Burundi: Downhill?

On 28 August 2000, Burundi appeared to be on the brink of peace when most political parties signed a peace agreement in Arusha. Less than a year later, however, an escalation of the conflict seems to be inevitable. Outstanding issues with regard to the peace agreement include the structure and composition of the new defence and security forces, including the integration of rebel forces and the modalities for a cease-fire. The most serious flaws in the peace negotiations have been the exclusion of the two main rebel forces, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), from the first two years of the negotiation process, and the signing of the agreement without a cease-fire. These flaws have now returned to haunt the process.

	Other factors impacting on the security situation include the stagnation of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between the (FLC) and Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebels and the allied forces, continued support to the FDD by Joseph Kabila, the belief among the Burundian rebels that they are strong enough to overthrow the Buyoya government militarily, and the fear of the disarmament of rebels in the DRC and in Tanzanian refugee camps. It has been reported that Burundi rebel groups are moving from the eastern DRC via Lake Tanganyika to central, western and southern Burundi and from Tanzania to the eastern provinces. The rebels have even been active in northern Burundi along the N1 national road. In another development, rebel movement from the Rutana and Makamba provinces in the south and into Tanzania, was reported in early June. Possible explanations for this movement could include flight from the Burundian army’s mopping up exercises, or moving to their bases for new supplies.

The Burundian refugees in Tanzania have become a major problem for Burundi and Tanzania. According to the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were approximately 328 000 Burundian refugees housed in 11 camps in western Tanzania in December 2000. The figure increased by 40 000 in January 2001. More worrying, the Tanzanian government estimates that an additional 470 000 unassisted Burundian refugees are living in settlements and Tanzanian villages. The Burundian government has alleged that the Tanzanian government is supporting the rebels. Tanzania has denied the allegations and the tension between the two countries has reached such a level that President Mkapa of Tanzania threatened to send the refugees back to Burundi. The threats were later withdrawn.

As the situation in Burundi continues to deteriorate, the likelihood grows of Rwandan intervention in Burundi to ensure the safety of its northern border. Other possible outcomes include crossborder strikes by the Burundian army on selected refugee camps where rebels are believed to be present, or even the forcible repatriation of refugees by the rebels to provide safe areas in Burundi. Clashes between Burundian and Tanzanian army units along the border are also possible.

Although political developments remain crucial, the most pressing problem at present is the security situation. Actions to reduce the tension should concentrate on stabilising the security situation in the country and preventing total chaos. This could include low-profile, high-level negotiations between the Burundian government and the rebel groups in an effort to foster trust, the deployment of a neutral force on the Burundi/Tanzania border to prevent rebels from entering Burundi, the control of activities and the movement of men in the refugee camps by the UNHCR, the monitoring and reporting of FDD and FNL movement and activities in the eastern DRC by the UNOrganisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the Joint Military Command to the parties involved in the DRC conflict, and international pressure on President Kabila to cease support to the rebels.

If the security situation in Burundi is not stabilised, it will lead to an increase in refugees and internally displaced people in the region and the spillover of the Central African conflict to parts of East Africa that have been relatively peaceful up till now. — HdB

Progress in Sudanese peace efforts, or déjà vu?

The announcement in early July by most of the parties involved in the Sudanese conflict that they accept the joint Egypt-Libya initiative for a comprehensive solution to the country’s conflict, has been welcomed internationally. It has led to speculation that a breakthrough is imminent in Sudan’s 18-year civil war. Long-term Sudan watchers, however, are cautioning that this is less of a breakthrough than it initially appeared, and that the situation in the country is still far too fluid. There is also a fear that this is little more than another part of the Sudanese government’s charm offensive, and that its actions on the ground belie any talk of peace.

On 5 July 2001, the Sudanese government announced its unconditional acceptance of a revised Egypt-Libya peace initiative. This came hard on the heels of a similar acceptance by the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which groups northern opposition parties together with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Umma Party of former premier al-Sadiq al-Sadiq al-Mahdi also signalled its acceptance of the plan.

The joint Egypt-Libya initiative consists of nine points:

The unity of Sudan should be preserved.



Citizenship should be the basis for exercising rights and duties.



There must be a recognition of the racial, religious and cultural diversity of Sudan.



A new constitution and system of government should safeguard the principle of democratic pluralism and freedom of expression, and separation of legislative, judicial and executive powers.



There should be guarantees for basic freedoms and observance of human rights.



A decentralised system of government must be established that will achieve balanced development and a just distribution of wealth and power.



Sudanese foreign policy should observe higher national interests.



An interim government should be formed that includes all political forces. This interim government will oversee the implementation of all the points laid out in the political agreement, as well as the organisation and convening of a national conference to revise the constitution and set a date for national elections.



There should be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

However, the political situation in the country is extremely unsettled at present and, even if all those who stated their acceptance of the agreement were sincere, there is a question over whether they could sell it to all their followers.

The SPLM/A, as the major party representing the south, is not surprisingly the most equivocal in its acceptance of the initiative. It has listed a number of concerns with the initiative which suggest that the peace process has not advanced very far. Chief among them is the fact that the joint initiative does not include any reference to the issue of self-determination for the south or separation of state and religion, its two main demands in the rival Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation process. Its position reflects divisions within the south and within the SPLM/A itself. The vast majority of southerners have reached a point where they cannot see any advantages in remaining united with the north in one country, and are pushing for secession. The leadership of the SPLM/A, especially leader John Garang, is still in favour of unity, but this position is increasingly rejected by southerners themselves, and self-determination is seen as a compromise position leading to eventual secession. The initiative’s insistence on Sudanese unity is partly a result of Egypt’s interest in the Nile waters, and of northern desire to continue benefiting from the oil and mineral wealth of the south.

	The SPLM/A is under increasing pressure in the south, and there is a growing belief among southerners that it is not interested in ending the war. A southern people’s peace conference was held in the Kenyan town of Kisumu two weeks before the revised joint initiative was announced. The SPLM/A did not attend, and even went so far to prevent some of its members both inside Sudan and in neighbouring countries from attending. This approach came under severe criticism from southerners attending the conference, who described the SPLM/A’s actions as a "crime against humanity." The Kisumu conference also reaffirmed the position that self-determination is the central demand of their struggle. The SPLM/A thus finds itself in a position where it is increasingly at odds with its constituency.

This divergence between the SPLM/A and its followers was, ironically, further highlighted by the military campaigns it launched in May/June. In late May, the SPLA Bahr al-Ghazal divisions launched an attack on government forces in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, taking Raga and a number of other towns, and inflicting serious losses on government troops. As a result, the government controlled only the two garrison towns of Wau and Aweil in Bahr al-Ghazal by July 2001. Wau has since come under attack from the SPLA. However, this offensive was at odds with SPLA military strategy, which is presided over by John Garang. For the last few years, SPLA strategy has focused on moving the theatre of war out of the south and into the north, hence much of its ability has been focused on areas in central and eastern Sudan, largely within what is considered northern Sudan. This has led to much criticism from within the SPLA itself, that southern troops are sent northwards and thus prevented from protecting southern civilians from government and Arab militia attack. It has been rumoured that the SPLA Bahr al-Ghazal forces planned and executed its recent offensive against the wishes of the SPLA military high command, which was presented with a fait accompli after the offensive began, and was then forced to sanction it. If the SPLA does succeed in taking all of Bahr al-Ghazal, it will be difficult to move these troops to other theatres of war.

The northern parties, including the government, are also reported to be divided by the initiative. Islamists are concerned that there is no reference to Islamic Shar’ia law in the plan, and fear the abrogation of Islamic principles. It was this fear that led to the military/Islamic coup d’êtat in 1989, and there are fears that history could repeat itself. Of far greater concern to the government and northern sectarian parties is the possibility that the initiative would lead to a ‘one Sudan, two systems’ approach, which would also threaten its sustainability. If the south was to be given rights and certain exemptions from Shar’ia not available to the north, this could create further tensions in the north that could undermine any settlement, as happened with the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. There are also concerns that the role of the military, which led the 1989 coup, in a future settlement is not clear.

It is also not clear how strong the government’s commitment is to peace. Over the past 12 years, since coming to power, it has shown a remarkable willingness to talk, without actually committing itself to implement any peace measures. It accepted the IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1997, which accepted the principles of self-determination for the south as well as separation of state and religion. Yet, it has since managed to stall this process, while simultaneously escalating the war in the oil areas of the south. The government is now in the midst of a major investment drive in its oil industry, having sold concessions not just in the border areas between north and south (where current exploration is located), but throughout the south as far as the Ugandan border. There are justifiable fears that its acceptance of the latest initiative is merely designed to buy time while it further divides the south and exploits its oil reserves.

The joint Egypt-Libya initiative is an advance on previous efforts. It is more inclusive than the rival IGAD initiative, which is limited to the government and the SPLM/A. Importantly, it includes Egypt, a major player in the Sudan, without whose support peace cannot be guaranteed. However, the IGAD initiative did achieve an important milestone when the Sudanese government accepted the IGAD Declaration of Principles. Since then, of course, it has made no other steps towards peace. The fear is that the Egypt-Libya initiative could suffer the same fate as the IGAD process. — FL

Central African Republic Retribution, reconciliation, reconstruction?

Early in the morning of 28 May, a group of soldiers launched an attack in the Central African Republic (CAR) on the residence of President Ange-Felix Patassé. Similar assaults were mounted on the national radio station and the headquarters of the presidential guard. These were beaten off eventually, but not without considerable loss of life on both sides. Government claims that it had routed the insurgents proved premature, and it was only after Libyan aircraft brought in three plane-loads of troops from Libya and Chad and the rebel Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba sent reinforcements across the Ubangui river that the insurrection was aborted. Libya’s intervention drew attention to the increasingly strong ties between Bangui and Tripoli, while Bemba drew sharp protest from Kinshasa, which had long suspected Bangui’s role as a supply line to its northern adversary.

	Although the timing of the coup attempt itself came as a surprise, there had been indications for some time that the CAR’s fragile polity was in difficulty. The political history of the CAR since independence has been particularly troubled, reaching the height of absurdity as the Central African Empire under the crazed and murderous rule of Bokassa, an administration in which Patassé himself had served as sometime prime minister. From the time of independence until the election of Patassé to the presidency in 1993, the country’s heads of state had all been southerners. From 1981 until 1993, when General André Kolingba of the minority Yakoma people ruled, the loyalty of the army was ensured by recruiting heavily from among his own people. Because of Yakoma’s relatively long exposure to French rule, they were in any event dominant in the civil service and commerce.

When assuming power in 1993, Patassé sought to alter this balance of military power, replacing most of the presidential guard with northerners. This attempt to restructure the armed forces helped precipitate a series of mutinies in 1996 and 1997, which pitched the riverine soldiers of the south against their northern counterparts. French intervention brought the initial mutinies to a halt, but Paris refused to carry the responsibility of keeping the peace alone and began a staged withdrawal from the CAR. For a while it continued to provide logistic support for a UN military presence drawn almost exclusively from African states, but withdrew this support in February 2000, leaving behind only a small observer and advisory mission. The mission was to monitor the security situation and advise on further military reform. However, it lacked the means to exert significant pressure on the recalcitrant militias operating on the fringes of a thoroughly politicised military, of whom many feared retrenchment in an economy where unemployment was the norm. Thus, military reform continued at a snail’s pace, hampered both by the lack of political will to disband forces loyal to the president, and a want of resources to pay the arrears due to discharged soldiers.

The reduction of official French support for the CAR government and the reluctance of the international community to take up the role of arbiter and donor left a vacuum that revealed the impotence of the stunted institutions of Bangui. Foreign interest was certainly evident, but this was confined principally to private entrepreneurs who connived with local power brokers to exploit the state’s resources for personal gain at the expense of further eroding the government’s meagre fiscal base. Although this prompted the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to insist on structural reforms, such expectations were often lacking in political sensitivity, given the government’s situation vis-à-vis its soldiers and administrators alike.

With regard to arrears in salaries, public officials were in far worse shape than their uniformed counterparts. By September 2000, some salaries were as much as 30 months in arrears. By the end of 2000, this situation was the focal point of opposition to the government, as unions and political parties mounted a series of protests, demonstrations and strikes, some of which became extremely violent.

Towards the end of January 2001, the United Nations Security Council expressed growing concern with the situation, especially in Bangui itself, and decided to extend the mandate of its observer mission to the end of 2001. France also renewed military ties with the CAR, albeit on a far more modest basis than prior to 1997.

Former President Kolingba has admitted being the instigator of the latest insurrection, casting himself in the role of a would-be national saviour. Realising that his plan had failed, he offered to negotiate, a gesture brusquely rebuffed by President Patassé, who has also indicated that Kolingba’s party may be permanently dissolved. At this point, matters can go in two directions. Patassé may attempt to finish off his troublesome rival once and for all. There have been alarming reports of summary executions of people suspected of rebellion and of persecution of the Yakoma group that has led to the flight of tens of thousands from the southern suburbs of the capital. Alternatively, he may heed the urgent advice of the UN Secretary-General and finally commit himself to earnest negotiations, long promised, with his political opponents with a view to construct a viable political system in a country where most people do their level best to avoid contact with the apparatus of the state.

	Towards the end of June, Prime Minister Ziguélé made an appeal for assistance to revive the economy and repair the damage caused by the abortive coup. He put forward a figure of US $75 million for a "minimum plan of action for social and economic recovery," a request endorsed by the UN Secretary-General at the beginning of July. As Kofi Annan made clear in his report to the Security Council on 2 July, the events of the previous two months had revealed the continuing precariousness of the situation despite the efforts of the international community over the past five years. Not only was extra support needed to assist in the restructuring of the armed forces of the CAR, he said, but urgent efforts were required to ease the financial difficulties of the state so that the socio-economic tensions in the capital could be addressed. Without such international support, he argued, there could be little hope of erecting the political and administrative structures that would permit the introduction or acceptance of a system based upon dialogue, consultation, tolerance and consensus. In other words, barring sustained engagement on the part of the international community, the CAR is likely to remain entrapped in a cycle of endemic political violence fed by, and in turn feeding into, other conflicts in the Central African region.

Though the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s report, there must be considerable doubt that the UN’s wealthiest members will accord the CAR adequate priority, even in the unlikely event of its government undertaking "appropriate structural reforms" as advised by the world body. In such a case, Bangui will remain firmly within the periphery of Tripoli’s sphere of influence, increasingly dependent upon the whims and bounty of the ‘Brother Leader’. — RC

Zimbabwe

Food for thought

Ever since the beginning of the so-called ‘fast-track approach to land resettlement’, there have been any number of expert voices warning of the dangers this posed to the economic future of Zimbabwe. These either went unheeded or were ridiculed by the powers that be. Indeed, the government has recently decided to identify even more commercial farms for acquisition. It should be obvious that such an assault on the principle of the security of private property - exacerbated as it was when the ‘war veterans’ broadened their front to include urban businesses - would completely undermine the confidence of external investors. So close are the linkages of commercial farming to other sectors of the economy that the effects, in terms of the closure of firms and the operation of others on short time, were quite predictable.

It has also been apparent for some time now that, sooner or later, Zimbabwe would start to feel the effects of the invasions of productive commercial farms in terms of its domestic food supply. A recent report by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Programme has produced a comprehensive and alarming picture of what lies ahead. Based on this analysis, the future will hold a fairly imminent shrinkage of the national economy, perhaps ultimately to about a half its current size. Since some 60% of Zimbabweans are already living in conditions of poverty, the desperate means to which the rest will have recourse can only be imagined. Many commercial farmers are no longer able or willing to obtain the credit necessary to plant this year’s crop. The banks are already dangerously over-exposed in terms of farm mortgages and have no desire to throw good money after bad. All the evidence suggests a much reduced planting of maize, wheat and tobacco, with dire consequences for the availability of foreign exchange, and thus fuel and other vital imports. Nor could the smallholder sector be expected to make up the shortfall in the annual grain harvest, as its potential had been undercut by the six-month delays in payment from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), a parastatal mired in debt. By the time the GMB came forward with payment for smallholder produce, much of the latter had been reduced in quality to stockfeed. Smallholders were thus paid too little and too late to buy inputs in a market subject to massive inflation. The plight of those who had been moved onto newly acquired land revealed the stark difference between land allocation and viable resettlement, for they lacked the means to undertake any but the most rudimentary planting.

For some months, the minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, Joseph Made, and other government spokespersons had denied opposition claims that the nation faced grave food shortages in the near future. In a sharp reversal early in July, Made and Dr Simba Makoni announced that there was indeed a looming shortfall in staple foodstuffs and that emergency measures were being implemented to address the situation. Now, all too late, the government has established an interministerial task force to ‘ensure food security’ and advise the GMB on ways to streamline its operations so that it may effectively manage grain reserves in line with projected shortages. Maize, wheat and wheat flour have been declared controlled products in which only the GMB may deal.

In a number of measures suggesting panic, the GMB has begun raiding its own silos where privately owned maize is stored, paying only 75% of the market price in compensation. The current strategic grain reserve holds some 290 000 tonnes of maize, and Made has ordered that this should be increased to 900 000 tonnes. The crop forecast for 2001 is 1 470 000 tonnes as opposed to 2 150 000 last year, which leaves a shortfall of some 500 000 tonnes if reserves are to be replenished, and of at least 200 000 at a bare minimum. Since the whole Southern African region experienced a decline of 22% on the harvest of 2000, it appears that the United States and Brazil may be the most likely sources for essential imports.

The initial shocks are expected in the area of wheat, where the prediction for the current harvest is down to 200 000 tonnes from 280 000 last season. Changing consumption patterns over the past 20 years have made bread a staple food for many urban dwellers and, though opinions in the milling industry differ, there are some who anticipate that shortages will be a reality by August 2001. Even if the millers manage to acquire sufficient grain to meet demand already reduced by falling living standards, prices will continue to move upwards at an increasing rate, threatening shortages based on cost alone. As it stands, Zimbabwe is expected to need an importation of at least 200 000 tonnes of wheat this year.

Not only is Zimbabwe failing to service its foreign debt, but its balance of payment position has moved well beyond the simply precarious, given its inability to access support from the Bretton Woods institutions. Efforts to shore up the exchange rate by fiat have pushed businesses to the wall and discouraged those still able to export, simply forcing most purchasers of hard currency into the parallel markets: the unit continues to trade officially at Z$55 to the US dollar, but at up to Z$250 on the parallel market. It is on this market that the government will have to raise most of the funding that will be needed for grain imports, yet no provision has been made for any such expenditure in the budget.

Nor is the food deficit expected to hit all areas of the country equally. The urban population and those in the southern and eastern areas will be the hardest hit, the latter because of adverse weather patterns in the last crop season. This would have implied the need to redistribute food stocks even discounting an absolute deficit, an operation fraught with difficulty given the country’s fuel shortage.

There is an acute awareness of the danger that food aid could easily be diverted to serve the needs of political patronage, and that those areas revealed as opposition strongholds will be left at the mercy of the elements. There are indications that the issue of new ZANU-PF membership cards may be related to this stratagem. The Movement for Democratic Change, which has long advocated the need for international aid, has called upon donors that food aid should be distributed independently of government or ruling party agencies. How the government and the donors will deal with this problem, which implicitly identifies the government’s own policies as the root of the food crisis, remains to be seen. — RC