convergence between sales and purchases can be disjointed. Diamonds can fund the direct purchase of materiel but can also be sold to generate cash for procurement in the same geographical location, but with the transactions carried out by different foreign individuals at different times. The distinction is slight but does suggest that while there may be a significant geographical overlap between procurement and export routes at certain stages, identifying import mechanisms does not necessarily also expose the legalising of rebel rough.

The purchaser largely defines the process of laundering UNITA diamonds. Legitimising rough is performed by a diverse array of individual networks that use lawful operations to mix legal and illicit diamonds. The camouflaging of illicit activity by single syndicates is thus accomplished through the use of numerous legal buying operations located in one or several countries and including business activities unrelated to diamonds. It would be a mistake to assume that UNITA exclusively relies upon a small group of criminal elements. Certain individuals mentioned by the UN Panel of Experts (Fowler Commission) play a significant role, but the Panel's exposure of key personalities is by no means extensive or complete. Not only have the larger players escaped public exposure, but the myriad of smaller actors remain hidden. The search for a handful of villains therefore may be less productive than cataloguing suspicious diamond transactions in the region and the dealers involved, entailing a less sensational and more detailed approach. If UNITA produces US \$300 million in diamonds per annum, the rebels sell approximately US \$25 million per month. This sum is not all purchased by a small group of 'sanctions busters', but is instead sold through a larger network of dealers who each process perhaps US \$1 million or less per month, a reasonable sum in the diamond industry. As a result, UNITA diamonds are not overflowing into the legitimate market in discernable quantities through rogue dealers. Instead, the diamonds are absorbed by numerous *diamantaires* buying both legal and illegal goods, making the trade in UNITA diamonds similar in resemblance to any other illegal diamond market.

One would expect that the best locations for laundering rough would be those African diamond producers with stones of similar quality to Angola. However, many countries supplying rough to Belgium have little or no domestic diamond production, such as Mauritius, Rwanda, Uganda, Benin, Togo and Gambia. Other trading centres such as Israel do not even publish rough imports by country of provenance or origin. As a result, washing UNITA rough into legitimate African

diamond producing countries is not necessary. Dealers can acquire export certificates from any number of countries, depending on the most cost-effective base of operations. It would actually be advantageous *not* to use a country with a significant local diamond market because controls are usually tighter and licensing more expensive²⁵, and controls are not apparently applied to rough arriving in Europe from countries without domestic diamond production. A declaration of origin upon import may only be a formality, especially once the goods have transited through another country such as Switzerland where the parcel's 'provenance', or country of last activity, replaces country of origin. The implementation of stricter import procedures in developed countries will do little to stem the flow of UNITA diamonds because rebel rough could be polished where controls are lax such as in Bangui, Monrovia, Port Louis or Johannesburg. Once distinguishing features had been removed these stones could then be entered into the international market.

Conclusion

Diamond mining has been UNITA's primary financial base from the early 1990s until the present, enabling the rebel movement to rearm, circumvent peace and profit from war. While UNITA's mining capacity has been seriously reduced, sales may have been close to US \$800 000 in 1999. Moreover, FAA military successes and UNITA's return to guerrilla warfare have not prevented diamond mining by the rebel central command or by peripheral cell structures. In spite of government offensives having successfully pushed the rebels out of several high profile diamond reserves, UNITA maintains a strong presence in many rich diamond fields with peripheral bands operating close to government garrisons in the Lundas. Since the true extent of UNITA's mining activities is known only to a select few rebel commanders, and has taken on a more secretive nature since the loss of Luzamba and the resumption of war in 1998, the international community has assumed that diamond output is marginal. There must logically be concern about overstating the extent of Savimbi's mining operations, which could easily serve to support UNITA's own propaganda or justify the market for research on conflict diamonds. However, the lack of definitive information on UNITA's current mining capacity and the accepted notion that warfare in Angola is a slow process, suggest that the rebels can potentially mine any area left unguarded by the government, and including portions of southern DRC.

UNITA has been mining and exporting diamonds for longer than most rebel groups have been in existence. Savimbi fully understands the methods of circumventing sanctions and using regional allies to achieve his goals, enabling the rebel leader to alter import and export mechanisms depending on the vagaries of the international community and the military situation in Angola. As a result, the UN sanctions do not appear to have affected UNITA's export capacity and the recent Fowler report is not likely to hurt the trade in rebel rough. Upgrading

controls in diamond trading centres such as Antwerp may not be sufficient. Even if major diamond trading and polishing centres refused to accept rough originating from non-producing countries such as Mauritius, Rwanda or Uganda, UNITA's gems could still be masked behind legitimate production in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Angola. Hypothetically, enhanced controls could see the polishing of UNITA rough before it is sent to the market. The lack of controls in Africa makes the exposure of laundering operations unlikely, especially with numerous government officials engaged in illicit entrepreneurial activity. Nor can increased European controls wish away the problem of 'dirty' diamonds. The solution lies in a commitment to more complete research and the exposure of networks operating on the boundaries of criminality. Only then will those seeking to marginalise UNITA's resource base be able to target the mechanisms that sustain illicit diamond networks.

Endnotes

- 1 *Report of the Panel of Experts on violations of the Security Council sanctions against UNITA*, Security Council Document S/2000/203 dated 10 March 2000.
- 2 S Peterson, Angola: Diamonds Help Finance Continuing Civil War, *Sunday Telegraph*, London, 25 February 1990 from Reuters Business Briefing.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 UNITA members were present during all phases of mining to monitor output and somewhat regulate operations. This was also true for foreign buyers who would work with a UNITA representative present for all deals.
- 5 General Antonio Dembo, UNITA's Vice-President, was in charge of the movement's diamond output and sales, although the exact period of his jurisdiction is unclear. According to Jakkie Potgieter, it is likely that Dembo rose to the position of chief administrator of UNITA's official diamonds around 1994/1995. It is further unclear whether Dembo still holds this position although he is one of Savimbi's most trusted supporters, acting as UNITA's chief-of-staff. Dembo currently operates in northern Angola and southern DR Congo, in the vicinity of UNITA's military zones 1 and 2, roughly comprised of Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Malange, Uige, Cuanza Norte and Zaire provinces.
- 6 UNITA did not possess much of an aviation capacity in 1993 and 1994, although peace after the Lusaka Protocol as well as large diamond revenues enabled a more effective method of transporting essential supplies, personnel, and diamonds.
- 7 This location also served as UNITA's military command centre for the entire region.
- 8 A UNITA member, Marcos Samondo, was appointed as the Angolan Minister of Geology and Mines and retained that position until August 1998. A less outspoken UNITA member, Manuel Bunjo who died of a heart attack in 1999, replaced him. The Ministerial position has not been filled and has instead been deferred to the vice-minister, Antonio Carlos Sumbula. Although the legitimacy of UNITA's diamond mining was an issue never fully addressed by the international community during the Lusaka process, the rebels' mining and exporting of diamonds was clearly illegal under Angolan law.

- 9 D Venter, Angola: back from the brink?, *Africa Insight*, vol 28, no 3/4, Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1998, p 111.
- 10 One cannot purchase major goods in the diamond fields but basic provisions such as food, alcohol, tools, spares, petrol, radios and medicine are all available through government-held towns, necessitating UNITA bands to maintain a certain degree of liquidity.
- 11 UNITA's presence in the Lundas is largely undocumented where smaller rebel bands freely operate in the rural areas. The government has cited increasing FAA advances in the region but recent rebel attacks in the eastern Lundas suggests the widespread presence of core or peripheral UNITA units. The August 10 attack at Southern Era's Camafuca concession, where the rebels murdered a Gray Security Services employee, highlights the limited extension of FAA protection over areas close to garrisoned towns such as Lucapa. Mines near these government strongholds usually do not have more than two hours advance notice of rebel incursions when perimeter security units are attacked or overrun.
- 12 *A Rough Trade* published by Global Witness, London 1998 estimated that this was US \$3,2 billion (a figure that includes UNITA mining in 1992 when the rebel group was a legitimate contender for the elections) while De Beers puts the figure closer to US \$2,5 billion (from 1993–1997). These figures are approximations only. UNITA's real financial gain from mining is not known for several reasons. First, UNITA was mining itself at several locations and the cost of mining even where labour is cheap can be very expensive; high prices of diesel and spare parts for machinery easily diminish profits. Second, UNITA levied a tax of 20% on certain *garimpeiro* groups, while a more defined *garimpeiro* work force operating formal mines received between 20 and 25% of the production, making one question whether the stones that the *garimpeiros* then sold in southern Zaire, were included in the estimates of UNITA's production.
- 13 A Coxon, *The Diamond Pipeline, the Current and Future Regulatory Frameworks*, paper presented at the Technical Forum on Diamonds, Kimberley, South Africa, 11–12 May 2000. Be Beers correctly cites UNITA's relinquishment of the Luzamba diggings in 1998, but does not account for UNITA's continued occupation of territory in the Sociedade desinvolvimento de Mineira (SDM) operations, meaning that UNITA has not withdrawn from the lower Cuango and maintains a strong presence in the northern Cuango. The reduction of UNITA diamonds by over 50% after the loss of Luzamba, as cited by De Beers, cannot be supported due to the current military geography in the Cuango. Moreover, a 50% decline in production from 1996 and 1997 levels would only reduce UNITA's diamond sales to US \$300 million. As there is no evidence that diamond holdings were reduced by power struggles and war in the Lundas were not replaced by production in other areas, such as north-central and south-eastern Angola, the authority of the De Beers figures must be questioned, especially with the company citing its knowledge of UNITA diamonds while also promoting a new, more detached positioning. In fact, the De Beers estimate is invalidated by the company's own admission that "UNITA appears to have concentrated itself in the north-east, working some Lucapa-type mines and others further south with which De Beers is not familiar ... The company notes that these southern Angolan mines produce stones that resemble South African and Namibian goods, rather than the usual northern Angolan mixtures. This could explain why the diamond trade fails to see UNITA goods on the market today – they could easily be disguised by mixing and matching them with alluvial production from other countries." De Beers Consolidated Mines

Ltd & De Beers Centenary AG, *Written Testimony before the United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings into the Issue of 'Conflict Diamonds', 9 May 2000, p 4, 4f.*

- 14 One example is that of De Decker allegedly bidding on 50 000 carats at an auction in Luzamba. He then returned to Angola in a Gulfstream jet with cash, allegedly lent to him by De Beers, packed in cardboard boxes.
- 15 It is possible to deduce that while Executive Outcomes played a prominent role in the Angolan airforce's interception powers, wealthy South Africans mining with UNITA were not seriously hindered.
- 16 A massive parcel went missing in 1998 when the Russian crew and several trusted UNITA members ditched an Illyushin transport in France. It is reported that the culprits were later killed, but the incident may have reinforced Savimbi's method of internalising as many of the sales as possible, especially with other notable UNITA defections. It is also possible that the heist had no appreciable effect on Savimbi's desire to sell diamonds overseas and directly deposit the earnings in bank accounts for future expenditure.
- 17 A courier can be placed with UNITA to purchase and transport diamonds to a neighbouring country where the stones are given to another courier and the UNITA-based agent returns to Angola with more cash. A courier could also be dispatched directly to Angola once a deal is negotiated with UNITA, with the agent only allowed to depart once the agreed fees are paid into an overseas UNITA bank account.
- 18 For example, a diamantaire probably nets at least 10% profit on stones bought from Savimbi. On a US \$10 million deal, US \$1 million profit could be expected, which could easily buy a twin engine King Air, pay for its licensing and hangar fees in southern Africa as well as a full-time pilot.
- 19 These representatives probably cannot even be traced to the financiers of the purchases in order to minimise dangers of bad publicity.
- 20 The collapse of the Meridian Bank in Zambia does not exemplify the majority of African banks. While many banks of dubious origin have begun operating in Africa, UNITA can still utilise any number of stable and legitimate banks to deposit foreign currency. These activities may be linked to UNITA's overseas banking facilities in order to facilitate the transfer of cash to Europe, or may be completely independent to isolate the danger of exposure.
- 21 'UNITA' stones in this case include diamonds mined by *garimpeiros* under UNITA control as well as rough possessed by UNITA members.
- 22 This is based on the possibly incorrect assumption that UNITA has not invested heavily in a complex and secure paper trail.
- 23 The easiest scenario for arms procurement would be to have a UNITA representative transfer money to an arms dealer's bank account – perhaps just a down payment. When the arms are delivered, payment is made in full using the same method. To fill the bank account, UNITA could invite a diamantaire's courier to a diamond epicentre such as Mavinga. When the courier inspects the parcel, a price is agreed upon, at which point the courier calls his boss via satellite phone, funds are transferred to UNITA's bank account, a UNITA representative verifies this and calls his counterpart in Angola to confirm. The courier then departs Mavinga in a twin-engine King Air, for example. Comparatively, a barter trade seems much more difficult. However, another angle may identify the advantages of barter to the arms broker and dealer who cannot deposit dirty cash, but can launder diamonds. Payment by UNITA in diamonds allows for the broker and seller to launder the stones through a fictitious mine, for example

in Liberia. Either scenario also depends on the system with which Savimbi is most comfortable; large bank accounts overseas could prove irresistible to potential defectors while a strategic reserve of rough in Angola could be stringently guarded.

24 Through an interview with a diamond dealer/courier in Antwerp, April 2000.

25 This is less than US \$1 000 in Zambia, but US \$30 000 in Sierra Leone and US \$200 000 in the Central African Republic.