Introduction

South Africa is the regional economic power in both sub-equatorial Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa. As such it cannot safely abdicate the regional security responsibilities that come with that status. These responsibilities include the following:

South Africa needs economic growth for its own prosperity and stability.



South Africa needs foreign fixed capital investment to trigger and sustain economic growth.



South Africa needs prosperous neighbours, both because ‘paupers make poor neighbours’ and because prosperous neighbours will be more valuable trading partners and will attract additional foreign investment to the region.



None of this will happen without security and stability. Fixed capital investment does not flow to insecure, unstable regions.



South Africa is the only country in the region that has the economic, financial and industrial base to develop and sustain regional military capacity.



If South Africa abdicates its regional security roles, either nothing will be done to ensure security and stability, or an outside power will step in to fill the vacuum. Such intervention may not be altruistic in nature.

In this respect it is worth noting that when President Mbeki outlined his MAP concept at Davos, he identified “creating peace, security and stability, and democratic governance, without which it would be impossible to engage in meaningful economic activity” as a priority. That “peace, security and stability” will neither come about by itself, nor will it be maintained merely by the goodwill of some or even most parties.

The region will face a range of security and stability threats over the medium term. While there is little likelihood of armed conflict between the countries of the region, there are security problems internal to the region and adjacent to it that will affect it:

The civil war in Angola is unlikely to be brought to a lasting conclusion in the near-term, and is likely to spill over increasingly into Namibia and Zambia.



The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is unlikely to be brought to a lasting conclusion in the medium term, and is likely to increasingly spill over into Zambia and Tanzania.



Political tensions in Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania (Zanzibar) and Zimbabwe could lead to more serious security threats. There is also the tension between Botswana and Namibia over the water of the Kavango River system.



There are several security problems outside the immediate region that, while they will have no immediate impact, cannot safely be entirely ignored. They include the precarious position of Kenya, virtually surrounded by conflicts and failed states; the lingering danger of renewed civil war in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville); the civil war in Burundi and the continuing insurgencies in Rwanda and Uganda, the latter also intermeshed with the civil war in the Sudan; and the potential for serious internal conflict in Nigeria and its potential to spill over into neighbouring countries.



There are present and growing paramilitary threats in the region that cannot safely be ignored: organised large-scale banditry in several countries and across some borders; coastal piracy in Angolan, Tanzanian and Kenyan waters; gun and narcotics smuggling.


There is no reason to assume that the region will not be affected by terrorism in one or other form.



There is no reason to assume that ethnic strife such as that plaguing Rwanda and Burundi, the Ituri region of the DRC, and the Kamanjor regions of Kenya and Uganda, will not also break out elsewhere in the region.

Crisis response forces

There is therefore a clear requirement for South Africa to develop and maintain an effective crisis response capability. That capability must include:

an intelligence system capable of providing prompt and accurate early warning of an impending crisis, of monitoring events effectively as the situation develops, and of evaluating likely responses by other powers



special forces capable of conducting both quick response reconnaissance to add detail to early warning information provided by intelligence sources, sustained surveillance and monitoring operations, and strategic interdiction and strike operations



an effective security decision-making system



forces organised, equipped and trained for crisis response operations, and the assets required to deploy, support and sustain them.

Autonomous capability

While the preference must clearly be for operations conducted in co-operation with other countries and under the auspices of international bodies, there is a requirement for autonomous capability. Circumstances will arise that demand a prompt and effective response to prevent a tense situation developing into a crisis, or to prevent an existing crisis taking on more dangerous proportions, or suddenly spilling over into a neighbouring country. South Africa, as the regional power, must be able to provide at least the initial response autonomously. There will not always be time to wait for the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU) to take a decision, or even to assemble a fully representative Southern African Development Community (SADC) force. South Africa’s crisis response forces must therefore have the strength, balance, flexibility and mobility to respond independently to a sudden emergency in the region or along its periphery. Mobility here also refers to the necessary airlift and sealift to deploy the force and to sustain its initial operations.

Co-operative capability

When there is no overriding need for an autonomous response, South Africa should seek to act jointly with other SADC and African states, and to draw support from the major powers. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) must therefore ensure that its crisis response forces are trained and equipped to co-operate effectively and efficiently with other forces.

Specific issues that must be addressed in this respect will include ensuring communications inter-operability and the development of a liaison system to allow different operational, tactical and logistic doctrines and systems to mesh to best effect and with the minimum of confusion and friction.

Among the SADC countries, that would be best addressed by a small standing joint planning staff, perhaps developed from the secretariat of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). As regards other countries, the task would best fall to the defence attachés, working with small study teams to establish initial guidelines that can then be kept updated by the attaché office.

The Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs should also co-operate to maintain a current assessment of who is likely to assist in a given situation, what form their assistance is most likely to take, and how it can be utilised most efficiently.

Missions

The type of crisis response operations that the SANDF may be required to conduct, will include the full range of disaster and emergency relief operations, plus:

conflict prevention operations, including ‘show of force’ deployments



conflict containment operations, to prevent or limit cross-border conflict spill-over



peacekeeping operations



peace-enforcement operations



limited security operations in unstable areas



law enforcement assistance in the wake of a crisis



hostage rescue operations



embassy relief operations



anti-bandit operations in support of local forces



coastal anti-piracy operations in support of local forces



constabulary operations in support of local forces against illegal fishing, gun and narcotics smuggling and similar problems



general assistance in the wake of a violent upheaval or natural disaster

Crisis response forces: force design and force levels

Conflict prevention, conflict containment, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations all require a strong, well-equipped force that can be deployed quickly. Too weak or ill-equipped a force, or too slow a deployment, will bring a real risk of failure. That applies equally to the early entry, follow-on and sustained operations forces.

The forces designed to handle those missions will effectively also be able to deal with most other types of crisis response operations.

Early-entry force

In the Southern African context, the minimum early-entry force level is probably a reinforced parachute or marine battalion group, deployed within 48 hours. That would typically comprise:

four paratroop or marine companies



the battalion support company (mortars, anti-tank, heavy machinegun, sniper, assault pioneer elements)



one light armoured car squadron



sufficient light armoured personnel carriers (APCs) for at least one paratroop or marine company



one battery of long-range light artillery (for example, the Visarend or the new 105mm G7)



one light air defence battery



one field engineer squadron



supporting medical elements.

Follow-on force

The follow-on force will similarly have to be of sufficient strength to be impressive and effective, and will also have to be deployed swiftly. The latter both to retain momentum and to allow the early withdrawal and refreshment of the early-entry force, to ensure that it is available for any quick-response operation that may arise, and to conduct a hot extraction operation should that become necessary.

The minimum strength for the follow-on force is probably a light mechanised battalion group with air-transportable vehicles and equipment or a light motorised battalion group, both with additional attached heavy weapons and other support elements, as may be dictated by the particular operation. The selection will depend on the location and situation.

Sustained operations force

The sustained operations force must be deployed as quickly as is commensurate with the particular situation. It will in most cases have to be at brigade or brigade-group strength if it is to be effective, and will need both helicopter and fixed-wing air support. In coastal areas it may also need coastal sealift, inshore patrol and naval gunfire support. This force would ideally be a SADC force rather than an SANDF-only force, but would be largely dependent on the SANDF for most operational and logistic support functions.

Deployment capability

These forces will only be effective if they are supported by adequate airlift and sealift assets. The deployment capability that will be required can be set out as being air and/or sealift able to:

move the early-entry force by air or sea to a crisis zone swiftly, and then deploy it within 48 hours



deliver and insert the follow-on force within a further 96 hours, to ensure force security and to enable the commencement of operations



rapidly withdraw the early-entry force once the follow-on force is in place, so that it can be refreshed and placed back on stand-by



sustain the deployment of a force up to brigade group strength, including the rotation of force elements



conduct a hot extraction if the occasion arises, with the covering force probably being a reinforced parachute or marine battalion group.

Air-landed operations

Air-landed operations will be a critical aspect of many or even most crisis response operations. Given the size of the theatre of operations, an adequately swift response to a crisis will often only be possible using air transport to deploy at least the early-entry force and the follow-on force. Such an air-landed operation may require an initial parachute landing to secure an airport for the intervention force, followed by tactical or logistic air-landing of other force elements.

Airborne operations headquarters

Air-landed operations are extremely complex and present many challenges not encountered in other operations. If the SANDF is to be able to conduct such operations effectively at short notice and with minimum risk, it is essential that a specific headquarters be established for this role, and that it be tasked with contingency planning and frequently exercised. This headquarters will have to include both Army and Air Force elements. The basis for such a headquarters exists in the staff of the former 44 Parachute Brigade, some of whose officers are still in the Army and could help reconstitute this capability. The current notion that any Army brigade headquarters can plan and conduct an airborne operation is fallacious to the point of being dangerous. This headquarters would function as a contingency planning and mission execution arm of the Chief of Joint Operations.

Airborne brigade

The core of the air-landed forces, and especially any parachute forces, should be permanently assigned to this headquarters. This will ensure the availability of a cohesive force able to deploy swiftly at short notice to conduct an effective operation. The current notion of ad hoc groupings will not meet this standard. The ideal route would, in fact, be to reconstitute 44 Parachute Brigade, but to do so as an airborne brigade including more heavily equipped non-parachute elements that can quickly be flown into an airhead seized by paratroops. The minimum force will be a parachute battalion group and an air-landed battalion group with some armoured vehicles. They should be backed up by reserve units that can be placed on stand-by when the regular units are deployed, thereby ensuring a continued rapid response capability.

The airlift requirement for a typical air-landed crisis response operation has been calculated (by the staff of the former 44 Parachute Brigade) as being 20 medium-heavy aircraft (C-130 Hercules and/or C-160 Transall) available on the day. The deployment of heavier force elements will have to follow at a slower rate and will have to include the use of chartered transport aircraft and/or sealift. The requirement to have 20 aircraft available on the day, suggests a minimum force of 24 aircraft of this type. The decision to dispose of the existing nine C-160s therefore presents a major problem, in that it leaves the SANDF without even the minimum airlift required for the effective deployment of a crisis response force. The South African Air Force’s (SAAF’s) ability to extract an endangered force is now also in grave doubt.

There is therefore clear need for an interim plan to restore the airlift capacity lost with the C-160s. Longer-term planning should include provision to replace the C-130s and the C-160s with the new European A-400, which offers the best combination of airlift capability and affordability. Despite the A-400’s greater lift capacity when compared to the C-130 and C-160, the numbers should ideally not be reduced, as there is inherent flexibility and fail-safe security in the number of aircraft available, not just in their capacity. The minimum force would probably be 20 aircraft, depending on the type of equipment acquired for the crisis response forces. It is important to bear in mind that these aircraft will be invaluable for deploying emergency personnel, equipment and supplies during non-military disaster and emergency relief operations, such as during the recent floods in Mozambique.

Most air-landed operations will require an airborne command post that can control the situation until the main command post is firmly established on the ground. An airborne command post will also be essential during a hot extraction operation. This aircraft, and perhaps a relief aircraft, will be required over and above the transport aircraft required to deploy the force.

Sea-landed operations

With many of the wider region’s capitals and other important towns being near the sea, and given the difficulty of moving heavy equipment by air, sealift will be a critical force capability.

Many crisis response operations will, in fact, ideally involve a combination of air-landed and sea-landed force elements for the early-entry and follow-on deployment, with air transport thereafter handling the supply of critical items and most personnel, while sealift is used to bring up the sustained deployment force and heavy equipment, and to provide routine logistic support.

The emphasis in the sealift capability will be on sea-landed operations rather than on amphibious assault. It is unlikely that South Africa would ever commit itself to an amphibious assault operation or, indeed, have the overall force capability to conduct such an operation. That said, the sealift capability will need to be structured to allow the conduct of:

company group strength beach-landed operations to take a harbour from the shore side to secure it for the insertion of the main force;



company group strength short-duration amphibious raids as part of a wider crisis response operation;



over-the-beach logistic landing of larger force elements in situations where a harbour cannot be secured intact in time; and



over-the-beach hot extraction of a covering force of parachute or marine battalion group strength.

The regional role of South Africa and the SANDF will also require the ability to deploy force elements in support of local forces conducting various security operations in the inshore area. That could require amphibious and related capability to conduct:

inshore patrol operations combined with amphibious raids;



over-the-beach insertion of patrol and blocking forces;



over-the-beach supply of deployed ground forces; and



deployment of small logistic support bases for inshore patrol and raiding forces. These bases might be deployed ashore, over-the-beach or through a small port, alongside/in a small harbour, or moored offshore.

Amphibious operations and sealift ships will also be of inestimable value in disaster relief and emergency relief operations. In addition to their cargo carrying, hospital and fresh water provision capability, their landing craft, boats and helicopters will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of rescue operations as well as the distribution of emergency supplies.
The minimum sealift capability for South Africa in its regional security role, could be provided by a sealift force comprising:

two landing ships similar to the Singapore Navy’s new Endurance class, but built with an extended helicopter hanger for four Oryx, six light helicopters, or two Oryx and four light helicopters. The primary mission of these ships will be to transport, land and logistically support a marine infantry battalion group or a light mechanised or motorised infantry battalion group. For some missions these ships might deploy with two or four Rooivalk;



the SAS Outeniqua, with the primary role of heavy vehicle and cargo transport;



the SAS Drakensberg, with the primary role of command ship, hospital ship, and at sea replenishment of accompanying smaller vessels. She might also be used to carry out the heliborne insertion of an advance force to gain control of a harbour from shore. That would require taking the risk of carrying two additional Oryx, spotted on the flight deck and the forward landing spot, to ensure the swift insertion of that force;



two patrol corvettes to escort the main body, insert reconnaissance parties, and to provide naval gunfire support and air defence; and



mine-countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) and other smaller vessels as required by the particular operation.

The assumption is that there will always be three of the four large ships available on the day. In the interim, a useful sealift capability does exist with just SAS Outeniqua and SAS Drakensberg, assuming that both ships will be available on the day, and assuming further that the Navy can overcome current objections to carrying troops aboard those two vessels. The assumption that the troops will be flown in and be waiting in the harbour to unload the vehicles and cargo is not a safe one. The efficiency of such an operation would be enhanced if the SA Agulhas were to be seconded from the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism to the Navy, as an additional support ship.

Looking to the long-term, the Navy will need to acquire at least two dedicated sealift ships. These could be based on the Endurance class or, preferably, on the Royal Australian Navy’s concept of a ‘multi-role auxiliary’ (MRA) with full flight deck, hanger deck, docking well and Ro-Ro ramps. Assuming that the latter route is chosen, two additional ships of the same type could then replace both SAS Outeniqua and SAS Drakensberg in the longer term. An alternative force mix might be two of the smaller Endurance class to be acquired first, followed by two of the larger MRA type to replace Drakensberg and Outeniqua. Either combination would give South Africa a flexible amphibious/sealift/afloat support/ disaster relief capability. Ships of this type would, for instance, have been of immense value as mobile bases for helicopters and landing craft during the recent floods in Mozambique.

Harbour operation

There is no guarantee that there will be a secure and functioning harbour available when and where it is needed. The Navy should therefore also consider forming a harbour operating detachment that can be deployed to operate a harbour through which a crisis response force is to deploy and be sustained. The personnel for this detachment could be drawn from among those staffing the Navy’s existing bases, supplemented with reservists who could either deploy with the detachment or replace regular personnel in their normal appointments for the duration of the deployment. A detachment of this type would also be able to assist with the re-opening of a harbour after a natural disaster.

South African Navy marine branch

The Navy should further consider establishing a small marine branch to handle the very specialised and highly demanding role of amphibious raids and larger-scale beach-landing operations. Even where the main force will be landed through a harbour, there may often be a requirement to conduct a smaller over-the-beach operation to secure that harbour. Operations of that nature are best handled by Marines rather than Army infantrymen. The members of this marine branch would be naval personnel first and foremost, with the training to conduct small over-the-beach infantry operations. Their training in infantry tactics, weapons and equipment would logically be handled by the Army after they have completed basic naval training. This branch would also operate the Navy’s landing craft and riverine craft.

Army marine infantry

The Army, in turn, will have to ensure that it has at least one battalion group which has vehicles and equipment that will allow optimum use of the available sealift (smaller, lighter vehicles with all equipment corrosion protected) and that is trained for sea-landed operations. This battalion group should be backed up by a reserve unit trained and equipped for this role. These units could logically be designated as marine infantry battalion groups.

Amphibious operations headquarters

Sea-landed operations of all types are highly complex and fraught with possibilities of unforeseen developments that disrupt the planned execution. They are best conducted by a headquarters that specialises in this role. As is the case with air-landed operations, the SANDF should establish a small specialist brigade-level headquarters to focus on sea-landed operations. This should be an Army headquarters designed to conduct ground operations once the force is landed, but must include a Navy staff to ensure properly co-ordinated planning and execution.

These headquarters would function as the contingency planning and mission execution arm of the Chief of Joint Operations.

Marine infantry brigade

The core of the sea-landed forces should be permanently assigned to this headquarters. This will ensure the availability of a cohesive force able to deploy swiftly at short notice to conduct an effective operation. The current notion of ad hoc groupings will not meet this standard. This brigade might comprise a South African Navy (SAN) Marine Battalion, tasked with tactical over-the-beach raids and landings and to serve as the early-entry force; a full-time Marine infantry battalion group with light armour and artillery, to provide the follow-on force; and a reserve Marine infantry battalion group. Logically it might also include a landing craft operating unit.

River and lake operations

The SANDF is also likely to be called on to conduct river and lake operations as part of a wider crisis-response operation. Such operations will be similar to – but more risky than – inshore patrol and amphibious raid operations. They will require specialised craft designed for delivery by air – to get to the lake or river – as well as highly trained personnel and helicopter support.

These operations will best be conducted by elements of a Marine branch of the Navy, which will be more used to routine boat operations and the ‘beach’ landings that lake and river operations will entail, than would Army engineer personnel.

The boats for these operations should be designed to facilitate deployment by cargo aircraft, perhaps partly dismantled, and some smaller boats should be of a size to allow deployment by means of sling-loading under an Oryx. As with much other equipment intended for the military crisis response role, these boats would also be of considerable value during coastal and inland flood relief operations.

Air support for crisis response operations

Given the size of the theatre of operations and the relatively small forces available, air support will be an essential element of most crisis response operations. Helicopters, both transport and combat support will be a key element of almost any crisis response operation. Transport aircraft, too, will always be a key element of the logistic support of the deployed forces. Depending on the particular operation, the air support needed could also include reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and fighters.

Reconnaissance and surveillance

Reconnaissance aircraft will be essential to provide both aerial photographs of the proposed landing zone or beachhead and the surrounding area for the insertion of the early-entry force, and to provide routine surveillance of key roads, border crossings and similar objectives, as well as tactical reconnaissance support for specific operations.

Apart from the classic photo- reconnaissance requirement, which today will include missions with side-looking radar and infra-red scanners, there will also be a requirement for an airborne communications intelligence capability. In some cases where there is large-scale movement of weapons, supplies and perhaps even troops by air, there will also be a need for an airborne radar capability. It must be stressed here that these capabilities will not be needed at the technological levels required in a major theatre of war, but at levels that are affordable, as epitomised by the equipment selected by Brazil for its Amazon Basin surveillance system.

The SAAF has an imagery reconnaissance capability with the Cheetah C, which will be transferred to the Gripen, and has a good operational level electronic/communications intelligence capability in the Boeing 707s. It does not have an adequate airborne radar capability, and does need some smaller electronic surveillance aircraft.

Unmanned aerial vehicles

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be essential to a small force to enable it to conduct effective short-notice tactical surveillance and reconnaissance. They will also be valuable for communications relay role. In some cases high-altitude/high-endurance UAVs could also be employed instead of manned reconnaissance or surveillance aircraft.

The SANDF has access to the well-proven Seeker UAV system, and could push ahead with further development of the Lark, Skua and Vulture systems to provide a range of complementary capabilities at relatively limited cost.

Fighters

In some situations the crisis response force may require fighter support, be it for air space control and air defence, or for interdiction or strike missions. This requires a fighter type that is suited to operations from an ‘austere’ base, with minimal demands on technical support. The Mirage F-1AZ would have been excellent for this role. The Gripen will be very well suited, while the Cheetah C is too demanding of ground support to be well suited to this role, leaving the SAAF with a medium-term capability gap.

In some situations the actual deployment of the crisis response force will only be possible given a fighter escort and/or a preparatory air strike and follow-on ground attack in support of the force until it can establish itself. This will require fighters that can be refueled in flight and tanker aircraft to support them. The Cheetah C and the Gripen can both be used in this role, the latter more efficiently. The Boeing 707s can continue to fill the tanker role for some time to come, although a slightly larger tanker force would be valuable.

Helicopters

Given the size of the theatre and the relatively small forces available, helicopters will be an essential element of any deployed force, whether air-landed or sea-landed.

Attack helicopters such as the Rooivalk will be able to provide quick-response close-air support even before an airport can be secured, in bad weather that hampers fixed-wing air operations, and in all cases to forward deployed elements.

Transport helicopters such as the Oryx will, particularly when operating as a team with attack helicopters, enable a small force to focus combat power effectively and efficiently to pre-empt situations that could lead to the overall situation deteriorating. The value of transport helicopters in the trooping, logistic and casualty evacuation roles will also be considerable.

Depending on the distance involved in the initial deployment, it may be necessary to deploy helicopters by means of transport aircraft. Self-deployment is possible, given the very good range performance of both the Rooivalk and the Oryx, but presents technical and security challenges. Transport by cargo aircraft ensures that the aircraft arrive quickly and in a good mechanical state. That will, of course, impose an additional burden on the transport force. An important aspect here is the state in which the helicopters can be transported: the less time and equipment needed to restore them to flying status on unloading, the better. In this respect it is worth noting that an Oryx can be flying within four hours of being unloaded from a C-160 Transall, but that it will take some 24 hours and a considerable amount of equipment to restore it to flying status after transport in a C-130 Hercules. The acquisition of A-400s to replace the C-130s in the medium- to long-term will alleviate this problem.

Shipborne helicopter operations

Helicopters will be a key element of the overall sealift capability. Helicopters will be able to deploy a harbour seizure force swiftly, and speed up the landing of the troops and light weapons and equipment of a raiding or landing force, thereby also freeing landing craft for the landing of heavy weapons, equipment and vehicles.

Helicopters will be essential to a coastal hot extraction operation.

Helicopters will allow deep penetration raid operations to be launched from the sea in support of a wider crisis response operation, and will also be a critical element in hostage rescue and embassy relief operations. The excellent range performance of the Oryx will offer interesting capability in this respect. The value of shipborne helicopters in search and rescue and disaster relief operations is also immense.

Shipborne attack helicopters (Rooivalk) will be able to provide valuable close combat air support to ground forces during sea-landed operations, which the SAAF’s fighter force will in many instances be precluded from doing by distance.

|In respect of shipborne helicopter operations generally, it is worth stressing that any helicopter-capable ship that deploys to African waters must carry two helicopters. That will give vastly greater tactical flexibility in its general operations, but will also be tactically essential to an effective hostage rescue or embassy relief operation. The exception would be where a patrol corvette is specifically tasked to carry a single Oryx for a particular long-range insertion or extraction operation.

The Navy should also look into the potential of long-range/high-endurance UAVs for the littoral operations role. While a through-deck ship would be needed to operate a system such as the Seeker, the long-range/high-endurance variant of the Army’s new Vulture UAV should be adaptable for operations from the two support ships if not from the patrol corvettes, which would, however, be able to operate the Lark. This reconnaissance capability will be invaluable in ensuring that an over-the-beach operation does not encounter unexpected opposition inland from the beach.

Summing up

South Africa’s regional security responsibilities will require the SANDF to conduct a range of crisis response operations. Most of these operations will require an air-landed or sea-landed force, if only for the early-entry and follow-on phases. The SANDF will have to undertake certain organisational and acquisition measures to develop the necessary capability.

Crisis response force (CRF) headquarters

It is essential that the SANDF establish joint headquarters focused on those mission types, to carry out contingency planning, to develop suitable force designs for such operations and the related equipment requirements, and to command such operations when they arise. This is not a function that can be left to just any headquarters: both types of operation are highly complex and fraught with risk. They demand specialist attention at all stages, from force design through execution and the analysis of lessons learned. These headquarters should function as contingency planning and mission execution arms of the Chief of Joint Operations.

Interim structure – CRF Brigade

This requirement will be best met in the interim by establishing a brigade-level joint headquarters reporting directly to the Chief of Joint Operations, much as does the Special Forces Brigade, and having two joint planning/command staffs, one Army–SAAF and one Army–SAN. There will, of course, have to be South African Military Health Service representatives on those staffs.

This headquarters should have under permanent command one parachute battalion group, one marine battalion group (Navy), one air-landed infantry battalion group, and one marine infantry battalion group (Army). It would ideally also include one light-mechanised battalion group to provide an integral heavier follow-on force that can be deployed by air (albeit slowly) or sea. There should also be a reserve battalion group for each of those roles, also falling under the command of this headquarters. This structure would give the SANDF an effective interim crisis response force able to conduct most likely early-entry and follow-on operations.

CRF division

In the longer term this organisation should be divided into two brigades under the control of a small division-level joint staff, in turn reporting to the Chief of Joint Operations. This division would then form the SANDF crisis response force, with key elements under command and others earmarked for employment as needed.

Army measures

The Army will not need to form new units for the interim brigade-level crisis response force, but can re-role existing units. The specialised equipment requirement will also not be large in the interim, as most needs can be met with equipment that is already on hand. One exception is the need for a light armoured car, as the Army intends to discard the remaining Eland-90s. When new equipment is needed, it will be in relatively small numbers and will not have a major impact on the defence budget. The expanded division-level force will also not require new units to be formed, as there are enough units that can be re-roled. Additional equipment will, however, then need to be acquired. This will include small numbers of air-transportable armoured vehicles and artillery, as well as some air-transportable logistic vehicles and support equipment.

Air Force measures

The SAAF will have to reconsider its long-term equipment plans to ensure that it can provide the necessary airlift and support. Were it not for the disposal of the nine C-160 Transalls, the core of the airlift capacity would already be on hand. As it is, there is need for an additional 12 C-130 or C-160 aircraft in the medium term. The long-term planning might be for a force of 16 to 24 A-400s to replace both the C-130 and the C-160. These aircraft will also, of course, be of great value in a wide range of disaster and emergency operations. Depending on the strategic appreciation, the SAAF might also have to consider bringing the Mirage F-1AZ back into service to bridge the deployable fighter gap until the Gripen is fully operational. Alternatively, attention must be paid to making the Cheetah C more readily deployable and supportable. The SAAF should also consider expanding the planned Rooivalk force to at least 20 aircraft, to be able to deploy an effective component with a crisis response force without putting the viability of the overall Rooivalk force at risk in the event of losses. These measures will have a real impact on the defence budget, unless the disposal of the C-160s can be reversed and the aircraft restored to service at a reasonable cost.

Navy measures

The SAN will have to acquire a new generation of landing craft, including a small number of medium landing craft suited to landing vehicles in the 10-ton range. It will also need to examine the requirements of lake and riverine operations. Neither of these acquisitions need be very costly. In the long term the SAN will have to acquire at least two ships capable of conducting sea-landed operations, and should consider a multi-role ship to replace SAS Drakensberg and SAS Outeniqua when that time comes. A combination of two small amphibious operations ships and two large multi-role ships would give South Africa a sealift capability adequate for most likely crisis response and other emergency operations.

Conclusion

Regional security and stability is essential to the economic future of South Africa, and only South Africa has the economic strength to provide the core of a regional crisis response capability for the SADC region. The development of an effective crisis response capability is therefore in South Africa’s direct interest.

The SANDF as it is structured and equipped today, is not capable of effective crisis response operations. There is a clear need to establish specific headquarters to handle contingency planning, to command these potentially very complex operations, and to permanently assign operating units to this role.

There is the further need to acquire some additional equipment to enable the SANDF to perform this role effectively.

An effective interim crisis response capability can be developed quickly at affordable cost, and can then be expanded to a more effective level over time. That expansion will not require any major increase in SANDF strength or funding.

If South Africa does not develop the necessary crisis response capability, it will not be able to take on its regional security responsibilities. No other country in the region has the economic base to fill that vacuum. The stability of the region will then remain hostage to the willingness of outside powers to intervene in African affairs.