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The Military in a Changing South Africa*
INTRODUCTION
The South African Defence Force (SADF) is part of the executive arm of the Government. It therefore does not have autonomy of action, or unlimited scope in defining its own role in society at large, except in so far as such actions or roles support, and are within the guidelines of national policy and objectives. In the past two years, national policy and objectives have changed fundamentally. As a result the role, task and composition of the SADF is also undergoing substantial and often painful adaptation.
The principle of self-defence as it is stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations provides the only moral justification for maintaining armed forces. While the realities of power politics and national interests have often superseded this moral ideal, it still provides the general constitutional basis for the establishment and deployment of armed forces. Military forces within a democracy exist to deter and defend the country the country against external physical threat. Police and military within a democracy can only have allegiance to the state, not to political parties, nor to ethnic or racial groupings. This is clearly the goal towards which South Africans are also striving.
This article speculates on some of the challenges facing the SADF in the light of the recent dramatic changes in the international, regional and national environment within which it exists and operates. The first sections discuss the most obvious changes in the international and regional balance of power and the effects which these changes could have on the future tasks of the SADF. The final sections deals with the demographic and political challenges which face the SADF in the shorter term.
CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The uncertainty of events in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe and the war in the Gulf would appear to dash the hopes that the New World Order is in any way a safer place than the previous era. In retrospect, the international bipolar structure may have provided a greater degree of stability than the uncertainty of present and expected future changes in regional and global balances of power.
In fact, recent events in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia give rise to concern about the stability and nature of this ‘New Order’. It is, of course, certain that new international ‘rules of the game’ will eventually emerge, but this will not happen overnight. Nor will acceptance of, or adherence to this new power structure be unanimous, particularly in the troubled former communist countries, nor in the southern half of the globe.
These events are disheartening as they make it obvious that the world has not yet entered a golden age in which military power and armed conflict are something of the past. In First World communities recognition is, however, being given to the declining utility of armed forces in favour of economic instruments of power. In contrast considerable value is still attached to the use of armed force and coercion in what is generally termed the Third World. In contrast considerable value is still attached to the use of armed force and coercion in what is generally termed the Third World. Since the majority of the peoples of the globe live in the Third World, this situation is cause for great concern. This assessment is illustrated by the fact that most of the wars which have occurred since 1945 took place in the Third World, whilst in the same period Europe and North America experienced an unprecedented era of peace. The last three decades have seen three major conventional conflicts in the Middle East alone, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war (which left an estimated 1,2 million people dead), and most recently, the unequal test of strength between a First World alliance and Iraq.
Even though First World rivalries and competition have played no small part in most of these Third World conflicts, the origins of these wars cannot only simply be attributed to external involvement alone. The Third World remains a laboratory for the clash of ‘isms’. Ideology is still abused as a means of retaining power and organising the state. Much of Africa has no tradition of political accountability. As a result, leaders are often in business for themselves and a rather small group of supporters. Although governments do change, this is usually by force, with the army claiming to be acting in the name of the people, as well as whatever ‘ism’ happens to be handy at the time.
A common speculative theory is that an end to the international ideological struggle between the superpowers will, in time, signify an end to First World interest in the troubled states of the Southern Hemisphere. This is dishearteningly possible. On the other hand, the single largest obstruction to constructive engagement by the First World in the affairs of the Third World, namely international competition between the superpowers, has now been removed. There may just be a chance that the First World will not completely ignore us should the problems of establishing viable economic and social states in former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe prove to be sufficiently complex.
Whatever the exact outcome or reasoning, existing tendencies of prescriptive involvement in the internal affairs of the Third World by international and multinational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are bound to intensify. Since such involvement has now apparently come to reflect that of a single dominant value system, as opposed to the previous situation of competing ideological systems, such intervention will marginally reduce the requirement for armed forces, strengthen the growth of democracy and a respect for human rights and hopefully reduce regional tensions. However, in this same process, Third World states will be threatened with a loss of freedom of action and independence. The era of true neo-colonialism may be just around the corner.
To a degree these developments may support the role of a regional power such as South Africa. Rather than run the risks inherent in direct involvement in the often messy conflicts and problems in a region such as southern Africa, the developed world may attempt to enhance regional stability through regional arrangements. However, lasting co-operation on such sensitive issues as security in southern Africa can only succeed if built upon a shared value system, common interests and co-operation. This, in essence, is the implication of President Bush’s New World Order.
The recent War in the Gulf has, in an increasingly interdependent world, also provided a number of lessons which are applicable to security in southern Africa and a future SADF. Many of these broader lessons are summarised in a statement made on 7th of March 1991 by General John Galvin, SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Central Europe) of NATO, before the United States Committee on Armed Services.
- We must plan our force structure in a manner which ensures a credible deterrence, promotes regional stability and provides a viable crisis response capability.
- We need to continue to place our highest emphasis on taking care of our people. This includes providing the equipment our forces need to fight and win on the modern battlefield, the best training we can devise and decent places to work and live.
- Collective security remains central to our security strategy. We were able to rapidly and effectively deploy forces to Southwest Asia from the US and Europe because of the friends we have in Europe.
Multinationality involves sharing the burden of defence while at the same time promoting common and regionally acceptable political and economic aims. In military strategic terms it implies that mobility be accepted as a strategic principle which guides force structure and doctrine considerations. Consequently military forces should have the ability to react quickly and appropriately to a crisis, i.e. implying lighter, multi-role forces capable of executing a variety of tasks which are not limited to those of conventional armed conflict alone. Along with these developments go the obvious requirement for strategic mobility and support, pre-positioned stocks, multinational co-operation, etc.
THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
In broad terms, Jenny Macgregor’s (1990; 5) description of Africa also holds true for southern Africa:
Most African states are suffering from high population growth rates, declining per capita food production, severe land degradation, declining export revenues, worsening trade balances and enormous debts.
To a great extent much of rural southern Africa north of our borders has deteriorated to the point where, in countries such as Angola and Mozambique, central governments have lost control over much of the countryside, either to armed opposition movements such as UNITA or RENAMO or to local fiefdoms and the African bush. In a once prosperous country such as Zambia, urban neglect and decay has reduced the modicum of central government control over the rural areas to an alarming degree.
The increasing division of these states into urban enclaves, surrounded by vast areas of rural poverty, is also having a marked effect on security considerations. In practice, it means that these governments cannot control the use of their territory for insurgency purposes. The result is ever-greater opportunity for increasing instability and loss of sovereignty in southern Africa. As a result, crime and deprivation increase in an ongoing spiral of cause and effect.
Against this already bleak background lurks the spectre of AIDS, which is, without doubt, the wild card of the future. Writing on AIDS in southern Africa, Edward Hooper (November 1990; 11) recently stated:
It is becoming increasingly apparent that southern Africa is now as severely affected by HIV, the human immuno-defficiency virus, as are the countries in East and Central Africa, which are commonly referred to as being at the epicentre of the AIDS epidemic.
The potential extent of the AIDS problem is vast. According to Whiteside (1990: 31):
AIDS is possibly the most serious threat to development in sub-Saharan Africa in the decade ahead.
The potentially disastrous effect of AIDS will be exacerbated by the continued decline in socio-economic standards in much of Africa, with a commensurate increase in hunger, unemployment and destitution. The effect could well be an increase in the already large number of refugees fleeing to South Africa in the hope of a better and more secure life.
In general, since the start of negotiations towards a settlement in Namibia during the second half of 1987, southern Africa has experienced a regional decrease in tensions. Whereas, in the past, South Africa’s military actions in Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique made a substantial contribution to the threat psychosis of the region, the movement towards the installation of an internationally acceptable government in the RSA has already done much to defuse the hostility in the region and will hopefully continue to do so.
Furthermore, in Mozambique and Angola settlements between the governing parties and RENAMO and UNITA appear imminent. In both cases, but particularly in Angola, the result could well be a moderate government prepared to be more pragmatic in its relationship with Pretoria and therefore to commit itself to closer ties with South Africa. The future of Mozambique however, is bleak, irrespective of any settlement achieved in that country, for Mozambique and its peoples have effectively fought themselves back into the last century.
SOUTH AFRICA’S SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
It is general wisdom that a conventional military offensive against the RSA either by any one, or any combination of its neighbours, will remain highly improbable, at least until the year 2000 and most probably for some time thereafter. It is also probable that the primary strategic concern of our neighbouring countries will continue to be the maintenance and defence of their territorial integrity, as well as the internal suppression of armed opposition to the ruling elites. On the other hand it would appear as if some attention is also being given to the political problem of extricating the military from politics.
However, the lack of a clear external military threat does not detract from the problems of instability in the region. For example:
- the effects of AIDS in southern Africa, which may not only decimate large populations, but could see South Africa faced with an as yet unprecedented refugee problem. These developments would also place severe pressure on the limited resources within the sub-continent and would probably increase the racial and ethnic stereotypes, already prevalent in our region.
- the African legacy of border disputes, historic national and ethnic conflicts, religious animosities, poverty and hunger, population increases and pressures, and political authoritarianism.
- the threat brought of by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and even biological weapons, coupled with the spread of tactical delivery systems such as SCUD, FROG and even LANCE. These weapons, once introduced into the arsenal of even a small nation with insignificant military capabilities, could pose a severe threat to the security of neighbouring countries and destabilise existing power relations.
In spite of these uncertainties, South African security concerns will inevitably tend to focus upon resistance to the internal settlement process rather than any external military threat. Examples of some of these problems are:
- deterrence against armed attack or harbouring of insurgent groups from left-wing radical organisations such as AZAPO and or the PAC or factions thereof who may reject any negotiated settlement;
- suppression of internal unrest, mass action and subversion for a variety of reasons, ranging from socio-economic to outright political mobilisation;
- counterrance of any possible threat of secession, perhaps by white right wing groupings or armed resistance against the settlement process as a whole.
The lack of any clear military threat to this country does not, therefore, obviate the requirement either for armed forces, or for a supporting industrial capability. It does, of course, impact severely upon both these sectors and particularly upon the organisation, training and equipment of the SADF. In brief, the SADF will have to accept a broad commitment to defend and protect the settlement process and integrity of South Africa against a wide variety of threats as well as against the instability of our region.
South Africa requires armed forces which are more flexible and can be used in any of a variety of scenario’s in a very uncertain region. Use during a conventional-type conflict is only one of these scenarios, and, as we have seen, an unlikely one. The future task of the SADF, it would appear from the preceding discussion, will revolve around dealing with regional instability and the effects thereof in terms of refugees, cross-border crime, etc.
In accordance with its regionally dominant position, South Africa could also find itself involved in a wide range of supportive actions in the region such as disaster relief work, policing actions in support of multinational efforts, search and rescue environmental control, food supply, military and technical training activities, etc. In combination, all of the above factors require the existence and readiness of well-equipped and trained, highly mobile rapid-deployment-type forces.
The key question regarding the nature and equipment of the South African military forces in future is, of course, whether the new ‘power-sharing government’ will aspire to assert itself as a regional power or adopt a more inward-looking approach. Ultimately, whatever internal changes South Africa has to face, the country cannot escape the fact that it is a regional power, with a vested interest in regional stability. As such, it will have to accept certain responsibilities towards contributing to regional stability, in co-operation with its neighbours and the legitimate government of those countries.
Such stability, is of course, not restricted to military matters, but includes a wide variety of subjects and issues including environmental protection, border control, refugees, cross-border crime, etc.
THE EFFECTS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
Apart from the changes in the international and regional context, South Africa is facing major internal change and a future which promises to be both exciting and turbulent. Negotiations on a new constitutional dispensation which will fundamentally alter the social, political and economic face of our country have begun. This process of change will probably continue for a number of years, perhaps even decades. At the time of writing Working Group 1 of CODESA is specifically mandated to address (CODESA, 21 December 1991, par 1.1.4 (I)):
... the composition and role of the security forces in South Africa and the TBVC states.
During this process parties with widely different experiences of and trust in the SADF and the armaments industry in its present form, are likely to play an important role in determining the future size, shape and purpose of these organisations and institutions. As a result:
- The seeds of the legitimate future Security Forces acceptable to all parties but which entrench parliamentary accountability and a respect for individual rights, must be sown during the transition process, whilst negotiations are occurring. This process cannot wait until formal consensus on a new constitution has been reached and elections are imminent. The question therefore becomes how to maintain an effective and credible military during transition, whilst at the same time preparing them for their role in a post settlement South Africa?
- For technical, practical and logical reasons any post-settlement armed force in South Africa will inevitably be built upon the SADF. As a consequence, the SADF must timeously debate and reach consensus upon its future tasks, composition and roles, and at the same time build support and understanding amongst all South African for these tasks. Decisions need to be made on whether we need a Rapid Deployment Force in accordance with South Africa’s regional dominance, or a military organisation with main tasks linked to internal security and border protection. Or are we merely looking at a much smaller conventional defence force with its primary task of deterrence against external aggression?
In this process massive demands will be made upon the SADF and SAP regard affirmative action, changes in doctrine and practise. Manpower systems will change, and much more, but at the end of the day South Africa will be left with both a military and police who, as far as leadership go, will be dominated by the existing cadre of officers for many years to come.
It is not, therefore, a question of disbanding the police and military and building up a ‘new democratically accountable armed force and police’, but of ensuring the appropriate institutions regarding parliamentary accountability and the requirements common to a constitutional state.
The question, then, is what is being done to prepare the military and police for their role in a post-settlement South Africa? Are they not in danger of being isolated and ignored in the mad rush to establish a new society, thereby becoming isolated - states within a state?
CHANGES IN SADF PERSONNEL POLICIES
Perhaps the most obvious change facing the SADF will be to its existing personnel policies. At present white male conscription (i.e. National Service) is a major source of manpower for the SA Army, providing an annual intake of roughly 29 000 conscripts.
Even were a political settlement in South Africa not imminent, the SADF would in any case have had to review its personnel systems if it wanted to maintain its existing levels of manpower supply. This, the involvement of the SADF in Namibia and various other local political developments have already led to a situation where more than half of its manpower is constituted by black permanent or short term soldiers. The dependency of the SADF upon white conscription is therefore less than is generally recognised, although it is still considerable. Demographic projections are that by the year 2000 there will be approximately 20% fewer white 18 year old males than there were in 1990. (Mostert et al, 1988, 80 & 83)
The primary determinant of a future personnel policy for the military in South Africa is, however, going to be political rather than purely practical. A negotiated political settlement will have a marked effect on the methods used to provide the armed forces with their required manpower. Should one accept the necessity of military forces, the most appropriate and balanced method of supplying manpower in a democracy is certainly that of general conscription, provided certain allowances are made for other forms of service in accordance with personal convictions. Succinctly national service armies appear the least likely to intervene in politics (when compared to fully volunteer or professional armies). As a system, national conscription, provided certain allowances are made for other forms of service in accordance with personal convictions. Succinctly, national service armies appear the least likely to intervene in politics (when compared to fully volunteer or professional armies). As a system, national conscription also reflects the composition of the broader society within at least the lower ranks of the armed forces - something which is often a serious problem in all-volunteer armed forces.
However, national conscription is often a logistic nightmare in Third World countries and too expensive and wasteful a system. In 1990, there were already about 0,78 million South Africans who reached the age of 19 during that year (the average number of people to join the work force), of whom roughly half could be conscripted if conscription were extended to all male South African citizens. This figure is set to increase to 1,26 million by 2010. (Mostert et al, 1988; 80 & 83)
There are a number of other considerations which mitigate against the introduction of a system of national conscription. The SADF was only able, until recently, to train and deploy a maximum of about 60 000 conscripts in any one year during the 24 month period of national service. There is, furthermore, no chance of any increase in the defence budget in real terms in the immediate and medium term. Finally, and most importantly, South Africa does not require such a large pool of armed manpower. As a result it is virtually certain that compulsory national military conscription will not be instituted for all population groups. This reduces the available options to either a type of voluntary system (i.e. a so-called professional military), or to a ballot system.
In the delicate world of post-settlement South Africa, a ballot system could potentially ensure an equitable sharing of the defence burden between racial, ethnic and even political groupings or geographic regions. The problem is, however, that such a system requires a sound population data base - something severely lacking in modern day South Africa. It would, of course, also be open to massive abuse or perceptions thereof, as has often been the case elsewhere. Finally, the military would still be reliant upon (often unwilling) conscripts with all the associated hidden costs in terms of equipment wear and tear, disciplinary problems and suchlike.
In the light of the continued high levels of unemployment and the benefits of having volunteers as opposed to conscripts serving in the armed forces, the institution of some type of all-volunteer force would appear to be the only practical solution. This need not necessarily imply only a long term career option, but could entail any number of permutations, the most likely being some type of short service scheme to provide the mass of lower ranking soldiers. Upon completion of their military service, these short service soldiers could then be allocated to various mobilisation units for further annual training and call-up in time of war.
This issue has recently again been the subject of a hot debate in various newspapers, with wild assertions regarding the relative costs associated with conscripted as opposed to volunteer forces. Until such time as reputable comparative figures are available this has, however, become somewhat of a sterile debate.
There is, however, a particular risk attached to a totally volunteer system, for, in the absence of a firmly entrenched democratic tradition, as is the case in South Africa, these forces often become a ‘state within a state’, standing apart and isolated from the rest of society, with the potential of intervening in society.
Whatever the choices that are made, and the arguments listed here are certainly very superficial, South Africa is a Third World country without a tradition of political tolerance or democracy in vast sections of our society. In the emerging New South Africa it will be our duty to train and continuously retrain our soldiers in the relationship between the military, the individual and the state to ensure that they know and understand their role in society and never attempt to usurp that role. Consequently, the simple argument that we should have an apolitical, professional military is inadequate, for it implies that military service is in pursuance of professionalism and efficiency as its only yardstick. There is a world of difference between the professionalism of a soldier serving a democracy.
Military service is by necessity a political matter, for the soldier serves to protect and defend a particular value system. Should South Africans decide upon a voluntary system for its armed forces in the future, as would appear most probable, such a choice should be tempered by careful attention to organisational culture, care against isolating the military from society and in caring for our soldiers.
Whatever new personnel system is decided upon, black South Africans will very rapidly come to occupy virtually all the junior ranks - to the distress of many whites who fear for their future safety. Although this trend will initially be restricted to the junior ranks, it will in time also have an impact on the more senior ranks.
As whites lose at least some of their political power, and the demand for some form of affirmative action for the disadvantaged sections of our society increases, the civil service and military will undoubtedly also become less attractive careers for its traditional source of (white) career soldiers.
The SA Army, which constitutes the largest component of the SADF, will doubtless face the greater challenge regarding changes in manpower systems. While most officers and even warrant and non-commissioned officers are expected to remain white, with a considerable degree of tertiary education and a formidable pool of practical experience, almost all lower ranks will be black, irrespective of the specific manpower system which is instituted. This will obviously not be the case as regards the Air Force and what is left of the South African Navy, for these forces rely to a much lesser degree on conscription than does the Army.
A further challenge will be the enormous pressures which the present SADF leadership will have to face when dealing with black upward mobility. With the acceptance of equality amongst all population groups, labour relations and managerial skills will come under considerable pressure. This will also require careful attention.
On the one hand, therefore, the supply and availability of highly qualified white manpower will decline, while on the other the pressure to advance black, coloured and Asian officers to senior rank will increase. If these challenges are not handled with great care they could have a severe effect upon standards and morale within the armed forces. This is even more urgent in the light of Baynham’s (1990; 9 - 10) most recent caution:
In politics that are fragmented by primordial affiliations of race, religion and ethnicity, the make-up of the security forces is of utmost importance to the state and to its inhabitants. Minorities - and indeed majorities - who regard themselves as under-represented in the military and police frequently fear for their own political influence and security. ... If a new constitution acceptable to the majority of South Africans came into being, ‘Africanisation’ of the military and police would be accelerated.
But even more importantly, with the change in manpower policies the SA Army would undoubtedly lose much of its experienced Citizen Force soldiers. Conventional battle experience in the land force of South Africa is essentially reposited in the Citizen Force rather than the Permanent Force. The end result would thus be a severe reduction of the combat capabilities and experience of the SA Army as a whole if timely steps are not taken in this regard. This issue is part and parcel of a larger one, namely how to maintain and improve standards.
MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS
Modern military leadership requires leaders and soldiers who can master complex technology, who are creative and responsible and who act in accordance with modern military doctrine.
By regional and comparative Third World standards, the combat forces which constitute the SADF are extremely competent. Training is of a high standard, there is a vast pool of practical operational experience upon which to draw and the SADF has modern weaponry well suited to local conditions. Despite all the allegations regarding unaccountability as a result of the revelations regarding CCB and related activities, the SADF is politically accountable to the government of the day and expected to remain so in the short and medium term future. Many of the revelations regarding funding of various front-organisations are often dealt with s if this was the SADF (military intelligence in particular) acting in complete defiance of its political masters. Time, one would suspect, is going to disprove the innocence of many a politician.
It is of the utmost importance that a concerted effort be made to retain and even increase the professional standards in the SADF as we move into the future. Quite simply it is dangerous to entrust the final guarantee of your sovereignty to poorly trained, badly led and semi-literate armed thugs. What is required is a concerted leadership development programme and a massive educationary program for its lower ranks within the SADF. In this sense the SADF will have to accept various additional responsibilities.
In particular, the requirement for affirmative action should not result in a decline in the educational level in the SADF. One obvious strategy to counter this effect would be to raise academic entry standards. By the year 2000 it is projected that the supply of matriculants would, in all possibility, massively exceed demand, thus providing a more than adequate supply of sufficiently schooled manpower for military duties within a technologically sophisticated environment. As a result, the SADF could, if it so wished, lay down a general entry requirement of matric or at least standard 8. The requirement for highly schooled lower ranks is, of course, most prominent in the Air Force, Navy and to a lesser degree within the conventional Army forces. Rural, area-bound light infantry type forces, have little requirement for highly qualified manpower.
Regarding the recruitment pool for more senior ranks (typically potential officer material), the SADF could draw from the apparent over-supply of students in the social sciences. For many years South Africa has experienced general formative education in the humanities at the expense of career and technical training. As time passes, the over supply of graduates in the human sciences could provide the SADF with a ready supply of academically adequately qualified and trained leadership cadre. The use of this pool of manpower may serve to replace the loss of white teachers who as a junior leader group, have often been the backbone of Army leadership at that level.
All of the above will inevitably occur against the backdrop of severe limitations on the availability of funds for defence-related expenditure which, by all indications, is set to decline to roughly 2% of GDP within the next two years, down from a level of 4,2% of GDP in 1989.
The preceding discussion enables us now to reflect upon:
- SADF deployment in support of the police;
- the primary and secondary functions of the SADF as it may evolve in the future; and
- strategic posture, doctrine and related aspects.
THE SADF IN SUPPORT OF THE SAP
The involvement of the SADF in the internal support to the SAP has now become of a semi-permanent nature. There are a number of reasons for this situation, both political and practical. However, there can be little doubt that this is an unsatisfactory and even a potentially dangerous situation in the long term. Clearly it is not the task of the SADF to be deployed in this manner to the extent that it is today. The maintenance of internal law and order is the task of the SA Police. The involvement of the military in such a role over an extended period of time tends to politicise the military, it affects morale and combat readiness, and detracts from the deterrence value of the military. However well trained and orientated military forces are for their use in the maintenance of law and order, the application of force within an internal law and order situation and on a battlefield differs fundamentally. The ethos of policing and soldiering are not the same and should not be confused.
Nevertheless, over extended as they are, the already high levels of crime and intimidation in many black townships would degenerate even further should the SADF withdraw from these areas in the foreseeable future. Clearly those resources deployed in support of the SA Police cannot readily be withdrawn until such time as the endemic cycle of violence in our society has been broken. And, seen against the background of the increased numbers of destitute peoples, declining economic growth rates, the growth in political intolerance and the like, there is little change of the SA Police being able to effectively discharge their duties without substantial assistance from both the affected communities and other state sectors. Potentially, the ongoing violence is of such a serious nature that the degree of instability thus created could not only threaten the settlement process but virtually threaten viable urban economic activity
Against this background there appear to be only two viable options on which analysts will inevitable focus their minds regarding continued SADF involvement in support of the police in controlling unrest in the medium term.
The first is for the SADF to plan for a continuing high level of assistance to the police on a semi-permanent basis and accept all the detrimental effects this will have in terms of the army’s conventional combat capabilities, continued politicisation of the armed forces, etc. While I would draw the military into socio-political issues and a host of problems associated with such a role, for the largest portion of the SADF, the SA Army, it provides a raison d’être - not only providing a legitimate focus for their undoubted capabilities, but providing the SA Army with considerable leverage in justifying an appropriate slice of the total defence budget. It could also influence the size of the defence budget within the national economy as a whole.
In the longer term the price that our national defence force may have to pay for such a choice may be very high, for the end result is a foregone conclusion - a military reduced to the status of a low-technology, land bound counter-insurgency force.
A second alternative would entail refocusing a much smaller and leaner SADF on its primary conventional duty of deterrence and defence against external attack. This would imply the transfer of those large portions of the SA Army (including personnel, equipment and facilities, the commando system, regional command headquarters, organisations such as military intelligence, etc.) at present involved in police-type duties to the SA Police not only to undergo conversion training in preparation of police-type duties, but ultimately to strengthen that organisation with an infusion of military staff work, planning and organisation. There are already indications that the rural Army commando system is refocusing its efforts on home and hearth crime-prevention and protection.
There are two important and perhaps decisive arguments in favour of this option. On the one hand it is probably the only manner is which the Army (in particular) can cut its operating budget in the short term in accordance with the present stringent financial circumstances - particularly against the background of a police budget which is bound to increase on a year to year basis. Secondly this allows the military to focus upon their primary and correct role in society, defence and deterrence against external attack. In the longer term, it ensures an appropriately trained and combat ready military which has not been politicised through its involvement in combating internal unrest and assistance in the maintenance of law and order.
A slightly different version of this second option is, of course, that of establishing a para-military force to lessen police reliance upon the army in particular. Such a force could draw heavily upon SADF personnel for its initial establishment. This is, however, undoubtedly an expensive option since it implies the establishment of a completely new force structure from ground level. This option has been widely debated within the ranks of the uniformed services for many years. By all indications the governments has recently decided in principle that such a force should be established, but little additional information has subsequently been made public.
THE ROLE AND MISSIONS OF THE SADF IN THE FUTURE
Whatever role the military may have in support of the police, the primary mission of the SADF should always remain one of deterrence and defence against external attack. Deterrence is only effective when a potential enemy is convinced firstly, that threatening to employ military force would prove unsuccessful, and secondly, that using it would involve an unacceptable risk to himself. Effective deterrence further presupposes that the political determination to defend oneself is credible and that the military capability to do so is recognisable by others.
The implications of this fact are firstly, that armed forces of adequate strength are indispensable for safeguarding peace and freedom, an secondly, that deterrence within the regional context is most successful when built upon bi- and multi-national co-operation. We should also remember that in the foregoing scenario, should deterrence fail, the SADF would still require the capability of resolutely defending South Africa, at the same time taking appropriate measures to restore deterrence whilst ending any war speedily, with a minimum of loss of life and damage and under acceptable political conditions. The aim remains always to preserve or restore the sovereignty and integrity of South Africa and its allies. This implies, in turn, the need to have sufficient ready forces available for deployment within short notice.
Apart from the political will, credible deterrence is based on the capability and attitude of the defence force itself, which in turn is a factor of their training standards, their readiness to fight, and win, on the battlefields of the future. Such deterrence requires conventional military forces tailored as a highly mobile mechanised and balanced land, air and sea force with day/night and all-weather capability, trained to high standards utilising modern doctrines, highly motivated and equipped with sophisticated, yet robust armament.
But there is a third element to the primary role of the SADF in modern-day South Africa. In its support of the political settlement process in South Africa, the SADF also has a responsibility regarding what is commonly termed ‘nation building’. Some of these aspects have already been discussed in a previous section.
There are a number of reasons for an SADF role in nation building, most fundamentally because South Africa has no established democratic culture, with the result that every institution of our society will have to contribute to creating consensus on our future constitutional dispensation and the values represented therein, increasing tolerance, reducing conflict, and conflict management. A second reason relates to the question of integrating the military of the future into civil society in persuance of national stability since the military of the future is going to differ fundamentally from that of the present in terms of racial and ethnic composition. Very simply, the SADF is undergoing rapid change which will require a concerted effort to maintain cohesion, motivation and esprit de corps.
In order to achieve this South Africans will require:
- a positive and future-orientated vision of the role of the soldier and the SADF in South African society promulgated amongst all citizens of the country; and
- motivated professional soldiers who understand and defend the constitution and accept parliament as sovereign body.
Whilst deterrence, defence and nation building can be identified as the primary tasks of the military in the future, those functions which are actually secondary to the primary task of the SADF, often termed auxiliary or secondary functions, are bound to increase in importance in the medium to longer term. Actual force structure and even equipment may, in time, come to reflect these tasks much more closely than they do those of deterrence and defence. These tasks include:
- border protection, both landward and seaward;
- control and policing of refugees;
- support of the SA Police and other para-military forces internally;
- control and policing of the sea areas to ensure safe passage of international maritime traffic;
- emergency relief operations, including the transportation and distribution of large quantities of emergency supplies over large distances;
- conducting disaster relief operations;
- operations in support of allies or in defence of national interests outside our borders;
- operations in support of nature conservation, towards curbing drug trafficking, gun-running, protection of marine resources, etc.;
- combating international terrorism;
- military training assistance to the armed forces of neighbouring countries.
These tasks require a highly trained personnel with skilled leadership and effective command and control, who are capable of rapidly and effectively handling a wide variety of tasks.
The successful execution of these tasks will enhance political stability both internally and within the region. However, it will require soldiers with good educational, communication and adaptability skills, as well as leaders with personal characteristics which must emphasise initiative, creativity and tolerance, characteristics which should be clearly portrayed by military personnel serving a democracy.
The SADF of the future will need to respond to a much wider range of challenges both on the battlefield and in peace time, than has been the case in the past. Above all such forces should also be versatile, and must have the ability to respond rapidly to any challenge whether it be in the air, on the sea or on land and to retaliate with as much shock and force as may be required. Not only must a proper balance be maintained between active combat ready forces and reserves, but an effective mobilisation, training and ready system must ensure the timeliness and quality of any deployment.
Power projection and rapid response require that substantial and effective combat power be deployed at the right time and in the required place. The SADF cannot at present execute this task as it lacks significant airlift and sealift capabilities. Rapid deployment can therefore at present only take place on a limited force level. The third dimension of the battlefield will also require emphasis, not only with regard to transport and quick deployment, but also in respect of quick firepower reaction from other services, such as, for example, with assault helicopters under direct command and control of army formations.
CONCLUSION
From the preceding it should be obvious that the SADF is faced with serious organisational and cultural changes in the near future, apart from the dramatic effects the declining defence budget is having upon the military. This is a complex subject and the comments contained in this paper only begin to address some of the more pertinent issues. One obvious aspect which has not been discussed in this article, is the question of the future of MK and the armed forces of the TBVC countries. This will be the subject of forthcoming articles.
The political transformation of South Africa will undoubtedly have a major influence on the SADF and its future planning. Its manpower policies will, for example, have to change dramatically in the near future, with an end to white conscription and the introduction of either a ballot system of national conscription, the establishment of a professional armed force or some combination these. By the year 2000 much of the steam from the boilers of internal political violence, which at present necessitates the deployment of the SADF in support of the police, will hopefully have been used up, thus relieving both the SAP and the SADF of this burden and allowing them to get on with their proper tasks. Unfortunately, there can be no certainty of these developments taking place, as the hope expressed is, of course, heavily dependent on, and influenced by, the rate of economic growth in South Africa.
All South Africans, of whatever race, colour or creed, have the opportunity, and the duty, in these challenging times, to create their future. The military have a vital role to play in this regard. If we do not plan and work together in order to look after our own future so as to achieve a desirable outcome, then we will without doubt be the victims of our own sloth and indecision.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
S. Baynham. 1990. Defence and Security Issues in a Transitional South Africa, in International Affairs Bulletin, vol 14, no 3.
C.A. Crocker. December 1989. Southern Africa in a Global Perspective, Occasional paper by the South African Institute of International Affairs.
CODESA Statement of Intent, 21 December 1991.
E. Hooper. November 1990 AIDS in Southern Africa, in Swiss Review of World Affairs, vol. XL, no 8.
J. McGregor. 1990 The crisis in African agriculture, in Africa Insight, vol. 20, no 1.
W.P. Mostert, J.L. van Tonder & B.E. Hofmeyr. 1988. Demographic Trends in South Africa, in H.C. Marais (ed) South African Perspectives on the Future, Owen Burgess, Pinetown.
A. Whiteside. 1990. AIDS in Southern Africa. A position paper for the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
* The financial assistance of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation is gratefully acknowledged in preparing this paper.
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